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This dissertation reviews the Kingdom of Yugoslavia’s attempt to instill “Yugoslav” 
national consciousness in its overseas population of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, as well as 
resistance to that same project, collectively referred to as a “Yugoslav diaspora.” Diaspora is 
treated as constructed phenomenon based on a transnational network between individuals and 
organizations, both emigrant and otherwise. In examining Yugoslav overseas nation-building, 
this dissertation is interested in the mechanics of diasporic networks—what catalyzes their 
formation, what are the roles of international organizations, and how are they influenced by the 
political context in the host country. The life of Louis Adamic, who was a central figure within 
this emerging network, provides a framework for this monograph, which begins with his arrival 
in the United States in 1914 and ends with his death in 1951.  
 Each chapter spans roughly five to ten years. Chapter One (1914-1924) deals with the 
initial encounter between Yugoslav diplomats and emigrants. Chapter Two (1924-1929) covers 
the beginnings of Yugoslav overseas nation-building. Chapter Three (1929-1934) covers 
Yugoslavia’s shift into a royal dictatorship and the corresponding effect on its emigration policy. 
Chapter Four (1929-1939) deals exclusively with political parties from Yugoslavia that aspired 
to organize overseas Yugoslav subjects. Chapter Five (1934-1941) deals with Yugoslav overseas 
nation building and cultural outreach after King Alexander’s death. Chapter Six (1941-1945) 
covers the formation of a Yugoslav diaspora organization, the United Committee of South Slavic 
Americans, during the Second World War. Lastly, Chapter Seven (1945-1951) covers the 
disintegration of the Yugoslav diaspora in Cold War Era America.  
This dissertation draws five major conclusions. First, there was, for a period in history, a 
“Yugoslav” diaspora rather than just a Serb, Croat, and Slovene diaspora. Secondly, this diaspora 




emerged due to factors specific to interwar America: closed border policies, America’s 
reputation as a “melting pot,” and the cultural pluralist movement, all of which had a centripetal 
effect on Serb, Croat, and Slovene organizations and gave them a reason to cooperate. Third, the 
Yugoslav nationalism espoused by these organizations was distinct from Yugoslavism in 
Yugoslavia, exhibiting syncretism with the nationalism of the host country, the United States. 
Fourth, old-country tourism—and travelers more broadly—are crucial to the formation of 
diasporic networks, (re)awakening national consciousness and giving the traveler symbolic 
capital within emigrant organizations. And fifth, the strength of diasporic networks lies not in 
























This project would not have turned out as it did without the contributions of a host of people. 
First, I would like to thank my academic advisor, Maria Todorova, who has provided me with support and 
guidance every step of the way. Not only did she read and provide feedback on chapter drafts, her own 
“transnational network” helped connect me with people in this acknowledgements section that I would 
not have met otherwise. I would also like to thank the members of my dissertation committee, Diane 
Koenker, Peter Fritzsche, and Ulf Brunnbauer, for pushing me out of my box as an Eastern-Europeanist to 
see Yugoslav history as a subset of global history. I am also grateful for their kindness and flexibility in 
agreeing to be on my committee despite their own dispersion around the globe.  
In addition, I am grateful to everyone who has given me comments at conferences, including, but 
not limited to: Miha Zobec, Nikolina Židek, Marie Štěpánová, and Ana Toroš. Thanks as well to Lidija 
Nikočević for inviting me on an “anthropological expedition.” I am also grateful to my parents, David and 
Deborah Larson, who read my early drafts and were a constant source of encouragement. I would also 
like to thank all the members of the University of Illinois Eastern European Reading Group: Stefan 
Djordjević, Stefan Peychev, Peter Wright, Agata Chmiel, Damir Vučićević, Liridona Veliu, Pelin Tiglay, 
Noyan Coskun, and others for reading my drafts, minding my č's and ć's, and making sure King 
Alexander I of Yugoslavia remained dead after 1934. Special thanks as well to Damir for showing me his 
collection of Louis Adamic memorabilia that (for now) exceeds my own.   
In addition, I am grateful to Dubravka Stojanović and Mirjana Pavlović at the Serbian Academy 
of Arts and Sciences for their perspectives on the historiographical literature, as well as for their 
generosity in giving me some of it. Apropos of books that are difficult to obtain, I am also indebted to 
Interlibrary Loan for tolerating both my requests for esoteric books and my tendency to return them 
several months overdue. I would also like to thank the archivists at the Archive of Yugoslavia, Croatian 
State Archives, Immigration History Research Center, Hoover Institution, and NARA for their assistance 
locating various primary sources. In addition, I would like to express my deepest gratitude to those 




archivists—you know who you are—who handwaved away the daily photography fees. Lastly, I am 
indebted to Marina Filipović, without whose instruction in Bosno-Serbo-Croatian none of this would have 
been possible.  
























TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................................................ 1 
CHAPTER ONE: THE NEW ‘OLD COUNTRY’ ..................................................................................... 30 
CHAPTER TWO: ANSWERING THE ‘EMIGRATION QUESTION’ .................................................... 78 
CHAPTER THREE: THE DICTATORSHIP AND THE ‘TENTH BANOVINA’ ................................. 125 
CHAPTER FOUR: YUGOSLAV POLITICAL PARTIES AND THE ‘TENTH                     
BANOVINA’ ............................................................................................................................................ 178 
CHAPTER FIVE: ON THEIR OWN: YUGOSLAV CULTURAL POLITICS FROM 1934-1941 ........ 249 
CHAPTER SIX: YUGOSLAVS UNITE!: THE SECOND WORLD WAR                                            
AND THE YUGOSLAV DIASPORA ..................................................................................................... 307 
CHAPTER SEVEN: THE YUGOSLAV DIASPORA DISINTEGRATES ............................................. 365 
BIBLIOGRAPHY ..................................................................................................................................... 407 
















In April 2017, while in Buenos Aires for a conference, I, along with two sociologists 
from Croatia, attended an event organized by the Union of Croats in Argentina. My Croatian 
companions referred to this, tongue-in-cheek, as “an anthropological expedition,” as if we were 
going to observe the customs of a remote uncontacted tribe rather than my colleagues’ co-
nationals. The reason for their witticism soon became apparent, as it turned out that the morning 
and afternoon’s entertainment were the 76th anniversary celebrations of the founding of the 
Independent State of Croatia (NDH), a genocidal fascist state established in 1941 after the Nazis 
invaded and dismembered Yugoslavia. Following a Catholic Mass held in a nearby chapel, a 
flag-waving procession, and speeches in a nearby ethnic club in Croatian and Spanish 
condemning Yugoslavia (a state that has been defunct since 1992), we listened to a choir of 
around fifteen youths in Croatian folk costume singing folk songs. Afterwards, the adults 
communed in the back for plum brandy and gossip. In the program I saw advertisements for 
Croatian language schools, bars, radio stations, and podiatrists. At the time, I was struck by the 
banality of the event—less a fascist rally than a high school concert. 
The banality of fascism is hardly a fresh observation.1 But my companion’s quip— “an 
anthropological expedition”—was more than a witticism; it hinted at a deeper insight. After all, 
the kind of diaspora nationalism there was foreign to all of us: to me, because I was an 
American, and to my Croatian colleagues because Argentina’s Croats had a reputation of being 
further to the right than Croats in Croatia. Argentina, after all, was where Ante Pavelić, the 
leader of the NDH, fled in 1948. There, Pavelić founded the Croatian Liberation Movement, the 
grandfather of several far-right groups that carried out several acts of terrorism in the 1960s and 
 
1 Hannah Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem: A report on the banality of evil (New York: Penguin Books, 1964). 




1970s, causing communist authorities to start referring to the “enemy Yugoslav migration.”2 The 
relationship between Yugoslavia and “its” diaspora was not always thus. Traces of a forgotten 
period of Yugoslav activism can still be found in the United States today: two sculptures by Ivan 
Meštrović in Grant Park, Chicago, a “Yugoslav Room” in the Cathedral of Learning in 
Pittsburgh, and a “Yugoslav garden” in Cleveland, to name a few examples. And in Buenos 
Aires, in 1918 and 1941, the Yugoslav National Defense was one of several emigrant 
organizations calling for a unified Yugoslav State. Still, there was a reason Pavelić went to 
Argentina—during the interwar period, Buenos Aires was a major hub of Ustaša activity, both 
publishing and recruitment. Aside from being a gibe about Buenos Aires, however, my 
companions’ witticism—“an anthropological expedition”— suggested that diaspora nationalism 
was not simply homeland nationalism transposed abroad, but a distinctive phenomenon that 
ought to be studied and explained in its own right. How is diaspora nationalism different from 
“regular” nationalism and what makes it so? 
Diaspora Nationalism: A Review of the Literature 
Much like the study of regular nationalism, the study of diaspora nationalism owes a debt 
to Benedict Anderson, who coined the term “Long-distance Nationalism” in a lecture in 1992, 
helping to popularize a growing field of study. For Anderson, “Long-distance Nationalism” was 
a side-effect of international capitalism and technology in the twentieth century. Since the 1930s, 
the accelerating improvement of travel, from steamships to commercial airliners, along with 
advancements in telecommunications, from radio to the internet, has made it ever easier for 
migrants to maintain sentimental and political ties with their country of origin. Although 
Anderson concedes that it would “be a mistake to assume that long-distance nationalism is 
 
2 Francesco Ragazzi, Governing Diasporas in International Relations (New York: Routledge, 2017), 59-69. 




necessarily extremist,” citing the benign effect of migrant remittances, Anderson’s assessment of 
long-distance nationalism was pessimistic, calling it a “menacing portent for the future.”3 Long-
distance nationalists, Anderson argues, are insulated from the consequences of their political 
demands by geography, which encourages a certain irresponsibility.4 Writing in the early 
nineties, Anderson could observe firsthand how long distance nationalists were fanning conflicts 
in the Caucasus and Sri Lanka. The breakup of Yugoslavia loomed especially large for 
Anderson, who cites several examples of diaspora meddling, including the ill-fated Yugoslav 
premiership of the Serbian-American Milan Panić or the Canadian pizza restauranteur Gojko 
Šušak, who bankrolled the election of the Croatian far-right politician Franjo Tudjmann, later 
serving as Tudjmann’s minister of defense.5 In part, this monograph is a reaction to this negative 
portrayal, to show how long-distance nationalism helped develop the Yugoslav idea, fifty years 
before it contributed to its destruction, that diaspora nationalists could pour oil on troubled 
waters instead of igniting the powder keg.   
Of course, Anderson was not the only scholar to observe the increasing salience of 
diaspora nationalism in the modern world, nor even the first. One year earlier, Khachig Tölölyan 
had founded the journal Diaspora, arguing that, over the last few decades, a cartography of 
sovereign and bounded nations was being undermined by the forces of globalization and an 
increasingly-mobile population, which he called “our transnational moment.” Like Anderson, 
Tölölyan identified the proliferation of diaspora national movements in the twentieth century, 
even if the phenomenon of “diaspora” could be dated back centuries or even millennia. 
Nonetheless, transnationalism, Tölölyan argued, meant less the end of nations-states and more a 
 
3 Benedict Anderson, “Long-Distance Nationalism” in The Spectre of Comparisons (New York: Verso, 1998), 74.  
4 Ibid. 
5 Ibid, 71-74. 




transformation in which national communities were imagined, calling on new studies that would 
document these new diaspora movements.6 Unlike Anderson, Tölölyan hesitated to pronounce a 
verdict on whether diaspora nationalism was malign or benign. 
Since the founding of Diaspora, the numbers of studies of diasporas have ballooned. And 
with this growth, as Rogers Brubaker documents, the meanings of the term “diaspora” have also 
stretched. Although the original meanings of “diaspora” were built around “classical” 
diasporas—Greeks, Jews, and Armenians—since the 1980s the meaning of “diaspora” has 
evolved to encompass any group of people living abroad who maintain political and economic 
ties to their original homeland. This includes both economic and political migrants, so long as 
they constitute a population, defined by religion, culture, or subculture that is somehow dispersed 
in space, oriented toward a real or imagined homeland, and separate from the general population 
through self-maintained cultural boundaries.7 The latter two characteristics make diaspora a 
category of practice—maintaining ties with the homeland along with the culture of that 
homeland requires work. But what percent of a population needs to be engaged in such activities 
for them to count as a diaspora? Gabriel Sheffer distinguishes between “core,” “marginal,” and 
“dormant” or “silent” members of diasporas, a framework borrowed by several other scholars of 
diaspora.8 It is uncontroversial to claim that, even in several universally-acknowledged 
“diasporas,” such as the Jewish, Chinese, Armenian, or Greek diasporas, only a small percentage 
of the population is engaged in the “work” of diaspora, of running organizations, fostering 
cultural retention, and maintaining ties with the homeland. Of course, this is no less true for 
 
6 Khachig Tölölyan, “The Nation-State and Its Others,” Diaspora 1, no. 1 (1991):3-7. 
7 Rogers Brubaker, “The ‘Diaspora’ Diaspora,” Ethnic and Racial Studies 28, no. 1 (2005): 1-6. 
8 Gabriel Sheffer, Diaspora Politics: At Home Abroad (New York: Cambridge UP, 2003), 100. See also: Yossi Shain, 
Marketing the American Creed Abroad: Diasporas in the US and their Homelands (New York: Cambridge UP, 
1999),11 




regular nationalism—as Michael Billig has argued, most people devote little time or conscious 
thought to their national identity, save in times of crisis, when “banal nationalism” evolves into 
conscious patriotism or even jingoism.9 It would be unfair to hold “diaspora nationalism” to a 
different standard. 
  Nonetheless, the low level of participation for “diaspora nationalism” has led one scholar 
of the “Croatian diaspora,” Francesco Ragazzi, to provocatively claim that “there is no such 
thing as diaspora.”  Rather, Ragazzi argues, diaspora is a speech act—someone, typically a 
representative of a diaspora civil society organization, or of the host or sending country, claims 
to speak on behalf of an imagined community of overseas nationals.10 Several scholars have 
echoed this point. Brubaker, for instance, characterizes diaspora as a political “claim” or a 
“category of practice,”11 as does Zlatko Skrbiš12 and Øivind Fuglerud.13  A related approach, 
proposed by Peggy Levitt and Nina Glick-Schiller, involves treating diaspora as “social field,” 
multiple interlocking networks of relationships that act as conduits for ideas, practices, and 
resources. Political movements, on which Brubaker, Skrbiš, and Fuglerud focused, are one type 
of network, but they are by no means the only kind. Levitt and Glick-Schiller identify 
remittances, family ties, and the dual-citizenship practices of sending states as other kinds 
networks.14 Tsypylma Darieva has identified travel and leisure as another such transnational 
 
9 Michael Billig, Banal Nationalism (London: Sage, 1995).  
10 Francesco Ragazzi, Governing Diasporas in International Relations: The Transnational Politics of Croatia and 
Former Yugoslavia (New York: Routledge, 2017), 7-9. 
11 Brubaker, “The ‘Diaspora’ Diaspora,” 12 
12 Zlatko Skrbiš, Long Distance Nationalism: Diasporas, Homelands, and Identities (Brookfield: Ashgate, 1999) 4-5. 
13 Øivind Fuglerud, Life on the Outside: The Tamil Diaspora and Long-Distance Nationalism (London: Pluto Press, 
1999), 9. 
14 Nina Glick-Schiller and Peggy Levitt, “Conceptualizing Simultaneity: A transnational social field perspective on 
society,” International Migration Review 36, no. 3 (2004): 1002-1039. 




practice as well,15 one that might, this dissertation argues, even be the most powerful in creating 
diaspora nationalists and stitching together movements.  
Treating diaspora as practice and/or as network also dovetails with theories of “regular” 
nationalism that sidestep the question of “identity” to look at nationalism as practice.16 Treating 
nationalism as identity introduces two problems. First, it is impractical to prove that everyone in 
a “nation” thinks themselves a member of a nation, which is only doable through interviews or 
surveys, data which usually not available in historical cases. And secondly, identity-based 
theories of nationalism may ignore the existence of multiple identities—regional, professional, 
and so on, among which the national identity may not even be the most important. This is this is 
especially true for migrants, as a recurrent theme of the historiography on emigrant nationalism 
is ”hybridity.” Yossi Shain, for instance, argues that diaspora lobbies in the United States, while 
maintaining an interest in homeland affairs, have worked to export “American values” such as 
democracy and pluralism to their homelands.17 On the other hand, as Tara Zahra argues, diaspora 
“hybridity” may be in the eye of the beholder—nationalizing states, seeking to exert authority 
over “their” population,  often identify “national indifference” as a symptom for which better 
national indoctrination is a cure.18  
Nonetheless, it seems clear that when explaining the character of diaspora nationalism, 
one needs to consider both the host and the sending country. Rogers Brubaker, for instance, 
proposes a triadic model to think about the relationships between diaspora nationalists, the host 
 
15 Tsypylma Darieva, “Between Long-Distance Nationalism and ‘rooted’ cosmopolitanism? Armenian-American 
Engagement with their Homeland,” in Ulrike Ziemer and Sean Robers, East European Diasporas, Migration, and 
Cosmopolitianism (New York: Routledge, 2013). 
16 See, e.g. John Breuilly, Nationalism and the State (Manchester: Manchester UP, 1982); E. J. Hobsbawm, Nations 
and Nationalism since 1780: Program, Myth, Reality (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1990). 
17 Shain, Marketing the American Creed Abroad. 
18 Tara Zahra, “Imagined Noncommunities: National Indifference as a Category of Analysis,” Slavic Review 69, no. 1: 
93-119. 




country, and homeland nationalists. Basing his conclusions on the case study of Russians living 
outside the Russian Federation in the former Soviet Union, Brubaker observed that host 
countries, newly nationalizing states like Estonia or Finland, often discriminate against or try to 
assimilate their Russian minorities. This, in turn, brings them into conflict with the second 
member of the triad, homeland nation nationalists, who seek to defend these embattled 
minorities, insofar as this is compatible with the national interest, and using them to rally support 
for a domestic nationalist agenda. This limited and instrumental commitment, in turn, creates 
tension with the third member of the triad, the national minority, which seeks to preserve their 
cultural distinctiveness and political rights.19 Although originally intended to describe the post-
1991 political situation in Eastern Europe, Brubaker’s model has proven adaptable to other 
places and times, forming the implicit framework to many studies of diaspora nationalism, 
including my own. Yet Brubaker’s triadic model, runs the risk of what Andreas Wimmer and 
Nina Schiller term “methodological nationalism.” By methodological nationalism, Wimmer and 
Schiller have three methodological sins in mind. The first is teleology—assuming, in a world of 
nation-states, that nation-states are both natural and inevitable, weakening explanations of 
success with the presumption of destiny.20 Studying Yugoslavia, a nation-state most now treat as 
artificial and doomed, at least circumvents Serbian, Croatian, or Slovene methodological 
nationalism.  
A second path to methodological nationalism is limiting the bounds of inquiry—which 
archives one visits, which organizations or phenomenon one studies, to the boundaries of the 
 
19 Rogers Brubaker, Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the national question in the new Europe (Cambridge: 
Cambridge UP, 1996), 405. 
20 Andreas Wimmer and Nina Glick Schiller, “Methodological Nationalism and Beyond: Nation-State building, 
migration, and the social sciences” Global Networks 2, no. 4, (2002): 304. 




nation-state.21 A good example of this would be writing a political history of interwar 
Yugoslavia, as Ivo Banac does, but only looking at the activities of Yugoslav politicians when 
they are inside Yugoslavia.22 This monograph also avoids this pitfall by extending its bounds of 
inquiry as far afield as Western Europe and North and South America. Yugoslav’s politics, as 
this dissertation will show, were not so neatly bounded, as political parties from Yugoslavia 
constituted a political force abroad on par with the agents of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. Despite 
the aesthetic and numerological appeal of the trinity, it would be better to amend Brubaker’s 
triad to a tetrad. This monograph is not the first to propose such a revision—David Smith, for 
instance, based on his work on post-Soviet Estonia, has likewise argued for a “quadratic nexus.” 
International organizations, he argues, contribute to shaping diasporic identity politics in Eastern 
Europe. However, the kinds of international organizations he refers to—NATO, the EU, the 
OSCE, and the Council of Europe—are starkly different from transnational parties in terms of 
their resources, agenda, and structure. The EU and its associated institutions of transnational 
governance typically pressure the host country to respect minority rights—they do not attempt to 
stoke diaspora nationalism or raise money to support various causes in the EU.23 Despite these 
differences, transnational parties, along with international organizations like the Comintern and 
the Catholic Church, likewise shaped the organizational development of the Yugoslav diaspora. 
This, in turn, suggests that quadradic nexus is a valid methodological model for the diasporic 
politics even before the era of globalization in the 1990s.  
Interwar Yugoslavia was much more affected by global currents than historians typically 
assume. For this reason, my study of the “tenth banovina” will supplement the work of historians 
 
21 Ibid, 307. 
22 Ivo Banac, The National Question in Yugoslavia (Ithaca, Cornell UP, 1984). 
23 David Smith, “Framing the National Question in Central and Eastern Europe: A Quadratic Nexus?,” The Global 
Review of Ethnopolitics 2, no. 1 (2002):3-16.  




of Yugoslavia. Andrew Wachtel, Sabrina Ramet, Pieter Troch, and Dejan Djokić, have 
discussed, for instance, the Kingdom of Yugoslavia’s effort to propagate Yugoslav unity among 
its subjects.24 Additionally, Ivo Banac has an excellent overview of Yugoslav interwar political 
parties that remains unparalleled, despite being three decades old.25 Nonetheless, each 
monograph’s examination of interwar Yugoslavia’s society, culture, and political problems stop 
at Yugoslavia’s borders. As a result, the picture these works present of Yugoslavia is incomplete, 
as Yugoslavia’s borders are not coterminous with the population that it desired to influence and 
control. On the contrary, as this dissertation will argue, the diaspora functioned, in effect, as the 
antechamber of Yugoslav politics and society. Programs to create good Yugoslavs in 
Yugoslavia, for instance, such as the law on holidays, were also implemented in the diaspora. 
Likewise, Yugoslav politicians regularly traveled to the tenth banovina to raise support, 
especially after the ban on political activity in Yugoslavia in 1929.  For that reason, this 
monograph will be a useful supplement to anyone interested in interwar Yugoslavia, as it 
enriches our understanding not just of Yugoslav political parties, but also on the development of 
the Yugoslav idea and its viability. 
Used incautiously, Brubaker’s treatment of the diaspora as an actor with an agenda may 
lead to oversimplification. After all, the third risk of “methodological nationalism” is to assume 
that the national minority is politically homogenous, ignoring divisions based on class, gender, 
region, or politics26—some of which are fostered by diaspora political parties. Indeed, diasporas 
 
24 Andrew Wachtel, Making a Nation, Breaking a Nation: Literature of Cultural Politics of Yugoslavia (Stanford: 
Stanford UP, 1998); Sabrina Ramet, The Three Yugoslavias: State-building and legitimation 1918-2005 
(Washington: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2006); Dejan Djokić, ed., Yugoslavism: Histories of a Failed Idea 1918-
1992 (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2003); Pieter Troch, Nationalism and Yugoslavia: Education, 
Yugoslavism, and the Balkans before World War II (London: I.B. Tauris, 2015). 
25 Banac, The National Question in Yugoslavia. 
26 Andreas Wimmer and Nina Glick Schiller, “Methodological Nationalism and Beyond: Nation-State building, 
migration, and the social sciences” Global Networks 2, no. 4, (2002): 324. 




can have many internal divisions. As Nadejda Marinova documents in her study of the Iraqi 
diaspora, no émigré organization represents everybody: Sunni and Shia, Left and Right, Kurd 
and Arab. To take other examples, the “Lebanese diaspora” is split between Christians and 
Muslims, just as the “Cuban diaspora” is divided between anti-Castro political migrants and a 
newer generation of economic migrants.27 If these are treated and studied as “diasporas,” there is 
no reason why we should not look for a “Yugoslav diaspora,” or even several “Yugoslav 
diasporas,” even if this frame of inquiry may not always find one. By the same token, there is no 
reason a “Serbian diaspora” and a “Yugoslav diaspora” cannot both exist at different places and 
times. As will be shown in the upcoming chapters, the divisions between migrants from 
Yugoslavia—Serb, Croat, and Slovene, Left-wing and Right-wing, religious and secular, are no 
more severe than these examples. So long as there is as a trans-oceanic political network 
characterized by the integration and participation of Serbs, Croats, and Slovene organizations, 
that is large enough to represent plausibly, in the eyes of contemporaries,  represent the will of an 
imagined diasporic community, and that is mobilized in support of a common Yugoslav 
homeland, then we can speak of a  “Yugoslav Diaspora” as well. This dissertation examines how 
such a diaspora emerged, or rather, was made, during the interwar period.   
Similar studies already exist for other “diasporas.” Donna Gabaccia has written an 
enormously influential study of Italian emigration. Building on the theory of diaspora based 
around networks and practice rather than identity, Gabaccia argues that Italy had not one 
diaspora, but many, which were variously linked together by village origin, family, profession, 
class, or political ideology. Although professing agnosticism at the idea of a singular “Italian 
diaspora,” Gabaccia nonetheless argues that a transnational methodology, broadening the frame 
 
27 Nadejda Marinova, Ask What You Can Do for Your (New) Country: How Host States Use Diasporas (New York: 
Oxford UP, 2017)17-33. 




of inquiry beyond the confines of specific nation states to examine Italians around the world, can 
yield new insights not just into the sort of networks that make a diaspora, but also the formation 
of the Italian nation and the global labor movement.28 Particularly illuminating are Gabaccia’s 
fifth and sixth chapters, which cover Liberal Italy’s and  Mussolini’s attempts to make Italians 
abroad,29 contemporaries of a similar project in Yugoslavia. Liberal Italy’s nation-building 
project is covered in more detail in Mark Choate’s Emigrant Nation, which argues that the 
projects of “making Italians” at home and abroad were interrelated and mutually-reinforcing. 
Italian consuls claimed emigrants as an organic part of the Italian nation, including them in the 
census and supporting ethnic schools, churches, and patriotic societies in order to maintain 
Italian nationalism in the face of assimilative pressures. A loyal diaspora, in turn, could be a 
source not just of money, but technical expertise and national pride.30  
Although Italy pioneered this model of transnational nationhood, it was not the only state 
to do so. For instance, during the interwar period, Hungary fought attempts to assimilate 
Hungarians abroad by subsidizing language schools and forging relationships with diaspora 
political parties. Simultaneously, Hungary gathered demographic data on Hungarians living 
outside of Hungary, using this information both to formulate policy and for patriotic 
propaganda.31 Similar policies were pursued by Poland and Germany in the interwar period32  
 
28 Donna Gabaccia, Italy’s Many Diasporas (London: UCL Press, 2000). 
29 Ibid, 129-152.  
30 Mark Choate, Emigrant Nation: The Making of Italy Abroad (Cambridge: Harvard UP, 2008), 7-9. 
31 Myra Waterbury, Between State and Nation: Diaspora Politics and Kin-state Nationalism in Hungary (New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 34-5 
32 Donna Gabaccia, Dirk Hoerder, and Adam Walaszek, “Emigration and Nation Building During the Mass 
Migrations from Europe,” in Nancy Green and Francois Weil, eds. Citizenship and Those Who Leave (Urbana: 
University of Illinois Press, 2007), 77-79 




and at various times by China33 and Mexico,34 as well. Likewise, several states have even 
adopted similar language in referring to “its” diaspora. Haiti, like Yugoslavia, calls its overseas 
community its “tenth province,”35 just as the diaspora is the “fourth district” of Poland36 or the 
“fifteenth department” of El Salvador.37 So, Yugoslavia’s ambitions for “its” diaspora were 
hardly unique. Although one could argue that another study of overseas nation-building is 
superfluous, the Yugoslav case is special in one important respect: it failed. Unlike its 
contemporaries, the Kingdom of Yugoslavia neither forged a lasting emigrant “Yugoslav” 
identity or a loyal “Yugoslav” political diaspora, although a temporary “diaspora” did emerge 
whose Yugoslavism differed markedly from that of their titular homeland. Just as the best way to 
understand a bicycle is to fix it oneself when it breaks down, dysfunctional national projects can 
yield new insights into the inner workings of nationalism and national movements.  
There have, of course, been studies of the Serbian and the Croatian diaspora as well. 
George Prpić, a Croatian scholar who emigrated from the Independent State of Croatia following 
the German surrender in May, 1945,38 published a well-researched but tendentious history of the 
“Croatian diaspora” in 1971. Prpić’s decision to examine the “Croatian diaspora” in near-
complete isolation from the Serbian and Slovenian diaspora organizations should be a cautionary 
tale of the dangers of methodological nationalism. Restricting his frame of inquiry to purely-
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Croatian nationalists leads him, for instance, to focus his account of the interwar period on the 
Hrvatski Kolo (Croatian Circle), a small and relatively unimportant far-right organization, rather 
than the Croatian Fraternal Union, the largest Croatian organization which, inconveniently, had a 
substantial Yugoslavist following. The fact that in the 1930s the CFU also joined a federation of 
Yugoslav societies, alongside Serbian and Slovene organizations, goes completely unmentioned, 
just as the participation of the CFU in the United Committee of South Slavic Americans during 
World War II is spun as support for “Sovietization,” rather than Yugoslavism.39 Conversely, the 
fascistic Domobran movement receives very gentle treatment, with Prpić presenting it as a 
patriotic organization of Croatian emigrants, making no mention of its acts of violence, 
intimidation, and racketeering.40 Despite being rather dated, Prpić’s book continues to distort 
scholarship on this period and region. A chapter by Saša Božić on Croatian diaspora activism in 
an edited collection published in 2005 sources much of its information from Prpić, and as a result 
ignores Yugoslavist activism during the period, discussing, for instance, the support of the 
Croatian Fraternal Union for Tito while eliding the fact that the CFU was doing so as part of the 
United Council for South Slavic Americans, an organization with a Yugoslavist political 
program and the participation of Serbs and Slovenes.41 
We also see the effects of methodological nationalism in the work of Ivan Čizmić, a 
Croatian historian who published a history of the Croatian Fraternal Union in 1994, in the latter 
years of the Croatian war for Independence, a struggle in which the financial support of Croatian 
emigrants was instrumental. Marinating in a nationalistic discourse in which the “Croatian 
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diaspora” was held up as bulwark of Croatian nationhood, it is not surprising to find that Čizmić 
omits or glosses over the CFU’s relationships with Serbian and Slovene organizations during the 
interwar period, as well as support within the CFU for the Yugoslav idea.42 While “diaspora” is a 
significantly more popular subject of research in Croatia, methodological nationalism has also 
affected Serbian scholars. In Mirjana Pavlović’s Srbi u Čikagu, which was published in 1990, the 
author complains “how few works there are dedicated to Serbs in the United States…relevant 
information is contained only in works that are concerned with Yugoslav emigrants more 
generally or Croats in particular,” citing the works of Croatian scholars like Čizmić as recent 
examples of this tendency.43 Pavlović, in contrast, was concerned only with whether Serbs 
abroad “have preserved their ethnic identity,” identity being an expression of group cohesion 
maintained through institutions and symbols.44 While one might question now whether it made 
sense to examine Serbs in isolation from other south-Slavic groups, put in context it made more 
sense. At that time, the emblematic work on the “Yugoslav diaspora” was Ivo Smoljan’s Tito 
and the Emigrants (1984), which was just as, if not more, ideological than these nationalist 
histories. Focusing on the activities of emigrants during World War II in support of Tito, 
Smoljan’s work elides any evidence that would suggest that emigrants were anything other than 
fervent supporters of Tito and Yugoslavia. Smoljan is less interested in establishing how these 
movements came to be than transcribing emigrant praise of Tito. According to Smoljan, “Tito's 
new Yugoslavia not only germinated during the National Liberation War, but also on distant 
continents,” which is, I argue in my last chapter, greatly overstates the case.45 For scholars like 
Pavlović or Čizmić, then, focusing on just the Serbs or just the Croats was a way to rebel against 
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scholarly works produced over the previous decades that tried to use the existence of a 
“Yugoslav diaspora” for propaganda.  
This pattern has continued even after the Yugoslav wars have ended. Take, for instance, 
Mirjana Pavlović’s article, published in 1999, on how print media in Serbia used the figure of 
Mihajlo Pupin, a Serbian scientist in the United States during the interwar period, for national 
propaganda. Despite covering the interwar period, when Pupin was active in several Yugoslavist 
organizations, the word “Yugoslavia” is mentioned just once, the author elsewhere referring only 
to Pupin’s “patriotism” and loyalties to a homeland, without specifying whether this was to 
Serbia or Yugoslavia.46 One also finds scholars from the Western Balkans shying away from 
studies of South-Slavs in the United States, especially during the interwar period, choosing 
instead to focus on smaller, newer, and more nationalistic “colonies” in Europe, South America, 
or Oceania. In an edited collection by Saša Božić on the development of Croatian migrant 
institutions (churches, self-help societies, etc), not one chapter deals with the United States, 
which had the oldest and richest associations, focusing instead on emigrant communities in 
Western Europe, Chile, and Australia.47 The same holds true for another edited collection from 
2014 by Caroline Tomić et. al. Of the thirty chapters in this book, just three deal with Croatian 
communities in the United States, compared to twelve that address Croatian communities in 
Australia/New Zealand, Central Europe, or South America. And of those three that deal with the 
United States, none deal with the interwar period, when Croatian political life was deeply 
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intertwined with the Yugoslav movement.48 Marin Sopta’s 2012 monograph emblematizes this 
tendency as well, focusing only on Croatians in Canada, and only after 1945, even though 
Croatian migration to Canada began in the interwar period.49 As these examples show, what felt 
like liberation in the 1990s has now become an academic straitjacket. In conversations over 
coffee, several Serbian scholars, including Mirjana Pavlović, have expressed frustration with the 
continued academic pressure to tell the history of diaspora from a nationalist perspective—that 
they maintained their identity, resisted assimilation, and implicitly had nothing to do with 
Yugoslavism.  
 Outside the Western Balkans, on the other hand, scholarship on the emigrants from 
Yugoslavia has belonged more to the disciplines of political science, focusing on the emigrants’ 
connection to the Yugoslav wars of the 1990s50 or anthropology/sociology, studying 
contemporary migrant communities and looking at questions of transnationalism, identity, and 
the lived experiences of migrants.51 While there is nothing inherently wrong with these 
approaches, it is also clear that there is currently a shortage of historical studies of emigrants 
from Yugoslavia that are up to date on the theoretical developments in the study of nationalism 
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that have emerged since the 1980s and are disentangled from the nationalizing agendas of 
Yugoslavia and its successor states. 
This has begun to change, however, with the publication of an excellent study of 
Yugoslavia’s emigration policy, by Ulf Brunnbauer, in 2016. Looking at the period between the 
1860s to the 1960s, Brunnbauer argues that the history of migration from Southeastern Europe is 
also a history of social organization in this region. By his own admission, Brunnbauer is not 
interested in “diaspora nationalism,” but rather the second member of Brubaker’s “triad,” the 
sending country. Too often, Brunnbauer argues, migration histories adopt the perspective of the 
host country, analyzing the degrees to which migrants acculturate and contribute to their new 
homelands, rather than their old. In contrast, Brunnbauer’s explores the political, economic, and 
social effects of migration on the Western Balkans.52 As a result, for instance, when Brunnbauer 
covers the interwar Kingdom of Yugoslavia’s emigration policy, the focus is on what 
administrators in Belgrade and Zagreb thought about the emigration, the evolution of the 
bureaucratic legal apparatus to deal with the emigration, and triumphant reports to the foreign 
ministry from Yugoslav diplomats.53  
This approach, Brunnbauer concedes, has a major blind spot, in that Yugoslav diplomats 
had an incentive to deceive their superiors in Belgrade, and so it was difficult to determine the 
degree to which Yugoslavism had a following overseas.54 Based on his sources, Brunnbauer 
concludes that “the ‘Yugoslav’ diaspora mainly existed in the minds of Yugoslav policymakers” 
and that diaspora activism on behalf of Tito was a “temporary diaspora [that] emerged when the 
lives of family, kin, friends, and former neighbors were at risk” and that “the various Yugoslav 
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diaspora-building initiatives contributed to fertilizing the soil from whence a short-lived diaspora 
identity could grow after receiving an external impulse.”55 While largely correct, this is not the 
whole story. Instead, I would argue that the “Yugoslav diaspora” formed gradually and in 
opposition to the Yugoslav state and its nation-building efforts over the course of the interwar 
period, rather than suddenly as a result of those same efforts. Put succinctly, Yugoslav officials 
failed their way to success—a “Yugoslav diaspora,” albeit united by anti-monarchism and 
republicanism rather than reverence for the Karadjordjević dynasty.   
A Note on Sources 
These different conclusions are based on different sources. Although like Brunnbauer, the 
source-base of this monograph derives primarily from the state archives of Kingdom of 
Yugoslavia, this monograph relies on Yugoslav officials outside rather than inside Yugoslavia—
the diplomats, the metaphorical front line in Yugoslavia’s campaign to teach “its” overseas 
population to be good Yugoslavs. As sources, these diplomats have both advantages and 
disadvantages. On the one hand Yugoslav diplomats tend to refer to all leftists as “Communists” 
and all Croatian nationalists as “separatists,” and were prone to exaggerating their own 
successes. Taken with a grain of salt, however, diplomatic sources are still valuable. After all, 
unlike the higher-ups in Belgrade and Zagreb, Yugoslav diplomats worked directly with 
emigrant civil society organizations, such as fraternal unions, and knew many emigrant leaders 
personally. Although this is still a history “from above,” the meso- and micro-historical approach 
that these sources are conducive to dovetails with the predominant scholarly approach to 
diaspora, which is to examine transnational networks. With this source base, one can look at just 
who is networking with whom, the field of alliances, family bonds, friendships, and rivalries that 
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help weave migrants into a “diaspora.” Beyond illuminating the way “diaspora” works, this 
approach can also yield ancillary insights into far-right politics, far left politics, and the ways in 
which migrants become nationalists. Additionally, Yugoslav diplomats assiduously tracked the 
movements and activities of Yugoslav émigré politicians, an independent and unpredictable 
force in the relationship between homeland, host country, and diaspora.  
Although Yugoslav diplomats were hostile and suspicious of any critic of the regime, 
diplomatic sources nonetheless provide a good picture of the ever-evolving relationships 
between emigrant civil society, its leaders, their peccadillos, and the constant ebb and flow of 
factionalism and alliances. Moreover, I argue, Yugoslav diplomats were in large part responsible 
for designing Yugoslavia’s overseas nation-building project, turning vague directives into 
concrete actions, which not infrequently, they also funded. Diplomats, of course, are not the only 
sources used by this monograph, which required visiting archives on both sides of the Atlantic. 
The personal papers of prominent emigrant figures, as well as records from the FBI and OSS, 
help round out the biases inherent to official Yugoslav sources.  
Lastly, these sources are conducive to an approach that looks at Serbian, Croatian, and 
Slovene diaspora histories together, which, as I have argued, helps avoid methodological 
nationalism. Attentive observers will, however, notice several South Slavic groups missing from 
this framework. Up until Yugoslavia’s dissolution in the 1990s, “Yugoslavs” were not just Serbs, 
Croats, and Slovenes, but also Bosniaks, Montenegrins, and Macedonians. During the interwar 
period, however, none of these “nations” were considered as such by official sources—
Montenegrins and Bosnians were seen as Serbs and Croats, just as Macedonians were considered 
by official sources to be “southern Serbs” or, occasionally, Bulgarians. While there were 
Macedonian nationalist organizations in the United States, just as there were Serb, Croat, and 




Slovene organizations, neither the government nor Yugoslav diaspora organizations paid them 
any more attention than Czech or Ukrainian groups—they were Slavs, but not Yugoslavs. In Ivan 
Mladineo’s Narodni Adresar, a thousand-page directory of “Yugoslav” emigrant organizations 
in the United States compiled by an Croatian emigrant in 1937, there is not a single mention of 
any Macedonian organization of any type—no newspapers, fraternal unions, businesses, social 
clubs, or singing societies.56 
Explaining the Yugoslav state’s silence regarding Macedonian emigrant groups is 
straightforward—to treat these organizations as they treated Serb, Croat, and Slovene 
organizations would have been a tacit admission that Macedonians, were, like Serbs, Croats, and 
Slovenes, a distinct national group rather than a subset of Bulgarianized Serbs. This went against 
Yugoslav policy on the highest level. But why did Serb, Croat, and Slovene groups also ignore 
the Macedonians?  One possible explanation is language—the fact that Macedonians speak a 
different language from Serbo-Croatian made it difficult for Serbian and Croatian groups to 
network with the Macedonians. This is a weak explanation, however—speaking from 
experience, Macedonian is much more intelligible to a Serbo-Croatian speaker than Slovene. It 
seems more likely that the Macedonian emigrant groups did not mix much with Serb, Croat, and 
Slovene groups (except within the Communist Party) because their political goals did not align. 
The Macedonian Political Organization, for instance, favored a Bulgarian annexation of 
Macedonia rather than the preservation of Yugoslavia. What reason, then, would they have to 
cooperate with other South-Slavic organizations?  
Nonetheless, regardless of the reasons, this dissertation’s source base of diplomatic and 
intelligence sources and émigré periodicals renders Macedonian diaspora life nearly invisible. 
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Nonetheless, where possible, I have tried to identify the involvement of Macedonian and 
Montenegrin nationalists in the Yugoslav movement or in the opposition to it, but there is still 
less material than I would like.  
This source base also leads to a focus on South Slavs living in the United States 
specifically. In part, this is for reasons of demography. During the interwar period, most 
emigrants from the Western Balkans lived in the United States. According to contemporary 
tallies, between 600,000 and 700,000 settled in the United States. This number dwarfed the 
roughly 170,000 South Slavs in South America and Europe. The North American settlement was 
also concentrated in urban centers, especially compared to migrants to South America.57 Urban 
life led to much denser network of newspapers and cultural associations and the newer 
communities in South America, Western Europe, and Australia. Consequently, it was on this 
diaspora that the Kingdom of Yugoslavia focused most of its efforts—not only was the diaspora 
in the United States perceived to be wealthier (and thus able to benefit the fatherland more), the 
emigrants in the United States were also the most threatened, Yugoslav officials thought, by 
assimilation—the legend of the American “melting pot” crossed the Atlantic. As a result, 
Yugoslav officials concentrated their efforts to promote national consciousness where it was 
most at risk. Where possible, and considering limitations of space, I have tried to include 
snapshots of political activity in other Yugoslav diasporas, in particular South America or the 
Low Countries. Nevertheless, the Yugoslav diaspora in the United States remains the focus of 
this dissertation, just as it was the focus of contemporary Yugoslav politicians.  
 
57 Dr. T. M. Lutković, “Jedno Važno Pitanje: Koliko nas ima i gdje smo?,” Zajedničar, April 19, 1928. Fond 967, kut. 
26, HDA; Emigration Museum, “Hrvatsko Iseljeništvo u Svijetu” (MAP), [undated, probably 1934-1937]. Fond 1619, 
kut. 1, HDA.  




No history of nationalism would be complete without defining the terms of analysis. 
Although diaspora was been well defined by now—this dissertation treats it as a transnational 
network that can credibly speak for a larger emigrant community—“Yugoslav” and 
“Yugoslavism” have not received nearly as exhaustive treatment. Both terms are potentially 
politically loaded, with multiple potential meanings. “Yugoslav,” for instance, which literally 
translates to “South Slav,” can be a neutral blanket term used to refer to the Slavic peoples of the 
Balkans: Slovenians, Croatians, Serbians, Montenegrins, Bosnians, Macedonians, and 
Bulgarians, although during the interwar period it was just the first three, the titular groups of the 
Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes. When not in quotation marks, this is the sense meant—
it is more convenient to write Yugoslav instead of Serb, Croat, and Slovene.  
When in quotation marks, however, “Yugoslav” refers to the idea of Yugoslav 
nationhood, a term which brings us to Yugoslavism, a political movement which dates back to 
the early 19th century. Germinating in the universities of the Habsburg empire where Serbs, 
Croats and Slovenes mingled, Yugoslavism began as an intellectual movement that tried to 
synthesize South Slav culture.58 By the turn of the 20th, century Yugoslavism had become a small 
political movement that found its expression in 1918, when, following the breakdown of order in 
the dying Austro-Hungarian Empire, national councils in Croatia and Slovenia seceded, 
proclaiming their unification with the Kingdom of Serbia, thereby laying the foundation for the 
Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, which would be renamed the Kingdom of Yugoslavia 
in 1929.59  
Over the decades of this Kingdom’s existence, “Yugoslavism” took on several additional 
“flavors,” each with their own political program. Three-tribe Yugoslavism, which was also the 
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state ideology of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia between 1918 and 1929, claimed that Serbs, 
Croats, and Slovenes are three “tribes,” subnational groups, of a single people in much the same 
way that the Sicilians, Tuscanese, and Piedmontese were part of a single, Italian nation despite 
their lingustic and cultural differences. Integral Yugoslavism, which was the state ideology of the 
Kingdom of Yugoslavia between 1929 and 1935, asserted that Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes are a 
single nation that required a single, standardized language and national culture, and quickly. 
After 1935, the ruling elites of Yugoslavia favored so-called “real Yugoslavism,” which hoped 
that cultural tolerance and political autonomy would lead to the gradual emergence of a 
Yugoslav nation.60 And lastly, there is Titoist Yugoslavism, which acknowledges that the 
cultural differences between Serb, Croat, and Slovene (and also Bosnians, Montenegrins and 
Macedonians) are likely to endure, but argues that these peoples should nonetheless live together 
in a single, federally organized state, under the slogan of “Bratstvo i Jedinstvo,” or Brotherhood 
and Unity.61 Whenever possible, I try to identify which variant of Yugoslavism is being 
advocated. The point, however, is that in arguing for a study of a “Yugoslav” diaspora, I am not 
effacing the possibility of there being Serb, Croat, and Slovene “diasporas” as well. As Pieter 
Troch argues, aside from integral Yugoslavism, Yugoslavism was not incompatible with Serb, 
Croat, and Slovene nationalism.62 Nor is, I argue, Yugoslavism incompatible with host-country 
nationalism.  As June Alexander argues in her study of Slovak nationalists in the United States, 
demonstrating Slovak nationalism was a way to demonstrate belonging in the American “Nation 
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of Nations,” to borrow a term from Louis Adamic.63 Diaspora Yugoslavism worked much the 
same way. 
Research Questions 
 In the conclusion to his ambitious attempt to create a general theory of diaspora 
nationalism, Gabriel Sheffer identifies several questions for future researchers. Why do migrants 
choose to become nationalists, to join “diasporas” and to maintain transnational ties with their 
homeland? Beyond remittances, what sorts of exchanges—guns, soldiers, political opinions—
link together diasporas and their homelands? And lastly, what sorts of tensions arise between 
these (over)generous diasporas and a homeland that takes diaspora loyalty for granted and 
diaspora donations as its due?64 While this dissertation cannot provide definitive answers to these 
questions, its focus on the minutia of people, relationships, and organizations seems the most 
productive way to begin.  In addition to these three questions, this dissertation is also interested 
in a fourth: how is nationalism affected by a diaspora context? This question encompasses not 
just the question of syncretism, of influence from the host nation, but also from other organized 
diasporas. Would diaspora nationalism take one form in the cities of United States, surrounded 
by other diasporas, like the Irish or Italian, from which organizational templates could be 
borrowed, and another in, say, Argentina?  
 Each chapter of this dissertation, which spans the period from 1914-1951, is interested in 
one or more of these questions. This timeframe is both an aesthetic and an analytic choice, using 
the life and death of a prominent Yugoslav activist to bookend a broader discussion of diaspora 
political life. This activist is Louis Adamic, born Alojz Adamič, a Slovene-American who rose to 
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become a public intellectual during the 1930s and a leader of the Yugoslav movement in the 
United States before his death (which was probably a murder) in 1951. Adamic is well-known to 
American historians and historians of migration—although he has been criticized for his 
Eurocentrism,65 Adamic’s prolific writings on the emigrant experience in the United State has 
contributed to theories of American multi-culturalism, dual nationality, and the mutability of 
assimilation and acculturation. Adamic’s advocacy of Yugoslavism, on the other hand, has 
attracted much less attention. In the two most recent biographies of Adamic, the focus has not 
been on Adamic’s role within the Yugoslav movement, but the American side of his activism: 
his support for multiculturalism, his opposition to fascism, and how both were received by the 
Anglophone public. 66 Nonetheless, Adamic’s central role in the Yugoslav movement should 
come as little surprise to those familiar with his life and work—multiculturalism is only a few 
steps away from bratstvo i jedinstvo (brotherhood and unity), the central thesis of Tito’s version 
of Yugoslavism. 
The first chapter, which covers the years 1914-1925, documents an unusual situation in 
world history, where a government of a new nation-state discovers that it had an old diaspora. 
Nearly all Yugoslav migrants had emigrated from Austria-Hungary, not Yugoslavia. In effect, 
Yugoslavia had to become the new “Old Country,” an imagined homeland for which the 
emigrant feels nostalgia. But before it could win those migrants’ affection or loyalty, Yugoslavia 
had to learn as much as possible about “its” diaspora. Focusing on the initial encounters between 
Yugoslav diplomats and overseas “colonies,” Chapter One both introduces basic information 
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about Yugoslavia’s overseas community—the major population centers, personages, and 
political tendencies—as well as the “emigration question,” an official debate about how to 
incorporate the emigration into the national body.    
Chapter Two picks up where chapter one left off, looking at the Kingdom of Serbs, 
Croats, and Slovenes’ early attempts to foster diaspora Yugoslavism and win the loyalty of its 
diaspora during its stint as a constitutional monarchy, which lasted until 1928. Despite the grand 
ambitions outlined in its first systematic program to promote national consciousness in 
emigrants, this chapter argues that Yugoslav diplomats did not have the resources to effectively 
support emigrant schools, churches, or cultural institutions, as a result offloading much of the 
work, and costs, of overseas nation building on emigrants themselves. As a result, emigrant 
institutions remained largely independent from Belgrade, the major exception being the Serbian 
emigrant exarchate, which was established during this period to exert control over the overly 
independent Serbian orthodox clergy in the United States.  
In 1929, Yugoslavia became, like many of its neighbors in Eastern Europe, a royal 
dictatorship, a dictatorship which lasted until the assassination of King Alexander in 1934. 
Chapter Three, which covers this period, argues that authoritarianism at home was matched by 
authoritarianism abroad, with attempts by Yugoslav diplomats to censor, deport, and blackmail 
emigrant dissidents. Although the ‘tenth banovina,’ as the diaspora came to be called in this 
period, was well outside the jurisdiction of Yugoslav police, Yugoslav officials often found the 
host country police to be willing collaborators in their efforts to punish and control “their” 
emigrants. This chapter will be of interest to those interested in contrasting the way authoritarian 
governments interacted with the diaspora with the methods of democratic governments, as well 
as those interested in diaspora-homeland tensions, of which this period had plenty. Nonetheless, 




this chapter argues, transnational repression discredited mainly the government in Belgrade, 
rather than the Yugoslav idea, which emigrants began to reinterpret. 
Chapter Four, which spans roughly the same period as chapter three, is interested in the 
other major consequence of Yugoslav dictatorship, a topic so large it needed its own chapter to 
adequately cover. This is a comparative study of diaspora politics of four Yugoslav political 
parties that went into exile under Alexander’s dictatorship—the Demokratska Stranka, the 
Croatian Peasant Party, the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, and the Ustaša. All four political 
parties each attempted, in their own way, to set up their own transnational network and become 
the “leader of the emigration,” be it Croatian or Yugoslav. Particular attention is devoted to the 
fascistic Ustaša/Domobran movement, an analysis that contains much of interest to anyone 
interested in why emigrants become not just nationalists, but ultranationalists, including 
individual case-studies of migrants who were recruited by the Domobran. The failure of the 
Domobran movement in North America is likewise explained by comparing its relationship to 
emigrant civil society to the more-successful German-American Bund. 
Chapter Five, like Chapter Two, is interested more in culture than politics, although 
culture can be deeply political. Covering the years between 1935 and 1941, the years following 
Alexander’s death and the leadup to the second world War, this chapter argues that, when one 
thinks in terms of transnational networks between diaspora individuals and organizations, the 
groundwork was laid in these years for a “Yugoslav diaspora,” even if no organization claimed 
yet to speak on its behalf. During this period, Serb, Croat, and Slovene groups worked together 
to establish Yugoslav rooms, gardens, and radio stations, even as official Yugoslav attempts to 
use emigrants for propaganda reached their apotheosis in the creation of a “Museum of the 
Emigration” in Zagreb and in the development of Yugoslav pavilions for several international 




expositions in the United States. In these contrasting exhibitions of national culture, Chapter five 
argues, one finds a growing gulf between the Yugoslavism espoused by emigrants and that 
favored by the Yugoslav state.  
Chapter Six, which covers 1941 to 1945, explores the effects of World War II on the 
transnational networks developed over the preceding two decades. The relationships that were 
forged between emigrant self-help groups, Yugoslav exile political parties, and the government 
of Yugoslavia all affected both the spread of information about conditions in Yugoslavia as well 
as the manifestation of several competing diaspora lobbies. Particular attention is devoted to the 
United Committee of South Slavic Americans (UCSSA) in North America, comparing it with the 
Yugoslav National Defense in South America. In addition, Chapter Six analyzes the surprising 
emergence of a far-right organization in North America, the Serbian National Defense. Using the 
Domobran movement of earlier years as a comparison, Chapter Six argues that the government 
of Yugoslavia’s attempt to suborn emigrant institutions actually undermined Yugoslavism, 
which only flourished in organizations that did not take subsidies or orders from the government 
of Yugoslavia.  
And finally, Chapter Seven, which covers 1945 to 1951, serves as an epilogue, 
documenting the disintegration of the Yugoslav diaspora in the aftermath of its success. As a 
transnational network, I argue, the Yugoslav diaspora was nonetheless fragile and contingent on 
a political climate in both the host and sending country that was friendly to New Deal liberalism. 
And, unfortunately, neither Tito’s Yugoslavia, which was an authoritarian communist state, nor 
the United States, which would be wracked by the Second Red Scare, met that definition any 
longer. In addition, the deaths or marginalization of several key figures within this network—
Zlatko Baloković, Sava Kosanović, and Louis Adamic—deprived the movement of leaders and 




made it difficult for the organizations within the Yugoslav diaspora to exchange information, 
resources, or otherwise coordinate their activities.  
In almost every chapter, Serbian, Croatian, and Slovene diaspora organizations, political 
parties, and their history is examined side by side, rather than separately, as previous histories 
have done. From an organizational perspective, Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes had much in 
common, and the development of their organizations and political life during this period was 
intertwined. For example, American Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes seem to have kept track of 
politics in their respective fraternal unions. The American Srbobran, for instance, reported on the 
Croatian Fraternal Union convention in 1929,67 just as Srpski Glasnik and the Slovene newspaper 
Prosveta reported on the CFU convention in 1935.68  Or if one looks the growth of emigrant 
tourism to Yugoslavia as an example, one cannot explain it without noting that the first trip was 
organized by a Croatian Yugoslavist, who got the idea from Swedish-Americans, after which 
Serb, Croat, and Slovene groups all began organizing their own trips, seemingly in imitation of 
one another, and within a broader boom of trans-Atlantic tourism within US immigrant 
populations in the 1930s. Emigrant groups learn from each other and are influenced by each 
other, despite the boundaries of language or culture. For future historians, it may just as it might 
be revealing to do a diaspora history of Czechs and Slovaks, or Croatians and Italians, or Poles 
and Ukrainians, or even diaspora pan-Slavism in the United States, which, like Yugoslavism, had 
a strong following during the Second World War. In defining the frame of inquiry, we should not 
be limited by national boundaries. 
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CHAPTER ONE: THE NEW ‘OLD COUNTRY’ 
 
On December 31st, 1913, a fourteen-year-old Slovene named Alojz Adamič embarked on 
a steamship to the United States. Adamic was the eldest living son of a well-to-do peasant family 
from Blato and a high-school student in Laibach (now Ljubljana). According to his later 
autobiography, Alojz had come to the attention of the Austrian police for his membership in a 
cell of the revolutionary Yugoslav nationalist movement, a gang of young romantics whose 
activities, at least at first, consisted of “singing ribald parodies of the Austrian anthem” and 
writing graffiti of “insulting words after the name of the Emperor Francis-Joseph.” Although 
Alojz confessed no belief in “the cause” (unity between Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes), having 
mainly joined the group for the adventure, Alojz nevertheless was caught in a police dragnet 
after a demonstration turned bloody. Expelled from the local gymnasium and put on a watchlist, 
Alojz’s prospects if he stayed in Laibach looked grim.69  
Alojz had heard stories about the United States from returned migrants in his village 
decided to follow in their footsteps.70 Like Alojz, hundreds of thousands of South Slavic 
emigrants, encouraged and assisted by friends and family already overseas, settled en-masse in 
the United States between 1880 and 1914. Young Alojz joined the toiling masses, finding work 
in the mailroom of Prosveta, a newspaper for New York City’s “Slovene colony.”71 Around 
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1900, this and similar enclaves had reached a critical mass—Serb, Croat, and Slovene 
newspapers, clubs, and mutual benefit societies began sprouting up across the United States. 
While primarily they provided insurance and entertainment to their members and subscribers, 
these organizations also nurtured national consciousness in emigrants, who could then be 
mobilized in support of political causes. They would soon have that cause. 
 Alojz had gotten out of Europe just in time. Six months after his departure, the Archduke 
Franz Ferdinand was assassinated by another Yugoslav revolutionary named Gavrilo Princip, a 
Bosnian Serb just five years Alojz’s elder. A month after that, Austria-Hungary declared war on 
Serbia—the Great War had begun, setting in motion events that would lead to the end of Austro-
Hungary and the creation of Yugoslavia. Fleeing Austrian censorship, a group of Yugoslav-
minded intellectuals went into exile, setting up an organization in London called the 
Jugoslavenski Odbor (Yugoslav Committee). The Yugoslav Committee lobbied for the creation 
of a federal South-Slavic State, preferably a republic.72 
 In 1915, to enhance their leverage and to fill their coffers, the Yugoslav Committee sent 
several leading members as emissaries to the United States to rally the Serbs, Croats, and 
Slovenes living there to their cause. They were warmly received and shortly thereafter, in 
Pittsburgh, 615 representatives from various emigrant groups in North America, and three 
delegates from a likeminded organization in South America, the Jugoslavenska Narodna 
Odbrana (Yugoslav National Defense), met and formed the Jugoslavensko Narodno Vijeće 
(Yugoslav National Council), an auxiliary of the Yugoslav Committee in London.73 At the 
 
72 Ivan Čizmić, Jugoslavenski Iseljenički Pokret u SAD I stvaranje jugoslavenske države 1918 (Zagreb, Liber, 1974). 
73 Ibid. 




council’s head were the biggest Serb, Croat, and Slovene names in the United States: Mihajlo 
Pupin74, Ante Biankini,75 Josip Marohnić76 and Niko Gršković77, to name a few. 
In early 1916, after losing his job at Prosveta, Alojz joined the United States Army—
again largely for adventure.78 On April 6, 1917, the United States entered the war, and Alojz 
found himself in the trenches on the Western Front.79 Meanwhile, on the Eastern Front, Austria 
had overrun the small Serbian Kingdom, driving its army to the island of Corfu. There, the 
Yugoslav Committee met with the Serbian government-in-exile, which harbored territorial 
designs on the western Balkans. On July 20, 1917, the Committee and the representatives of 
Serbia reached a compromise, laying the groundwork for a Yugoslav state. 
 The Corfu Declaration of August 1917 was received with jubilation and optimism by 
Zajedničar, the official organ of the Croatian Union and the most widely read newspaper in 
Serbo-Croatian in all of North America.80 Finally, they wrote, Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes would 
live together, with the rights they now only enjoyed in the United States and Canada: freedom of 
religion, equality, and a constitution, in a “progressive and Western state.”81  The Yugoslav 
National Council in the United States backed the Corfu declaration without reservation.82 Even 
from the beginning, however, there were misgivings about the Serbian King. Proletarec, the 
Slovene-language organ of the Yugoslav Socialist Union in the United States, called the Corfu 
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declaration a monarchist ruse.83 Zajedničar, however, was willing to be wooed. Shortly after the 
Corfu declaration, Milan Pribićević, a Serbian politician and integral Yugoslavist, contributed to 
Zajedničar a series of editorials arguing for a unified Yugoslav state, promising freedom, justice, 
and prosperity for Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes.84  
But by late 1918, disappointment had set in—the new Yugoslavia was not what the 
Yugoslav committee had promised. Instead of federalism and equality, power was concentrated 
in Belgrade, with the Serbian king presiding over a constitutional monarchy, which Croatia’s 
republican political parties would not abide.  Eventually, this division would tear the Yugoslav 
Council apart, with its monarchists and republicans parting ways.85 And over the next year in 
South America, the JNO would disintegrate, having lost most of its members.86 As for Alojz—he 
had naturalized, dropping the haček above the “c” to become Louis Adamic. Yugoslavia and the 
Vidovdan constitution did not interest him at that point. Although Adamic felt some cultural 
affinity with his neighbors in the Croato-Slovene district of San Pedro, California, American 
concerns now filled his writing, which was now in English.87 Acculturation, however, was not a 
one-way street, but a “two-way passage,” to borrow the title from a book written by Adamic two 
decades later, after he had “rediscovered” his ancestry and become associated with Yugoslav 
émigré politics. 
Likewise, 1918 was not the end for overseas Yugoslavism. As will be shown, despite the 
disintegration of the Yugoslav National Council, many Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes were willing 
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to give Yugoslavia’s new government a chance. However, one could not speak of there being in 
1919 a “Yugoslav diaspora”—here defined as a trans-oceanic political network characterized by 
the integration and participation of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, that is large enough to plausibly 
represent the will of an imagined diasporic community, and that is mobilized in support of a 
common Yugoslav homeland. Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes overseas had some limited experience 
working together in the Yugoslav Committee and collecting postwar relief, but otherwise 
generally kept to themselves in their own “colonies,” each with their own newspapers, fraternal 
organizations, and cultural clubs. In fact, it would even be difficult to speak of a Croat, Serb, or 
Slovene diaspora, as localism was still pronounced, since people tended to settle nearby people 
from the same village or island. And on a regional level, according to one consular report, 
“Croats” were fragmented between the Dalmatians, Islanders, Banovci, and Slavonians, 
“Slovenes” between Carniolans, Korušani, and Štajerci, and the “Serbs” between Ličani, 
Hercegovci, Vojvođani, and Montenegrins (sic).88 Many more, like Adamic, remade themselves 
into Americans. As such, it would be better to borrow Donna Gabaccia’s formula of there being 
“many diasporas” rather than a “Yugoslav diaspora.”89  
For the “Yugoslav diaspora” to reemerge, the social, organizational, and cultural barriers 
between these smaller diasporas would need to be broken down. This was the ambition of 
interwar Yugoslav diplomats and politicians. But before they could begin to put together a grand 
strategy, they needed to scout out these various overseas “colonies” of “Yugoslavs.” This chapter 
focuses on these first encounters between Yugoslav officials and emigres. Conveniently, this also 
introduces the “Yugoslav emigration” to the reader—its main personages, organizations, and 
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political quirks—exploring the various contours of the emigrant community that Yugoslavia 
would begin to systematically woo in 1925. Chronologically, this chapter covers the period 
leading up to 1925, with occasional references to later events.  
The Development of Yugoslavia’s Diplomatic Service 
Although Yugoslavia was formed on December 1918, archival records dealing with the 
iseljeništvo (emigration or diaspora) for the first two years of the interwar period are scarce. This 
is understandable, however—whenever a country triples in size, like when Serbia became 
Yugoslavia, one expects disruption, chaos, and poor record-keeping as its bureaucracy grows to 
meet the needs of a tripled population. And Yugoslavia’s first two years had no shortage of 
chaos. Following unification, the Serbian, now Yugoslav, army was sent to occupy Croatia, 
Slovenia, and Montenegro and to govern through martial law while elections were held and a 
constitution was drafted.90 Croatian administrators were, in certain places, sacked and replaced 
with Serbs. Yugoslavia’s new subjects took poorly to beatings and authoritarianism and 
rebellions broke out in several places, including in Montenegro and in Croatia.91 Making matters 
worse, the Italian adventurer D’Annunzio had seized Fiume (Rijeka) in Istria, hoping to establish 
the ‘facts on the ground’ that would lead to an Italian annexation of the city and its Slavic 
hinterland.92 Elections in Yugoslavia were not held until November 1920, which was followed 
by the ratification of the Vidovdan constitution of June 28, 1921, which made a compromised 
centralism the basis for the new state. The Triune Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes would 
be the national state of a “single people with three names.” The Croatian Diet, the Sabor, was 
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abolished, and the Kingdom would henceforth be governed as a constitutional monarchy with a 
unicameral legislature, the Skupština.93  
With its home-front pacified, Yugoslavia’s government turned its attention to the tenth of 
their population living overseas and their diplomatic service. Much like Yugoslavia’s 
bureaucracy, its diplomatic service was a hodgepodge of Serbian and Austro-Hungarian 
elements. Austro-Hungary had a tradition of emigration from its Croatian and Slovenian 
territories and had an experienced Emigration Office in Zagreb. For decades, this Emigration 
Office oversaw the flow of Croats, Slovenes, and the occasional Serb overseas, helping migrants 
with paperwork and informing them about destination countries. Perhaps because of this long 
experience dealing with emigration, the Austro-Hungarian Emigration Office was retained in its 
entirety, except for its name, which became the Emigration Commissariat (IK) in 1922.94  To 
surveil emigrants once they arrived, Yugoslavia was forced to expand Serbia’s small network of 
consulates and legations; Austria, after all, still existed as a rump state and retained its 
proprietary claim to the Habsburg consulates in the United States.  
With over half a million Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes scattered across the world, from 
Argentina to Canada to Belgium to Australia, the Yugoslav diplomatic service was spread thin. 
Smaller overseas settlements, consisting of hundreds to several thousand people, often did 
without any nearby consulates.  In 1923, Yugoslavs in South America were served by only one 
general consulate in Buenos Aires, a condition that persisted through most of the interwar period. 
North America was better served, receiving a legation in Washington DC and Ottawa,  two 
general consulates (one in New York and one in Chicago), as well of a host of regular 
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consulates, in San Francisco, Denver, and, eventually, Pittsburgh. 95 This arrangement made the 
best use of Yugoslavia’s limited resources, as the overwhelming majority of overseas Serbs, 
Croats, and Slovenes, over 600,000 by some estimates, lived in the United States.96 And since 
most of that overseas population was from Croatia, the foreign ministry made an effort to include 
a few Croats in the diplomatic apparatus; letting an exclusively Serbian diplomatic service lord 
over a primarily Croatian diaspora would have been politically tone-deaf.97 Accordingly, Ante 
Trešić-Pavičić, a Croatian writer and intellectual, was chosen to head the Yugoslav Legation in 
Washington, where he would oversee the work of the consulates and keep an eye on emigres. 
Trešić-Pavičić, was specifically chosen for his conservative leanings and his support for Serbian 
centralism at the Paris peace conference. Most diplomats, however, were Serbs—Trešić-Pavičić 
later complained that he was the only Croat in the legation with any power.98 That power, 
moreover, was very limited. If one visualized the emigration as a province of Yugoslavia (as 
became common in the 1930s), Trešić-Pavičić would be its governor, albeit one without the 
formal authority to tax, levy soldiers, or issue edicts. The emigration could not be ruled like a 
regular province, as Yugoslav officials would find out the hard way.    
“Colony” Visits: Toward a Diaspora Census 
By 1921, having expanded their diplomatic apparatus, the Yugoslav Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, determined that  
Given the fact that our national unification has been (in the main) achieved, we sense 
the…need to more strongly link emigrants from our provinces, most of which are in 
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America, with our national body and to preserve their national distinctiveness…So we 
can take steps toward this goal,  we need to have at our disposal the necessary 
information so we can evaluate where and how educational-cultural (prosvetni) 
establishments should be organized.99  
 
These orders were coupled with the 1921 Law on Emigration, which called for emigrant 
outreach.100 Shortly thereafter, consular officials began to visit Yugoslav “colonies” across the 
US. The official use of the term “colony” is suggestive—from the beginning, emigrants 
settlements were seen as the overseas dominion of Yugoslavia. Likewise, “colony” visits soon 
acquired the aspect of a census or territorial survey, with diplomats reporting on population, 
location, and the ethnic balance between Serb, Croat, and Slovene. Macedonians emigrants in the 
United States, despite being numerous, were typically excluded from these surveys—they were 
not imagined as part of the “Yugoslav diaspora.” 
One of the earliest recorded visits by a Yugoslav consul to a “colony” was on December 
10, 1921, in Sacramento, an invitation to the yearly convention of “Yugoslav,” “Serbian,” and 
“Croatian” Sokols from Los Angeles, Oakland, San Jose, and San Francisco. As athletic clubs 
for Slavic youths, the Sokol has long been a pillar of Slavic nationalist movements. After 
prompting by the Yugoslav consul, these Californian Sokols agreed to denounce a Croatian 
“separatist” periodical and pledged their loyalty to King Alexander of Yugoslavia. In his 
subsequent report, the consul in question found this willingness to embrace Yugoslavism and 
Alexander remarkable, since only two out of the three hundred present at this meeting were 
Serbs, whom officials usually considered the most politically reliable of the south Slavic peoples. 
Galvanized, the consul wrote directly to the Yugoslav Minster of Foreign Affairs, urging him to 
publicize the results of this convention, ostensibly to propagate the Yugoslav idea throughout the 
 
99 Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Yugoslav Legation in Washington, April 6, 1921, Fond 371, Fasc. 56, BO 72, AJ. 
100 Brunnbauer, Globalizing Southeastern Europe, 220.  




diaspora, and perhaps in Yugoslavia as well. 101 This was also one of the very earliest proposals 
to link Yugoslav nation-building abroad with that same project in the homeland. 
Nonetheless, Yugoslav diplomats remained suspicious of Croats—sometimes to the point 
of absurdity. On July 22, 1922, a lodge of the Hrvatska Zajednica in Watsonville, California, 
celebrating their fifteenth anniversary, decided to invite a Yugoslav consul. The consul noted 
that:  
This was the first time since unification that our people in Watsonville contacted an 
official representative of our monarchy, [probably] because a majority of these so-called 
Austrians-Konavljanini,102 who even today keep a portrait of Franz-Josef and other 
Habsburgs in their homes, hope to reestablish Austro-Hungary under Habsburg rule. 103  
 
This was a misunderstanding—Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes were often called “Austrians” (or a 
contraction of “Bohemian-Hungarians”) by unaware Americans, but that did not make them pro-
Habsburg.  But despite his reservations, the consul’s speech about Yugoslav unity was well 
received by attendees, causing him to recommend to his superiors in the legation that more 
frequent contact between Yugoslav diplomats and Yugoslav colonies would “be of great use” 
and would help heal “the great division between our people, that is, Serbs and Croats.”104  At the 
very least, it could bring an end to the official suspicion of Croats. 
Evidently, the legation took this advice to heart, as visiting Yugoslav colonies and 
learning about their denizens seems to have become a regular diplomatic duty. By autumn of 
1922, consular information gathering was becoming more methodical, expanding from purely 
national/political concerns to the economic and demographic. “Colony” populations, geographic 
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distribution, occupations, living conditions, careers, ethnic makeup, social institutions, and 
political affiliations were all of interest to the Yugoslav authorities. For instance, when visiting 
“our colony” St. Louis, Missouri, the consul reported on the number of Yugoslav emigrant 
organizations (fifteen), whether there were enough shop-owners, merchants, and factory owners 
among them (there were), and whether those present at the meeting seemed well-disposed toward 
King Alexander of Yugoslavia (they were). On consular prompting, representatives of these 
organizations agreed to form a Yugoslav Club to improve Serb-Croat relations, as well as an 
organization of “Yugoslav” businessmen.105 While seemingly quotidian in its concerns, this 
report shows that official interest in the American emigration was partly pecuniary—a 
prosperous diaspora had more political clout and could potentially invest in the still-
industrializing Kingdom of Yugoslavia.  
Moreover, this report also provided further evidence that consular suspicion of overseas 
Croats was misplaced. After meeting with the colony’s merchant community, the consul met 
with a group of Croatian “separatists” who wished to denounce a favorite of the Consulate, 
Vinko Budrović, as an “anti-Yugoslav” opportunist and to petition for the establishment of 
another general consulate in St. Louis. The consul demurred, seeing both requests as a ruse. He 
may have been wrong to do so: these so-called “separatists” were willing to embrace, or at least 
pay lip-service to, the Yugoslav idea. Moreover, they wanted more representatives of the 
Yugoslav government nearer by—hardly hostile behavior. It is no mystery why they were so 
eager: in a separate meeting with representatives of Chicago’s Slovene colony, the consul’s 
Slovene interlocutor observed that Austro-Hungarian diplomats generally refused to meet with 
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Slavic emigrants.106 Whether this was true or not, south-Slavic migrants were probably pleased 
to have co-ethnics as consuls, whom they assumed would be more sympathetic to their material 
concerns. The stormy debates in the Belgrade skupština had little weight compared to avoiding 
deportation, supporting one’s mutual benefit society, or getting a passport to visit one’s relatives 
in ‘the Old Country’—Stjepan Radić and the Vidovdan constitution were mentally and 
physically far away.  
The sort of behavior identified in these “colony” visits does not fit the model of “long-
distance nationalism” as identified by Benedict Anderson or of “vicarious nationalism” as 
explained by Anthony Smith.107 In Anderson’s formulation, émigré nationalists tended to be 
more nationalistic rather than less, largely because their distance from the homeland meant that 
they could take extreme political positions with impunity. For Smith, a militant political defense 
of or advocacy for their titular homeland is a strategy by which immigrants cope with the “pain 
and loss” of assimilation into their host nation as well as their geopolitical liminality. Granted, 
this model works for the 1990s, when the Serbian and Croatian “diasporas” supported and 
funded secessionist militants in Yugoslavia.108 But as the accounts from these early colony visits 
suggest, distance does not necessarily make extremists. The willingness of American Serbs and 
Croats to tactically embrace Yugoslavism fits better with Tara Zahra’s exploration of the term 
“national indifference.” For Zahra, “national indifference” is often a charge lobbed by national 
 
106 Dvadesetogodišnjica Slovenske Narodne Potporne Jednote,” report to the political division of the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs from the Yugoslav Consul in Chicago. April 18, 1924. Fond 449, Fasc. 4, BO 10, AJ. 
107 Benedict Anderson, Long-Distance Nationalism: World Capitalism and the Rise of Identity Politics, 
(Amsterdam: Center for Asian Studies, 1992); Anthony Smith, The Ethnic Origins of Nations (Malden: Blackwell 
Publishers Inc, 1986), 151-2. 
108 See: Ivana Djurić, “The Croatian diaspora in North America: identity, ethnic solidarity, and the 
formation of a ‘‘transnational national community’’’, International Journal of Politics, Culture, 
and Society, Vol 17, No. 1 (2003): 113-30; Birgit Bock-Luna, The Past in Exile: Serbian Long-Distance 
Nationalism and Identity in the Wake of the Third Balkan War, (Berlin: Lit, 2007); Paul Hockenos,  Homeland 
Calling: Exile, Patriotism and the Balkan Wars (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003). 




missionaries (like consular officials) who are frustrated by a gamut of un-national behaviors in 
the people to which they preach: cosmopolitanism, regionalism, national hybridity, side-
switching, and so on. 109 “National ambivalence” might be a better term. Sometimes, emigrant 
national flexibility could be useful to the missionaries of the Yugoslav idea, as these previous 
examples of emigrants tactically declaring their loyalty to Yugoslavia has shown. 
But national ambivalence could also backfire.  After a visit in 1924 to several “colonies” 
of factory workers and miners in Colorado and Wyoming, Consul Ađemović (a Serb) 
pronounced a failure the emigrant efforts to preserve “Yugoslav” national consciousness and that 
of their offspring, who were “ashamed of their ancestry.” Many did not know “their own 
language” and had little knowledge of “their national culture.” Even worse, according to the 
consul, their standards of hygiene were deplorable, with many using their free time for “negative 
work” (meaning drinking and gambling). Someone needed to teach them to be a “human being, 
rather than a typical animal.” 110 Yugoslav attitudes toward the emigration had at their core a 
paradox: emigrants were seen as simultaneously entrepreneurs who could industrialize a 
backward Yugoslavia, while also being savages in need of Yugoslav civilizing. In civilizing and 
Yugoslavizing the emigrant, the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, would, through encouraging 
repatriation and investment, industrialize and Yugoslavize her own people. In any event, one 
major finding of this informal census was that assimilation was a major problem.  
Expanding the Census beyond North America 
In 1924 the Emigration Commissariat (IK) in Zagreb published its discoveries about the 
emigration in its yearly report on its own activities, contrasting the North American and South 
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American emigration and evaluating each’s capacity to both prosper and reproduce their culture 
overseas. The major metric of nationalist organization was the number of ethnic organizations 
among the various “Yugoslav” emigrations. Emigrants in North America (meaning the United 
States and Canada) were the most organized, with five major mutual-benefit societies—the 
Hrvatska Narodna Zajednica, the Hrvatska Zajednica Illinois, the Srpski Savez, the Slovensko 
Dobrotvorno Drustvo, and the Krajnsko-Slovensko Katolička Jednota.111 Serbs, Croats, and 
Slovenes each had their respective fraternal unions, all of which were in no danger of 
disappearing. In fact, these organizations continue to exist today, albeit with some name changes. 
In this respect, the North American emigration were preserving their “Yugoslav” culture, even if 
they lacked a pan-Yugoslav society (which consular officials were lobbying for at the time.)112 
South America had the opposite problem. Although it had a pan-Yugoslav society, the 
Jugoslovenska Narodna Odbrana,113 that society was financially troubled and chronically 
unstable: after having imploded in 1921, it briefly revived, only to fail some years later. There 
would be another attempt to revive in the 1930s and again in 1941, but the JNO would never 
regain its WWI-era glory and was perpetually on the verge of bankruptcy.114  
One potential cause for this organizational disparity was the different ages of the 
emigrant communities in North and South America. Most “Yugoslavs” had emigrated to North 
America between 1880 and 1914. They had had decades to build up their own fraternal unions, 
newspapers, and clubs—their national movements were much more developed. The IK did not 
see it that way, however. Thanks to their long stay and of “intensive propaganda of 
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Americanization,” many in North America had alienated themselves (otuđili) from our ethnic 
and national idea.”115 Although the greater number of South Slavic fraternal societies in the 
United States might seem to contradict this assertion, the IK did not seem to believe it was 
possible for its overseas population to be loyal to two countries: one was either an American 
citizen or a good Yugoslav.  
In comparison, the emigration in South America was much younger, as the USA’s new 
quota laws for South-Eastern Europeans, part of a nativist backlash, simply redirected the flow of 
emigrants to South America, Canada, and (to a small extent) Australia. It took roughly ten years 
for the emigration in North America to start getting organized after they started arriving en-
masse in the 1880s. The Hrvatska Zajednica and the Krajnsko-Slovensko Katolička Jednota were 
both founded in 1894, the Srpski Savez in 1901, and the Slovensko Narodno Potporna Jednota in 
1904.116 Twenty years later, in 1924, emigration to South America had just begun in earnest. But 
there was an economic element to South American emigrant disorganization as well. While 
industrial jobs in the United States were plentiful, the same could not be said of Argentina and 
Brazil.  Both countries simply did not have enough factories to employ its Yugoslav emigrants. 
Some could find work on farms and plantations, herding cattle or cultivating coffee or cacao.117 
Of course, this dispersed them over the vastness of the South American continent, hundreds of 
miles from the nearest Yugoslav consulate. This also it very difficult for them to form the kinds 
of social and fraternal organizations common in North America, which were fundamentally 
urban.118 Perhaps as a result, this state of disorganization persisted through the entire interwar 
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period and would prove to be a major Achilles heel for Yugoslav authorities after 1928 as South 
America became the main recruiting ground for the Croatian far-right. 
The emigration census that was pioneered by consular officials in the United States was 
extended to migrant communities in Europe by the late twenties. On April 16, 1927, the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs, recognizing that because emigrants living overseas “constitute a meaningful 
proportion of our nation,” established a sub-department for Emigrant Politics. The responsibility 
of this sub-department, at the time of its founding, would be “to accumulate, sort, and centralize 
all material which relates to the numerical status of colonies of our emigrants, [as well as] their 
cultural-educational and social position, their interpersonal relationships, and their political 
activity with regard both to the country in which they live as well as to our own state.” This data 
would be collected by the diplomatic service and by whatever collaborators they could find in 
the emigration.119 In other words, this was a census, at least in its goals.  Its methods were less 
standard: disregarding the fact that foreign ministries do not typically conduct censuses, the 
reliance on volunteers from the population being surveilled is atypical. Following the census, the 
responsibility of this new sub-department would be to “issue needed directives…so that 
[emigrants’] political activities are more efficaciously controlled and their activities abroad are 
better used for state-national and state-political purposes.”120 Put more plainly, émigré politics 
needed to be regulated and channeled, somehow, to serve the interests of Yugoslavia and the 
Yugoslav idea.   
But for this to happen, the Foreign Ministry needed to learn more about the overseas 
workers outside of the United States.  In Belgium, where tens of thousands of Croats and 
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Slovenes were employed in the mines and foundries around Seraing, the Legation there, after a 
wait of around half a year, enlisted the help of a Catholic priest, Father Mašić, to report on the 
activities of the workers and to conduct “national-patriotic” work. Apparently, based on the 
delay, they presumably had some difficulty finding someone who lived among the workers but 
was literate enough to relay information, a difficulty which was surely compounded by the 
Legation’s location in distant Brussels rather than near the primary sites of Yugoslav settlement 
in Wallonia. In the first report, a handwritten note from 1927, Father Mašić called the majority of 
“our workers” in Seraing “entirely dissipated in both a national and a religious sense.” What this 
means by this is not elaborated: were the workers Communists, nationally indifferent, or simply 
infrequent churchgoers?  Nor was there mention of workers’ living conditions, typical 
occupation, or even an estimate of how many workers there were in total. For this terse report he 
charged the Yugoslav legation two-hundred Belgian Francs.121 Detailed and typewritten statistics 
did not appear in the Legation’s records until 1931—until then they presumably had to rely on 
Father Mašić’s terse, scrawled notes and to tolerate his frequent requests for more money. In 
what is a recurring theme, the Yugoslav diplomatic service and their ambitious program of 
overseas nation-building was often hamstrung by shortages of will, talent, and cash.    
Publishing the results: Census as Propaganda 
Statistical information about the “Yugoslav diaspora” was eagerly consumed and 
publicized by Serbo-Croatian-language newspapers in the United States. In 1923, Yugoslavia, a 
reliably pro-regime newspaper from Chicago, aggregated the Foreign Language Information 
Service (FLIS) data on the number of “Slovenes” and “Serbo-Croats” in the United States into a 
statistical overview of the number of “Yugoslavs” in the United States. According to the author, 
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the United States was home to about four-hundred thousand Yugoslavs. Of that number, around 
two-hundred ten thousand were Slovene, one-hundred forty thousand were Croatian, fifty-
thousand Serbian, and five-thousand Montenegrin.  Although spread over thirty-one states, the 
most “Yugoslavs” were in the Old Northwest, the top five states being, in order of magnitude, 
Pennsylvania, Ohio, Illinois, New York, and Minnesota.122  This was not new information—
FLIS had originally published the data in 1920—that this article was printed in 1923, after 
Yugoslav diplomats began to take an interest in the “Yugoslav” diaspora’s demographics, was 
probably not coincidental. Even so, it was good propaganda: it would be much more satisfying 
for a typical emigrant to imagine himself part of a large community of four-hundred thousand 
“Yugoslavs” than a comparatively paltry one-hundred and forty-thousand Croats.   
There was clearly an appetite for demography among American Serbs, Croats, and 
Slovenes. And the elusiveness of exact estimates meant that newspapers could argue about 
demography so long as that interest held.  In 1928, emigrants could read about “How many of us 
there are and where we are,” as one on-the-nose headline from Zajedničar, the organ of the 
North American-based Croatian Fraternal Union, put it. Referring to an earlier article published 
also in Zajedničar on the same subject, this article referred to the difficulties associated with 
estimating the number of “us,” an “us” that explicitly included Serbs and Slovenes in the 
collective. That this paper, the organ of the largest and richest organization in the entire 
emigration, had no problem accepting the Yugoslav idea showed that Yugoslavism was still alive 
and well in the emigration. Moreover, this tally typified the national flexibility of emigrants: one 
could be both a Croat and a Yugoslav. And, perhaps, an American as well, since, as the article 
pointed out, naturalization could obscure the number of ethnic “Yugoslavs.” However, as the 
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article notes, this basic ambiguity at the heart of emigrant identity made estimating the number of 
Yugoslavs in the United States very difficult, a point they made by comparing wildly different 
estimates for the number of “Yugoslavs” in each state. Moreover, since most had emigrated from 
the Habsburg Monarchy rather than Yugoslavia, some are mistakenly listed as “Austrian” or 
“Hungarian” in official US statistics. What this meant was that an earlier estimate of 664,500 
Yugoslavs in the United States was potentially much greater—perhaps even a million.123 This 
was an exciting idea for readers: there is strength in numbers, as the old saw goes.  
In any event, there is little question that these articles were planted by the Yugoslav 
Emigration Commissariat. Ivan Mladineo, who wrote the original article in Zajedničar that set 
off this debate, was under IK sponsorship, and was, moreover, deeply involved in the diaspora 
census effort. In fact, he was the once of the principle actors. Mladineo would eventually publish 
the preliminary results in a slim booklet in 1931, the Jugoslovenski Almanak, as well as in a 
much fatter tome, the Narodni Adresar, in 1937. The former also contains an interesting attempt 
to visualize the “Yugoslav” settlement as territory (See Figure 1). While both books will be 
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Fig. 1 “Density of the Yugoslav Settlement by State,” in Jugoslovenski Almanak: 
Jugosloveni u Sjedinjenim Državama Amerike, Berislav Angjelinović and Ivan Mladineo 
(New York: 1931). 
 
 In “Census, Map, and Museum,” Benedict Anderson introduced the concept of 
“logoization” to describe the effect of maps and museums on national consciousness. Using the 
example of Borobudur, Anderson argued that the museums use cartography and archeology to 
produce symbols/logos of the nation-state, which are infinitely reproducible propaganda. 
Borobudur, for instance, has become virtually synonymous with Cambodia and now adorns its 
flag. While maps do not generally end up on flags, they likewise function as logos.124 I would 
argue that logoization also applies to censuses. Aside from producing the ethnic categories with 
which people see themselves, they can also, when published, reproduce and reinforce a national 
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imagined community. We see this clearly in the Yugoslav case, as Yugoslavia, in counting ‘its’ 
emigration, reified it. Of course, census data is not usually used for propaganda—I would 
hypothesize that most people do not find learning about how many people live in one’s own 
country terribly scintillating. However, as these early examples show, “Yugoslavs” in the United 
States were excited to learn of the existence of an “us” spread across the globe.   
Yugoslavs and Labor: A Tale of Two Stjepans 
 While Yugoslav authorities concerned about assimilation paid close attention to emigrant 
organizations organized around ethnic identity, they tended to overlook those based around class. 
These became increasingly important during this period. Beginning in the first years of the 20th 
century, American labor unions attempted to broaden their membership beyond skilled laborers, 
often of Western European extraction, to incorporate the new wave of migrant laborers from 
Eastern Europe. Their reasoning was simple: better that these workers be union members than 
strikebreakers. Meetings and reading materials were frequently translated into the languages 
languages of new migrants—Polish, German, Lithuanian, and so forth. 125  In addition, following 
the October Revolution in 1917, an upsurge of vigorous and aggressive communist parties 
around the world bolstered the old socialist left. The CPUSA, for instance, had nearly eighty 
thousand members at its peak during the Second World War.126 Like contemporary trade unions, 
Marxist parties sought to harness the energies of emigrant workers by talking to them in their 
native language. The CPUSA, for instance, was subdivided into language-based “fractions”127 
with their own cells and foreign-language newspapers. Among them was the Yugoslav Fraction, 
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founded 1919, which published Radnik (The Worker) in Serbo-Croatian. In addition, the 
Yugoslav Socialist Union, which had between one and two thousand members, published three 
newspapers: Proletarec (The Proletarian) in Slovene, Radnička Straža, and Narodni Glas (The 
Worker's Guard and the People's Voice, in Serbo-Croatian). 128 Likewise, the Slovene National 
Benefit Society, which was a socialist fraternal union, published two newspapers, Enakopravost 
and Prosveta (Equality and Education, in Slovene)—Louis Adamic worked briefly in the latter’s 
mailroom. While James Barrett characterizes these unions as agents of “Americanization,” in 
that they integrated migrants into American political life,129 they were nonetheless preserving 
emigrant literacy in their native language—just what Yugoslav authorities wanted.  
 Although American socialist organizations were oriented toward Marxism rather than 
Yugoslav nationalism, politically engaged Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes often had a foot in both 
ethnic and class-based activism. Moreover, activism in these organizations tended to reinforce 
Yugoslavism as a principle of organizational cooperation. The story of Stjepan Mesaroš, better 
known as Steve Nelson, was a good example of how the labor movement brought Yugoslavs 
together. Several years Adamic’s junior, Stjepan Mesaroš emigrated from Subocka, a village in 
Croatian Slavonia, to the United States in 1920. Although his family connections in the United 
States helped Mesaroš  land his first job, the factory floor integrated him into a broader network 
of Serb, Croat, and Slovene activists, who were often his neighbors and coworkers. In 1921, after 
being persuaded by a Serbian co-worker, Mesaroš joined the South Slavic branch of the Socialist 
Labor Party. His cell was predominantly Serbian. Once in the world of labor activism, however, 
Mesaroš found himself drawn to the Yugoslav section of the CPUSA, which seemed more 
dynamic. When Mesaroš moved to Pittsburgh, where many Serbs and Croats worked in the 
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mines of the Monongahela river valley, it was a Slovene activist who connected him with the 
labor movement there.130 Emigrant ethnic societies like the Croatian Fraternal Union or the 
Slovene National Benefit Society often served as arenas for CPUSA activism, which is why 
when Mesaroš moved to Detroit to work in the automobile plants, he remained an active member 
in the local Croatian Fraternal Union Lodge. Aside from being a hub for socialization, CFU 
lodges were a convenient venue to fundraise among emigrant workers for things like shop 
newspapers or to recruit more members to the Party.131 By the end of the 1920s, however, 
Nelson had drifted away from CFU-based activism, choosing instead to focus on agitating 
among labor unions.132 Symbolizing this shift, Stjepan Mesaroš changed his name to Steve 
Nelson.133 Calling this assimilation, however, could be misleading. Nelson retained his ability to 
speak Serbo-Croatian and became much more involved in “nationality work” once he ascended 
to the National Board of the CPUSA in 1945.134  
 While Nelson devoted most of his energies in his early years to building socialism in the 
United States, other socialist activists, like Stjepan Lojen, remained interested in old country 
affairs. Lojen, a Croat from Karlovec, emigrated to work in the steelworks of Youngstown, Ohio 
in 1912. 135  Before he left, Lojen had met few Croats from outside his village. Only once he 
arrived in the United States did he become aware that “a million of our people [emphasis mine] 
had emigrated from the Yugoslav territories that were under Austro-Hungarian rule, along with a 
lesser number of Montenegrins, Macedonians, and Serbs from Serbia.” Lojen was already 
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imagining himself as part of a diasporic, Yugoslav community.136 American factories not only 
awakened Lojen’s national consciousness, he also quickly came to see the common class 
interests of his fellow migrants. He found himself, like Nelson, swept up in labor activism. In 
Lojen’s case, following a workplace accident in 1913, he joined the Croatian National Union, a 
fraternal organization that would later become the Croatian Fraternal Union.137 He subsequently 
joined the Yugoslav Socialist Federation in 1916,138 jumping ship to the Yugoslav Fraction of 
the CPUSA in 1920.139 Like Nelson, Lojen encountered his share of Serbs and Slovenes in the 
Party. For instance, as a correspondent for the party newspaper, Radnik, which was edited by a 
Croat, Lojen became acquainted with a Vojvodina Serb named Dragan, who worked as an 
editorial assistant. However, because Dragan was a speaker of the ekavian dialect, he proved 
unable to adapt to the ijekavian140 dialect in which the paper was written and was subsequently 
replaced by a Slovene, Franjo Preveden.141 Unlike Nelson, however, Lojen remained engaged in 
the politics of the Croatian Fraternal Union, especially at their conventions, where he 
consistently fought against hardline and exclusionary Croatian nationalism and advocated for 
cooperation between Serb, Croat, and Slovene emigrant organizations.142 And during the Second 
World War, Lojen supported the United Committee of South Slavic Americans, a progressive 
Yugoslavist organization that will be discussed in Chapter Six.   
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Although Stjepan Mesaroš and Stjepan Lojen lived in very similar circumstances, their 
attitude toward Americanization revealed that “assimilation” was less a question of identity than 
tactics—Nelson chose to become an “American” because it made it easier for him to agitate 
among native-born union workers, whereas Lojen found that preserving his Croatian or 
Yugoslav identity was better suited to the world of fraternal union politics. Nonetheless, while 
the interconnected nature of South-Slavic socialists showed that there was potential for 
Yugoslavism as a working-class movement, during the 1920s such a movement could only get 
limited traction—times were good, work was plentiful, and the repression against labor activists 
was vicious and ubiquitous, especially against foreigners. Deportation was a favorite tactic of the 
American authorities. In 1919 and 1920, the attorney general Alexander Palmer ordered a series 
of raids against leftist organizations in over seventy cities, rounding up over ten-thousand 
workers, including thirty-five hundred migrant workers who were threatened with deportation. 
Eight of Stjepan Lojen’s comrades in Detroit were caught up in what became known as the 
“Palmer raids,” Lojen only escaping because he was not yet prominent within the Party.143 Being 
found to be a member of the Party risked one’s naturalization status—Nelson only registered as a 
Party member after he had become an American citizen.144 Throughout the 1920s, workers who 
got involved with left wing organizations risked their jobs. Nelson rarely worked in any factory 
longer than several months—fortunately, the lack of social security numbers made it difficult to 
enforce blacklists, and Nelson found it easy to find work in another city.145 The constant 
movement of workers, however, undoubtably disrupted Party activism in Yugoslav fraternal 
societies. There was also the threat of violence: while Nelson was handing out leaflets outside a 
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copper factory in New York, he was attacked by company thugs armed with blackjacks. After 
receiving a severe beating that would require months of recuperation, Nelson was subsequently 
arrested for “disturbing the peace” and fined.146  In short, socialist activists, Yugoslav and 
otherwise, did not enjoy basic civil rights within the United States, hamstringing any potential 
for a mass movement. Likewise, Yugoslav socialists could count on little support from the 
government of Yugoslavia; this was not the sort of Yugoslavism the government of Yugoslavia 
wanted to promote.  
The Yugoslav ‘Old Guard’ in the 1920s 
Yugoslav diplomats were also dismissive of the emigrant political, economic, and 
intellectual elite in the United States. Reporting in 1922 to the Yugoslav foreign ministry, the 
Yugoslav consul in Chicago wrote that the “greatest number of our emigrants” he wrote, “learn 
nothing, read nothing, and do not participate in local public life…and often return [to 
Yugoslavia] more savage than when they left [emphasis mine].” Moreover, the consul noted, 
those emigrants who did become entrepreneurs, scientists, or professors in America also 
Americanized. And having sunk time and effort into America’s complicated naturalization 
process, successful Yugoslav-Americans scorned repatriation. Emigrant notables seemed to be of 
little use to the consul—not only could they “be counted on the fingers,” but many seemed 
unwilling to serve as spokespeople for the new Yugoslav state or to establish commercial ties 
with the old country. 147 
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However, the consul’s assertions about emigrant notables were misleading. Even if they 
were not willing to repatriate, the United States had many veteran Yugoslavist activists and 
public figures, their ardor undiminished by their acculturation to American life. In fact, 
ironically, the most Americanized were often also the biggest proponents of the Yugoslav idea. 
In this regard, Anderson’s take on Long-Distance nationalism is entirely correct—emigres tend 
to be more nationalistic than their counterparts in the old country, largely because their distance 
from that old country allows them to stake out more starkly nationalist positions without having 
to worry about the consequences in the old country. Where Anderson and those who agree with 
him are wrong, however, is when they conclude that this radicalization pushes emigrants to the 
right, toward nationalist chauvinism.148 One case in point was Niko Gršković, a Croatian priest 
from Krk, then an Austrian dominion.  In 1901, Gršković’s  pro-Yugoslav views, which were 
verboten in Austria, compelled him to leave for the United States. In America, Gršković 
continued to lend his charisma and oratory talents to various Yugoslav causes, the most 
prominent of which was his support of the Yugoslav Committee during WWI. Although the 
adoption of Centralist Yugoslavism after the Vidovdan constitution of 1921 pushed Gršković 
into the anti-Belgrade opposition, Gršković remained devoted to the Yugoslav cause.  
Throughout the interwar period, he would edit the left-wing but stalwartly pro-Yugoslav 
newspaper Jugoslovenski Svijet out of New York City.149  
 
148 Benedict Anderson, Long-Distance Nationalism: World Capitalism and the Rise of Identity Politics, 
(Amsterdam: Center for Asian Studies, 1992). See, eg.: Daniel Conversi, “Irresponsible Radicalization: Diasporas, 
Globalization, and Long-Distance Nationalism in the Digital Age,” Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, Vol. 
38, No. 9,  (November 2012): 1357-1379; Birgit Bock-Luna, The Past in Exile: Serbian Long-Distance Nationalism 
and Identity in the Wake of the Third Balkan War (Berlin: Lit Verlag, 2007); Ivana Djurić, “The Croatian diaspora in 
North America: identity, ethnic solidarity, and the 
formation of a ‘‘transnational national community’’’, International Journal of Politics, Culture, 
and Society, Vol 17, No. 1 (2003): 113-30 . 
149 Letter to Minister Miloje Smijlanović from Minister-Plenipotentiary Konstantin Fotić about Gršković’s life, 
December 22, 1939, Fond 371, Fasc. 60, BO 78, AJ. 




Aside from Gršković, another potential friend of Yugoslavia in America was Dr. Ante 
Biankini, a Croatian surgeon from Chicago and brother to the Juraj Biankini, a politician in 
Croatia. Ante Biankini, like Gršković, had been in the Yugoslav Council.  Additionally, Biankini 
had organized the then-bankrupt American-Yugoslav Import-Export Society. 150 In other words, 
he was willing to establish commercial ties with Yugoslavia, just as the consul wanted. Perhaps 
because of this, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs proposed in 1923 to make Biankini a consul, as 
well as on the grounds that “here it America it is particularly necessary that our consuls be 
Croats.” The “Yugoslav diaspora” was, after all, around 50% Croatian. However, one problem 
with Biankini, according to the Yugoslav consul vetting him, was that he had a record of 
embezzling and otherwise wasting money, and was far too old to be of much use anyway.151  
Ante Biankini would pass away in 1934 and be buried with pomp in Yugoslavia—ironically, he 
would be much more useful to the Kingdom of Yugoslavia as a dead symbol than a living 
activist. 
Another potential Croatian collaborator was Ivan Mladineo. Originally from the island of 
Brač in Dalmatia, Mladineo emigrated sometime before 1909, eventually settling in New York in 
1918.  Aside from his efforts to count the “Yugoslav” emigration, which I have already touched 
upon, Mladineo was a lifelong collaborator with the Foreign Language Information Service. 
Mladineo was also president of various Yugoslav Sokols and singing societies, and for a time 
dabbled in editing a newspaper. Later, he would organize the first mass-excursions by emigrants 
to Yugoslavia.  Mladineo saw no contradiction between a Yugoslav and Croatian identity, also 
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publishing a short history of Croatians in the United States sometime after 1923.152 In fact, parts 
of that work would later be recycled to form the introduction to his later works, the 
Jugoslovenski Almanak (1931) and Narodni Adresar (1937), both of which attempted to provide 
a complete catalogue of the ‘Yugoslav’ emigration and their organizations the 1930s. These 
works will be analyzed in greater detail in later chapters. 
Yet another possible collaborator was Paul Radosavljević, a Serbian professor at New 
York University.  Radosavljević’s 1919 opus, Who Are the Slavs: A Contribution to Race 
Psychology Vol. 1, revealed him to be an ardent panslavist and Yugoslavist (albeit one with a 
strong dislike of the Bulgarian “race,” which he calls “cold-blooded and calculating….with the 
characteristic Bulgarian tenacity and ruthless, silent persistence that is positively Asiatic”153 .)  
Blending the latest scholarship on Slavic linguistics, history, and culture with currently-
fashionable racist pseudoscience, Radosavljević adumbrated the typical psychology of each 
Slavic “tribe.” Goaded by nativist stereotypes about “Hunkie” sloth and barbarism, 
Radoslavljević lauded each Slavic tribe—Russians (“Great, Small, and White”)154, Poles, 
“Czecho-Slovaks,” “Lusatian Serbs,”155 “Serbo-Croats,” Slovenes, and “Bulgars”— noting for 
each their bravery, industriousness, creativity, honesty, and democratic spirit. Even the 
Bulgarians he praised for their business savvy.156 These racial traits, he argued, made Slavs 
worthy of having their own super-state, a “United States of the Slavs,” which could serve as a 
counterweight to an imperialist Germany.157  
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In fact, Radoslavljević’s ethnology was the forerunner of similar racial analyses that 
would be published over the next two decades in Yugoslavia. For instance, Jovan Cvijić would 
also attempt a typology of each Yugoslav tribe in 1926 in article form. And in 1939, Vladimir 
Dvorniković would expand Cvijić’s work into book form, using craniology, anthropology, and 
cultural studies (just as Radosavljević did exactly twenty years before) to prove the existence of 
a Yugoslav race and describe its psychology.158 Their conclusions are even quite similar. Just as 
Dvorniković stated that the Yugoslav’s primary traits are a capacity for self-sacrifice, a strong 
sense of idealism, a peaceful spirit, and an elemental creativity,159 Radosavljević argued that the 
Serbo-Croat is “impulsive, tempestuous, sensitive, he distinguished for the vigor of his frame, his 
personal valor, his love of freedom, and his glowing poetical spirit.”160 While this might simply 
be a coincidence, it shows that Radosavljević was in Yugoslavism’s intellectual vanguard even if 
his enthusiasm for American political models clashed with the vision of the ruling Serbian 
Radical Party. 
To belabor the point still further, Americanization often went hand-in-hand with 
Yugoslavism. Besides Radoslavljević, there was also Joseph Goričar, a former Austro-Hungarian 
diplomat who had defected in 1914 to campaign for Yugoslav cause in the United States.161  In 
1920, echoing Radosavljević, he sought to found a “United States of Slavia,” a pan-Slavic 
federative state in Eastern Europe that would be modeled on the United States.162  Both 
Radosavljević and Goričar were proof that Americanization did not diminish one’s Yugoslavism 
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so much as give it an American flavor. Nor did long residence in the United States cause 
emigrants to forgot about their ‘Old Country.’ Anton Grdina, a mortician from Cleveland and 
one of the founders of the Carniolan Slovene Catholic Union,163 and Vincent Cankar, head of the 
Slovene National Benefit Society,164 had both lived in the United States for decades but 
nonetheless both pledged their loyalty to the government of Yugoslavia and to the Yugoslav idea 
in 1920 and 1924, respectively. Additionally, there was Thomas ‘Tomo’ Blažina, who had 
emigrated from Croatia in 1904, fought in World War I as an American soldier, but nonetheless 
went on to found and lead the stalwartly pro-regime Yugoslav-American Legion.165 There was 
also John Palandech/Ivan Palandačić, who had emigrated from Montenegro some time prior to 
1900, become a naturalized citizen, and Americanized his name. Nonetheless, Palandech still 
edited the newspaper Yugoslavia through the interwar period while tirelessly advocating for the 
Yugoslav idea.166 And lastly of course, there was Mihajlo Pupin, a Serbian-American inventor 
who had been in the United States since 1874, longer than even Nikola Tesla! Despite being 
arguably “Americanized,” Pupin already had an impressive track record for a nationalist: he had 
founded the Savez Sjedinjenih Srba- “Sloga,” one of the first Serbian fraternal unions. He had 
also served as honorary consul of the Kingdom of Serbia during the interwar period, and during 
the war, Pupin supported the Yugoslav committee. Lastly, at the peace conference, Pupin’s 
testimony that his birthplace, the Banat, was ethnically Serbian helped get Yugoslavia a slice of 
it (Romania got the other half). Pupin aside, Yugoslavia would have no shortage of potential 
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friends in the United States if it was willing to tolerate their personal idiosyncrasies, ideological 
eclecticism, and republican idealism.   
The consul was right about one notable, however: Nikola Tesla. A Serb from Croatia and 
a world-renowned scientist, Tesla would have been an ideal spokesperson for the Yugoslav idea. 
Unfortunately, Tesla, then in his seventies and something of a recluse, preferred the laboratory to 
the podium.  In 1926, Yugoslav officials attempted to award Tesla their most prestigious medal, 
the Order of St. Sava, 1st Degree, an exercise designed to link his prestige with that of 
Yugoslavia. Tesla accepted the award but refused ceremony or publicity—he apparently had 
little appetite for pomp or large crowds.167 Yugoslav officials acquiesced, although this defeated 
the entire purpose of giving him the medal in the first place. According to the legation’s later 
report to their superiors in the Yugoslav foreign ministry, Tesla “lived modestly and withdrawn 
from society.” Elaborating further on Tesla’s suitability as a spokesperson, they compared him to 
Pupin, writing: “although Tesla is by education higher than Mihajlo Pupin…”“unlike his 
contemporary Mihajlo Pupin, who is altogether normal, Tesla displays here and there various 
abnormalities…his greatest joy is to feed pigeons…which he does by scattering grain while they 
sleep..., and treating the lame or wounded ones at home.” Completing his portrait of an eccentric 
eremite, the legation noted that “he flees from society, particularly female,” which doubtless 
would prove an obstacle to him participating in diaspora politics to the degree Pupin did. 168  
Tesla probably also wanted to avoid Pupin, as the two Serbs famously despised one another. In 
1931, Pupin remarked in a letter to his friend that he had not seen Tesla in over twenty years!169  
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Tesla was reclusive in general, having “rarely been in contact with our own [representatives of 
the Yugoslav government],” although during those brief contacts Tesla had allegedly displayed 
“an entirely Serbian soul” and “could recite by heart our national songs.”170 Unfortunately, 
Yugoslavia needed Tesla’s voice, not his soul. 
But while Tesla’s agoraphobia made him a poor avatar of Yugoslavism in the United 
States, he could still be made, through selective reporting, to serve the Yugoslav cause in 
Yugoslavia.  Nova Doba, a newspaper from Split, proudly announced in 1926 “the decoration of 
our countryman the inventor Nikola Tesla.” Based on the lack of further introduction of Tesla or 
his achievements, one may conclude that Tesla was already famous in Yugoslavia. Upon 
receiving the award, according to Novo Doba, Tesla dispatched a radiogram in Serbo-Croatian to 
Yugoslavia, which Novo Doba, (and presumably other newspapers) reprinted.  After praising the 
efforts of Yugoslav scientists and Yugoslavia’s brave soldiers, “to whose titanic efforts for their 
ideals and European culture Europe is indebted, and which have earned the recognition and 
respect of the entire world, particularly great America,” Tesla concluded his short message with 
a round of “Long Live Yugoslavia! Long live his Majesty your brave and patriotic ruler! And 
again, as a Serbian-American I must repeat: Long Live his Majesty and his exalted family!”171 
Their hero Tesla, domestic audiences now knew, supported Yugoslavia and the king. Moreover, 
they now ‘knew’ that their plucky little country of 12 million people was respected by the 
citizens of a great power. While that last bit was demonstrably false, (in 1924 one Yugoslav 
official quipped that most Americans neither knew nor cared about “Jugoslovakia and 
Czechoslavia,” considering their inhabitants “half-barbarians who might as well live on 
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Mars”)172, Tesla’s fame lent it credibility. And if Yugoslavia was a ‘great country,’ the Yugoslav 
idea was vindicated.  This episode aside, Tesla showed no inclination to actively participate in 
the Yugoslav cause in the United States and so Yugoslavia’s government essentially forgot about 
him until his eightieth birthday.   
The Political Dangers of Repatriation 
Another issue shaping official attitudes toward the emigration was the question of 
repatriation was not regarded with favor by all sectors of Yugoslav government. The Ministry of 
Internal Affairs, or MUP, which processed, surveilled, and interrogated returnees, suspected that 
mass repatriation could bring political contagion, like communism or separatist nationalism, into 
Yugoslavia. Their suspicions were somewhat justified by events in immediate postwar period.  
During the Great War, many Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes had been conscripted into Austro-
Hungarian armies and sent to the Eastern Front, where many deserted or were captured.  These 
soldiers (one of them a certain Josip Broz), were then caught up in the Russian Civil War, where 
many became communists.  Still more former soldiers were caught up in the 1919 Hungarian 
revolution. Based on the Yugoslav interrogation of Milorad Vlaškalić, a Serbian soldier from the 
Austro-Hungarian army, many had little choice but to become communists. Getting travel 
papers, not to mention surviving the various waves of arrests, often meant pinning a red star on 
one’s cap. Once in the party, Milorad and others like him were indoctrinated in special schools 
that the Bolsheviks had set up for expat soldiers. These soldiers, the Bolsheviks hoped, would 
form the core of a Yugoslav brigade, which the Bolsheviks planned to infiltrate back intro 
Yugoslavia.173  
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Whether they were caught up with the Russian revolution or not, many former soldiers 
still wanted to return home to Yugoslavia, where they could potentially bolster Yugoslavia’s own 
nascent communist movement. From 1918 to 1922, we see in in the archived records from the 
Zagreb municipality that many did. One highlight of these cases was in 1919, when a communist 
operative was caught trying to lead an armed band of roughly four-hundred and fifty former 
soldiers into Yugoslavia via the railway from Kaposvár in Hungary.  This, the report averred, 
was part of an organized operation by the communist party in Hungary to funnel militants into 
Yugoslavia, information they presumably wrung from the several agitators now languishing in 
Zagreb jails.174 Whether that was true or not ultimately did not matter, as on February 10, 1920, 
the current minister of Internal Affairs, Svetozar Pribićević, warned the provincial government in 
Ljubljana (through which many returnees passed) that the local Bolsheviks were becoming both 
more numerous and noisier, urging local police to be more vigilant. Known and suspected 
communists were to have their names, occupations, place of residence, and nationality recorded 
and were to be placed under police surveillance. Lastly, more attention was to be paid to their 
perambulations into and around Yugoslavia.175 Just as would-be emigrants were to be filtered by 
their potential usefulness or danger to Yugoslavia, so too were these early returnees. 
This barebones system of surveillance was not especially effective, owing in part to the 
lackadaisical attitude of Yugoslav police. As chance would have it, Josip Broz was caught up in 
this dragnet against returnees from Russia. His recollections of this, recorded by Louis Adamic 
in 1948 and by Vlado Dedijer in 1950, provide a rare glimpse at how Pribićević’s directives were 
actually enforced. Broz returned to Yugoslavia (or rather, entered it for the first time), in 
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September, 1920, having taken the train from Stettin (Szczecin). At the border, two of his fellow-
passengers denounced him as a Bolshevik and asked the authorities to arrest Tito. They obliged, 
but only held him for a few days. 176 Tito gave a somewhat different account in 1948 in an 
interview with Louis Adamic. 177  Then, he made no mention of being denounced. Rather, the 
guards saw his Russian clothing and arrested him on that basis, holding him for a week and 
putting him on a watch list afterwards.178 In both versions, however, the border controls were so 
perfunctory that Tito’s experience at the border earned only a short paragraph. Presumably, those 
who were prudent enough to shed their Russian greatcoats had no problems at all with the 
Yugoslav border police.  
For these lapses, however, the police can be forgiven—there were far too many returning 
POWs to track effectively.   A report from 1921 on Yugoslav returnees provides some sense of 
scale. As if November 1, 1921, over 27,000 Yugoslav prisoners of war and nearly one hundred 
and fifty officers had returned to Yugoslavia after being processed through POW camps in 
Ljubljana and Maribor. Of that number, roughly 15,000 had returned from Russia. Since all 
27,000 were supposed to be watched for any sign of latent bolshevism,179 it is easy to see how 
security forces could be overwhelmed.    
In addition to returning POWs, the kingdom of Yugoslavia also had to contend with 
communist deportees from the United States. After the First Red Scare, membership in any 
organization that advocated the armed overthrow of the US government became a deportable 
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offence. Very few Yugoslav emigrants, however, were deported for political reasons throughout 
the 1920s—in the Croatian State Archive section on returnees there is only record of two. The 
more detailed record is a dossier of one P. Marković, a cobbler, who had immigrated to the US in 
1910, only to be expelled twelve years later in 1922 after he was found to be a member of the 
Yugoslav Section of the CPUSA.180 Based on details in the description, notably, the fact that his 
height was given in feet rather than meters, the Yugoslav authorities were likely informed of his 
arrival by the American authorities.  In the 1930s, the Kingdom of Yugoslavia would have their 
consular service warn them about potentially troublesome deportees, but for this decade they 
relied on the American authorities for tip-offs, which might also account for the low volume of 
known communists among the inflow of repatriates. Yet although America’s contribution to the 
Yugoslav communist underground was negligible, at least in the 1920s, we can still see from t 
Marković’s story that Yugoslav police forces were theoretically on guard against all returnees of 
objectionable political persuasion, rather than just those from Russia.   
Nor was this suspicion restricted to returnees—both the police and the Foreign Service 
were concerned about subversive potential of all Yugoslavs living abroad, which Yugoslavia’s 
foes, Italy and Hungary, could then exploit to advance their irredentist claims. At the Versailles 
peace talks, Yugoslavia had taken the Bačka, and Banat, and Slavonia from Hungary. Italy, in 
turn had been promised Dalmatia and Istria by the British in exchange for switching sides during 
WWI, only to be denied them in the final peace settlement—the “mutilated victory,” as 
D’Annunzio would later call it. Thus, both Italy and Hungary were willing to harbor or fund 
revolutionary or secessionist émigré groups.  
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In 1921, Yugoslav police discovered a covert society of Croatian separatists and 
revolutionaries, code named “Orchid,” although the accounts of this conspiracy by Yugoslav 
police were probably exaggerated or embellished. The ringleaders allegedly lived in Budapest 
and received subsidies from the Hungarian government. The goal of this society was the creation 
of an independent Croatia through armed revolution and, naturally, the return of Bačka and 
Banat to Hungary. They would achieve this by slipping across the border, persuading 
discontented Frankists, Croatian Peasant Party members, and even communists to rise up, arming 
them with Hungarian weapons.181 Of course, this scheme was highly unrealistic—Communists 
would never work with the far-right Frankists, and the chances that a cell of sixteen activists 
could ignite a successful war of Croatian secession were slim. What “Orchid” could do, 
however, was encourage even more paranoia toward emigres. Nor was it the only such 
organization doing so.  
Aside from “Orchid,” there was also the “Yugoslav Legion.” Much of the information 
about this organization is contradictory. Even its name is unclear: the Croatian historian Ivo 
Banac claims that the organization was called the “Croat Legion,” and it very well may have 
been at the top echelons, which were filled with far-right Croatian nationalists like Josip 
Metzger, who famously promised to “fry Serbs in boiling oil.”182 Banac mentions that the 
Yugoslav or Croatian Legion recruited Croats by “one device or another” and “under false 
pretenses.”183 That may have included representing the organization as Yugoslav rather than 
Croatian, since much of what Yugoslavia knew about this organization was gleaned through 
interrogation (and probably torture) of Mustafa Dohojčić, a young Bosnian recruited to serve as a 
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foot-soldier. According to his account, after escaping from an internment camp for Serbs, 
Mustafa fled to Hungary in 1918, where he then found work in a logging enterprise. In 1919, 
when Bela Kun’s revolution was in full swing, Mustafa, along with his other South-Slavic co-
workers, was recruited by mysterious figures into a “Yugoslav Legion” and whisked away to a 
paramilitary training camp in Zalaegerszeg. At this camp, according to Mustafa, there were about 
two-thousand trainees. Their goal: “the return of Karl Habsburg to the throne.”184  
In addition, Mustafa provided descriptions of sixty people in the organization, including 
leaders, proving that the “Yugoslav legion” was the same as the “Croatian legion” described by  
Banac. Ethnically, the organization seems to have been truly Yugoslav, with Slovenes, Croats, 
Bosnians, and even Serbs among the recruits that Mustafa knew. Among the Serbs were Karlo 
Šmit, a “Serbian Soldier,” Sergeant Ilija Živanović, from Vršac, a small town in the east Banat, a 
predominately Serbian region, and Tomo Segar, from Pančevo, which is twenty kilometers (or 
about thirty minutes by bus) from Belgrade going east.185 It seems unlikely that an organization 
calling itself the “Croatian Legion” could attract such people. Moreover, as Banac concedes, the 
organization’s leadership contained both Croatian separatists and genuine Yugoslavists, like 
Stjepan Duić and Baron Stjepan Sarkotić, who both wanted “a confederation of the South Slavs 
in which all their historical traits would remain intact.” Others, of course, wanted a fully 
independent Greater Croatia that might include large numbers of Serbs and Slovenes. 186 In other 
words, the Yugoslav/Croat legion, as many of its members understood it, was less a statement of 
pure Croatian nationalism (as Banac presents it), than an ideologically-incoherent violent protest 
against the Serbian centralism. 
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Political Exiles and Trans-Atlantic Politics  
 Demobilized soldiers were not the only targets for foreign intrigue, but they did seem to 
be the most convenient for early-twenties-era Hungary, a defeated, impoverished, and 
revolution-wracked rump state with little ability to project power beyond its own borders. Italy, 
in contrast, had a well-developed diplomatic service and the financial wherewithal to meddle in 
overseas diaspora politics. Italian diplomats also had a great deal of practice doing so; they had 
been “making Italians” in Italy’s enormous overseas emigration since the late 1880s.187 Nor did 
Italian diplomats limit themselves to ‘their own’ overseas nationals. In 1922, the Yugoslav 
general consul in Chicago learned of the existence of a Montenegrin separatist movement within 
the United States.188 While small and short-lived, its history merits retelling because it 
anticipated the pattern of émigré politics during the 1930s.  
The movement had its origins in 1919, when the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes 
annexed the principality of Montenegro via referendum. Displeased by this outcome, some 
elements of the government of Montenegro went into exile, most notably Jovan Plamenac, the 
former Minister of the Interior of the Montenegrin government. Plamenac had previously made a 
name for himself by launching an insurrection in Montenegro in January, 1919. It failed: the 
insurgents were both outgunned (the government had artillery) and badly outnumbered: Ivo 
Banac put their numbers at only several thousand. 189 Nonetheless, Montenegrin separatism 
represented an opportunity for Italy, which coveted Yugoslavia’s Adriatic littoral.Three years 
later, in 1922, Montenegrin separatist organizations began springing up in the United States. 
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Their Italian backing was only thinly disguised. For instance, the Detroit-based Federacija 
Nezavisnih Crnagoraca (Federation of Independent Montenegrins), was by an Italian, Luigi 
Criscuolo, although it had a Montenegrin figurehead.190 Other “Montenegrin” organizations 
made no pretentions toward Slavdom: take, for instance, Montenegrini Central Relief 
Association, whose program at its fundraiser concert consisted almost entirely of Italian artists,191 
or the Associazione Centrale Montenegrina di Benefizenza. Despite the name, the latter 
organization was headed by Jovan Plamenac, who had reemerged in émigré politics in 1922 
when he wrote to Vladimir Petrović, a former member of the Montenegrin Diplomatic Service, 
unilaterally appointing him Delegate General of his new organization, which in 1922 fronted as 
an apolitical charity.192  
In spring of 1923, Plamenac was permitted entry the United States over the protests of 
Yugoslav diplomats.193 This would come to be a leitmotif of diaspora politics—American 
officials were generally indifferent to the pleas of Yugoslav consular officials to bar entry to 
opposition political figures. Furthermore, Plamenac, in what would also become a pattern, 
circumvented the need for a Yugoslav passport by obtaining a passport in Italy. In this case, it 
was a “Montenegrin” passport, although later it would be more common to simply use Italian, 
Hungarian, or German passports. Once he arrived in New York City, Plamenac contacted his 
nephew, Dr. N. Kaludjerović, a prominent Yugoslav-American. This too was not unusual: many 
Yugoslav public figures had family on both sides of the Atlantic. Svetozar Pribićević’s son 
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Stojan lived and worked in the in America after 1932. There were many others: Nikola Tesla had 
a nephew in the Yugoslav parliament: Sava Kosanović. Ante Biankini, an American surgeon, 
was the brother of Juraj Biankini, a Croatian politician. The Yugoslav consul in Chicago, 
Božidar Purić, was married to Nikola Pašić’s daughter. Stjepan Radić’s son, Petar, would 
continue his late father’s work in the United States and in South America after 1929.  And so on. 
Family ties formed one part of the web of transnational connections that linked the emigration, 
and its debate over the Yugoslav idea, to the old country. Moreover, family ties made it easier for 
overseas politicians to navigate the treacherous waters of émigré politics and allowed them to 
circumvent the bounds of acceptable meddling for foreigners. Using Kaludjerović as a proxy, 
Plamenac was able to abandon the Associazione Centrale Montenegrina di Benefizenza’s 
apolitical pretense, issuing a declaration that “Montenegro will never submit to Serbian 
domination.”194 While in the United States, Plamenac also collaborated and coordinated with 
Luigi Criscuolo and the openly “separatist” Federation of Independent Montenegrins.195 
Plamenac even printed his own money, ten-dollar bonds to be redeemed if Montenegro achieved 
independence.196 Although they were a poor investment in hindsight, at least a few Americans 
bought them. 
 Among Montenegrin-Americans, however, the idea of an independent Montenegro had 
little appeal; the Federation of Independent Montenegrins had only about one-hundred members, 
according to consular estimates.197 And one could speculate as to what percentage of that was 
Italian-American. Nevertheless, Plamenac’s connections to the American political elite made 
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him a threat. In May 17, 1923, coinciding with Plamenac’s arrival, Hamilton Fish III, a 
prominent congressman, attempted to organize a political committee “for the sole purpose of 
advocating the right of the people of Montenegro to hold a plebiscite to determine whether they 
shall enter Yugoslavia, or maintain their own independence and territorial integrity.” He also 
invited the editor of the New York Times, Louis Wiley, to join, according to correspondence 
intercepted by the Yugoslav consulate.198 In the opinion of the New York Yugoslav general 
consulate, Plamenac was behind it all. Having identified the problem, they proposed as that they 
round up some loyal Montenegrin Americans into a counter-lobby, which would receive a $200 
monthly subsidy from the consulate. This lobby, like Plamenac’s, would also raise money for the 
victims of the famine in Montenegro, thereby denying Plamenac the moral high ground. From 
this bully pulpit, this committee would issue scathing denunciations of Plamenac, accusing him 
of embezzling donations, funding terrorism in Montenegro, taking money from Italy, and being 
an Italian hireling.199 This was, in fact, the first proposal by Yugoslav officials to organize 
emigrants into a political lobby, albeit a temporary one.  
In any event, smearing Plamenac proved superfluous, as Plamenac was neutralized 
through deportation and bribery. By enlisting the help of prominent Serbian, Croatian, and 
Slovenian Americas in petitioning several congressmen, the General Consulate in Chicago was 
able to prevent the extension of Plamenac’s six-month stay in the United States.200 Plamenac’s 
departure fractured his movement’s unity. Plamenac and Criscuolo parted ways after 1923 over 
an unspecified dispute. Barred from staying further in the United States and having found little 
traction for his movement there, Plamenac cut a deal with Yugoslav authorities, agreeing to 
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inform on Criscuolo201 and to join the pro-regime Serbian Radical Party.202 The movement for 
Montenegrin independence in America petered out soon after. 
 The Croatian Republican Peasant Party (HRSS), however, proved to be a more tenacious 
overseas critic. As the backbone of the opposition through both the entirety of Yugoslavia’s 
parliamentary period as well as during the dictatorship, which began in 1929, the HRSS stood for 
autonomy for Croatia within a decentralized, federal Yugoslavia, which made them the enemy of 
the ruling People’s Radical Party (NRS), which, while neither particularly radical and nor 
populist, did support a strong central government based in Belgrade. Because the Yugoslavia’s 
emigrant population was around fifty-percent Croatian, it is not surprising that HRSS politicians 
made campaigning in the diaspora one part of their fight against Belgrade’s ‘tyranny.’  
 In January, 1922, the same year that Plamenac began his effort to organize a movement 
for Montenegrin Independence, the Yugoslav foreign ministry learned that Ljudevit Kežman, a 
member of the HRSS’s central committee, intended to visit the United States.203 According to 
intelligence from the General Consul in Chicago, sympathizers in the United States had been 
preparing for Kežman’s arrival for some time.204 Near the end of 1921, HRSS sympathizers in 
the United States had founded the Croatian Republican League, modeling their new organization 
on the Irish Republican League. Like the Irish Republican League, the Croatian Republican 
League was also dedicated to financing nationalist political parties in the homeland. Despite the 
Croatian Republican League’s youth, this organization was already flourishing: over fifty 
branches (which could be from ten to one hundred people) had been founded and they had 
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already begun to collect donations.205 This made them magnitudes more threatening to 
Yugoslavia than Plamenac’s hundreds. One reason the CRL were so popular was that, unlike 
Plamenac, the Croatian Peasant Party sought no assistance from Italy or Hungary—being 
identified as foreign provocateur could undermine an organiation’s credibility. 
Both the HRSS’s and Montenegrin Green’s overseas operations movements suggest that 
this sort of trans-Atlantic politics depend on a symbiotic relationship with émigré notables. First, 
while émigré nationalists are capable of organizing on their own (the original organizer behind 
the Croatian Republican League drive was actually a priest from Kansas City named 
Krmpotić)206, the arrival of ‘old country’ politicians like Kežman lent strength and credibility to 
these efforts. These political celebrities, regardless of their actions or speeches, function as 
rallying points for overseas nationalists. Additionally, the emergence of the Croatian Republican 
League shows how existing “diasporas” provide templates for the ways newer arrivals form their 
own cultural and fraternal organizations—the existence of the Irish Republican League meant 
that the creators of the Croatian Republican league did not have to reinvent the organizational 
wheel. And since these organizations are the main vectors of diaspora nationalist activity, a 
country with many of them, like the United States, may be better at creating diasporas than even 
the emigrants’ country of origin. 
 Visiting Croatian enclaves and making speeches across America for the next two years, 
Kežman attempted to enlist the support of Croats in America for the parliamentary opposition in 
Yugoslavia. Of course, it was not phrased in those terms. According to the Consulate in Chicago, 
which had someone eavesdropping on his speeches, Kežman adopted the language of universal 
human rights and national self-determination, arguing that only the head of the HRSS, Stjepan 
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Radić, could liberate the “oppressed Croatian people” from the Serbian yoke.207  In November of 
the same year, Radić himself attempted to come to the United States, showing the degree to 
which outreach to overseas Croats had become a pillar of HRSS strategy. However, the 
Yugoslav Legation in Washington, did not think Radić would be able to achieve anything since 
he lacked any contacts in Washington; the support of the hoi polloi was apparently not enough to 
effect kind of radical change Radić wanted.208 Put another way, Radić was just as dependent on 
collaboration with local notables as the Emigration Service or Jovan Plamenac. Naturalized 
‘Yugoslavs’ and community leaders were vital intermediaries between Yugoslav politicians and 
the people that they were trying to persuade. But while Radić and Kežman’s efforts were not 
total successes, in the sense that they were not able to induce the US government to support 
Croatian independence, they were not the total failures predicted by the Legation: the HRSS had 
sunk organizational roots in the United States that would prove difficult to dislodge over the next 
two decades. More broadly, these early experiences with Croatian and Montenegrin “separatists” 
conditioned Yugoslav officials to view emigres as a security threat. In their view, emigres were a 
potential source of national renewal, but they were uniquely vulnerable to the suasion of disloyal 
politicians.  
Conclusion 
To recapitulate, from 1922 onward, the newly formed Kingdom of Yugoslavia sought to 
learn all it could about the hundreds of thousands of overseas Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes that it 
inherited from Austria-Hungary. While their basic assumption was that the emigration ought to 
support Yugoslavia both economically and politically, Yugoslav officials discovered that, for the 
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emigration to do this, they must first combat assimilation and make its overseas “subjects” into 
good Yugoslavs. Only then could they be permitted to repatriate and put the money and skills 
they acquired overseas to use in Yugoslavia. This conviction was reinforced by their early 
experience with émigré paramilitary groups like the Yugoslav Legion as well as more peaceful 
activists like Jovan Plamenac of the Montenegrin Greens or Ljudevit Kežman of the Croatian 
Peasant Party.  Yugoslavization, at least as practiced overseas, was a direct reaction both to 
Americanization and the efforts of émigré politicians and dissidents.  
Yet Yugoslav diplomats understanding of Americanization was flawed. Assimilation and 
“Americanization” was not incompatible with Yugoslavism, but often complementary. We see 
this, for instance in the activities and proclamations of émigré activists in the United States, 
whose Yugoslav patriotism was often grounded in support for a republic and/or federalism. In 
this, we can find the beginnings of an answer to the question posed in my introduction: how is 
diaspora nationalism shaped both by the host country (in this case, a federal republic)? Further 
evidence that Americanization and Yugoslavization were compatible can be found within the 
nascent Yugoslav labor movement within the United States. Although building socialism in the 
United States remained the goal of many Yugoslavs in the CPUSA, much of their activism took 
place within and created connections between emigrant organizations like the Croatian Fraternal 
Union or the Slovene National Benefit Society. As such, there existed the potential for a 
Yugoslav diaspora united by the left, although political repression in the United States made 
such a network politically unviable, at least for the moment. 
 Similarly, we see the influence of US-based diasporas in the overseas activism of the 
Croatian Peasant Party or the Montenegrin Greens. From these existing political networks 




émigré activists could borrow templates for their own activism, like the Irish Republican League 
or even obtain financial assistance in the case of Italian migrants.   
Moreover, the cases of Kežman and Plamanac relate back to the question posed in the 
introduction about what, besides remittances, anchor diasporic networks. Travel and travelers, I 
argue, possess symbolic capital no less significant to migrants than the flow of money to family 
in the ‘old country.’ Given the difficulties and costs associated with trans-Atlantic trouble, being 
seen to possess the “truth” about Yugoslavia, derived from personal experience, gave instant 
credibility and celebrity to travelers, their audience hungry for news about the country of their 
birth. Kežman and Plamanac would be the first of many Yugoslav politicians to take advantage 
of this.  



















CHAPTER TWO: ANSWERING THE ‘EMIGRATION QUESTION’ 
 
On the March 12, 1922, Jutarnji List, a major Yugoslav newspaper published in Zagreb, 
issued a dire warning about “the propaganda of Americanization” in the United States, stating:  
When an emigrant brings his wife and child overseas, when they liquidate their 
[Yugoslav] property, when they break all ties that link them to the Old Country, 
when they settle down in their new homeland and become citizens: then they are 
lost to us, then they have ceased to become a factor in our national calculus, despite 
the pure national blood of them and their offspring.209 
 
Yet despite the handwringing in the “Old Country” about the “threat” posed by the American 
“melting pot,” during the first half of the 1920s the number of “Yugoslav” emigrant 
organizations surged. The Sokol organization, a gymnastic society for youths long associated 
with Slavic national movements, were a case in point. In 1921, the Croatian Sokol groups in the 
San Francisco bay area decided at their yearly convention to rebrand as Yugoslav Sokols and to 
reaffiliate with the Yugoslav Sokol organization, which was based out of Ljubljana, rather than 
the Croatian Sokol organization, which was based in Zagreb.210  The Yugoslav zeitgeist 
influenced other groups as well. In St. Louis in 1922, Serbian and Croatian community leaders in 
the “colony” agreed to form a “Yugoslav Club,” which would work toward “ever closer 
rapprochement between Serb and Croat.” A group of Serbian and Croatian businessmen also 
agreed to form an “Association of Yugoslav Traders,” which sought to build commercial ties 
between the two groups, as well as linkages between America and Yugoslavia.211 In Detroit of 
the next year, local Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes formed another “Yugoslav Club,” which would 
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be headed by a Croat from Bosnia, with a Prečani Serb as Treasurer, and a Croatian and 
Montenegrin secretary.212 It is difficult to say how common these new “Yugoslav” clubs and 
organizations were at the time, as the evidence for them is mostly anecdotal—Yugoslavia, as 
noted in the previous chapter, initially knew very little about “its” emigrant population. But we 
can extrapolate backward: Ivan Mladineo’s Narodni Adresar, a snapshot of diaspora political life 
in the 1930s, reveals that roughly one-third of their national cultural organizations, mutual 
benefit societies, athletic societies, and newspapers were “Yugoslav” in name, rather than Serb, 
Croat, or Slovene.213  
Even critics of these organizations found it necessary to pay lip-service to Yugoslavism. 
After the Organization of Yugoslav traders formed, for instance, a group of Croatian 
businessmen denounced one of the organizers of these initiatives in a private meeting with the 
consul. Yet, remarkably, they still couched their opposition in the Yugoslav idea, noting that one 
of the organizers was “not a good Yugoslav,” a Serbian chauvinist and an Italian flunky, 
(concerns that the consul dismissed as “stupidities”).214 Yet even if the consul did not see it, the 
Yugoslav idea enjoyed legitimacy if even criticism of Yugoslavist initiatives was couched in 
Yugoslavist language.  
As such, the postwar period represented a golden opportunity for the Yugoslav 
Emigration Commissariat to promote a “Yugoslav diaspora.” As was discussed in the previous 
chapter, during the immediate postwar period (1918-1923), Yugoslav officials came to see the 
“Yugoslav diaspora” that Serbia inherited from Austria-Hungary as both an Achilles heel as well 
as a source of national regeneration. The diaspora harbored both terrorists and entrepreneurs, 
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extremists and the apathetic. The economic potential and industrial expertise of the diaspora 
could only be tapped if assimilation was averted and Croatian, Bosnian, Macedonian, and 
Slovenian “separatism” reigned in.  
This attitude of Yugoslav diplomats reflected a broader discourse in the “old country” 
surrounding what came to be called the “emigration question.” The “emigration question,” in 
turn, affected the development of Yugoslavia’s policy toward “its” diaspora. This chapter 
focuses on the Yugoslav state’s efforts to address the “emigration question” during Yugoslavia’s 
parliamentary period, which ended on January 6, 1929 with the proclamation of a royal 
dictatorship. The 1920s was a formative period for the “Yugoslav diaspora,” during which it 
developed many of the cultural and political institutions and debates that would become 
important nodes in a growing diasporic network during the thirties. During the twenties, we see 
the genesis of the Serbian Exarchate, joint charity drives, Yugoslav clubs, and the major 
Yugoslav fraternal societies, along with a variety of political and cultural interpretations of the 
Yugoslav idea, both by emigrants and cultural missionaries from the ‘Old Country.’ While 
outlining these developments, this chapter will evaluate the effectiveness of the Yugoslav 
bureaucracy at implementing its own proposals, as well as the role of emigrants and their 
organizations, which often picked up the slack.  
The Emigration Question 
But what was the emigration question? The “iseljeničko pitanje” or  “emigration 
question” was not new—it had roots in prewar debates over the evils of emigration in various 
South-Slavic newspapers of the Habsburg monarchy. Like the Eastern Question, Macedonian 
Question, and Jewish question, the Yugoslav Emigrant Question was a convenient shorthand for 
many interrelated policy debates and concerns: depopulation of areas contributing emigrants, 




mistreatment of emigrants by steamship companies and by American capitalists, vices acquired 
by emigrants living in American cities, and so on. The Croatian politician Stjepan Radić even 
attacked emigration as an attempt by Austro-Hungary to expel its Slavic subjects and colonize 
their former villages with Germans and Magyars. While that was debatable, Austro-Hungary had 
done little to hinder emigration. Nor had provincial governments had much success either: all 
three attempts (in 1906, 1910, and 1914) by the Croatian Sabor to pass emigration reform had 
ended in failure.215 The creation of Yugoslavia represented an opportunity for those who wanted 
to “do something” about emigration.  
Likewise, news stories about emigres and their activities across the Atlantic had been an 
established genre in old-country newspapers for decades. Prewar Serbo-Croatian newspapers from 
Austro-Hungary regularly bemoaned emigration as a force that sapped the vital energies of the 
Croatian or Serbian people. In this form, the “emigration question” was already almost two 
decades old by the time of Yugoslavia’s formation.216 Yet the formation of a Yugoslav state caused 
some periodicals to take an interest in “Yugoslav” rather than Croatian, Serb, or Slovene 
emigrants. On November 12, 1921, Jutarnji List, a major Zagreb newspaper, launched a new 
column about “our emigrants.”  In typical fashion, Jutarnji List focused almost exclusively on the 
American emigration, probably because of the emigration’s size, as well as longstanding 
fascination with America as a nascent great power and the famed ‘land of opportunity.’ The United 
States’ reputation as a “melting pot” also proved influential, as almost from the beginning, Jutarnji 
List homed in on the issue of assimilation. 
 In this first article, Jutarnji list introduced its audience to the history of European 
emigration to the United States and provided estimates for the percentage of each ethnic group to 
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have become Americanized, statistics they acquired from an Emigration Commission Report from 
1912. The English, Germans, Scandinavians and the Irish were, unsurprisingly, the most 
Americanized, with an acculturation rate above eighty percent. “Yugoslavs” were significantly 
less so, with an overall naturalization rate of 23.7%, which broke down to 35.8% for Slovenes, 
22.5% for Croats, and 12.8% for Serbs. This encouraging data notwithstanding, Jutarnji List 
concluded by warning that Yugoslavs in America, like the groups of emigrants who preceded 
them, were starting to set down roots in America, taking wives and having children, children who 
were “our future national strength.” Jutarnji List continued: “We should not permit our strongest 
and healthiest to serve another…let us return them [to Yugoslavia]…as qualified workers to serve 
our own national renewal.”217 Even before the Yugoslav government began to address the 
“emigration question,” the Yugoslav press was debating how the energies of Yugoslavia’s newly-
discovered diaspora could be harnessed and its ethnic identity “preserved.”  
Jutarnji List was not finished with the issue. On the March 12, 1922, Jutarnji List 
publicized several alarmist anecdotes about returning emigrants. One involved a couple, “fanatical 
Americans” deluded by “egalitarian dreaming or inflated jingoism,” gushing about the ease of 
acquiring a factory job in America, the kindness of police, and respect with which workers were 
treated. Another of their anecdotes recounted how a returning emigrant bragged about his three 
children “who speak only English and who rarely speak Croatian aloud, asserting that to do so 
would bring them shame.” And a third recounted how another emigrant only sent his children to 
American schools (instead of Croatian-language schools.) The article concluded:  
“As we can see from these examples of precipitous denationalization, our world is 
not immune to Americanization, there are those who have already…gone mad from 
Americanism, and if our state does not make an effort to attack [Americanization] 
in the same measure, the percentage of emigrants breaking ties with the Old 
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Country, who are already sinking into the American mileau, and whose children 
may even lose the memory of the land of their fathers, will steadily grow. The 
cardinal assignment of our Emigration Policy should be the examination of all 
threats to our emigrants analogous [to Americanization] around the world and the 
redoubling of efforts to preserve their national consciousness…[because] it is in 
our national and economic interest [that these emigrants] return richer to the 
homeland, as a factor in economic reconstruction. ” 218 
 
As we can see, Jutarnji List had a visceral reaction to Americanization, portraying it as an 
unnatural process that deprived Yugoslavia of its rightful citizens. American nationality is 
conceived of as a delusion masking emigrants’ true nationality. In this, their take on the emigration 
question differed slightly from that of the consuls, who, at least at the beginning, were more 
concerned about money. Of course, as Jutarnji List pointed out, émigré dollars mattered as well, 
but, as they correctly observed, the ‘diaspora dollar’ could only be tapped if Yugoslavia could 
“preserve” emigrant national consciousness.  
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Fig. 2: Cartoon in Politika, April 30, 1936. “Nikola Tesla and his Ličani” Fond 967, 
kut. 38, HDA. 
 
This belief that emigrants would bring all the benefits of industrial civilization to a 
backward Yugoslavia, along with the belief that the emigration was, for whatever reason, not doing 
nearly enough in that direction, lasted through the entire interwar period. Eventually, emigrants 
would develop their counter-narrative, in which despite all their charitable initiatives, Yugoslavia 
was not doing enough to help them. But the heart of the emigration question is most poignantly 
captured by this 1936 political cartoon from the Belgrade daily Politika, titled “Tesla and his fellow 
Likans” which depicts two hard-bitten peasants from Lika, Tesla’s birthplace. One says to the 
other in the local dialect: “Hey, it’s said in the newspapers that every ‘lectric (appliance) that shines 
in the world was a gift of that Tesla of ours,” to which the other grouses: “Eh, I wish he would 




remember to send us at least one little match.”219 In their view, Tesla was clearly not doing his part 
if Likan peasants were still using matches while electric lighting spread across the world.  
The intervention of the Yugoslav state gave the “emigration question” a statist flavor—its 
priorities shifted. For the interwar period the emigration question could be distilled down to a 
single root question: How can citizens abroad, whose country of origin cannot tax, draft, arrest, 
or otherwise coerce them, be persuaded to contribute to the fatherland?  While this proprietary 
attitude was implicit in the emigrant “census” and the “colony” visits, Yugoslav officials’ first 
systematic consideration of the “emigration question” comes in a five-page policy paper from the 
general consul in Chicago from 1922, addressed directly to Momčilo Ninčić, the Yugoslav 
Minister of Foreign Affairs. Since both its reasoning and conclusions laid the foundation for 
Yugoslav’s emigration-politic in the interwar period, it merits scrutiny. The beginning of the 
report notes that from the date of their founding in America, neither the legation nor the general 
consulates had received any broad policy directives about the “emigration question.” Their 
activity had been largely directionless— according to the consulate, they did not know whether 
emigration to America ought to be discouraged, allowed, or reversed entirely with the aim of 
repatriating Yugoslavs, who were overwhelmingly factory laborers, to Yugoslavia.220 With this 
lack of direction in mind, the consul laid out what were, in his view, the benefits and drawbacks 
of Yugoslavia’s overseas population.  
In the consul’s estimation, the emigration’s potential was primarily economic. Families in 
Yugoslavia depended on remittances, which provided an influx of hard currency that could be 
used to pay off Yugoslavia’s war debt and fund growth.221 In this, the consul was probably 
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thinking of Italy, which had harnessed remittances from overseas Italians to fund 
industrialization before WWI.222  Nonetheless, the consul averred, this economic benefit would 
be greater if the overseas Yugoslav was instead working in a factory in Yugoslavia, where their 
labor would be benefiting Yugoslav industrialists and their wages supporting Yugoslav 
shopkeepers and merchants.223 Of course, in 1922 these factories only existed on paper. 
According to the Chicago consul, emigrants were valuable to Yugoslavia not just for 
what they earned in the United States, but also for what they learned. Working in factories and 
mines, emigrants became familiar with manufacturing techniques and labor organization, which 
the emigrants could then, theoretically, use to benefit Yugoslavia when they repatriated.224 This 
idea had been circulating for some time—the US progressive intellectual Randolph Bourne 
argued in 1916 in Atlantic Monthly that “To stigmatize the alien who works in America for a few 
years and returns to his own land…is to ignore the fact that the returning immigrant is often a 
missionary to an inferior civilization…this continued passage to and fro has already raised the 
material standard of living of these backward countries.”225  
Nonetheless, the Chicago consul’s overall conclusions were grim: emigrants constituted a 
net loss for the fatherland. Because most overseas workers remained unmarried, they were 
hurting Yugoslav population growth. The six-hundred thousand “Yugoslavs” in the United States 
drained Yugoslavia of roughly one-hundred thousand draftable men, or, as the consul bluntly put 
it, “seven whole divisions…that could save our state in a critical moment from annihilation.” By 
his calculus, ninety-percent of Yugoslav earnings were being retained in America and the 
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benefits of their labor were accruing to American capitalists. And making the situation even 
worse, thanks to “the traitorous propaganda of our [emigrant] newspapers, most of our emigrants 
are alienated from their new state,” by which he meant Yugoslavia, not the United States. Based 
on these assessments, the consul concluded that the “momentary benefit of the emigrant dollar 
cannot make up for the enormous losses that the (Yugoslav) state and the (Yugoslav) national 
body endure from their departure for foreign lands.” But although he was able to diagnose the 
problem, the “emigration question” as he outlined it was far too large for a mere consul to 
provide policy prescriptions, and as such the consul urged his superiors in the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs to convene a meeting with the Ministries of Social Policy and Finance to discuss 
the problem further at a cabinet meeting and determine how the state should address the 
emigration question.226  
Toward a Solution 
In response to this meeting, the Emigration Service’s first steps were to tighten border 
controls, preventing the emigration ‘problem’ from growing any larger. Their officials were 
instructed to “make difficult the granting of passports in both a material and formal manner.”227 
Very likely, this meant high fees and bureaucratic obstruction—escalating demands for 
increasingly-exotic supporting documents, long lines, long lunch breaks, and short office hours. 
This process would be expedited, however, for non-Slavs (i.e. Germans or Hungarians) desiring 
to emigrate—emigration was seen as a way to rid Yugoslavia of non-Yugoslavs, a non-violent 
form of ethnic cleansing.228 Acknowledging that Yugoslavia had neither enough consulates nor 
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had budgeted enough money to defend overseas emigrants, the Emigration Service instructed 
consulates to build ties with emigrant fraternal societies, which shared their goals of defending 
emigrant finances and fighting assimilation. Further underlining the need for cooperation with 
the emigration, the emigration service also supplemented its official budget with a Emigration 
Fund, which would be filled by donations from “those who benefit from emigration,” namely 
steamship companies, the various banks that handled emigrant remittances, and the emigrants 
themselves.229 Essentially a slush fund for consular officials, the Emigration Fund allowed 
consuls to patronize emigrant activists and their organizations without seeking formal approval 
for the expenditures from the Skupština or foreign ministry. 
While ‘Yugoslavs’ could be prevented from leaving Yugoslavia, they could not be so 
easily compelled to return. Of course, Yugoslav officials might not have anticipated this as a 
problem; they had reason to expect repatriation. After all, during the pre-war period, the rate of 
return for Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes had been quite high—over two thirds of migrants 
surveyed in 1910 expressed their intent to work for several years in the United States, save up 
money, and then return to their families in the old country. Over half actually did so, according 
to Ulf Brunnbauer’s estimate.230 And while World War I disrupted the flow of migrants, the 
prewar pattern seemed to have hesitantly resumed in the immediate postwar period: 1,950 
repatriated in 1923 and 4,821 in 1924.231 1924, however, proved to be a turning point: the 1924 
quota law capped the allowed number of ‘Yugoslav’ emigrants to 671 per annum.232 
Consequently, those who repatriated would find it difficult to return to the United States (legally, 
anyway) if they changed their mind. As Brunnbauer points out, wages were higher and prices 
 
229 Ibid, 20, 28.  
230 Brunnbauer, Globalizing Southeastern Europe, 110-11. 
231 Yearly report of the IK for 1924, part 1, page 32. Fond 1071, kut. 548, HDA. 
232 Yearly report of the IK for 1924, part 2 (Information Division), page 2. Fond 1071, kut. 548, HDA. 




were lower in the United States233—better to be stuck in the United States (where a worker could 
eat meat every day) than in Yugoslavia. As a result, overseas return migration plummeted after 
1924 and stayed depressed through the entire interwar period.234 
A more systematic plan by Yugoslavia to address the emigration question emerged 
following a conference on the “emigration question” sponsored and hosted by Italy in 1924.235 
After all, Yugoslavia was not the only country with an “emigration question”—Italy too had 
struggled with imposing a national identity on a restive emigrant population, most of whom were 
from southern Italy. The IK was not able to attend the event, although they were invited. They 
did, however, request and receive transcripts and various other conference materials, which they 
thought would be “of great importance for the construction of our own emigration service.”236 
One year later, Yugoslavia published a comprehensive plan for promoting national identity in 
emigrants. We can assume that many of this conference inspired many of the following 
proposals, although the exact material that the IK requested unfortunately does not appear in the 
archive.   
In 1925, the Emigration Commissariat (IK) of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and 
Slovenes (KSHS) authored their first reply to the emigration question, a blueprint for creating a 
“Yugoslav diaspora.” Declaring that “the Emigration Question is so important that it should not 
be left to a few state functionaries to resolve; it requires the cooperation of our entire society, 
which heretofore has shown too little interest in the tenth of our People residing overseas,”237 the 
IK broke with the practice of leaving overseas cultural propaganda to a handful of Yugoslav 
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diplomats living in the United States. Recognizing that mass-repatriation was no longer likely, 
the IK nonetheless resolved to combat Americanization, stating, “if [emigres] must be 
Americans, let them be Americans who nurture sympathy for our narod and our people.”238 To 
accomplish this, the IK laid out a twelve-point program for ‘preserving’ Yugoslav culture 
overseas and cultivating ties between overseas “Yugoslavs” and their new ‘Old Country.’ Many 
elements of this program overlapped, however, and it can be distilled into four major themes: 
supporting organized religion, sending national “missionaries,” disseminating literature, and 
promoting tourism. We will go through each proposal in turn. 
The Founding of the Serbian Exarchate in America 
The first proposal of the IK was to fund emigrant churches and parish schools, while 
simultaneously bringing them under control of the Yugoslav state.239 Support for these 
organizations was not merely about piety; organized religion and Yugoslavia’s conservative 
government were natural allies in the fight against both denationalization and “separatism.” To 
wit, Eastern Orthodoxy was linked with “Serbian-ness,” which could sow confusion in the ranks 
of overseas Montenegrin and Macedonian “separatists,” who were also Orthodox.  In much the 
same way, Catholicism was linked to being Croatian and Slovenian. And parochial schools for 
both faiths could ensure that the children of emigrants would continue to speak “Serbo-Croato-
Slovene,”240 thereby preserving (or creating) a “Yugoslav” linguistic community. Lastly, religion 
was a natural antidote to communism, a specter that Yugoslavia (like most other European 
governments) feared.  
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But according to the IK’s sources, both ethnic churches and schools were in a woeful 
state throughout the overseas settlement—not only were they poor and badly managed, there 
were just too few of them. In the entire United States, to meet the needs of over six-hundred 
thousand people, there were thirty-eight Slovene, twenty-eight Croatian, and twenty-three 
Serbian churches. The situation was even grimmer elsewhere: Canada had only a single Serbian 
Orthodox Church! As for parish schools, there were, again in the United States, altogether 
twenty-six: fourteen for the Slovenes, twelve for the Croats, and none for the Serbs. And in 
South America, there was only one school, in Antofagasta, Chile.241 These statistics made a 
powerful argument for state intervention in religious affairs. Unless Yugoslavia could do 
something to support organized religion, the second generation of overseas Yugoslavs was going 
to grow up speaking English, Spanish, or Portuguese and, unfortified by religion, might even 
become Communists.  
In the case of religious support, the IK’s plan was merely an attempt to get out ahead of 
something already being done on the consular level. Since 1923, the consulates had been 
working to build up the Serbian Orthodox church in the United States. Their goal was to 
establish an exarchate. After all, there were neither enough churches nor priests for the Yugoslav 
diaspora, with the Serbs being the worst affected. Establishing a Serbian Orthodox exarchate (a 
kind of autonomous diocese one rank below a full patriarchate), would subordinate Serbian 
orthodox churches in America to the Church in Yugoslavia and allow the Yugoslav government 
to shape and direct their cultural  activities. Moreover, this move would legally justify 
Yugoslavia sending money and priests, who would then, in theory, preach Yugoslav patriotism.  
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To head this exarchate, Archimandrite Mardarije, a Montenegrin, was selected. This 
choice was explicitly about promoting national unity, both at home and abroad. The Yugoslav 
consulate in Chicago hoped that this choice would stymie Montenegrin separatist agitators like 
Dr. Vladimir Petrović, a former minister in the Montenegrin government, or Jovan Plamenac, 
who was discussed in Chapter One. Mardarije’s selection, the consulate privately admitted, 
would  prove to both the broader American public and to Montenegrins in America that 
Montenegrins from Yugoslavia were firmly behind the new Yugoslav government.242 Moreover, 
the arrival of Mardarije, they argued, would “encourage the intensification of the nationalistic 
work of Orthodox priests, particularly the subduing of Bolshevik and Montenegrin 
propaganda.”243 There is no ambiguity—the work of Orthodox priests was explicitly political: to 
fight Bolshevism and Montenegrin nationalism. Shortly after his arrival, Mardarije met with 
Serbian Orthodox priests in Gary, Indiana to rally them behind the exarchate. Attendance at this 
summit was lukewarm; only eighteen out of the twenty-eight Serbian Orthodox priests in the 
United States attended. 
 But despite this halfhearted turnout and the vociferous opposition of a handful of these 
priests to the loss of their autonomy, Mardarije was nonetheless able to muster the support he 
needed to declare a Serbian exarchate in the United States. Its headquarters were to be in 
Chicago, where their work could be supervised by the nearby General Consulate. Not 
surprisingly, Mardarije was in the pay of the Yugoslav foreign ministry—earning forty dollars 
per month, an amount the Consulates proposed be raised to one-hundred dollars in 1923.244 In 
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modern-day dollars, that is roughly $1,500 per month (a graduate student stipend); Yugoslavia 
was a poor country. Still, Mardarije had probably earned it. A skilled administrator, Mardarije 
would, within a single year, establish numerous churches, schools, and orphanages, reorganize 
the Serbian clergy in America, and go on a whirlwind speaking tour of the United States, 
extolling to those present the virtues of their new ‘Old Country.’245 
Mardarije worked closely with the Yugoslav legation in Washington, which oversaw and 
directed his propagandistic activities. In 1923, the head of the Yugoslav legation, Minister 
Trešić-Pavičić (a Croat), wrote to Mardarije, further confirming that the exarchate and the 
Yugoslav diplomatic service were working together. After congratulating Mardarije on the 
successful founding of another orphanage, Trešić-Pavičić expressed his hope that Mardarije’s 
charitable work on behalf of Serb war-orphans could help unite Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes into 
a single Yugoslav people in the United States. While the problem of war-orphans was more of a 
problem for Serbia, which had been bled dry by the Great War, the problem of workplace 
accidents in the United States affected Serb, Croat, and Slovene equally, and could provide a 
basis for cross-ethnic cooperation and perhaps even the creation of a single pan-Yugoslav 
fraternal society. Yugoslav harmony in the United States could then be held up as an example for 
Yugoslavs in Yugoslavia, Trešić-Pavičić enthused.246 Trešić-Pavičić’s correspondence with 
Mardarije reveals how the Yugoslavization program in the United States was interlinked with 
domestic nation-building efforts—successes on one shore of the Atlantic could be used to 
reinforce the Yugoslavization drive on the other.  
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Conversely, priorities from the domestic Yugoslavization campaign tended to bleed over 
into the emigration. Throughout the interwar period, the Kingdom of Yugoslavia struggled with 
the problem of Macedonian nationalism. Officially, the Kingdom of Yugoslavia did not 
recognize the existence of a separate Macedonian people—Macedonia was called “Southern” or 
“Old” Serbia and its inhabitants were called Serbs, even though they spoke a language far closer 
to Bulgarian than to Serbian. Across the Atlantic, however, Macedonian-American diaspora 
nationalism barely registered on the radar of the diplomatic service—in all their records about 
the various “anti-regime” groups in the United States throughout the twenties, Macedonian 
separatists are mentioned only in passing—and then only rarely. At the time of the campaign to 
build a Serbian exarchate in the United States, the diplomatic service did not seem to regard 
Macedonians as a real threat. Nonetheless, they felt they ought to take proactive measures. A 
note from October 23, 1923 reveals that, in addition to using Mardarije’s Montenegrin 
background as an olive branch Montenegrin Americans, they sought to use the same trick with 
Macedonian Americans, bringing in at least one priest from “Old Serbia” to minister to an 
enclave of “Southern Serbians” in Kansas City.247 By folding Macedonian Americans into a 
Serbian Orthodox exarchate and supplying them with pro-regime priests from Macedonia, the 
Yugoslav Foreign Service sought to dampen the expression of Macedonian separatism.  
There is no evidence of an analogous effort to support Croatian or Slovenian Catholicism 
in the United States. This may be because their churches did not need as much assistance. 
According to the assessment of Ante Trešić-Pavičić, the Croatian head of the Yugoslav Legation, 
“our [Yugoslav] Catholic element in America is far more numerous, organized, and wealthy.”248 
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But while the Serbs undoubtedly did need the help, Croatian and Slovenian Catholics also 
needed institutional support. After all, according to the IK’s own report from 1925, there were 
only thirty-eight Slovene and twenty-eight Croatian churches for the United States, and only 
twenty-six parish schools altogether: fourteen for the Slovenes and twelve for the Croats.249 
Moreover, those same parish schools threatened to work against the Yugoslav project, rather 
than for it. Cardinal Mundelein, as Bishop of Chicago until his death in 1939, worked to turn the 
Catholic Church into an agent of Americanization.  Instruction in Catholic Schools had to be in 
English. According to Mundelein, “the people of the United States must be Americans or 
something else. They cannot serve two masters.” In a separate missive to Theodore Roosevelt, 
Mundelein asserted that “there is hardly any other institution here in the country that does so 
much to bring about a sure, safe and sane Americanization of the children of emigrant people as 
do our parochial schools.”250 This rhetoric coming from the Bishop of Chicago, where tens of 
thousands of Croats and Slovenes lived, ought to have alarmed the Yugoslav diplomatic service. 
But it did not.  
But while Croatian and Slovene Catholic churches were not funded, individual priests 
sometimes enjoyed state support. Just as the consulates found the Orthodox clergy willing 
collaborators in national propaganda, there is at least one documented instance in the 1920s of a 
Catholic priest filling a similar role: Father Mašić, who conducted national propaganda for the 
Yugoslav legation, beginning in 1927, in Seraing, Belgium.251 There were probably others—
according to a report from 1930 from the Chicago General Consulate, most Croatian catholic 
priests were “on our side” and were “patriots and good priests,” even after the assassination of 
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Stjepan Radić sent shockwaves through émigré Croatian communities. The troublemakers, in the 
official view, were not the regular clergy, but Franciscan monks. These monks, unlike the regular 
clergy, were not suborned to American bishops, but to the Franciscan organization in Yugoslavia 
itself. These transatlantic ties made them, in the view of the consulate, more likely bearers of a 
far-right version of Croatian nationalism.252 Moreover, disloyal priests were also an Orthodox 
problem.  Resistance among Serbian-American priests to Mardarije’s exarchate continued well 
into the 1930s.253 So despite the attention Yugoslavia showered on the Serbian exarchate and 
their neglect of Croatian and Slovenian Catholicism, Yugoslav religious policy vis-à-vis the 
diaspora cannot be described as pro-Orthodox and anti-Catholic, or pro-Serb and anti-Croat, 
although it was certainly anti-Montenegrin and Macedonian. Priests of both Christian 
denominations were potential allies in the Yugoslavization project, so long as they accepted 
Belgrade’s leadership.  
The Role of Charity 
As Yugoslav diplomats discovered through their support of emigrant churches, charitable 
work, such as orphanages, provided a palatable way for Serbian, Croatian, and Slovene 
organizations to work together as a Yugoslav whole. They had already witnessed one such 
initiative: post-war relief for Yugoslavia, which had been devastated (along with the rest of 
Europe) by the Great War.  Organized in 1919 in the United States, the Committee for Yugoslav 
relief sent 1,616 chests full of clothes, shoes, and other sundries to Yugoslavia, worth 
$41,595.64, or roughly six-hundred thousand dollars today.  While most of these chests were 
addressed to individuals, presumably relatives or friends of the sender in the old country, sixty-
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six were addressed to neighborhoods or districts, and eighteen to all the people of Yugoslavia.254 
While this suggests that most regular people had more affection for their family or their 
neighborhoods in the old country than for the country itself, that Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes 
from across the United States collected money as part of a single organization meant that the 
Yugoslav idea held some sway on an organizational level. 
In the middle of 1926, heavy rains inundated Yugoslavia, with floods drowning livestock, 
demolishing homes, and destroying the harvest. Since this catastrophe affected all parts of 
Yugoslavia equally, it also represented an opportunity for the diplomatic service to recreate the 
success of post-war relief, but this time under government control. The Yugoslav legation in 
Washington immediately took charge of the relief drive, putting Minister Trešić-Pavičić at the 
organization’s head. Prominent Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes from the emigration were recruited 
into the organization. Representing the Slovenes, there was Vincent Cainkar of the largest 
Slovene mutual-benefit society, the SNPJ, as well as Etbin Kristan, a Slovene politician from 
Yugoslavia now working for the Emigration Commissariat in New York.  Representing the 
Croats, there was the newly formed Croatian Fraternal Union, the largest Croatian mutual benefit 
society, as well as the largest and richest South Slavic organization of any type in the entire 
overseas settlement.  Nikola Tesla and Mihajlo Pupin, the two famous Serbian inventors, 
represented the Serbs. The newly-founded Serbian exarchate, as well as two lodges of the 
Serbian fraternal society Srbobran-Sloga also sponsored the effort.255 These names, written side 
by side in a flyer that was distributed across the United States, were a potent argument for the 
Yugoslav idea, an implicit demonstration of what could be achieved if Serb, Croat, and Slovene 
worked together.  For the same reason, those who donated had their names printed in émigré 
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newspapers, as well as in newspapers in Yugoslavia.256 Once again, the actions the emigration 
took on behalf of Yugoslavia were turned into domestic propaganda. 
 This Yugoslavization aim was also reflected in their call for donations. Addressed to 
“Our People in America,” they both claimed the overseas population and declared them to be 
part of a single (Yugoslav) people. Invoking the memory of Yugoslav postwar relief, they 
declared that the flood “had done enormous harm to our frequently-attacked people,” implicitly 
equating it with the war’s ravages. Stating repeatedly that the floods affected Croatia, Slovenia, 
Bosnia, Montenegro, and “Southern Serbia” almost equally, they implored all “Yugoslavs in 
America to help, in these difficult times their brothers, just as they have acted before for the 
advancement of our united homeland and the well-being of our three-named brethren.” The relief 
money was to be routed to Yugoslavia through the General Consulate in New York. This way, 
Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes who donated were giving to the fatherland rather than to their 
overseas kin or their neighborhoods. Despite all this overt Yugoslavism and the open 
involvement of the Yugoslav diplomatic service, this effort was a qualified success.  While they 
could not match the $40,000 raised for Yugoslav post-war relief, the Committee for the 
Gathering of Aid for Flood Victims nonetheless announced proudly that they had already raised 
$2,706 dollars in the first half of 1926.257 Their implicit message was that much could be 
achieved when Serbian, Croatian, and Slovene societies pooled their resources and acted 
collectively, solidifying a tradition of collective action by the newly unified fraternal societies. 
The Consolidation of the South-Slavic Fraternal Unions 
While the consolidation of the Yugoslav fraternal societies was not a part of the IK’s 
1925 plan, they would nonetheless prove instrumental in its implementation.  It is difficult to 
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overstate the importance of fraternal societies for this period and subject. Around one in three 
“Yugoslavs” in America was in one of these organizations, and it is not hard to see why: in 
exchange for membership dues, fraternal societies provided their members with insurance in case 
of accidents or workplace mishaps.258 Given the near absence of a social safety net in the United 
States during the 1920s, coupled with the dangerous nature of industrial labor, it is difficult to 
overstate the importance of these benefits to workers. Moreover, fraternal unions were a major 
hub of diaspora social and political life for the emigrant working class, especially those that did 
not attend church regularly. Fraternal Unions contributed to ethnic schools, ethnic clubs, and 
ethnic churches. They had their own newspapers, and thus had an enormous influence over the 
minds of their members.259When sufficiently large, they could even influence American 
politicians. Thus, control of the fraternal unions could both bring the Yugoslav idea to regular 
Serb, Croat, and Slovene-Americans, and perhaps also determine the policy of the United States 
toward Yugoslavia. But in 1918, not only was their no single Yugoslav Fraternal Society, there 
was no dominant Serbian, Croatian, or Slovene fraternal organization. 
This began to change in the early 1920s. In 1923, consular officials began to float the 
idea that the various Serb, Croat, and Slovene fraternal societies ought to consolidate and merge 
on Yugoslav lines. Larger and richer organizations, in their view, would be better equipped to 
support libraries, reading rooms, and language courses for their members—in other words, better 
able to fight assimilation and promote the Yugoslav idea.  While they asserted that the eventual 
goal of “the unification of all our Unions [meaning fraternal organizations]…of our three tribes: 
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Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes” was “temporarily impossible to carry out,” the consolidation of 
Serb, Croat, and Slovene organizations “by tribe” was a satisfactory stepping stone.260  
Even facilitating this “tribal” consolidation would prove nettlesome, as the Serbian 
fraternal societies were especially fractured. According to diplomatic records, after the first 
Serbian fraternal organization was founded in 1901, the Srpski Pravoslavni Savez-Srbobran 
(Serbian Orthodox Union-Serb Defender), Serbian fraternal societies had “splintered into many 
smaller groups that were constantly in interpersonal quarrels...one could write whole books on 
these quarrels [as well as] on the misuse of funds, deficits, and the waste of the hard-earned 
dollars of our working world here in America.” For this reason, the diplomatic service opted to 
focus their efforts on the Serbs. Fortunately, consular blandishments had swayed the leaders of 
the two largest Serbian societies, the Srpski Savez Svesne Srbadije (Serbian Union of the 
Conscious Srbadija), from New York, and the Sjedinjenji Savez Srbobran-Sloga (United Union 
of the Serb-Defender-Unity) to consider unification at their twelfth convention in 1923. There, 
they debated a merger, with the (mercifully less alliterative) title: the Srpski Narodni Potporni 
Savez (Serbian National Self-Help Society). Unfortunately, the Srpski Savez Sloboda (Serbian 
Union Freedom), another relatively large organization from Pittsburgh with 3,000 members, 
refused to attend the summit. 261 And at the meeting, the proposal for unification was rejected by 
an overwhelming majority of the members of Sjedinjenji Savez Srbobran-Sloga.262 In a 
resolution delivered to the vice-consul in attendance, they protested also against “those who 
would force our organization to put itself in the hands of those malefactors who have ruined us in 
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the past.” They evidently did not appreciate consular interference—consular heavy-handedness 
could, and would, often backfire. Despite this, the consul vowed to not give up,263 keeping up the 
pressure throughout the 1920s. While their determination would eventually pay off in 1929, with 
the formation of the Srpski Narodni Savez (the Serbian National Union, or SNS), reconciling the 
Serbian self-help-societies kept the Yugoslav diplomatic service busy and prevented them from 
mediating the disputes between Croat and Slovene mutual-benefit societies.  
The Croats and Slovenes muddled through nonetheless. In 1921, at the fourteenth 
convention of the National Croatian Society, the strongest Croatian fraternal union at the time, a 
resolution was passed, apparently without difficulty, calling for a merger of all Croatian fraternal 
societies in America, beginning with the Croatian League of Illinois and the National Croatian 
Society. The merger was carried out smoothly in 1926, forming the Hrvatska Bratska Zajednica 
(Croatian Fraternal Union, or CFU), but not without opposition.264 One Ivan Lupis-Vukić, 
writing in Hrvatski Glasnik, a Croatian émigré newspaper, criticized the merger, citing various 
illegalities in its execution. Ivan Čizmić, a Croat writing during the Yugoslav wars of the 90s, 
conjectured that Lupis-Vukić, a Croat, was, in fact, a Belgrade saboteur and provocateur—
Yugoslavia allegedly did not want a powerful Croatian organization.265 However, as we have 
seen, such an attitude contradicted official policy, which, as we have seen, favored unification. It 
seems unlikely that Yugoslav authorities would seek to sabotage the formation of the Croatian 
Fraternal Union, since that was supposed to be a stepping-stone to a Yugoslav Fraternal Union. 
Moreover, Yugoslav diplomats would later harass the editor of Hrvatski Glasnik in 1929 because 
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of his Croatian nationalism266—it is implausible that they would use that newspaper as a 
mouthpiece in 1926, or that its editor, a nationalist, would consent to such an arrangement. 
Hrvatski Glasnik only became a regime mouthpiece in 1932 after it went bankrupt and its presses 
were bought by the pro-regime newspaper Hrvatska with the help of a secret loan from the 
Chicago general consulate.267  Such an action was also out of character for Lupis-Vukić, who 
returned to Yugoslavia in the 1930s. When Louis Adamic met Lupis-Vukić for the first time on 
his trip to Yugoslavia in 1934, Adamic immediately liked “Lupis” (as he nicknamed him), 
finding him to be “charming” and “uncommonly quiet-mannered for a Dalmatian.”268 Given that 
Louis Adamic was a vocal critic of Belgrade and, as an author, a keen judge of character, it is 
difficult to imagine his “Lupis” as a Belgrade saboteur, driven by hatred for the Croatian cause. 
It seems more likely that Lupis-Vukić either genuinely believed that the merger of fraternal 
unions that created the CFU was illegal or was driven by the same sort of inter-organizational 
rivalries that had stymied the Serbian fraternal unification. If there was sabotage by the Yugoslav 
government, it left little trace in the diplomatic archives, where it almost certainly would have 
appeared—Yugoslav diplomats, as the availability of the abovementioned information should 
indicate, tended to document their schemes. 
Regardless of whether its formation was supported by the government of Yugoslavia, the 
Croatian Fraternal Union, or CFU, instantly became the most important emigrant association. 
With nearly 54,000 members, 467 lodges, and $3,628,932 dollars in assets in 1926,269 the CFU 
was the largest émigré organization and the largest Croatian organization outside of Yugoslavia. 
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And even contrasted with organizations within Yugoslavia, the CFU was respectable. For 
comparison, the preeminent Croatian organization, Stjepan Radić’s Croatian Republican Peasant 
Party (HRSS) had several hundred-thousand supporters, as measured by their vote tally in the 
1923 Yugoslav parliamentary elections.270 The CFU’s relative importance would only grow after 
the HRSS was outlawed in 1929. By 1930, the CFU would have over 92,000 members. The 
second and third largest fraternal societies were both Slovene: the leftist Slovenske Narodne 
Potporna Jednota (SNPJ) and the pro-Clerical Kranjsko Slovenska Katoliško Jednota (KSKJ), 
with 63,000 and 34,000 members respectively. In a distant fourth was the Serbian National 
Union(SNS), with nearly 22,000 members.271 Fifth place was occupied by the only major 
“Yugoslav” organization, the Yugoslav Catholic Union, with 21,000 members, which for 
obvious reasons had limited appeal to the Orthodox Serbs. There remained many minor unions 
with a few thousand members, like the ultraconservative Croatian Catholic Union or the leftist 
Slovene Progressive Benefit Union. However, the CFU, SNPJ, KSKJ, and SNS were the most 
important.  Any advocate of a “Yugoslav” fraternal union would have to reconcile these four 
organizations.   
This would eventually happen in the early 1930s. The eventual driving force behind this 
and the head of the SNPJ, Vincent Cainkar,272 may have been planning it for some time. In 1924, 
just when the consulates were floating the idea of a Yugoslav Fraternal Society, Vincent Cainkar 
approached the Yugoslav General Consul in Chicago to invite him to the twentieth anniversary 
gala of the SNPJ, expressing his delight in having a “homeland founded on national and 
economic freedom,” whose diplomatic service, unlike their Austrian predecessors, took the time 
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to visit Slavic emigrant communities. Furthermore, he asserted that all 50,000 members of the 
SNPJ were “always prepared to suffer for total national unity (narodno jedinstvo) and 
democracy.”273 Because of his deliberate invocation of the Yugoslavist slogan of narodno 
jedinstvo, meaning the unity of Serb, Croat, and Slovene, it is possible that Cainkar was 
attempting to signal his willingness to support a Yugoslav Fraternal Union. The consul did not 
spot this subtext, however, noting later only that “it is interesting that this socialist organization 
is one of the most patriotic organizations in America and that of all our ethnic organizations and 
they respect the authority of our state and its representatives the most.” In other words, the SNPJ 
was a curiosity rather than an opportunity—Yugoslav officials did not generally see leftists as 
allies. While Cainkar’s Yugoslavist ambitions survived, his efforts to consolidate the fraternal 
unions would not begin again in earnest until 1928. 
It is telling that these efforts at unification only began after 1918 and the formation of 
Yugoslavia. It is possible that Yugoslav unification may have shown the benefits of Yugoslav 
unity to the leaders of these fraternal organizations. After all, larger organizations had more 
political clout and were in a better position, though economies of scale, to meet the financial 
needs of their members. But there was another factor at work: American emigration quotas. In 
1921, the Emergency Quota Act limited incoming emigration by national origin, with the per-
year emigration quota being set at 3% of the number of residents from that country living in the 
United States as of the 1910 census. Since far fewer Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes lived in the 
United States then, this choked off the flow of emigration, redirecting it to Canada and South 
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America. Three years later, the Immigration Act of 1924 reduced that percentage to 2%—or 671 
Yugoslavs per annum. Yugoslav emigration to the United States was effectively over.274  
This had one surprising repercussion. In general, ethnic fraternal societies need a constant 
influx of new members to offset the losses from Americanization, demographic attrition, and 
apathy. Since they could no longer recruit new members ‘off the boat,’ Yugoslav fraternal 
societies were left with two other ways of getting new members: absorbing other organizations 
and recruiting the children of existing members. Indeed, this was one of the main reasons for 
unification cited by the CFU.275 After all, it was in the interest of all working-class South Slavs 
that their respective fraternal organizations continue to provide the same benefits. That Yugoslav 
fraternal societies did not undergo a similar consolidation in South America or Belgium, coupled 
with the fact that these drives for unity all began after 1921, suggests that the consolidation of 
fraternal societies was more a product of American quota legislation, and the common class 
interests of immigrant workers, than of consular encouragement or Yugoslavist idealism.  
Nonetheless, these mergers benefited Yugoslavism in North America. After all, 
Yugoslavism was not incompatible with Serbian, Croatian, or Slovene nationalisms, as Pieter 
Troch has argued.276 Moreover, the formation of strong fraternal unions gave each fraternal 
union more resources to devote to cultural work, like schools or newspapers, which could 
potentially be taken in a Yugoslav direction. Sturdy fraternal unions also helped North American 
workers weather the Great Depression better than their counterparts elsewhere in the globe, 
making it difficult for far-right anti-Yugoslav groups like the Ustaša to gain traction. And, lastly, 
these mergers, by simplifying the political terrain, laid the groundwork for the formation of the 
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Yugoslav National Federation, a confederation between the CFU, SNPJ, and SNS, in the 1930s. 
It is easier to unite three large organizations than forty small ones.  
Educational Politics in the 1920s 
Several initiatives during the 1920s failed or had to be delayed due to lack of state 
support. One of those was the creation of a Yugoslav Press-bureau in New York City. There was 
certainly need for it. Despite all this activity going on in their midst, Americans in the 1920s 
knew nothing about Yugoslavia. To them “Jugoslovakia and Czechoslavia” were the same: their 
citizens “half-barbarians who might as well live on Mars,” as one diplomat put it.277 Louis 
Adamic, in his biography, wrote how Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes were the same as “Austrians” 
to ignorant Americans.278 Furthermore, American parochialism and its confusing taxonomies 
interfered with Ivan Mladineo’s efforts to count the number of “Yugoslavs” in the United States, 
part of the ad-hoc diaspora census discussed in Chapter One. Because of this, from 1922 to 1924, 
Mladineo lobbied the legation in Washington and the Yugoslav foreign ministry for permission 
to create a Yugoslav-American information service.  
This new information service was modeled on the Foreign Language Information 
Service, an organization that was founded in the wake of America’s entry into the first World 
War, in 1918. Although initially formed to help a non-English-speaking audience understand 
draft and enlistment paperwork, after the war FLIS’s goal became something called 
“constructive assimilation.” Declared that “assimilation cannot be forced on the immigrant,” 
FLIS’s goal was to demolish the language barrier, “to interpret America to the Alien and the 
Alien to America,” translating information about of variety of subjects, from the naturalization 
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process to child care, into a host of European languages and dispersing them as press releases to 
immigrant newspapers.279 Ivan Mladineo headed and managed the Yugoslav section of FLIS.280  
Mladineo’s proposed organization’s goal superficially resembled that of FLIS: to “teach 
the American public about our land and people (narod).”  Emigrants of Yugoslav origin were 
also a target audience. Had it been founded, Mladineo’s new pressbureau would have shown how 
Americanization and the promotion of ethnic distinctiveness were complementary projects. The 
Yugoslav legation, however, shot down his proposal in 1924, allegedly because the legation, 
which already put out press releases, saw it as redundant. It is also possible that Yugoslavia was 
unwilling to let an American citizen and an employee of an organization whose stated goal was 
assimilation to decide what Yugoslav culture was.281 Regardless, Yugoslavia would not seriously 
attempt to steer press coverage in the diaspora until after 1929. 
Another initiative that foundered because of Yugoslav tightfistedness was language 
instruction. At the beginning of the 1920s, according to reports collected from the General 
Consulate in Chicago, language instruction for Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes was controlled by 
priests, who “from time to time teach our children.” Occasional instruction was not enough—
formal schools with daily instruction, paid teachers, and a schoolhouse were needed. But there 
were none. In 1921, the Chicago Consulate found no formal schools in its entire jurisdiction, 
which included the entire Midwest and the three major “Yugoslav” cities: Cleveland, Pittsburgh, 
and Chicago.282 And on the West Coast, Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes were far too dispersed for 
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language schools to be practical, according to a report by the Consul in San Francisco.  Most 
secular language schools were only afterschool programs that operated for only two or three days 
of the week.  For that reason, the consul in San Francisco was “very pessimistic” about the 
possibility of establishing full-time schools, noting that previous attempts had had trouble getting 
enough students and had quickly become “unprofitable.” Emigrant education apparently had to 
pay for itself—the emigration was something that contributed to Yugoslavia, rather than vice-
versa. Instead of funding full-time secular language education, the consul recommended that, “if 
there is still an intention to do something to preserve the national identity of our emigrants,” the 
best approach would be a system of “traveling teachers.”283 Despite their dissatisfaction with 
parochial schools, building a network of secular schools was apparently too expensive.  For the 
remainder of the 1920s the official policy of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia was to leave language 
education to the clergy-- according to a survey of Yugoslav schools in the United States from 
1930, parochial schools still predominated. 284 And since, the Kingdom of Yugoslavia was only 
supporting the Serbian Orthodox church, they were effectively leaving Croats and Slovenes to 
educate themselves. Emigrants, however, were not significantly worse off, education-wise, than 
Yugoslavs in Yugoslavia. As Pieter Troch notes, the Kingdom of Yugoslavia did not form a 
standardized curriculum to inculcate Yugoslav patriotism until the establishment of the royal 
dictatorship in 1929. Even after, 40% of the population continued to be illiterate.285  
The reluctance or inability of Yugoslavia to support emigrant cultural initiatives was not 
restricted to North America. In 1926, local notables (a university professor, two architects, and 
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several businessmen) in Buenos Aires also founded a Yugoslav club in 1926 and immediately 
sought support from the Yugoslav legation. They received assistance no more substantial than 
“moral support” and had to pay for the club themselves. Possibly as a result, this Yugoslav club 
proved short-lived as its support among the urban elite dwindled over the next few years. Some 
lost interest, others, including the club’s original founder, were driven out. Its original cultural 
mission likewise fell by the wayside. Bereft of state support, the club had relied overmuch on 
games of chance as a revenue source, turning it into a “typical gambling den.” In1935, the club, 
having no more than twenty members, went bankrupt.286 Part of the problem was that the 
Yugoslav legation in South America lacked both the will and the funds to interfere in émigré 
politics until it was far too late. Because many of the emigrants were recent arrivals, it is possible 
that they assumed that emigrants already were Yugoslavs and had no need to be made into them, 
unlike their counterparts in North America.  
In other cases, Yugoslav officials failed to support emigrant Yugoslavist organizations in 
other ways as well. Alongside the new crop of Yugoslav clubs and schools existed an older 
stratum of Serbian, Croatian, and Slovene clubs, which continued to have much larger 
memberships. However, the diplomatic service did not see those “tribal” organizations as anti-
Yugoslav, nor were these organizations hostile to the Yugoslav idea. We know this because in 
the case of Detroit, the consul admonished the head of the Yugoslav legation, Ante Trešić-
Pavičić, for visiting only the Yugoslav club, “which has altogether fifty members…[rather than] 
the Serbian and Croatian clubs in which is concentrated the majority of our people.” The 
decision not to visit them, the consul observed, was treated as a snub and caused both to voice 
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their official protest.287 That, in turn, implied that these “tribal” organizations wanted the 
diplomatic service present at their gatherings. While this blunder did not cast the diplomatic 
service in a good light, it nonetheless reveals both that most Serbs and Croats, even if they were 
unlikely to abandon preexisting clubs, were still sympathetic to Yugoslavia and wanted the 
patronage of its officials.  
Nonetheless, local activists were sometimes frustrated by the lack of initiative shown by 
Yugoslav officials. In 1926, Mladineo, having recovered from his failure to gain official support 
for his pressbureau, declared that “for us who live here…it is our duty, not waiting for our 
[brethren] from the old country to act, to teach America about us.” Moving toward that goal, 
Mladineo announced the founding of two sections of the Jugoslovenska Kulturna Matica in New 
York, the purpose of which was to act as a center of ‘Yugoslav’ culture in the United States, with 
a particular focus on translating Yugoslav literature into English and disseminating it to the 
broader American reading public, as well as to the assimilated children of Yugoslav 
emigrants.288 Again, we see how local activists often sought to blend Yugoslav culture with 
American and vice versa—Yugoslav culture in English was still Yugoslav culture.  
The lack of support for a Yugoslav pressbureau did not mean that the IK had abandoned 
the cause of literacy: ensuring that emigrants and their children could continue to read emigrant 
newspapers in Serbo-Croatian and Slovenian, not to mention Yugoslav literature, was critical. 
Moreover, literacy in both Yugoslav languages made possible the writing of letters to overseas 
kin, which in turn preserve sentimental ties between the diaspora and the fatherland. To promote 
literacy, the third and fourth points of the IK’s plan was to support Yugoslav-language libraries 
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and reading rooms by sending them patriotic literature, and to supply extant Yugoslav language 
schools with up-to-date textbooks. Completing this outreach to the second generation, the IK 
would try to revive the flagging institution of Sokols, a gymnastic society which had, for over 
half a century, been unobtrusively involved in mass-based national movements across Eastern 
Europe. According to the records of the IK, the number of Yugoslav Sokols for the diaspora had 
fallen precipitously in recent years, from twenty-two to a mere three.289 Lastly, to reach those in 
the second generation who, for whatever reason, could not attend a Yugoslav language school, 
the IK sought to sway the American school system in areas where many Yugoslavs lived, into 
allowing Serbo-Croatian to be taught as a second language. This was not as far-fetched as it 
seemed. Cleveland had recently allowed Ukrainian to be taught in its public schools. If Ukrainian 
could be taught, why not Serbo-Croatian?290 
Emigrant associations also made efforts to support education and youth outreach, 
something made more effective by their consolidation. The newly-formed Croatian Fraternal 
Union (CFU), for instance, also took up the challenge of fighting assimilation after their first 
convention in 1927. The first prong of this was a general membership drive, declaring that “only 
a small percentage of Croats and other Yugoslavs can justify not being a member of the 
Union…[but] as Croats, as Yugoslavs, none can justify not participating in our public work 
[emphasis mine].”291 Croatian and Yugoslav nationalism were complementary. Furthermore, 
enrolling new members was linked with making them into good Croats and Yugoslavs. Lodges 
that succeeded in enrolling large numbers were awarded Serbo-Croatian language textbooks, 
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readers, and dictionaries.292 Periodic ads were run for new books in Serbo-Croatian coming out 
of Yugoslavia and European publishing houses.293 Lastly, the CFU also sought to attract young 
people, adding new amenities to lodges like dance floors, bowling alleys, billiards, libraries, and 
bars.294 What people would drink at those bars was unclear, as Prohibition was in force. 
The generational divide, however, could be difficult to bridge—among the second 
generation, enthusiasm for Croatian clubs was tepid. Georgeanna Kirin, a second-generation 
Croat from Los Angeles, who wrote to Zajedničar in 1927, was alienated by the mandate that 
club business be discussed in Croatian, “of which the majority of us, young people, understand 
little or nothing.” Moreover, “the active members of these lodges…in most cases older, 
European-bred people…cannot accept us, young people, as intelligent persons with opinions and 
ideas of our own, but as children.” Lastly, the clubs seemed to have “too many lengthy 
arguments…over apparently insignificant matters.” For that reason, she argued that English-
speaking lodges were the CFU’s best hope for attracting the second generation.295 She was not 
proposing to abandon her Croatian national identity—after all, she was still coming to an ethnic 
club. But some within the organization believed that one could not be Croatian without speaking 
Croatian. Replying to Georgeanna, George Stublar, of Roundup, Montana, believed that “it 
would be unjust to the founders of this organization to change this into an English-speaking 
society,” as such a move would alienate those who spoke only Croatian and would deprive the 
CFU of its raison d’etre.296 Of course, that was not what Georgeanna was proposing, which was 
only that second-generation Croats be allowed to form their own English-speaking lodges. This 
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was the generational conflict within the CFU, a consequence of the membership drive—in 
bringing the Yugoslav idea to the second generation, they had to let the second generation also 
be Americans. In any event, the move toward English speaking lodges could not be halted, and 
the very first was organized in Cleveland later that year. Lacking facilities of their own, they 
borrowed Grdina Hall from the local Slovenes—Yugoslav cooperation paid off.297    
These debates aside, the Americanization of teenage Serbs. Croats, and Slovenes could 
always be reversed in adulthood, as consular officials would learn from their collaborators in the 
emigration.  In 1925, Franjo Preveden, a Croat from Sremska Kamenica with a doctorate from 
Winona, Minnesota, was recruited by the University of Chicago to teach of subject of his choice. 
To the delight of the Yugoslav legation in Washington, Preveden elected to teach Serbo-Croatian 
on the college level, possibly the first course of its kind. He also sought to teach Serbo-Croatian 
literature. Such a course, the legation opined, could help reach “the great numbers of the 
Americanized children of our emigrants who are now in high school and college...[and] could be 
very useful in…reminding them of their mother tongue.” For this reason, they proposed that 
Preveden’s $500 stipend from the University of Chicago be supplemented by another $500 to be 
paid out of the Yugoslav state coffer, which is remarkable given Preveden’s checkered political 
past. This was also five times what they were paying Archimandrite Mardarije. While Preveden 
had joined a patriotic Yugoslav society in Paris and briefly worked as a translator for the Press-
bureau of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Belgrade, he had also spent time in Russia during 
the civil war and worked for the Communist Party in the United States as a propagandist for 
several years before being expelled from the party as an “opportunist.” 298 “Opportunism” 
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regardless, Dr. Preveden was apparently too good of an opportunity to pass up—there were still 
relatively few Serbs, Croats, or Slovenes in academia.  
Making Leisure “Yugoslav”: Cultural Politics in the 1920s 
The emigration commissariat (IK) had great ambitions in the realm of cultural politics, a 
catch-all term to describe a variety of musical and artistic initiatives that are less about literacy 
and more about entertainment. In this area, the biggest failure of the Yugoslav state was tourism.  
Part of the IK’s 1925 blueprint was to bring emigrants to Yugoslavia as tourists, generally in 
large excursion groups (izleti). Unlike many of the other forms of cultural propaganda and 
outreach planned by Yugoslavia, tourism could both turn a profit and build sentimental ties 
between Yugoslavia and the emigration.299 Since so much was not implemented due to lack of 
funding, this makes the total lack of izleti during Yugoslavia’s parliamentary period a particular 
anomaly. In fact, the first mass trip to Yugoslavia, an excursion by the Yugoslav Sokols, did not 
take place until the summer of 1929, months after the royal dictatorship was proclaimed,300 
although after that the number of izleti surged. In 1930, the Slovene National Mutual Benefit 
Society (SNPJ) organized their own izlet.301  In 1931, the other major Slovene fraternal society, 
the Carniolan Slovene Catholic Union, followed suit. In 1937, both the Croatian Fraternal Union 
and the Serb National Federation organized their own excursions.302 In all these cases, it was the 
emigrant activists, not the government of Yugoslavia, who took the initiative. The issue was not 
the price of passage, which could be earned in a month by an unskilled laborer.303 Rather, one 
possible explanation for the lag in promoting izleti was that funding tourism was politically 
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dangerous for Yugoslavia. Emigrant tourists did not always like what they saw in Yugoslavia, 
nor was it practical to vet them such that only pro-regime Yugoslavs could go.  
In other areas, the KSHS did somewhat better. Support for singing societies were a major 
part of the IK’s 1925 blueprint, and was one of the areas in which they followed through on their 
intentions.304 Music was a particularly convenient mode of propaganda. Neither the performers 
nor the listeners of folk songs needed to be particularly literate. Moreover, music reminded 
audiences of the ‘old country’ and all its sentimental associations, which emigrants, living in 
bustling multiethnic metropolises and working arduous factory shifts, sometimes forgot. A 1936 
article from Srbobran, a major Serbian-American newspaper, is illustrative. Reviewing the 
performance of the “Maksimovich Quartet,” a group of Montenegrin musicians who traveled to 
Ohio as national missionaries, a continuation of the program begun with this document, the 
author (herself an Americanized Serb) wrote:     
Dressed in their dashing, colorful Montenegrin costumes, the brothers 
Maksimovich silently stood. Our tongues were paralyzed for a few 
moments. To think that after years and years of anxiety for our homeland, 
some of our brothers came to see us!...We always felt as if Yugoslavia 
were another world, another planet…When the Brothers Maksimovich 
sang, it was like a bomb exploding within us and opening our eyes, mind, 
and hearts to the realization that Yugoslavia is supreme in her culture, her 
music, and her soul!...Sincere and earnest tears flowed freely down the 
faithful Serbians’ faces… There were many who knew that they were 
Serbian yet never felt it until that moment [emphasis mine].305 
 
While the tears might have been artistic license, singing societies were nonetheless one of the 
most effective tools in the Yugoslav kit. Yet, as with churches, there were too few of them: there 
were, in all, sixty-five Yugoslav singing societies with 10,000 male members and only 385 
female members. Moreover, these societies lacked both teachers and fresh material to sing.  This 
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was a need that Yugoslavia could meet: the fifth point of the IK’s program was to supply the 
aforementioned singing and theater societies with patriotic Yugoslav songs, plays, and excerpts 
“from our glorious history.” In this way, they could turn singing societies into mouthpieces of 
Yugoslav unity. And if that failed, they could also supply the performers, as the eighth part of 
their plan stipulated. Lastly, moving beyond song, Yugoslavia could also send traveling 
exhibitions to bring Yugoslav art, culture, and history to the Yugoslav masses overseas. 306 
As with education, these sorts of cultural initiatives often relied on activists from the 
diaspora rather than the old country. Interestingly, rather than preserving Serb, Croat, and 
Slovene culture unchanged, however, many of these exhibitions attempted to situate Serb, Croat, 
and Slovene culture into an overarching “Yugoslav” culture. Take, for instance, the very first of 
these cultural exhibitions, a “Symposium of Jugoslav Genius” held in St. Mark’s Church-In-the-
Bowery in New York City. By choosing an Episcopalian, rather than a Catholic or Orthodox 
church, the organizers sidestepped accusations of pro-Croat or pro-Serb bias. This 
evenhandedness was extended to the program as well. Attendees were treated to lectures on 
“Yugoslavia, the New Nation,” “The Literature of Yugoslavia,” “the Music of Yugoslavia,” as 
well as acapella renditions of Serb, Croat, and Slovene folk songs. While the general consul 
attended, his involvement was relatively minimal— the Federation of the Jugoslav Singing 
Societies, based in the United States, did the actual singing. The lectures and performances at 
this event were not solely Slavic-themed, however. Just as Serb, Croat, and Slovene culture was 
situated within a Yugoslav framework, Yugoslav culture was situated within a broader 
“Western” culture by incorporating music by non-Yugoslav composers like Matheson and 
Schubert, as well as patriotic American hymns like “All Hail America.”307 Taken as a whole, the 
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planers of the symposium signaled that its attendees could be both Yugoslavs and Americans. 
While the Emigration Commissariat, unlike some in the foreign ministry, saw both identities as 
compatible, it was up to their collaborators in the Yugoslav-American intelligentsia to find ways 
to synthesize Yugoslav and American culture. 
One consequence of the reliance on Yugoslav-American intellectuals was that the 
Yugoslav culture being created and promulgated in the United States generally lacked great-
Serbian overtones. Take, for instance, a play performed by the Yugoslav Cultural/Educational 
Society in Chicago in 1926, titled “Osloboditelji,” or “Liberators,” written by the Croatian 
playwright Srđan Tucić, who had been living in New York City since 1914.308 A committed 
Yugoslavist, Tucič left Yugoslavia after “Liberators” was published in August 1914, two months 
after the outbreak of the First World War. This was an inauspicious time for a play that was 
sympathetic to the Serbs, and “Liberators” was promptly banned by the Austro-Hungarian 
authorities.309  
A tragedy set during the Second Balkan War, the plot of “Liberators” centers around a 
romance between a Dragoljub, a wounded Serbian officer convalescing in Sofia, and Katja, the 
daughter of a Bulgarian general. There is, however, remarkably little romance in this romance, 
with most of the dialogue consisting of political commentary on the ongoing conflict. Following 
the victory of Serbia, Greece, Montenegro, and Bulgaria over the Ottoman empire in the First 
Balkan War in 1913, the Second Balkan War erupted when Bulgaria refused to accept its share 
of the territorial spoils and declared war on Serbia and Greece. Having already overestimated its 
military capabilities, Bulgaria found itself overwhelmed when the Ottoman Empire and Romania 
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intervened on the Serbian side and was forced to accept a humiliating peace. In “Liberators,” 
Tucić repeatedly deplored the Second Balkan War as “fratricidal,” implying South Slav 
brotherhood.310 Likewise, attention is drawn to the human cost of war, particularly invalids, who 
make up much of the male cast—Dragoljub, for instance, has a missing right arm.311 Other 
characters, the older generation, bear psychological scars as their sons perish on the battlefield.312 
War between brothers benefits nobody but “greedy diplomats and ambitious politicians,” as 
Katja points out,313 a sentiment unlikely to be appreciated by Yugoslav politicians in Belgrade or 
their diplomatic representatives overseas.  
Unlike official Yugoslav propaganda, which was based on a heroic myth of Serbian 
military prowess, Tucić portrays the Serbian army as both tragic and unheroic. During the second 
act, Dragoljub monologues that the Serbs are “a victor who cannot rejoice because he has shed 
his brother’s blood” and that “this war is even more tragic for the Serbs than for the Bulgars 
because it has robbed us of our faith in our brothers, and until quite recently this faith seemed our 
best guarantee of a happier future for the Slav Balkans.”314 Furthermore, Tucić depicts national 
chauvinists as absurd, grotesque figures. In one scene, a trio of madly grinning paraplegic 
Bulgarian soldiers threaten Dragoljub for his (non-existent) role in the Serbian advance into 
Bulgaria and then proceed to hop around on crutches singing the Bulgarian national anthem.315 
Physical impairment becomes a metaphor for a deformity of the soul—they lack legs, but more 
importantly, they lack hearts. Not all Bulgarians are depicted negatively, and the women of the 
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general’s household often act as the cast’s conscience and voice of reason. With his themes of 
brotherhood, equality, and pacifism, Tucić exhibited a very different sort of Yugoslavism than 
the sort found among political elites in Belgrade. The diaspora, however, was a natural home for 
this sort of freethinker and iconoclast.   
As an additional Yugoslav touch, the play was written entirely in the Croatian dialect of 
Serbo-Croatian.316 Given the sympathetic approach to Bulgarians, who fought on the opposite 
side of the Serbs, as well as the cross-cultural romance, it is difficult to characterize this play as 
anything other than “Yugoslav”. This was also the conclusion of Hugh Seton-Watson, who wrote 
the introduction to the English translation of the play, published in 1918.317 At the Chicago 
performance of “Liberators,” we can also see how “Yugoslav” culture received a Croatian gloss: 
from after the play until midnight, attendees could stay and dance the kolo, a traditional folk 
dance, while being serenaded by the local “Zvonimir” orchestra, which, based on the name, was 
almost certainly Croatian.318     
Cultural syncretism also appeared in the work of David Brčin, a Serbian-American 
sculptor that the Chicago consulate recruited in late 1927. While, in the appraisal of the local 
consul, Brčin had “neither deep artistic creative force…nor originality,” he nonetheless had 
“adequate nobility in his conception of things.” In other words, in their view, though he was no 
Meštrović, he was a competent artist and a good propagandist. Moreover, Brčin was already 
famous, particularly in Chicago, where he was hailed as “our sculptor.” For that reason, the 
consul stated that “we need to help him as a Serb who has broken through into this ruthless 
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American world.”319 Of course, they only did this after Brčin contacted the consul seeking their 
patronage, which, Brčin pointedly noted, he had not yet received. As usual, emigrant activists 
were the initiators, and the role of the Yugoslav foreign service was largely reactive. To link 
Brčin’s success with the prestige of Yugoslavia, the local consul attended an exhibition of 
Brčin’s sculptures. But although Brčin characterized the body of his work on display as 
“decidedly Slavonic and Serbian,”320 Brčin’s exhibition was also about Yugoslav unity, with 
sculptures titled The Dalmatian Express, The Women of Ragusa, and The Bard of Bosnia.321 His 
exhibition also had a distinct American flavor: alongside sculptures of Božidar Purić (the charge 
d’affaires in the Legation in Washington), Razin the Cossack Bandit, Dostoievsky, and 
(Kraljević) Marko, Brčin put Woodrow Wilson, Mark Twain, and Washington and Kosciusko. 
With his predilection for heroic figures, Brčin was clearly well suited for national propaganda. 
However, the message of his exhibition was left unclear: was he trying to promote Americanism, 
Panslavism, or Yugoslavism? Did he believe they could be synthesized?  
Yugoslav officials were not wholly dependent on local talent, however—several of these 
national missionaries were imported from the Yugoslav cultural elite.  In late 1924, Milan Šimić, 
a well-known photographer from Belgrade, decided to visit the United States as a national 
missionary. Presumably, he was recruited by the foreign ministry, which had vetted him as a 
“good patriot and a nationalist,” ordering the diplomatic service in America to assist him in this 
“mission.” That mission was explicitly national propaganda: a traveling exhibition of 
photographs depicting of the living conditions of the singular Yugoslav people. This traveling 
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exhibition, they hoped,  would facilitate the “our land’s…rapprochement (zbliženje) with her 
scattered children.” Presumably, viewing these photographs would, like hearing a familiar folk 
song, remind emigrants of their homeland.322 The same held true for Žarko Savić, the director of 
Belgrade’s operatic school, who was induced to travel to the United States on a concert tour in 
1924 “for the purpose of state propaganda.”323 Of course, outsiders like Šimić or Savić, unlike 
their Yugoslav-American cultural elite, were often entirely dependent on the Yugoslav 
diplomatic service to parade them around, limiting their exposure.  
Lastly, no discussion of Yugoslav cultural propaganda in the twenties would be complete 
without mention of the sculptor Ivan Meštrović, its most prominent cultural exponent. Meštrović 
is best known for his unfinished Kosovo Temple project, which first debuted at the Rome 
Exhibition of 1911. Combining motifs from Catholicism and Orthodoxy, and depicting Serbian 
heroes like Kraljević Marko with the more “Croatian” medium of sculpture, Mestrović’s temple 
was a powerful argument for Yugoslav cultural synthesis.324 Mestrović remained active in the 
interwar period, though the messages of his sculptures were not always as obvious.  
In 1928, a pair of Meštrović’s sculptures, The Bowman and the Spearman, traveled from 
his studio in Zagreb to Grant Park, Chicago, where they are still on display. While these two 
sculptures of Native-American horsemen were of themselves no statement on Yugoslav unity, 
their installation was nonetheless intertwined with the Yugoslavization project in the United 
States. It is no coincidence that Chicago, with its large ‘Yugoslav’ population, was chosen-- 
these sculptures were another way for Yugoslavia to ‘remind’ its emigrants of their old country. 
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In theory, the many Yugoslavs in Chicago would look at these sculptures and know their origin, 
from an artist whose name and prestige were bound up in the Yugoslav idea, an artist who had 
not forgotten about his overseas brethren.  For that reason, it is not surprising that the unveiling 
of these sculptures in October of 1928 was so politicized. The unveiling committee asserted that 
the ceremony’s “importance to our entire people (narod)” required “Croats in unity (u 
zajedništvu) with their brother Serbs and Slovenes.” Each “tribe” would thus be given 
opportunity to perform national songs and to parade around in their national costumes.325 But the 
crux of the controversy was whether they would do so divided, as a Serbian, Croatian, and 
Slovene group, or united as Yugoslavs. Some in the Croatian contingent of the unveiling balked 
at this. The Croats were also divided over how they should act toward representatives of 
Yugoslavia’s diplomatic service, who would also be present at The Bowman and The Spearman’s 
unveiling.326 In other words, they were debating whether Yugoslavs were a single people, or a 
people with three-discrete tribes (Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes), and whether that people 
supported the government of Yugoslavia. Eventually, it was decided, albeit by a narrow 
majority, to participate as Croats, but to march with the Serbian and Slovene delegations, a fine 
distinction that suggested support for the Yugoslav idea, provided the Croats could retain their 
cultural and political distinctiveness. Regarding the diplomatic service, the Croatian party 
resolved to participate “alongside,” but not with. They were unwilling to endorse the government 
of Yugoslavia, but they would grudgingly cooperate with it—for now. 
The Croatian delegation at the unveiling ceremony were almost certainly reacting an 
event from earlier that year: the death of Stjepan Radić, the charismatic force behind the Croatian 
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Peasant Party, the party of mainstream Croatian nationalism. On June 20, 1928, Radić was 
gunned down by Puniša Račić, a deputy of the People’s Radical Party on the floor of the 
Yugoslav Parliament. Radić succumbed to his injuries on August 8, igniting a political crisis. 
Seeing an opportunity, King Alexander Karađorđević abolished the parliament, banned all 
political parties, and proclaimed a royal dictatorship in January, 1929. Yugoslavia’s 
parliamentary period was over, as was the first cautious phase of diaspora Yugoslavization. 
Conclusion 
In general, this first phase of overseas Yugoslavization project was characterized by a 
disjuncture between the program designed by the IK in 1925 and its implementation.  Yugoslav 
diplomats did not have the resources to do many of the things they wanted, whether it was 
building churches, supporting schools, or teaching people about Yugoslav culture. For that 
reason, they offloaded much of the work on émigrés themselves, who often had their own 
interpretation of the Yugoslav idea. One some occasions, Croatian culture predominated. On 
others, activists tried to syncretize ‘Yugoslav’ and American culture. This, again, relates back to 
the question of host-country influence posed in the introduction, from which we can derive two 
lessons. First, the sorts of borrowing that take place are not limited to political prescriptions, i.e. 
federalism or republicanism or pacifism, but extend to the symbolic vocabulary in which these 
ideas are expressed. Figures as diverse as Washington, Mark Twain, or The Bowman and the 
Spearman could become symbols of a transnational Yugoslav community, despite their lack of 
Slavic content. In much the same way, the emergence of English language lodges in the fraternal 
unions showed that the loss of language proficiency by second-generation migrants was entirely 
compatible with ethnic activism. Secondly, although this may seem obvious, the degree of 




syncretism in the expression of emigrant nationalism is inversely related to the extent to which 
the Yugoslav state attempted to curate cultural production.    
Where the Yugoslav state was involved, Yugoslavization, at least during the 1920s, was 
not synonymous with Serbianization. While Serbs were given more institutional support via the 
exarchate or in fraternal union politics, they probably also needed it the most; the Serbs were the 
least numerous, had the fewest churches, and the smallest and most fractured fraternal unions. In 
other words, this was a kind of affirmative action for their national movement, rather than pro-
Serb bias. Even so, the most significant development in diaspora politics during this period, the 
consolidation of the Serb, Croat, and Slovene fraternal unions, was driven less by Yugoslav 
encouragement than by demographic demands. The xenophobic turn in the United States, as 
reflected by its new immigration quotas, forced these working-class organizations to set aside old 
grudges and band together.  Still, encouraging self-reliance among Croat and Slovene emigrants 
would come back to haunt Yugoslavia, once Yugoslavia’s approach to émigré politics became 
















CHAPTER THREE: THE DICTATORSHIP AND THE ‘TENTH BANOVINA’ 
 
On August 8, 1928, Stjepan Radić succumbed to the wounds he had sustained several 
weeks earlier in the Belgrade Parliament at the hand of Puniša Račić, a Serb MP. In the United 
States, the outrage of Croats took varying forms. Hrvatski Glasnik of Chicago, for instance, 
denounced the “persecution, violence, and murders committed by Serbian Belgrade,” asserting 
that Radić’s murder was part of a broader campaign “organized by the Belgrade government to 
kill all the leaders of the Croatian people.”327 In Pennsylvania, Croats gathered to issue a series 
of protest resolutions against “the tyranny of Belgrade” and the murder of Radić, calling for 
“Croatia for the Croats, and Serbia for the Serbs”328 and for American Croats elsewhere to unite 
behind this cause. A more conciliatory note was struck by Ivan Mladineo, a Croat and close 
collaborator with the Yugoslav diplomatic service, who issued his own resolution as a leader of 
the Yugoslav Sokol in New York. Deploring “the ominous and reprehensible deed that took 
place in the Belgrade skupština on July 20,” as well as Puniša Račić’s “felonious clique” and the 
“intertribal conflict” between Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, Mladineo nonetheless asserted that 
the slogan “United we stand, divided we fall” was still useful and valid for the people of 
Yugoslavia.329 That quintessentially American slogan, it seemed, made Mladineo reluctant to 
embrace ethnic separatism—was not Yugoslavia, like the United States, stronger as a unified 
nation? Regardless, the following decade would see hundreds of similar protest resolutions from 
American Croats— some calling for Croatian independence and some not, but all voicing their 
displeasure at the autocratic and tyrannical government in Belgrade.  
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While the “tyranny of Belgrade” may not have been a cause of Radić’s assassination (the 
Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes was, after all, a parliamentary democracy), tyranny was 
certainly a consequence—Radić’s death gave King Alexander a pretext to proclaim a royal 
dictatorship on January 6, 1929. Declaring his intent to forge Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes into a 
single Yugoslav people, King Alexander banned all political parties, as well as any political 
organization with “Serbian, “Croatian,” or “Slovene” in its name.  Accompanying this, the 
Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes was renamed the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. Police terror 
was introduced against political dissidents, both communists and ethnic “separatists,” and 
newspapers were censored. Lastly, Yugoslavia was reorganized into nine banovine (singular 
banovina), or provinces, that were named after geographic features rather than national 
signifiers.330 Croatia, for instance, became the Savska and Primorska Banovine, Macedonia and 
parts of Southern Serbia became the Vardar Banovina, and so forth. 
Soon after, Yugoslavia’s overseas population came to be called the “tenth banovina” by 
the political and journalistic class, although it is unclear who originally coined the term.331 
Regardless, this nickname was symptomatic of a broader overhaul of the entire legal and 
bureaucratic apparatus dedicated to controlling and indoctrinating Yugoslavia’s overseas 
population, which is the main subject of this chapter.’ First, this chapter will examine the new 
laws, decrees, and organizations that dictatorship introduced to govern its “tenth banovina”: the 
Citizenship Law of 1928, the Emigration Law of 1929, the Law on Holidays, and the failed 
expansion of the Postal Savings Bank of Yugoslavia. Then, turning from high-level law to low-
level practice, this chapter will show that the dictatorial period was also characterized by 
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attempts by Yugoslav diplomats to censor, arrest, intimidate, and deport emigrant critics of the 
regime. In short, the ‘tenth banovina’ was treated like the other nine. Also like in the other nine, 
these new laws and new practices created a great deal of bitterness toward Alexander’s 
government. But Belgrade’s abuses did not, I will argue, delegitimize Yugoslavism as an idea, 
which manifested in three important developments for Yugoslavism in the United States: the 
attempted creation of a Yugoslav fraternal union, the rise of old-country tourism, and the 
emergence of Louis Adamic as a public figure.  
From Emigrants to Citizens Abroad 
 Above all, Alexander’s dictatorship was characterized by a proprietary attitude toward 
emigrants, as well as efforts to translate this into law. One of the first changes, even slightly 
predating the January 6 dictatorship, was Yugoslavia’s new citizenship law of 1928. This law 
gave everyone who emigrated from the territory of Yugoslavia citizenship, even if they 
emigrated before Yugoslavia’s formation in 1918, so long as they did not renounce their 
citizenship. And to prevent that from happening, emigrants were given a very short window of 
time to do so—within three years of their twenty-first birthday, they had to travel to one of 
Yugoslavia’s consulates and formerly renounce their Yugoslav citizenship. If they forgot, or 
were simply ignorant of this regulation, they were out of luck, and could even be drafted if they 
entered Yugoslavia. Yugoslav citizenship was not a privilege, but an obligation. Emigrants who 
had emigrated prior to 1918, and had thus missed the three-year window, were given until 1936 
to formerly renounce their citizenship. Adding insult to injury, renouncing one’s Yugoslav 
citizenship also involved paying a small fine.332 While not exorbitant, the fine, along with the 
difficulties associated with getting time off work to travel hundreds of miles to Yugoslav 
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consulate, put renunciation beyond the reach of many ordinary emigrants, particularly during the 
Great Depression. This was probably intentional—to make it as difficult as possible for 
emigrants to shed their Yugoslav citizenship, which could be used to justify more interference 
from the Kingdom of Yugoslavia into their daily lives.  
This tendency to treat emigrants as Yugoslav subjects was developed even further by the 
Emigration Law of 1929, passed soon after the country’s renaming and the provincial 
organization. Declaring in a press release that “the emigration question has become even more 
complicated and important, and as such we dare not delay its resolution any longer,”333 the 
Emigration Commissariat declared its intent to make sure that “our emigrant’s life be tightly 
connected with the national life in the fatherland, that they will become part of the national 
whole.”334 That, in turn, involved combating the “problem of de-nationalization,” ensuring that 
Yugoslavia’s overseas citizens remained good Yugoslavs, loyal to their fatherland. Admittedly, 
the law contained few specifics on how this propagandistic work would be accomplished—the 
focus of this law was restricting further immigration and establishing legal and financial 
protections for migrants from unscrupulous foreign capitalists. Section four proposed education 
for emigrants and their children, but remained vague on specifics.335 The primary innovation, if it 
could be called that, was the “emigration fund,” the consular slush fund established in 1925, was 
now explicitly to be used for propaganda activities. In effect, this meant that the specifics of 
overseas Yugoslavization were left to the Yugoslav diplomatic service. While it made sense in 
theory to delegate these decisions to a group that spent the most time among emigrants, in 
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practice, as we will see, Yugoslav diplomats seemed more concerned with quashing dissent than 
cultivating loyalty.  
The Postal Savings-Bank Disaster 
As I have emphasized in previous chapters, much of Yugoslavia’s interest in the “tenth 
banovina” was pecuniary—emigrant wealth had to be tapped by the fatherland, either through 
remittances or investment. Once the dictatorship was proclaimed in January 1929, one of the 
earliest legal reforms was the centralization and coordination of the flow of remittances through 
a state-owned bank, the Poštanska Štedionica, or postal savings-bank.336 Until that point, 
emigrants had to rely on a panoply of private banks, which on occasion swindled their customers 
(at least, Yugoslav officials thought so). This threatened to choke the flow of remittances, (which 
Yugoslav authorities did not want). To resolve this problem, Yugoslav officials plotted the 
overseas expansion of the Poštanska Štedionica, which could offer emigrants better rates than 
American banks. In a sense, this was a way for Yugoslavia to “tax” its new “citizens.” 
The Poštanska Štedionica was publicized via coordinated ads in émigré newspapers by 
the general consulates, which were tasked with promoting the bank.337 Housed in the Palace 
Rossiya, a Belgrade architectural landmark (now better known as the Hotel Moskva), the bank 
oozed respectability. Its backing by the government of Yugoslavia was mentioned at every 
opportunity in advertisements—four times in as many pages in one leaflet. At the same time, the 
bank also emphasized its proletarian character to appeal to emigrants. Around the margins of one 
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leaflet, we can see depictions of farming, factory work, and mining, the main occupations of 
migrants, along with Slavic embroidery patterns.338  
 
Fig. 3. Leaflet for the Postal Savings-Bank, 1929. Fond 449, fasc. 4, BO 10, AJ. 
Ads for the Poštanska Štedionica framed its use as a patriotic duty. Readers were enjoined to 
“not forget kin in the old country” and to “help their countrymen” by working hard and “saving 
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as much as you can.339” In essence, the state was inserting itself between emigrants and their 
families in the old country, turning a traditional familial and economic relationship into a 
statement of identity and loyalty to a would-be nation state.  
The ‘patriotism’ of those who switched to the Poštanska Štedionica soon would be 
punished. The Poštanska Štedionica shared the fate of most banks after the crash of 1929. By 
1931, it was on the verge of collapse. To survive, the bank needed a bailout of around 
50,000,000 dinars to cover all emigrant deposits.  On Vidovdan340 (June 28) 1931, an emigrant 
delegation approached King Alexander to ask him to intervene to save emigrant deposits. 
Alexander assured the delegation that he would act immediately to resolve the problem. He did 
not. After a delay of six months, the government of Yugoslavia finally acted to save the bank, 
but its solution left much to be desired, according to Zajedničar, the main émigré paper for 
Croats. To be reimbursed by the state treasury for their lost savings, former patrons of the bank 
had to submit legal proof that they were citizens of Yugoslavia along with their claim—the 
postal savings bank was ultimately about the control of a state over its overseas “citizens.” 
Migrants who had become American citizens occupied an uncertain position, on which the 
official government statement offered little clarity. Even for the non-naturalized, obtaining legal 
proof that one had emigrated from Yugoslavia could be a problem, especially since many had 
emigrated before the widespread adoption of passports during World War I. After all, back then 
travel to the United States from the Balkans was as simple as buying a steamship ticket—
passport controls only became endemic during World War I.341 As a result, determining who was 
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eligible for reimbursement rested in the hands of Belgrade bureaucrats, who were, according to 
the fine print, under no obligation to pay out at all!342 A long wait for response, bureaucratic 
hurdles, and no guarantee of payout—in the eyes of emigrants, these were not the actions of a 
government that cared about its overseas subjects. 
This debacle mattered because its affected regular people who may not have participated 
in émigré political life. In aggregate, only about four in ten people in the “tenth banovina” were 
in a fraternal union.343 Even the largest oppositional newspaper, Zajedničar, only had a 
subscribership of between 85,000-90,000 people, a little more than a tenth of the “tenth 
banovina.” 344 Therefore, we can safely say in 1929, most Serb, Croat, and Slovene emigrants 
were still apathetic toward Yugoslav politics. After all, the murder of Stjepan Radić was an 
ocean away, and they had more immediate concerns, like earning enough money in the 
ironworks support one’s family in the old country. The savings bank disaster gave these people a 
reason to resent the King, who did nothing while their savings vanished. Moreover, Yugoslavia 
had foolishly linked support of the bank with one’s patriotic duty to the old country—when the 
bank failed, the legitimacy of the Yugoslav government was likewise undermined. This would 
cast a pall over future attempts by the Kingdom of Yugoslavia to create a Yugoslav diaspora.  
Pomp and Parades 
Another immediate change brought about by King Alexander’s dictatorship was the use 
of official holidays and, more broadly, public demonstrations of loyalty, to promote loyalty to 
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Yugoslavia. The Law on Holidays (Zakon o Praznicima), promulgated in late 1929, introduced 
several official holidays for citizens of Yugoslavia, like celebration of the royal birthday, or 
Unification Day, which commemorated the proclamation of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and 
Slovenes on December 1, 1918. Through the central press bureau, Yugoslav officials worked to 
ensure that these holidays were well attended and received favorable press coverage. Celebration 
of these holidays in Yugoslavia was mandatory, with abstainers being fined and put on 
watchlists.345 Ostensibly, the purpose of these holidays was to unite Yugoslavs through the 
common celebration of patriotic rituals.   
Tellingly, the Yugoslav state also tried to implement the Law on Holidays in the ‘tenth 
banovina,’ further proof that they considered the Yugoslav diaspora part of the national body.  
Shortly after the Law on Holiday’s promulgation, the Central Pressbureau began to distribute 
press releases for emigrant newspapers.346 Reporting on the celebration of these holidays, these 
press releases told emigrants that all of Yugoslavia unanimously supported the provincial 
reorganization and the royal dictatorship. To quote from one example: “All across the land, and 
even in Zagreb, today is the day of the most-solemn Unification Day, a state that now bears the 
common, single name, Yugoslavia. In every banovina celebrations were led by the new bans 
[governors], who in state in their speeches the importance for the future of the state that this 
year’s celebrations be conducted under the auspices of these new circumstances and in a new 
spirit.”347 With these sorts of stilted statements, Yugoslav officials hoped to undercut emigrant 
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opposition to the new regime, by claiming that it enjoyed popular legitimacy, “even in 
Zagreb”—the implication being, of course, that overseas Croats, who were fifty percent of the 
diaspora, should follow the example of their old-country counterparts. Of course, as Christian 
Nielsen documents, support for these new holidays, Croatian or otherwise, was negligible, and 
resistance to these holidays was pervasive. 348 The same held true abroad.  
While Yugoslav diplomats could not arrest emigrants for not attending official holidays, 
they nonetheless assiduously tracked attendance, as well as counter-celebrations organized in 
protest of these official holidays. Even the first celebration of Unification Day in 1929 in New 
York City proved to be a fraught affair. One group of Croats, grouped around the Croatian 
nationalist newspaper Danica Hrvatska, refused to attend altogether. Even Niko Gršković, editor 
of the pro-Yugoslav but anti-regime left-wing Croatian newspaper Svijet, stayed home for fear of 
being labeled a Belgrade hireling.349 Although Croats were split on the idea of Yugoslavia, social 
pressure deterred even pro-Yugoslav Croats from attending these events. In Chicago, Unification 
Day that year fared similarly, despite several concessions intended to attract Croats, such as 
holding the opening ceremony in both a Croatian Catholic and a Serbian orthodox church, as 
well as an effort by the consul to involve emigrant notables “from all three tribes.” The response 
was weak. Although General Consul tried to spin events positively by noting the attendance of 
some minor Croatian organizations, a close reading reveals that the event was boycotted by both 
the Croatian Fraternal Union and the Slovene National Benefit Society (SNPJ). In fact, the only 
fraternal union represented at the event was the conservative Carniolan Slovene Catholic Union 
(KSKJ). Likewise, only the KSKJ’s newspaper, along with Ujedinjeno Srpstvo (United 
Serbdom) and Yugoslavia (both integral Yugoslavist paper published by a Serb) agreed to reprint 
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official press releases about the event. Attendance was around two-thousand people,350 at number 
that was probably inflated, and yet still represented a minority of the roughly 58,000 
“Yugoslavs” living in Chicago at that time.351 The government of Yugoslavia clearly had a 
legitimacy problem.  
The emigrant opposition to Unification Day or the King’s birthday intensified over time, 
uniting Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, and sometimes even Macedonians.  In his report on the 
1931 celebration of Unification Day, the general consul of Chicago was forced to note that the 
event was not only boycotted, but publicly protested by a panoply of “anti-state elements,” which 
included “Communists,” “clericals,” Croatian “separatists,” “republican-socialists,” partisans of 
the Croatian Peasant Party, and Macedonian nationalists.352 One year before King Alexander’s 
assassination in 1934, the general consul of Chicago opened his report on the 1933 proceedings 
of Unification Day with the remarkable admission that “Never have there been so many attacks 
and organized campaigns in the separatist Croatian, Slovenian, Clerical, and Communist, and, 
more generally, the anti-state and anti-regime press to weaken and belittle the celebration of 
Unification Day, as there have been this year.” All across Chicago a “United Opposition” of 
Serbs, Croats, Slovenes, and Macedonians demonstrated, besieging official celebrations. In 
Milwaukee, Communists disrupted the General Consul’s speech there by littering the assembly 
hall with anti-regime leaflets.353 Even the staunchest allies of the regime were beginning to have 
misgivings—in Chicago, one group of Serbs, led by veteran Yugoslavist activist John Palandech, 
a Montenegrin, publicly joined the opposition. In previous years, Palandech had loyally 
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supported and worked with Yugoslav diplomats to ensure the success of Unification Day. But by 
1933, Palandech was fed up with the general consul’s “rude and incorrect management…and use 
of the Yugoslav name for his own personal gain,” which had “created a chasm between Croat 
and Yugoslav.” To protest, Palandech and his followers held their own parallel Unification Day 
celebration, one with no diplomatic representatives of Yugoslavia present.354 Ironically, 
Unification Day was working, having united the “tenth banovina” against King Alexander.  
Censoring the ‘Tenth Banovina’ 
 After 1929 and the introduction of strict censorship laws in Yugoslavia, most émigré 
newspapers were banned in Yugoslavia.  Although the Kingdom had banned a few newspapers 
in the 1920s (primarily Communist and socialist newspapers) 355, after 1929 that trickle became a 
torrent. By 1931, out of the thirty-so major Serbo-Croatian and Slovene newspapers published in 
North America, only thirteen were permitted entry into Yugoslavia.356 Among those allowed in 
were the official organ of the (conservative) Serbian National Union and the (conservative) 
Carniolan Slovene Catholic Union, as well as a few smaller integral-Yugoslavist newspapers (at 
least one of which was secretly subsidized by the General Consulate in Chicago, see below). In 
South America, the ratio of banned-to-unbanned was somewhat better: two out of seven.357  
Some of these newspapers, like Buenos Aires’s Hrvatski Domobran, the official organ of 
the fascistic Ustaša, were genuine dangers. But many of the banned newspapers were not anti-
Yugoslav at all. Take, for instance, Svijet, a New York newspaper that was edited by Don Niko 
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Gršković, a veteran Yugoslavist activist who had participated in the WWI era Yugoslav National 
Council. Banning Svijet made little sense even to Yugoslav diplomats—the Chicago General 
Consul observed in 1933 that Don Niko’s newspaper, despite being “rather to the left…was 
altogether Yugoslav and patriotic.”358 That same statement held true for many of other 
newspapers on the banned list: Prosveta and  Proleterec (both affiliated with the left-leaning 
SNPJ), Radnik and Radnička Borba(Yugoslav Communist), Novi Svijet (Croatian progressive), 
Ednakopravost (Slovene liberal), and Naroden Glas (Macedonian progressive).359 But the most 
important and influential newspaper to be banned was Zajedničar, the official organ of the 
Croatian Fraternal Union, the largest and wealthiest organization anywhere in the “tenth 
banovina,” and the largest Croatian organization anywhere except for the now-banned Croatian 
Peasant Party.360 It was a bizarre decision. In the words of the Chicago general consul, 
Zajedničar was “anti-regime, but not anti-Yugoslav.” Politically, its editor, Milan Petrak, tended 
toward republicanism.361 Apparently, monarchism, not Yugoslavism, was the criterion that 
determined whether a newspaper would be allowed entry into Yugoslavia. And in demanding 
absolute loyalty, the royal dictatorship made powerful enemies, including the two largest and 
wealthiest fraternal unions.362  
Banning Zajedničar provoked an immediate backlash. Some in the diplomatic service 
regarded it as a serious blunder. Radoje Janković, the consul general for Chicago, complained to 
his superiors in the ministry of foreign affairs that “there are small newspapers that periodically 
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appear to create disorder, which need to be immediately suppressed, but there are also older 
constructive newspapers, behind which stand organized masses of emigrants, that we need to 
approach with more caution” and that “we need to always keep in mind the sums that emigrants 
send to the fatherland.”363 In effect, there was a tacit covenant: emigrants believed that they had a 
right to say what they liked about Yugoslavia, so long as they continued to send home 
remittances. 
 Zajedničar’s editor, Milan Petrak, articulated this covenant explicitly when he wrote 
directly to Aranicki, chief of Yugoslavia’s emigration commissariat, to protest this wave of 
censorship. Noting that “nearly all of our emigrant newspapers, among them Zajedničar, the 
organ of the largest fraternal organization not just in America, but anywhere, are now banned in 
Yugoslavia” Petrak asserted that, because of the Croatian Fraternal Union’s charitable donations 
to the Old Country and its government, “which it helped create,” it “had the right to say whatever 
it thought about what is going on over there [in Yugoslavia].” Continuing with his theme of 
betrayal, Petrak noted “he was sorry to answer your previous letter thus, since only recently he 
had “heard praise from the mouth of a returning emigrant regarding your work as emigration 
commissioner.” Nonetheless, he promised, “so long as the government [of Yugoslavia] continues 
to treat our newspapers in America this way, we will be compelled to return the favor in kind.”364 
With that, Zajedničar declared war on Yugoslavia’s government. It is also worth noting that this 
idea of an emigrant-old country covenant imagines diaspora Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, as a 
single community that was wronged by official censorship. Just as was the case with the law on 
holidays, political repression was creating Yugoslavs—just not the kind King Alexander wanted.  
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But quarantining the political contagion that Yugoslav officials thought émigré 
newspapers represented was not enough, particularly since that quarantine was ineffective—
Yugoslav police regularly discovered subversive newspapers getting smuggled into 
Yugoslavia.365 Opposition had to be rooted out at the source, and so soon after the dictatorship 
was proclaimed, Yugoslav diplomats began trying to crush hostile newspapers or bribe them into 
silence. The main instigator of this policy was the General Consul of Chicago, the Serb Djuro 
Kolumbatović. Born in Split in the Austro-Hungarian empire, Kolumbatović studied law in 
Zagreb, Prague, and Lvov, before enlisting as an officer in the Habsburg army. Sent to Galicia, 
he deserted to the Tsar, and would later fight on the side of the Whites in the Russian civil war. 
After serving as consul in Dusseldorf, Kolumbatović was transferred to Chicago in 1929,366 
presumably for his credentials as a stalwart monarchist. This appointment was probably 
connected with Yugoslavia’s attempt to exert control over its overseas population, and it would 
be Kolumbatović in Chicago who would be the main architect of their censorship and 
punishment. 
 A report from October 1929 from the Chicago general consulate identified the three 
biggest targets: Zajedničar, Hrvatski Glasnik, and Hrvatska, all Croatian newspapers.367 
Although the Chicago consulate could not seriously damage a major newspaper like Zajedničar, 
which had a guaranteed subsidy from a major fraternal society, the same could not be said of 
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Hrvatska or Hrvatski Glasnik, which both depended on sales to stay solvent. Both newspapers 
had narrow profit margins and deep debts, making them financially vulnerable. To “isolate and 
disable” these two newspapers, the consul proposed a hostile takeover, funded by an extension of 
credit from the Yugoslav Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The newspapers were pressured to accept 
consular money, in return for accepting an “approved patriot” as editor.368 Hrvatska buckled 
several months later, becoming a mouthpiece of the Chicago consulate, receiving regular 
subsidies in return for printing pro-Yugoslav propaganda and attacks on “separatists.”369  
Likewise, the ban on its entry into Yugoslavia was lifted,370 suggesting that the government of 
Yugoslavia wanted its own people to think that American Croats were loyal to the government.  
Hrvatski Glasnik’s editor, Ivan Horvat, a music teacher from Karlovac and longtime US-
resident, declined the bribe. Horvat was a consistent advocate for Croatian independence but was 
politically flexible; a former Frankist (conservative Croatian Nationalist), Horvat later switched 
sides to the more moderate Croatian Peasant Party.371 Kolumbatović’s retribution was truly 
baroque. While Horvat’s US citizenship made it difficult for the consul to punish him directly, 
his Achilles heel was his son-in-law, Juraj Abzac, who had been employed by Hrvatski Glasnik 
as an assistant since 1923. Specifically, Horvat’s daughter Borislava and Juraj Abzac had entered 
the US in 1923 on a visitor visa, which they subsequently overstayed.372 To deprive Horvat of 
Abzac, his right-hand-man, the Chicago consulate sought, and subsequently obtained from the 
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government of the Savska banovina, documentation that Abzac and his wife had emigrated in 
1923 and thus overstayed their visa. 373  This was then submitted to the American immigration 
authorities.374 Borislava Abzac was deported, but her husband only lost his American citizenship, 
which he had obtained under false pretenses.375 Simultaneously, Kolumbatović used his new 
mouthpiece Hrvatska to run polemics against Ivan Horvat, presumably to confuse and 
demoralize Hrvatski Glasnik’s readership.376 Pressured from multiple fronts, Hrvatski Glasnik’s 
circulation plummeted, from 4500 to a mere 2000 issues, and Ivan Horvat openly contemplated 
selling his newspaper, forswearing politics, and moving to Canada.377 In 1932, Hrvatski Glasnik 
ceased publishing altogether, after Kolumbatović prevailed on Kaspar State Bank to repossess 
Hrvatski Glasnik’s linotype machine, offices, and all of their property.378  
But Kolumbatović’s intrigues ultimately accomplished little.  Croatian discontent had 
found a new voice in other newspapers, like Hrvatski List and Danica Hrvatska.379 Protest 
resolutions continued to flood in. But the ultimate irony was that Borislava Abzac, Ivan Horvat’s 
daughter, after being deported, joined the Ustaša in the port city of Rijeka, where she worked as 
a courier, carrying messages and helping Ustaša militants travel around Yugoslavia unnoticed by 
the authorities.380 Kolumbatović’s intrigues had turned a member of the moderate and pacifistic 
Croatian peasant party into a far-right extremist and terrorist. Throughout this enterprise, 
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Kolumbatović worked closely with the Ministry of Internal Affairs—emigrants were treated, 
even on an administrative level, as if they were part of Yugoslavia and subject to the same 
repressive forces. That attitude is even more apparent in another clash between Kolumbatović 
and Ujedinjeno Srpstvo and Yugoslavia—not all attempts to silence hostile emigrant newspapers 
targeted Croatian publications.   
Ivan Palandačić, or John Palandech as he typically Americanized his name—he had 
emigrated from Montenegro around 1900 and had become a naturalized citizen381—ought to 
have been an ally of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. An editor of two pro-Yugoslav newspapers in 
Chicago, Yugoslavia and Ujedinjeno Srpstvo (United Serbdom), Palandech also headed the 
planning committee for the Yugoslav pavilion for the upcoming 1933 World Fair in Chicago, 
where he was working to introduce “Yugoslav” culture to fairgoers.382 For that reason, 
Kolumbatović judged his newspapers to be the perfect vessel to promote the Jugoslovenska 
Centralna Organizacija (JCO), a new consulate-backed organization dedicated to promoting and 
preserving “Yugoslav” culture overseas.383 The JCO will be discussed in more detail toward the 
end of this chapter within the context of the drive toward a Yugoslav Fraternal Union.   
For now, what matters is that, to promote the JCO, Kolumbatović had Hrvatska, now a 
regime mouthpiece, draft an article for other supposedly regime-friendly newspapers: the 
Amerikanski Srbobran (which Yugoslavia also now probably subsidized) 384 and Palandech’s two 
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newspapers, Ujedinjeno Srpstvo and Yugoslavia.385 But instead of reprinting the article, 
Palandech chose to lambast the JCO, accusing it and Hrvatska of being “paid for by the State 
Treasury in Belgrade.” The JCO actually was receiving state subsidies, although how Palandech 
intuited this is unclear.386 Despite the truth of these allegations, the consul saw them as 
“treasonous” 387—making emigres into overseas citizens apparently turned criticism into treason. 
Rationalizing Palandech’s ‘betrayal,’ Kolumbatović complained to his superiors in the foreign 
ministry that Palandech considered the Chicago Yugoslav community a fiefdom “from which he 
profits.”388 Of course, that contradicted Kolumbatović’s theory from an earlier report, in which 
he asserted that Palandech was trying to get the consulate to buy his silence since his paper 
lacked readers and was in dire financial straits.389 That accusation also made no sense in light of 
the Kolumbatović’s earlier choice of Palandech’s paper as a propaganda platform for the JCO—
why use a newspaper that nobody read? 
 
relationship, the case of Hrvatska shows that planting articles in sympathetic diaspora papers was standard 
practice for Yugoslav diplomats, as was giving papers subsidies to ensure friendly coverage.  There is also 
substantial correspondence between the leaders of the SNS, which owned Srbobran, and Ambassador Fotić, in Box 
41, Folder 7 of the Konstantin Fotić Papers at the Hoover Institution Archive.  
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It is more likely that Palandech was rankled by Kolumbatović’s campaign against 
newspapers. After all, Palandech was a veteran newspaperman in a country that prided itself on 
its free press. Reflecting on the incident a year later in 1934, Palandech wrote: 
He (Kolumbatović)…thinks that he is somewhere in Albania and not in free America, 
which values and respects the honor and character of people…This gentleman does not 
take into account that in this affair of individuals…all patriots whom he characterizes as 
separatists, traitors to the fatherland, and chauvinists, are harmed. Also harmed are all of 
our societies and organizations, in which he has, through his intrigues, sown conflict, 
disunity, and in many, disintegration and ruin.390  
 
Here, Palandech implicitly sides with the Croatian newspapers that Kolumbatović targeted for 
“suppression;” “separatist” was the most common epithet used in government documents to refer 
to Croatian nationalists, even those who did not advocate for Croatian independence. In a 
separate article, Palandech rhetorically asked: “does Mr. Kolumbatović really expect that our 
nation here [emphasis mine], American citizens, loyal to the fatherland…will run from his 
oppression and the slanders of his spies and agents, just as we were forced to flee from our own 
hearths by Austrian terror? No!“391  Once again, grievances against Alexander’s dictatorship 
prompted people to imagine themselves part of a single Yugoslav diasporic community.  
Kolumbatović retaliated by smearing Palandech’s management of the World Fair, again 
through Hrvatska. Palandech was accused of usurping the presidency of the planning committee, 
of having been unsanctioned by the Yugoslav consul, of embezzling money intended for the fair, 
of refusing to permit Yugoslav diplomats attend to Yugoslav day at the pavilion,  and rebuffing 
the assistance of other “Yugoslavs” in the setting up the Yugoslav pavilion.392 As a consequence, 
Hrvatska asserted, attendance had suffered, with only five to six thousand Yugoslavs present on 
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Yugoslav day rather than the anticipated twenty-thousand. 393  Although unsigned, the article’s 
author was probably Kolumbatović’—the article reproduced exactly Kolumbatović’s complains 
about Palandech’s corruption and defiance of Yugoslav officials, both of which were in 
classified documents. In effect, Kolumbatović’s crusade against hostile immigrant publications 
led him to disparage his own country’s pavilion at a World Fair—truly bizarre behavior. 
If these attempts to silence emigrant critics prove anything, it was that censorship of the 
emigrant press was connected, both on a rhetorical and bureaucratic level, with the treatment of 
emigrants as part of the Yugoslav national body. However, culling a few small newspapers could 
not quell criticism of the royal dictatorship. If anything, it probably made it fiercer, turning 
potential friends into implacable enemies through heavy handed half-measures. After all, if one 
is going to censor the press, one had best do so systematically, lest the uncensored newspapers 
notice! Of course, Yugoslavia lacked the legal authority to do any such thing overseas.  
The censorious policies of Yugoslav diplomats also did not consider the English-
language press in the United States, which tended to be critical of Yugoslavia’s government, 
especially the limitations on press freedom and political expression. The New York Times, for 
instance, repeatedly characterized Alexander’s personal rule as “fascist” and compared it to the 
regime of Mussolini.394 American newspapers were important since emigrant newspapers lacked 
the resources to support foreign language correspondents. This, in turn, meant that much of what 
was printed in emigrant newspapers came either from English-language reporting or press 
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releases from Yugoslav authorities—Yugoslav diplomats did not have a monopoly on 
information coming out of Yugoslavia. Moreover, the broader anti-dictator discourse created a 
supportive environment for critics of Yugoslavia’s government like John Palandech.   
Arresting the Tenth Banovina 
 Yugoslavia’s diplomats did not stop at censorship, however. The case of Reverend Bono 
Andačić, who became a cause célèbre among American Croats in 1930, eloquently captures both 
the risks and limits of applying repressive force overseas. Andačić was one of eight Croatian 
Franciscan priests stationed in the United States. He came to the attention of the Yugoslav 
authorities in January 1930 for his alleged “anti-national and anti-state” activities. These were 
left vague, but Andačić’s crime was probably Croatian nationalism.395 Croatian priests like 
Andačić had a central role in Croatian communities, both because churches were a social hub, 
but also because parochial schools were responsible for transmitting Croatian language and 
culture to the second generation. In the 1920s, Yugoslavia’s policy toward the Croatian Catholic 
church abroad had been neutrality: while they saw their activities as a useful bulwark against 
assimilation, and their priests as potential national activists, emigrant Catholic churches received 
no administrative or financial assistance from the Yugoslav state, the justification being that the 
famously wealthy Catholic church, unlike the Orthodox, needed little assistance.396 But as we 
have already seen, with the advent of Alexander’s dictatorship, Croatian national organizations 
were no longer tolerated, and priests like Andačić could suddenly find themselves enemies of the 
state if their support of Croatian national organizations and newspapers was too outspoken. 
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 Of course, Yugoslav gendarmes could not simply arrest a priest on the streets of 
Chicago—extraordinary rendition is only tolerated if a great power does it. But in May 1930, 
Andačić unwisely visited the General Consulate in Chicago to request a visa to visit the old 
country. Seeing an opportunity, consul Kolumbatović immediately contacted the foreign 
ministry, calling Andačić “one of the worst priests,” and alleging several instances where 
Andačić or people in his company had said unkind things about King Alexander or the Yugoslav 
state.397 The visa was granted, Andačić left the safety of the United States, and in the picturesque 
Bosnian town of Mostar, Andačić was arrested by Yugoslav police. Word quickly got back to 
American Croatian priests (whom Kolumbatović had previously judged to be loyal398), who then 
approached the vice-Consul Cerrezin, a Croat, to voice their outrage. Cerrezin, himself a former 
emigrant, and a lawyer from Cleveland,399 was sympathetic, recognizing that arresting Andačić 
was like cutting off a hydra’s head. In his words:  
It is my opinion that if they can fasten the Rev. Andačić arrest on the Jugoslav 
government or on you, his friends and fellow clergymen will do so, as they have 
been looking for something of this kind for a long time. They may then use it as a 
propaganda to further the hatred and prejudice against the Jugoslav government 
and against those who disagree with them. Friends of Rev. Andačić will 
undoubtedly seize this opportunity and endeavor to make a martyr out of him.400  
 
Kolumbatović brushed off Cerrezin’s warning, contending that Andačić’s arrest would “have 
very good consequences here, as each and every friar and priest will now think twice before they 
attack the state and [the principle of] national unity.”401 Presumably, all these critics would 
deliver themselves to Yugoslavia to be arrested. 
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  Cerrezin’s predictions proved prescient. Andačić’s arrest, instead of intimidating 
Yugoslavia’s critics, galvanized them. The remaining seven Franciscan monks in the United 
States, who had previously been neutral to or supportive of the Yugoslav state, made common 
cause with sympathizers of the Croatian Peasant Party, lobbying senators for Andačić’s 
release.402  That release was secured almost immediately.403 Andačić, as it turned out, was an 
American citizen, and American diplomats had intervened on his behalf.404 Kolumbatović 
learned nothing from this setback. Several months later, he immediately began plotting to 
“liquidate” another Croatian priest, Reverend Blaž Jerković, a move that Kolumbatović predicted 
would decapitate the opposition to the royal dictatorship.405 Jerković, Kolumbatović suspected, 
had been responsible for the campaign to free Andačić, orchestrating rallies, newspaper 
editorials, and protest resolutions calling for Andačić’s release.406 Kolumbatović, however, 
would never get the chance to act against Jerković, who would remain a fixture of the “anti-
Yugoslav” opposition for the remainder of the thirties.407 Yugoslav officials had few legal 
options against critics abroad.  
 One workaround was to hold emigrants’ old-country relatives hostage. The Yugoslav 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs developed this technique in early 1934. Family members of 
suspected émigré troublemakers were compelled in their correspondence, to “warn emigrants 
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about the consequences that they could expect from their anti-state activity.” By using family 
members to write these messages, the foreign service was making an implicit threat that these 
consequences might fall on an emigrants’ family, who were, as the letter demonstrated, in their 
power. If emigrants were members of a terrorist organization, family members were also 
instructed to inform their emigrant relatives that they could be condemned to death or imprisoned 
should they ever return to Yugoslavia.408 As appalling as this policy was, it tells us that émigré 
dissidents represented a dilemma for Yugoslav officials. They did not want émigré dissidents 
back in Yugoslavia, and yet at the same time they feared the damage that they could do while 
abroad.  
 Hostage-taking was not, however, a common practice—or at least one that left little 
archival trace. It was much simpler to have emigrant troublemakers arrested and/or deported by 
the American police. We have already seen how this tactic was used against Ivan Horvat’s 
daughter. Deportation seemed to work best against Communists, which the United States was 
extremely willing to deport. Take, for instance, the case of Karl Novak, a communist leader from 
Detroit who, early in 1929, intended to hold a small meeting of Croatian and Macedonian 
communists to protest police terror in Yugoslavia. Learning of this, the Chicago consulate wrote 
to the Detroit police, emphasizing that those at the meeting were insulting an ally of the United 
States, and were, moreover, Bolsheviks. Despite only a few days advance warning, the Detroit 
police broke up the meeting and arrested Novak. Afterwards, the consulate contacted the police 
again, informing them that Novak had entered the US illegally and should be deported.409  This 
was not an isolated incident. A very large cell of Yugoslav communists in Chicago suffered a 
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setback when two of its three leaders were arrested by local police, apparently also on consular 
prompting. They too were deported.410 At least for deporting communists, Yugoslav diplomats 
found willing accomplices in the American police.  
 However, deportation was less effective against non-communists. One notable instance 
where it failed to work was in 1934, when Yugoslav diplomats attempted to deport Stojan 
Pribićević. Stojan was the son of Svetozar Pribićević, the leader of the Demokratska Stranka, 
(DS), a pro-Yugoslav political party that during the thirties aligned itself with the Croatian 
Peasant Party against Alexander’s dictatorship and in favor of a federal reorganization of 
Yugoslavia. The DS were not communists, but liberals. Stojan Pribićević entered the United 
States in March 1934 on a tourist visa, although his real purpose was probably to rally support 
for the Yugoslav opposition.411 Following what was by now a well-established procedure, 
Yugoslav diplomats attempted to get him deported later that year by writing to the US Secretary 
of State Cordell Hull, claiming that Stojan’s passport was a forgery, demanding that “this man be 
delt (sic) with…and be deported from the United States, as has been done in previous instances 
[emphasis mine].” 412 By now, this was apparently routine. But this time, Hull refused, 
explaining that “an official of this government is without authority to deprive Mr. Pribichevitch 
of [his passport] except by appropriate judicial proceedings based on a formal complaint and 
supported by competent evidence.”413 In other words, this time the Americans were not going to 
take the word of the Yugoslav government that Stojan Pribićević had a fake passport. After all, 
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Stojan Pribićević was not a communist, and thus had the right to due process in the United 
States.  
 Was the authoritarian turn in Yugoslavia’s diaspora politics purely the doing of 
Kolumbatović or was it emblematic of the entire diplomatic service? To answer this question, it 
is helpful to turn briefly to South America, where many of the same repressive techniques were 
on display. For example, Consulates compiled enemy lists of “anti-state elements.”414  Moreover, 
Macedonians were denied return visas to Yugoslavia on suspicion that they were working for the 
Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization (VMRO).415 In Argentina, for instance, 
Yugoslav diplomats repeatedly (and unsuccessfully) requested that Argentine police arrest and 
deport Marko Vujeva, a Croatian national activist sympathetic to the Croatian Peasant Party.416 
In 1930, Argentine police finally obliged, sentencing Vujeva to six months imprisonment, after 
which Vujeva fled to Montevideo.417 In Uruguay, Vujeva then fell under the influence of 
Branimir Jelić, where joined the growing Ustaša movement418—like Borislava Abzac, here was 
another moderate nationalist turned into an extremist by the inability of Yugoslav diplomats to 
tolerate dissent. In general, however, the police in Argentina, Uruguay, and Brazil were less 
willing than police in the “land of the free” to arrest and deport whomever Yugoslav diplomats 
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indicated.419 Thus, Yugoslav attempts to police its diaspora in South America were generally not 
as severe, although this was not for lack of trying.  
Federalism and Centralism 
As these individual cases show, the ideological commitment to treating emigrants as part 
of the nation, epitomized by their calling the emigration the “tenth province” of Yugoslavia, 
provoked a backlash without seriously impairing dissent. The rebellious mood of the ‘tenth 
banovina’ and their attitude toward Yugoslav unity can be gauged by a consular survey of the 
emigrant press in the United States from 1933. Of the nine Croatian newspapers, all but one were 
“anti-regime,” the exception being Hrvatska, which received a subsidy from the legation. Yet of 
those nine, only two advocated the secession of Croatia! For the seven Slovene newspapers, all 
supported the continued existence of Yugoslavia except for Prosveta and Proleterec, both 
affiliated with the SNPJ, the largest Slovene fraternal society, attacked Belgrade from the left. 
For the Serbian press, all supported Yugoslav unity and King Alexander’s dictatorship (although 
within a year two of those newspapers, Ujedinjeno Srpstvo and Jugoslavija would join the 
opposition), and one other was flirting with the ideas of Svetozar Pribićević, a notable critic of 
the regime. Although both the right-wing and the left-wing Macedonian newspapers opposed the 
dictatorship, although only the right-wing advocated the dissolution of Yugoslavia.420  In 
general, although support of the regime was generally confined to Serbian and some Slovene 
organizations, opposition to the regime was frequently paired with continued support for 
Yugoslav unity and left-wing politics. 
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As these statistics suggest, North American Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes tended to 
embrace alternative forms of Yugoslavism rather than ethnic separatism. Moreover, this was put 
into practice. In late 1930, after over a year of talks, the leadership of the Croatian Fraternal 
Union (CFU) and the Slovene National Benefit Society (SNPJ) agreed to form an umbrella 
organization for their fraternal societies. These talks later expanded to include the Serb National 
Federation and several smaller fraternal societies, fourteen in total.421 The name of this 
organization was the Jugoslovenska Bratska Federacija, or Yugoslav Fraternal Federation (JBF). 
True to its name, the JBF was organized on the federal principal—each fraternal society retained 
its autonomy but resolved to work together.422 Each fraternal society would collaborate on 
charitable initiatives (like supporting orphans), lobbying for better conditions for workers, 
recruitment, and conducting cultural propaganda.423 In this, we can see the common interests of 
the South-Slavic working class. However, at its root the JBF remained a Slovene-Croat 
condominium, with the numerically-inferior Serbs as junior partners. Slovenes and Croats 
dominated the leadership and set the agenda. Whether the JBF would eventually unify into a 
single self-help society was left unresolved in these early meetings. In part, this was because the 
CFU’s president was wary of complete unification, even as he saw the benefits of cooperation 
with other self-help societies.424  Still, the formation of the JBF was an enormously significant 
step, showing that Serb, Croat, and Slovene diaspora politics were becoming increasingly 
integrated on Yugoslav lines.  
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The formation of the JBF was a result of the same centripetal forces that had caused the 
confederation of Croatian self-help societies into the CFU in 1926 or the various Serb societies 
to unite into the SNS in 1929. Explaining the CFU’s reasons to pursue confederation with the 
SNPJ at their second convention in June 1929, the CFU declared that “there exist in the Unites 
States numerous Croatian, Serbian, and Slovene self-help organizations that have the same goals 
and interests.” Concretely, “emigration laws…have become stricter, preventing the emigration of 
our people from the old country….which would have given an inflow of new members for our 
organizations.”425 Their membership was getting older and financial pressure from the Great 
Depression was getting worse.426 This mergers between fraternal organizations, in short, was 
driven by working class interests. Yet a genuine belief in Yugoslav unity also unquestionably 
also a factor. In one section, the CFU asserted that that “our three-named people is already mixed 
together to a great degree in these organizations.”427 The SNPJ, for instance, had around 5000 
Serbs and Croats in its ranks.428 The Croatian Fraternal Union likewise had a minority of Serbs 
within it. In other words these “ethnic” fraternal societies were already somewhat Yugoslav in 
practice, if not in name. Note also the use of “our three-named people,” an explicit recognition of 
Yugoslav unity! The timing of this resolution was also suggestive. Proclaimed a mere six months 
after Alexander declared his dictatorship (and before anyone knew how repressive it would be), 
this drive toward Yugoslav unification of the fraternal societies may have been motivated by a 
mixture of Yugoslav idealism and pragmatism.  
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Although the JBF’s inclusion of the three largest South-Slav fraternal organizations made 
it a hegemon, there were two major fraternal organizations that remained aloof. The first 
organization to avoid federation was the Carniolan Slovene Catholic Union (KSKJ), which 
debated joining but ultimately decided not to join the federation.429 The other major fraternal 
union, the Croatian Catholic Union, was much more vocal in its opposition, calling in 1929 for 
“war to the knife” against the emergent JBF.430 This opposition seemed to have stemmed, in part, 
for their distaste for the “forty thousand unbelievers” in the SNPJ.431 Opposition to the JBF 
seemed to come chiefly from Catholic organizations, which treated left-wing rhetoric like the 
scent of brimstone. Moreover, devout Catholics, if they were paying attention to events in the 
“old country,” had good reason to be suspicious of Yugoslavism. King Alexander of Yugoslavia, 
due to his desire suborn all institutions in Yugoslavia to the crown, worked to undermine the 
influence and independence of the Catholic Church in Yugoslavia. The Catholic church was 
starved of state subsidies while the Orthodox church proselytized in traditionally Catholic lands. 
Catholic clergy were prevented from teaching in schools. And in the press, the Catholic church 
was attached as being pro-fascist.432  Regardless of the reasons for Catholic animosity to 
Yugoslavia, it was already becoming apparent that the main divide among emigrants was not 
between Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, but between the left and right.  
In addition, Yugoslav diplomats were not entirely sympathetic to the JBF’s model of 
federal Yugoslav cooperation. In December 1931 they founded a new fraternal organization 
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calling itself the Yugoslav Central Organization, or JCO.433  Conceived as an alternative to the 
still-ethnically-split fraternal unions, the Yugoslav Central Organization was supposed to bring 
Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes together in a single organization dedicated to promoting and 
preserving “Yugoslav” culture overseas.434  Though the JCO  had a Yugoslav-American 
figurehead, Kolumbatović was clearly the man behind the curtain, personally organizing new 
lodges, recruiting speakers, inviting people to meetings, and arranging for favorable press 
coverage, all the while reporting directly to the Yugoslav Minister of Foreign Affairs about the 
organization’s popularity (which never amounted to much).435  The JCO was also subsidized by 
the Yugoslav Ministry of Social Politics and National Health, which routed its donations through 
the General Consulate in Chicago.436  Superficially, the JCO was apolitical.437 But in practice, 
according to Kolumbatović, apoliticism meant fighting against “destructive elements,” which 
included both “the Communist-Croatian-Separatist movement” and Macedonian nationalists, 
who were becoming increasingly active in the American Midwest.438 The JCO did this primarily, 
as one would expect, by holding Unification Day parades and denouncing “separatists” in rallies 
and in their official newspaper, Jugosloven.439  
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Aside from the JCO, the HKZ, and the KSKJ, the other main source of opposition to the 
Yugoslav Fraternal Federation came from Yugo-skeptics within the Croatian Fraternal Union. As 
one political observer at the time noted in 1931, the JCO seemed to be evolving into the 
Yugoslav Fraternal Union, as the central committee of the JBF, still dominated by the SNPJ, 
gradually usurped more and more authority from its constituent organizations. Moreover, the 
question of full unification was increasingly raised at meetings.440 Ultimately, everything 
depended on which way the CFU would tip—for unification, or against?  In 1932, the 
conservative wing of the Croatian Fraternal Union, the Narodna Zajednica, or National Bloc, 
elected the most delegates to the CFU’s annual convention, defeating the Levičari (communists) 
and Prosvetaši (center-leftists) factions opposing them.441  The presidency of the CFU passed 
from Anton Gazdić, who was sympathetic to Yugoslavism, to Ivan Butković, a Yugo-skeptic. A 
rumor that Gazdić had accepted the Order of St. Sava from the Yugoslav ambassador had 
discredited his presidency, allowing the National Bloc to take over. 442 Apparently, any 
association with Yugoslav officials was politically toxic, something that should not be surprising 
by now.   
In 1933, the JBF’s Slovene president, Vincent Cainkar, declared at the annual meeting of 
the Central Committee that the “critical economic circumstances have made it such that we must 
begin to seriously consider the unification of our organizations.”443 The proposal was received 
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relatively favorably by the central committee, even by the Croatian delegates.444 The National 
Bloc’s resurgence was mainly confined to the presidency; the delegation to the JBF seems to 
have been less affected. Unification seemed inevitable. But at next year’s meeting, in 1934, the 
CFU’s new president Butković showed up in person, declaring that the CFU was “neither 
Slovene nor Yugoslav, but rather solely Croatian” and signaled his desire to withdraw from the 
JBF by stating “let us Croats go free.”445 Records about the JBF, or mention of it in the press, 
stopped after 1934. It seems very likely that the withdrawal of the Croatia Fraternal Union, the 
largest and richest constituent organization of the JBF, caused the JBF to collapse. This was an 
enormous setback for the Yugoslav movement in the United States—fraternal unions were the 
main guardian of national identity in the ‘tenth banovina’—their very existence as organizations 
depended on maintaining their titular culture among emigrants and their children. A unified 
organization might have smoothed over cultural differences between Serbs, Croats, and 
Slovenes. Moreover, the JBF could have plausibly spoken on behalf of a “Yugoslav diaspora;” if 
the CFU, SNPJ, and SNS had merged, they would have had, at roughly 176,000 members, two-
thirds of the population of the ‘tenth banovina’ in the United States that was in a fraternal 
society.446 Still, all hope was not lost for the Yugoslav movement in the United States. That the 
JBF lasted until at least 1934 illustrated that the clumsy attempts of Yugoslav diplomats to 
import political terror to the tenth banovina had not delegitimized the Yugoslav idea. Moreover, 
the JBF had demonstrated that the main divide in the emigration was not between Serb, Croat, 
and Slovene, but the pro-Yugoslav center-left and the anti-Yugoslav right. Thus, the foundation 
for a future “Yugoslav diaspora” among emigrants still existed.  
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The Rise of Transatlantic Tourism 
Additionally, it was during the dictatorship that another form of engagement with the 
homeland, tourism, rose dramatically. Encouraging group tourist excursions (izleti, in Serbo-
Croatian and Slovene) to Yugoslavia had been part of the Emigration Commissariat’s original 
1925 plan to combat denationalization. These excursions, they believed, would build sentimental 
ties between the emigration and the fatherland.447 But nothing was done to implement this vision 
until 1929. In May 1929, Ivan Mladineo, an emigrant collaborator with the diplomatic service, 
approached representatives of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia with a detailed written proposal to 
organize regular trips to Yugoslavia for the children of the Yugoslav sokols. According to 
Mladineo, the intent of these trips was explicitly nationalistic, intended to cultivate sympathy for 
Yugoslavia in the second generation of “Yugoslavs,” who were in danger of being 
Americanized. In keeping with the Yugoslav theme, excursioners would visit the major Serbian, 
Croatian, and Slovene cities—Belgrade, Zagreb, Ljubljana, Sarajevo, and Cetinje—although 
much of the itinerary focused on littoral Croatia—no doubt to take advantage of Yugoslavia’s 
Adriatic beaches and picturesque renaissance architecture in cities like Dubrovnik or Split.448  
 Ironically, Mladineo was inspired to organize this trip not by the emigration 
commissariat’s 1925 plan, but by American Swedes, who were doing something similar. Every 
year, Mladineo noted, between fifty and one-hundred Swedish schoolchildren went on an 
excursion to Sweden. This was nearly totally subsidized by the Swedish government (the 
excursioners only had to pay for their transatlantic steamship ticket).449 Just like the Irish 
Republican League in the United States inspired the Croatian Republican League, techniques of 
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nationalist mobilization spread memetically from one diaspora to another, making the United 
States uniquely fertile ground for creating a Yugoslav diaspora. Moreover, that Mladineo learned 
this technique from Swedish-Americans was symptomatic not of Yugoslav overseas nation-
building, but the growth of a transatlantic tourism industry that catered to Americans of 
European origin. After the 1924 emigration law, which dramatically reduced the number of 
emigrants allowed into the United States, steamship companies like Cunard could no longer turn 
a profit by hauling large numbers of would-be immigrants to the United States. To fill these 
now-empty third-class births, steamship companies in the late 1920s began advertising to these 
former-immigrants and their children, encouraging them to revisit the ‘old country.’ 
Transatlantic tourism, which had previously been a preserve of the wealthy, had become 
accessible to the urban working class,450 allowing it to become a tool of nationalist activists.   
 After Mladineo’s first mass-excursion to Yugoslavia, izleti proliferated. The Slovene 
fraternal unions were the first, with the SNPJ organizing their first izlet in the summer of 1930.451 
In 1931, the Carniolan Slovene Catholic Union organized their own izlet.452 In 1932, Anton 
Grdina, a Slovene, organized the American Yugoslav Tourist club and another youth izlet.453 
Yugoslav sokols in the United States visited again in 1934454 and 1937.455 In 1937 the Serbian 
National Union and Croatian Fraternal Union both organized their own respective izleti.456 The 
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size of a typical excursions could range from a few dozen to hundreds of people, tending to grow 
larger over time. One of the last, the SNS’s excursion, had 138 people.457  
The government of Yugoslavia capitalized on this trend. Emigrant tourist groups were 
welcomed with crowds, pomp, parades, and speeches from government officials, as a mass 
return of Yugoslavia’s prodigal sons and daughters. In choreographing these events, Yugoslav 
officials showed the great importance that they attached to emigrant tourism.458 At the visit of the 
SNS to Yugoslavia, for instance, one young Serb woman reported being greeted at the train 
station with a marching band. Later, her group shook hands with Prime Minister Stojadinović in 
the Yugoslav cabinet building. They ate well too: beer, vermouth, whiskey, pastries, roast pigs 
and spinach pies at just one mealtime!459 Based on other accounts, lavish receptions were 
standard for izlet-goers from America. Nor were these displays intended solely to impress 
emigrants, as these events were documented assiduously by the Yugoslav press.460 They were 
proof, in the eyes of the Yugoslav government, that emigrants continued to feel affection for 
their old country.  
 Part of tourism’s power was its ability to combine pleasure and patriotism, allowing 
nationalism to reach a broader audience. Even those who were indifferent to the idea of 
Yugoslav unity could nonetheless be attracted by the warm beaches of Dalmatia, the forested 
peaks of the Dinaric alps, the picturesque old towns of Belgrade or Zagreb, or the prospect of 
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reconnecting with one’s extended family who had stayed in the ‘old country.’ Moreover, 
traveling to the ‘old country’ had a preternatural ability to convert regular people into 
nationalists. Many of those who went on these excursion trips, upon their return to the United 
States, felt compelled to share their experiences in articles in emigrant newspapers. There 
emerged a whole genre of articles recounting the experience of awakening to one’s own 
nationality on an izlet. For instance, Kristina Kolar, a young Slovene from Minnesota, writing in 
the official organ of the KSKJ, recalled her awe at the seeing the Savica waterfall and the caves 
in the Slovenian highlands.461 Branko Pekić, an American Serb, likewise commented on 
Yugoslavia’s natural beauty multiple times in a lengthy account of his trip that was printed as a 
serial in Srbobran.462 Marica Vuković was particularly explicit, beginning her article with the 
exhortation: “to every reader, we say, if it is possible, visit Yugoslavia and be proud of the land 
of your birth and  ancestry.”463 Even if the total number of izlet-goers was probably less than a 
few thousand, the izlet reached a broad audience through newspapers. 
 It is important to note, however, that travel did not necessarily make Yugoslav 
nationalists: five years later, for instance, Branko Pekić would become editor of Srbobran, 
turning it from a Yugoslav paper to a greater-Serbian newspaper.464 Pekić’s trip might have 
nudged him toward national chauvinism; before entering Yugoslavia, Pekić had been curious 
about the “Croatian question” and immediately questioned the locals in Belgrade, who all told 
him that Croatian nationalists were “fanatics” and malcontents. Thus primed, everything he saw 
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in Croatia confirmed his suspicions that Croats were overreacting to Alexander’s personal 
rule.465 Alternatively, Pekić might have held latent anti-Croat beliefs even before his trip. 
Regardless, having been to Yugoslavia and seen the conditions there gave a Serbian nationalist 
greater credibility among emigrant audiences—travel was often a springboard toward greater 
prominence in emigrant media. 
Branko’s case reveals that tourism had a significant downside—tourists’ interactions with 
locals could not be totally circumscribed. Ivan Mladineo, recalling his own travel experience in 
the Croatian newspaper Narodni Glasnik, noted that, despite his satisfaction with the warm 
welcome from Yugoslav officials and the personal freedom enjoyed by regular people, 
allegiances to the now-banned political parties of the twenties remained alive and Croats 
remained suspicious of the Belgrade government. Moreover, that regime, he observed, was 
somewhat ineffectual at combating partisanship and national disunity, with many problems being 
left to fester or tackled with inadequate preparation.466 Kristina Kolar, a Slovene who visited in 
1935, also mentioned in her account her dissatisfaction with the poverty in which ordinary 
Slovenes lived.467 All the parades in the world could not conceal the misadministration of 
Alexander’s regime or the dissatisfaction of regular people with that government.  
Moreover, there was always the risk that tourists would stir up trouble in Yugoslavia.  
One dramatic instance of this occurred in 1937, on the izlet of the Croatian Fraternal Union. Prior 
to the trip, Yugoslav diplomats twice interviewed the leader of the excursion, CFU president 
Ivan Butković. Butković said all the right things in these conversations, reassuring the charge 
d’affaires that he had “sympathy and respect for Serbs, many of whom are his personal friends 
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[and] that he believed in the current need for national and ethnic unity [in Yugoslavia].” He also 
expressed the desire to visit Belgrade, although during his second visit to the consulate he 
dropped the Yugoslav capital from his planned itinerary, which included several cities in Croatia 
and Bosnia. That made the diplomat suspicious.468 It seems to have been important that tourists 
visit all parts of Yugoslavia, and, moreover, that tourist groups be screened to keep 
troublemakers out. After all, tourism was as much about promoting Yugoslavism in Yugoslavia 
by making it into a display of immigrant loyalty, and so ‘disloyal’ emigrants could not be 
permitted to visit.  
Likewise, per custom, Yugoslav officials greeted the izlet with parades and pageantry, on 
which Yugoslav newspapers reported. Novi Iseljenik, a government mouthpiece, reported how  
all Zagreb was covered in flags. Windows are ornamented with flowers in sacred 
expectation. They await our immigrant brothers from America. Shoulder to 
shoulder…they await the joyous moment when they can greet Croatian emigrants, who 
have returned to visit their fatherland. Everything seemed like it was a great national 
holiday. 
 
 At the train station, this tourist group was greeted by cheering crowds, a folk music ensemble, a 
singing society, and local dignitaries.469 The event was also covered by Zagreb newspapers 
Hrvatski Dnevnik, Jutarnji List, and Večer, where it made the front page.470 The proceedings 
were even reported on by Politika in Belgrade!471 Clearly, emigrant visits were important sources 
of symbolic capital to the Belgrade regime. Butković gave a brief speech at the train station in 
Zagreb, promising “the most energetic cooperation with all needs of the fatherland.”472 However, 
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these puff-pieces concealed an embarrassing episode. During a reception hosted by a local 
cultural organization, Butković delivered an incendiary speech denouncing Regent Paul, who 
had succeeded Alexander. According to Yugoslav authorities, those present, Yugoslavs and 
Americans alike, then began to chant “Down with Yugoslavia” and “Down with bloody 
Belgrade!”473  For “abusing Yugoslavia’s hospitality,” Butković was deported back to America, 
where he used the incident to portray himself as a victim of Yugoslav police brutality.474 While 
the visit of the CFU to Yugoslavia might have helped Yugoslavia reassure its citizens that 
emigrants had not forgotten about their fatherland, it provided yet another demonstration for 
emigrants of King Alexander’s hatred of free speech.  
The Native’s Return 
No instance better illustrated the potential and risks of tourism than the case of Louis 
Adamic, who went to Yugoslavia in 1932 after winning a Guggenheim fellowship for creative 
writing in Europe. This trip eventually resulted in a book, The Native’s Return, the most 
important book to come out of the Yugoslav émigré community for the interwar period. Not only 
was it the only bestseller, it also marked Adamic’s debut into Yugoslav diaspora politics—travel, 
after all, gave emigrants the authority to speak about the old country to their brethren.  
Of course, Louis Adamic’s journey to Yugoslavia was unlike that those of the large 
tourist groups in three important ways. First, he stayed in Yugoslavia significantly longer—an 
entire year, rather than a few weeks. Secondly, while izleti were choreographed, Adamic’s 
itinerary was improvised. This unpredictability hindered official efforts to keep Adamic from 
meeting anybody or seeing anything embarrassing. The length of Adamic’s stay compounded 
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this risk. Lastly, Adamic was a classic muckraker. Adamic’s time in the states had afforded him 
the opportunity to read Upton Sinclair, who may have inspired Adamic to write his own 
exposé/history of labor conditions and racketeering in his first book, Dynamite (1931).475  
Adamic’s second book, Laughing in the Jungle (1932), uses Adamic’s own life to examine the 
conditions of emigrants in America. Laughing in the Jungle was also a tribute to Sinclair’s The 
Jungle, which Adamic had read to teach himself English at age sixteen. 476 Modeling himself 
after Sinclair, Adamic would not stay on the beaten tourist track.  
 Thus, it is not surprising that Adamic met with large sections of the Yugoslav 
underground on his journey. In Montenegro, Adamic met with both progressives and radical 
youth, some of whom were communists, from whom he received grisly accounts of how 
government torturers would “put live coals under their armpits…stuck needles under their finger-
and toe-nails…[drive] awls into their heels,” and so forth. Some even corroborated their stories 
by showing Adamic their scars.477 In Split, Adamic heard complaints about the lack of political 
freedom under the dictatorship.478 In Sarajevo, Adamic met with young writers, who griped 
about censorship and the ban on importing books, one young worker, who supplied him with 
statistics about the awful wages and conditions for factory workers and lumberjacks, and still 
more dissidents who told him more about conditions in Alexander’s prisons.479 In Macedonia, 
Adamic found and spoke with colonies of political prisoners, communists and some members of 
the Croatian Peasant Party, who had been exiled to malarial villages as punishment.480 In 
Belgrade, Adamic had coffee with a university professor who diverted him with anecdotes of 
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corruption, nepotism, graft, and even assassinations within the Yugoslavia’s political and 
economic elite.481 In Zagreb, Adamic met with a procession of students, professors, writers, 
union-leaders, and party organizers, all of whom were dissatisfied with the government.  Adamic 
was told that the wages of industrial workers in Yugoslavia were pitifully low, that the industrial 
proletariat was on the verge of insurrection, that various western European capitalists were 
pillaging Yugoslavia of its natural resources, that landlords were colluding with the government 
to charge exorbitant rent and pay no taxes. One radical even took him to a communist safehouse, 
where Adamic was shown still more burned-out armpits.482 This is just more proof that allowing 
tourism is risky for authoritarian governments. 
Adamic’s rapidly-dimming view of Alexander’s regime worsened when he noticed 
detectives shadowing him and monitoring his speaking engagements.483 And he was appalled 
when gendarmes crushed a demonstration on Ban Jelačić square, which his hotel in Zagreb 
overlooked. Adamic called it “the speediest, most efficient piece of terroristic brutality I have 
ever witnessed.”484   Adamic summed up the cumulative effect of these experiences thus: 
When I arrived in Yugoslavia, the country had been for over three years under 
the ruthless military dictatorship of King Alexander, which I knew but vaguely 
before I came here. I did not know what that really meant. I was not interested 
[emphasis mine]. I did not fully realize till months later that dictatorship meant 
that thousands of people were in prisons…;that every city swarmed with secret 
agents; that newspaper, magazine, and book editors and publishers were under 
strict censorship; that public meetings…were forbidden; and so on.485   
 
 Reading about “bloody Belgrade” in Zajedničar or Svijet was one thing, seeing it firsthand was 
another—this was the great risk that tourism posed for Yugoslavia, and by extension, every ‘old 
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country’ with an oppressive government. But on the other hand, travel also renewed national 
sentiment and prompted Adamic to think about how Yugoslavia’s government could be 
reformed.  
Ironically, that government treated him quite well, extending to Adamic the same 
treatment that they afforded to the izlet-goers. Stepping off the boat in Trieste, Adamic was 
greeted personally by a representative of the ban (provincial governor).486 In Split, government 
officials gave him the use of state-owned cars, and orchestrated a meeting between him and the 
ban.487 Adamic received the same service in Sarajevo and Zagreb.488 True to their habit of using 
the achievements of emigrants as propaganda, Yugoslavia’s government announced his arrival to 
all the major Yugoslav newspapers. Articles written about Adamic exaggerated Adamic’s fame 
and prominence in the United States, making him into a “great writer,” living proof of Yugoslav 
greatness.489 Although Adamic’s first two books had been well received by critics, in the United 
States he had been a relatively obscure figure. But in Yugoslavia Adamic became an instant 
celebrity, a peer to Yugoslavia’s intellectual and cultural elite. While in Yugoslavia, Adamic 
would meet with Yugoslavia’s preeminent sculptor, Ivan Meštrović,490 and one of their leading 
writers, Miroslav Krleža!491 Adamic was particularly impressed by Meštrović, whom he called 
“a mystic, an adventuruer, a Christ, a devil, a lover, a child, a seer, an ascetic, a Rabelaisian, a 
cheap politician and opportunist…but—basically, essentially—always an artist, a genius.”492 
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Adamic was less impressed by the Yugoslav political and economic elite (often 
overlapping categories), who chauffeured him around, showing him new parks, bridges, and 
housing developments while urging Adamic to write glowing reviews of Yugoslavia and attract 
foreign investment.493 Later, the government press-bureau offered Adamic a bribe of several 
thousand dollars if he would write favorably about Yugoslavia. Adamic declined.494 A Slovene 
politician allied to the government took Adamic out to lunch at one of the nicest restaurants in 
Belgrade, promising Adamic a “bright future” if he would “cooperate” with the Belgrade 
government. Adamic demurred.495 Adamic was offered the Order of the White Eagle. Adamic 
refused that too.496 The Yugoslav authorities, concerned by Adamic’s intractability, made a last-
ditch bet that Alexander’s royal charisma would win Adamic over.497 It did not. Their anti-
climactic meeting (which lasted no more than thirty minutes) was characterized by small talk, 
awkward silences, and passive-aggression: Adamic declined to call King Alexander “your 
majesty,” Alexander declined to offer Adamic an autograph (as was customary).498 Adamic had 
already made up his mind months before. If anything, attempts to dazzle Adamic with wealth 
and authority backfired, offending Adamic’s inchoate socialistic-republican sympathies.  
Though his time in Belgrade kindled a lasting hatred for Alexander’s dictatorship in 
Adamic, his time in Yugoslavia also rejuvenated Adamic’s interest in his Slovene and Yugoslav 
heritage. Indeed, the narrative arc of The Native’s Return strongly resembles those of the izlet 
travelogues. Contrast Adamic’s declaration of his national sympathies at the beginning and the 
end of his A Native’s Return Before traveling to Yugoslavia, Adamic was interested in “events 
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and things outside of America…only in so far as they…affected the United States. I spoke, 
wrote, and read only in English…I had practically no close contact with immigrants of my native 
nationality…I had become an American writer, writing on American subjects for American 
readers.”499 Yet by the end of his journey, Adamic was declaring: “I love Carniola, all 
Yugoslavia. I am glad I was born there; that by origin I am a Slovene, a Yugoslav.”500 Moreover, 
Adamic declared that henceforth he would be an evangelist for the Yugoslav idea in the United 
States: “It’s grand to be a Yugoslav-American and to come back after a visit to the old 
country…I guess my job in the next few years, perhaps for the rest of my life, will be…to 
interpret my old country to America. I love Yugoslavia and I think Americans should be 
interested in it.”501 He would be true to his word.  
What about travel had such a strong effect on Adamic? In part, travel renewed his 
personal and familial ties to Yugoslavia. Over the nearly twenty years he had spent in the United 
States, Adamic had grown distant from his family. In his own words: “before I returned home, 
they had not meant much to me; now, I feel great affection for them…it was fine to get 
reacquainted with Uncle Mikha, to see Uncle Yanez before he died, to play a part in the marriage 
of Tone and Yulka.”502  His family gave Adamic a personal investment in his new ‘old country.’ 
Part of the power of travel is that it creates and renews personal ties between the tourist and the 
friends and family they meet abroad, allowing the tourist to imagine themselves as part of a 
diasporic national community, which, in this case, was Yugoslav, rather than, say, Serb, Croat, or 
Slovene.  
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More interestingly, Adamic’s appreciation for Yugoslavia’s people and scenery was 
mediated through his own experiences as an American; being an American helped him 
understand Yugoslavia—both its faults and its positive qualities.  Belgrade, the capital, he 
compares to “a ‘boom’ town—and this in the most thorough sense of that 100-per-cent American 
phrase” much like “Chicago was thirty years ago.”503 The Belgrade economic elite “reminded 
[him] very much of American boosters.”504 The political elite Adamic compares to American 
racketeers, and their leader, King Alexander, Adamic compares to Al Capone.505 Stjepan Radić 
Adamic compares to William Jennings Bryan.506 And so forth—these are not even half of 
Adamic’s analogies between America and Yugoslavia.  
Adamic made implicit comparisons as well. One of Adamic’s arguments in The Native’s 
Return is that Yugoslavia’s economy and people are becoming like those of the United States, 
and a major theme in this book was the disjuncture between the old and the new Yugoslavia. For 
instance, Adamic contrasts Dubrovnik’s the old merchant elite and their “palaces…[whose] 
corridors and rooms virtually smell of tragedy and death” with “the peasants who daily come to 
town from near-by villages, and the porters, laborers, would-be laborers, bums and vagabonds” 
who make the old city seem “very much alive with people utterly unlike the declining gospari,” 
the Dubrovnik elite.507 In Split, Adamic juxtaposed the Roman ruins around which the city was 
built with the “booming harbor and growing business enterprises,” a contrast that struck him as 
“vastly ironical, downright funny.”508  In Montenegro, Adamic harshly critiqued the 
“professional heroes” in traditional folk costume, whom he asserts “should be pickled clad in 
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their costumes and posed in characteristic attitudes and put in a museum,” with the younger 
generation, whom he calls “the most determined section of the progressive and radical-
revolutionary element in the Balkans.509 In general, Adamic was “deeply impressed by the 
tremendous vitality, physical and spiritual, of the plain people of Yugoslavia,” a vitality that, 
through immigration, “is frozen in America’s present-day greatness; in the tall buildings of New 
York…in the bridges and railroads throughout America; in nearly everything that is important in 
her material equipment. A thin, imperceptible threat of our Slavic energy runs in every track of 
America’s railway system.”510 Adamic’s American nationalism, became, through travel, his 
Yugoslav nationalism, which was not about folk costumes and national songs, but technology 
and “modernity.” 
 Adamic’s travelogue of his time in Yugoslavia, The Native’s Return, published in 1934, 
became Adamic’s first bestseller.511  The New York Times called it “one of those rare 
unclassifiable ‘originals’ that turn up once in every blue moon. We cannot think of a person 
living who won’t like at least portions of The Native’s Return.”512 Written in accessible English 
and filled with analogies with American history and culture, The Native’s Return made 
Yugoslavia accessible to an American audience. And some parts, like Adamic’s lush description 
of a Slovene wedding, are equal parts poignant and comical. Moreover, its core premise, of an 
American rediscovering his European roots, fed into the general growth of old-country tourism 
in the United States. 
For Yugoslav-Americans, The Native’s Return managed to tap into the prevailing pro-
Yugoslav but anti-regime mood among emigrants, who had already suffered for years under 
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Belgrade’s (ineffectual) attempt to import censorship and police terror to the tenth banovina.  
The Native’s Return was hyped heavily—even before it went on sale, excerpts from Adamic’s 
book were printed in an ideologically diverse group of “anti-regime” emigrant newspapers..513 
On the lecture circuit for his new book, Adamic was welcomed again by every “anti-state and 
anti-regime element” in the diaspora, according to consul Kolumbatović, from communists to 
clericals, republicans to revolutionaries. Adamic even persuaded a group of Macedonian 
nationalists based in Chicago, Nezavisima Makedonija, to host a rally which was attended by 
“every destructive element” in the area, meaning, very likely, HSS sympathizers and Croat and 
Slovene leftists.514  Since Adamic was a newcomer to émigré politics, he had few enemies and 
was therefore a potentially unifying figure. Moreover, having been to Yugoslavia made him 
popular on the lecture circuit—people were curious about the way things really were. In this 
way, travel enhances the authority of national activists. Lastly, The Native’s Return argued that it 
was possible to be both a patriotic American and a proud Yugoslav; one did not have to choose 
between them. This must have appealed to south Slavs, who were not always treated as racial 
equals to Anglo-Americans. 
 The Yugoslav government, however, was not charmed by The Native’s Return. In fact, 
despite making a case for Yugoslavism, Adamic’s book was banned by special decree in 
Yugoslavia almost immediately after it was published.515 Possession of a copy was punishable 
with a two-year jail sentence. Newspapers in Yugoslavia were not even permitted to mention the 
 
513 “Hrvatski Separatiste; Sukob Kola sa HRSS; Memorandum; Ujedinjeni Front; akcija Adamica,” Report from Djuro 
Kolumbatović to MIP Political Division, December 26, 1933. Fond 414, fasc. 4, BO 7, AJ. 
514 “Raspustanje Hrvatskog Veca; Sukob izmedju HRSS i hrvatskog Kola; Adamiceva Knjiga ‘Povratak Jednog 
Iseljenika,’” Report from Djuro Kolumbatović to MIP Political Division, February 31, 1934. Fond 414, fasc. 4, BO 7, 
AJ. 
515 “Zabrana Adamićeve knjige,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs to Yugoslav Legation in Washington,  March 2, 1934. 
Fond 371, fasc. 60, BO 78, AJ.  




book’s existence.516 However, in the United States, this merely gave The Native’s Return the 
allure of the forbidden; as Zajedničar put it, the ban “proves in most simple words just how far 
the autocratic government of Jugoslavia must go to suppress the freedom of mind…to maintain 
its ‘right’ to rule over an unfortunate people. For Adamic’s book, this is the best advertisement 
ever written and it is given without cost.”517 Here is yet more proof that attempts to censor the 
‘tenth banovina’ were counterproductive. 
Yet the reaction to Adamic’s book within the diplomatic service was ambivalent. Consul 
Cerrezin, reporting on a speech Adamic gave in Cleveland, asserted that Adamic “spoke very 
nicely pertaining to the country” excluding one mildly critical comment about the Belgrade 
government. Adamic’s talk, Cerrezin argued “had done more good than harm to the Yugoslav 
government.”518  Just after Adamic’s book was published, Consul Unković attended one of 
Adamic’s speeches in Pittsburgh. Reporting to his superiors in the Washington legation, Unković 
underlined that Adamic spoke very highly of Yugoslavia and its people, asserting that “ it is the 
opinion of the undersigned that Mr. Adamic is rendering great services to our Nation as a whole 
and to our emigrants specifically.”519 Of course, Unković, like Cerrezin, was a migrant himself. 
Having emigrated from Korčula to Pittsburgh in 1906, Unković had resided in the United States 
for almost two decades, working for several emigrant newspapers before he became Yugoslav 
vice-consul in Pittsburgh in 1930.520 It seems that Yugoslav diplomats who had spent decades in 
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the American milieu were more likely to see critiques of Yugoslavia as harmless, perhaps 
because of their experience of American press freedom. 
Yet for Kolumbatović, who outranked Cerrezin and Unković, Adamic’s promotion of the 
Yugoslav cause did not outweigh his criticism of Alexander’s government. Through various 
proxies, he launched a press war against Adamic, hoping that this would “weaken the impression 
that some of our unguarded countrymen might get upon reading Adamic’s book.”521 The 
American Srbobran, which had a close working relationship with the Yugoslav consulate and 
may have received state subsidies,522 wrote to the Foreign Language Information Service, which 
employed Adamic as a naturalization expert, asking them to quash Adamic’s discussions of 
political conditions in Yugoslavia on the grounds that those discussions might incite ethnic 
hatred. 523 In January 1935, Kolumbatović tried to persuade the Council of Foreign Relations to 
drop Adamic as a speaker and substitute someone more sympathetic to the Yugoslav 
government.524 Mihajlo Pupin, an ally of the consulate, denounced Adamic on October 20, 1934 
in a letter to the editor of the New York Times, saying that Adamic “looks upon the rule of King 
Alexander with the spectacles of a man who at one time prided himself to be a hobo. He finally 
degenerated into a Bolshevik.”525 Nikola Tesla did the same four days later, asserting that The 
 
521 “Hrvatski Separatiste; Sukob Kola sa HRSS; Memorandum; Ujedinjeni Front; akcija Adamica,” Report from Djuro 
Kolumbatović to MIP Political Division, December 26, 1933. Fond 414, fasc. 4, BO 7, AJ 
522 According to Vaso Trivanović, who worked for CBS and had contacts in the State Department, it was an open 
secret that Srbobran had “always” been subsidized by Belgrade and its editors usually printed whatever they were 
told by Ambassador Fotić, who became ambassador in 1935. See: Letter from Vaso Trivanović to Srđan 
Budisavljević, April 4, 1942, Fond 83, fasc. 5, BO 42, AJ. Although I have found no direct evidence of this 
relationship, the case of Hrvatska shows that planting articles in sympathetic diaspora papers was standard 
practice for Yugoslav diplomats, as was giving papers subsidies to ensure friendly coverage.  There is also a 
substantial amount of correspondence between the leaders of the SNS, which owned Srbobran, and Ambassador 
Fotić, in Box 41, Folder 7 of the Konstantin Fotić Papers at the Hoover Institution Archive.  
523 Letter from B. Dejicich to Foreign Language Information Service, March 28, 1934. Fond 371, fasc. 60, BO 78, AJ 
524 Predavanje L. Adamica u Čikagu,” Report from Djuro Kolumbatović to MIP political division, January 29, 1935. 
Fond 371, fasc. 60, BO 78, AJ. 
525 Mihajlo Pupin, “The Yugoslav Union,” The New York Times, October 20, 1934.  




Native’s Return “indulges in political defamation, denunciation of the ruler of the country and 
promulgation of ideas as unwelcome here as in Yugoslavia” and that Adamic’s “denunciations of 
the King and reflections on his character can be contemptuously passed.”526 While there is no 
direct proof that Kolumbatović put Tesla and Pupin up to it, the close interval between the 
editorials bespeaks some sort of coordination, particularly since Tesla and Pupin were not on 
speaking terms.527 Moreover, Mihajlo Pupin had delivered pro-Government lectures on behalf of 
the consulate on other occasions.528  But being written about, even critically, by Mihajlo Pupin or 
Nikola Tesla merely proved that The Native’s Return had transformed Louis Adamic from an 
obscure writer to a central personality within the growing Yugoslav movement within the United 
States.  
Conclusion 
Although The Native’s Return and the success it enjoyed demonstrated that the Yugoslav 
idea still enjoyed popular legitimacy, it also showed that emigrants were no longer willing to 
defer to the Yugoslav state’s authoritarian interpretation of Yugoslavism. Some emigrants, like 
Adamic, turned to leftism and federalism as guiding principles for a hypothetical Yugoslav state.  
This, in turn, answers Gabriel Sheffer’s theoretical question about the sorts of tensions 
that arise between the ‘old country’ and the diaspora.529 Moreover, the Yugoslav case tells us one 
potential consequence of such a strained relationship. The Yugoslav emigration was becoming 
increasingly independent, even as the web of connections between individuals and organizations 
that is essential to the functioning of a “diaspora” grew denser. We see this, for instance, in the 
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failed attempt to create a Yugoslav Fraternal Union, which nonetheless reinforced the habits of 
collaboration between Serb, Croat, and Slovene fraternal unions. This incipient diasporic 
network in the United States was anchored by the dual principles of leftism and anti-
authoritarianism, a product both of Yugoslavia’s attempts to export repressive governance, but 
also anti-authoritarian discourse within the United States. Yugoslavism in the United States 
seemed poised to become a mass working-class movement, decades before something similar 
occurred in Yugoslavia.  
Moreover, travel and travelers played an outsized role within the South Slavic milieu. 
Not only was travel fatal to indifference about the ‘old country,’ reversing “Americanization” if 
you will, being seen to possess “the truth” about Yugoslavia elevated previously liminal figures 
into central nodes within this network.  Yet this significance of travel also made the ‘tenth 
banovina’ fertile soil for disaffected Yugoslav politicians and the communist and fascist 
underground, now seeking to make their case overseas.  The contestation between these parties 
















CHAPTER FOUR: YUGOSLAV POLITICAL PARTIES AND THE ‘TENTH BANOVINA’ 
 
In 1938, Yugoslav police in Vojnić, a village in central Croatia, detained and interrogated 
a man named Mate Valentić. Born in Selnica, another village in Croatia, Valentić had gone to 
Paris in 1926 in search of work. Upon his return, he was questioned: had he participated in any 
strikes? Were the strikes organized by communists? With whom did he associate abroad? Did he 
join any political organizations or labor unions? Did he attend any speeches by Vlatko Radić (of 
the Croatian Peasant Party) or Svetozar Pribićević (of the Independent Democrats)? How did he 
react to the (Ustaša-organized) assassination of King Alexander in Marseille in 1934? 
Eventually, Valentić’s case reached the provincial governor of the Savska Banovina, who 
prepared a dossier on this emigrant worker. Ultimately Valentić was released but put under 
“strict surveillance.”530  
Although Valentić answered each question in the negative, his interrogation, and the 
many like it in Yugoslav archives, reflect official anxiety over the overseas activities of four 
Yugoslav political parties: the Croatian Peasant Party, the Democratic Party, the Communist 
Party of Yugoslavia, and the Ustaša. Although banned in Yugoslavia, over the 1930s all four 
parties carved a new niche for themselves in emigrant communities, with varying degrees of 
success. Although emigrants could not vote in Yugoslav elections, their donations could keep 
these opposition parties alive. More importantly, Yugoslav emigrants could be a source of 
symbolic capital. As underlined in previous chapters, the “emigration question” and the ideal of a 
“loyal diaspora” was a pillar of official Yugoslavia’s legitimacy—in contesting the diaspora, 
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these four parties both reinforced the importance of Yugoslavia’s emigrants, but also shifted the 
trajectory of émigré politics.  
Even though one of these parties, the Ustaša, was anti-Yugoslav, all four parties 
competed within the same political arena and were aware of the others. The rivalries and 
alliances between these parties led to ever more sophisticated strategies to connect emigrant 
communities on multiple continents. Despite this fact, studies of these political parties have 
tended to examine them in isolation, rather than comparatively.531  Only Ivo Banac examines 
these parties as players within the broader framework of Yugoslav politics, although his 
monograph does not cover the activities of these parties in exile.532 As such, this chapter is a 
necessary supplement to Yugoslav historiography, both in its subject matter, but also in its 
comparative approach.  
This comparative approach is also important because all four parties connected emigrant 
communities on multiple continents and linked discontent with Belgrade with the struggle 
between fascists and anti-fascists. National identity is frequently built in reference to an “other,” 
and combating the Ustaša abroad gave the Croatian Peasant Party, Democratic Party, and the 
Communists a common cause in émigré politics, letting their ideological affinities manifest on an 
organizational level. In so doing, these four parties inadvertently laid the foundation for the 
emergence of a “Yugoslav diaspora,” a transnational network of Serb, Croat, and Slovene 
emigrant organizations mobilized in support of their homeland. 
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This chapter examines each political party in turn, beginning with Croatian Peasant Party 
and concluding with the Ustaša, comparing how these parties recruited and mobilized emigrants, 
engaged with civil society organizations, and maintained the cohesion of their respective 
organizations. These parties faced common challenges, and the solutions they devised show the 
degree to which they learned from one another, despite their differing attitudes toward the 
Yugoslav idea. By analyzing these parties, it becomes possible to understand not only how 
nationalist parties appealed to economic migrants, but also the effects of different national 
contexts on diaspora nationalism. Most importantly, comparing the Croatian Peasant Party, DS, 
and Communists to the Ustaša can explain why the Ustaša was unable to gain a foothold in 
Croatian communities in the United States, preventing the ethnic polarization that could have 
undermined later efforts by Serb, Croat, and Slovene emigrant groups to work together.  
What About the Macedonians?  
There is, however, a noticeable omission from this chapter: the Internal Macedonian 
Revolutionary Organization (VMRO) and its leader, Vančo Mihailov. During the interwar 
period, VMRO, like the Ustaša, became a transnational political party, even coordinating with 
Ante Pavelić the assassination of King Alexander of Yugoslavia in Marseilles in 1934. 
Moreover, one finds sporadic mentions of Macedonian emigre nationalist groups in the archives 
of Yugoslav diplomats monitoring “subversive” immigrant associations.533 Nonetheless, VMRO 
is excluded from this chapter because of the paucity of both primary and secondary sources 
dealing with its organization during the interwar period. For the Yugoslav authorities surveilling 
emigrants, VMRO did not draw the same level of attention as the four abovementioned parties. 
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We see this tendency, for instance, in the interrogation of Valentić, who was not asked about 
VMRO. More broadly, the Kingdom of Yugoslavia was never able to plant a mole in VMRO’s 
subsidiary in the United States, the Macedonian Political Organization (MPO), something they 
were able to do for both the HSS and the Domobran.534 As a result, the Yugoslav diplomatic 
archives yield little insight into VMRO’s inner workings. Also, unlike the Domobran, the MPO 
was not broken up by the FBI, meaning there are no casefiles to read.  
The MPO’s parent organization, VMRO, is also largely opaque. Because it was a 
clandestine terrorist organization, primary source coverage of its inner workings is largely 
limited to Mihailov’s three-volume autobiography, which details his political activities in exile 
up to 1934.535 As a result, studies of VMRO are forced to rely on Mihailov’s autobiography—
about which historians frequently complain.536 Leaving aside the issue that his autobiography 
was written decades after the fact, Mihailov rarely let the truth interfere with self-glorification. 
Mihailov’s autobiography also tells us little about VMRO’s ground game with emigrants. During 
these years, Mihailov lived in Bulgaria, orchestrating assassinations against prominent figures in 
Yugoslavia and members of his own organization who displeased him. In 1934, Mihailov was 
forced to leave Bulgaria for Turkey and subsequently Poland. In 1941, Mihailov resurfaced as a 
guest of Ustaša in Zagreb, where he remained for the remainder of the Second World War. For 
historians, this part of Mihailov’s life—after his exile from Bulgaria and before his re-
appearance in Zagreb, is largely a mystery. Stefan Troebst, an authority on VMRO, even labeled 
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the 1934-41 period “terra incognito.”537 Although Mihailov wrote a fourth volume of his 
autobiography which dealt with this period, he never published it and the manuscript remains 
largely inaccessible.538 Since this chapter is  concerned with the 1930s, this lacuna makes it 
difficult to include VMRO.  
This paucity of sources also makes it difficult to compare VMRO and the DS, Ustaša, 
and Communist Party of Yugoslavia. Although there is a wealth of information on the DS, 
Ustaša, and KPJ’s attempts to sway emigrants, the same cannot be said for VMRO. We do not 
know how the VMRO’s daughter organization in America, the Macedonian Political 
Organization (MPO), recruited migrants. Also unclear is the extent to which VMRO directed the 
activity of the MPO. Although there is evidence that Mihailov wrote a few articles for the main 
MPO newspaper, the MPO claimed to be independent of VMRO.539 Moreover, Mihailov 
remained in Poland and Turkey for most of the interwar period,540 unlike the DS, Ustaša, and 
Communists, which all sent party members overseas to coordinate political activity. Mihailov, 
however, was not permitted entry into the United States.541 The absence of evidence is not 
evidence of absence, however, and the MPO’s archives from this period might yield interesting 
finds. As such, VMRO’s involvement in diaspora politics remains a direction for future research. 
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The Croatian Peasant Party 
Although it had established a beachhead in the United States in the 1920s, the Croatian 
Peasant Party (HSS) only became a major force overseas after 1929, when they were able to 
capitalize on a groundswell of Croatian nationalism that followed the murder of HSS leader 
Stjepan Radić. While difficult to quantify, this zeitgeist was on full display at a rally in 
Pittsburgh in 1930, where fifteen hundred Croats gathered to protest the “bloody, criminal, 
tyrannical, and brutal Yugo-Serbian dictatorship” and to call for freedom for the Croatian 
people.542 Kanadski Glas, reporting on the event, noted with pride how people seemed to be 
deliberately acting more Croatian—how “ one saw more and more Croats, all telling each other 
what they thought about their unfortunately homeland Croatia...Aside from those who were born 
in the Croatian fatherland, there were also their children, who were born in America…Everyone 
everywhere was speaking exclusively in Croatian, even those youngsters who found it easier to 
speak English were speaking Croatian with a particular but sweet American accent.”543 
Assimilation, the great threat of the “Emigration Question,” it seemed, was reversible; the second 
generation, mobilized by Radić’s death, were reconnecting with their Croatian heritage.  
The Croatian Peasant Party took advantage of this Croatian revival, although the impetus 
came initially from below, not from the party leadership in Geneva or London. Beginning in 
early 1930, HSS-sympathetic activists established many new lodges in Croatian enclaves across 
the Midwest.544 The central committee of the HSS’s overseas division was in Chicago.545 
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Ironically, the HSS’s supporters in the Rust Belt were not typical of the its base in the home 
country. In Yugoslavia, the HSS did not do well in cities—in the 1920 Yugoslav parliamentary 
elections, the Croatian Peasant Party only won 6.77 % of the vote in Zagreb.546   Of course, for 
American Croats, the HSS was a nationalist rather than agrarian party.  
In the summer of 1930, August Košutić, a member of the HSS’s central committee, 
departed for the United States to harness this political energy. Entering the United States was not 
a simple matter, however, as the Yugoslav legation immediately declared his passport and visa 
forgeries (apparently without having examined  them)547 and petitioned the US immigration 
service and State Department to bar him entry.548 As the previous chapter notes, using the 
American immigration regime to limit the spread of dissent in the emigration was standard 
practice for Yugoslav diplomats. In this case, however, the attempt to bar Košutić’s entry 
backfired, making him a cause célèbre for American Croats, who raised funds to pay Košutić’s 
legal bills and to free him from detainment on Ellis Island.549 Although this effort did not prevent 
his subsequent deportation, Košutić was nonetheless able to successfully reenter the United 
States one year later in July 1931 on a German passport. Yugoslav diplomats, despite several 
months forewarning, had no legal basis to prevent Košutić’s entrance to the United States.550 
Moreover, the drama surrounding Yugoslav attempts to keep Košutić away from American 
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Croats probably improved his overseas standing and sustained the anger of HSS activists in the 
United States.   
Ironically, despite the terror of Yugoslav diplomats that Košutić would rile up émigré 
Croats, Košutić was pessimistic about his chances within diaspora political life. Writing his 
observations on the back of a hotel laundry form, he noted that factionalism was rife, with 
Communists and a local faction of conservatives, the Hrvatski Kolo, or “Croatian Circle.” 
scheming to take control of the Croatian Fraternal Union. Other Croat notables were “in 
Yugoslav hands,” along with several newspapers. Even worse, eighty percent of regular Croats 
were nationally “apathetic,” in Košutić’s estimation.551 
As with Krnjević, the HSS emissary to the United States in the 1920s, Košutić sourced 
much of this information from a local activist, Ivan Horvat, who both edited the main HSS 
newspaper, Hrvatski Glasnik (The Croatian Herald), and headed the HSS organization in the 
United States.552 According to Horvat, Croats in the United States were generally indifferent to 
old-country politics. This was especially true for the second generation. Košutić’s chief task, 
then, was not to build up cells of the HSS in the United States per-se, but to ensure that a faction 
sympathetic to his cause controlled the Croatian Fraternal Union (CFU), which Horvat perceived 
as the key to the entire diaspora.553 And for good reason: an emigrant self-help society, the 
Croatian Fraternal Union had, in 1931, over 90,000 members and 5 million dollars in assets—the 
most of any South Slav emigrant society.554 The CFU was also, after the Croatian Peasant Party, 
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the second largest “Croatian” organization in the world. With the CFU on its side, the HSS could 
plausibly speak on behalf of the “Croatian diaspora.” 
Although its primary mission was to provide insurance to its members, the CFU elected 
its leaders and had internal factions. There was a right wing, Narodna Zajednica, or National 
Bloc , a medley of socially-conservative Catholics, pro-secessionist , and pro-autonomist Croats. 
There were the Levičari, or Leftists, a mixture of socialists and communists.555 And there was 
Prosvetaši (lit. the Educators), who took their name from the Jugoslavenski Prosvetni Savez, the 
Yugoslav Educational Union, a pro-Yugoslav cultural organization. As their name suggested, the 
Prosvetaši were Yugoslavists, albeit critical of Belgrade.556 Of these three factions, the National 
Bloc, with its many HSS sympathizers, were the obvious choice for Košutić. With the National 
Bloc’s help, Košutić hoped both to raise awareness and money from American Croats.557 
Relying on diaspora generosity was critical to the HSS, which refused to accept subsidies from 
enemies of Yugoslavia like Germany, Italy, or Hungary.558  
Although the HSS seems to have focused on American Croats, with their large and rich 
fraternal organizations, the HSS also reached out to newer migrant communities in Western 
Europe. Because many of these workers returned home after a few years abroad, and were 
subsequently interrogated by Yugoslav police, these interviews can illuminate what the Croatian 
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Peasant Party meant to its rank-and-file. As it turned out, Košutić’s concerns about lack of 
emigrant enthusiasm had some foundation. 
Take, for instance, Antun Drožijibob, who worked a series of short-term contracts in 
construction, industry, and agriculture in and around Paris. Drožijibob joined the HSS in 1931, 
having been recruited by door-to-door HSS organizers in St. Denis, an enclave of Croats near 
Paris. At that time, Drožijibob estimated the number of HSS members in Paris at around four 
hundred. These numbers did not bespeak enthusiasm. Moreover, Drožijibob was quite critical of 
the HSS’s organization in Paris. Although membership dues were one franc per month, 
Drožijibob refused to pay, believing that the HSS cell’s treasurer was embezzling. The 
leadership apparently ignored both the embezzlement and Drožijibob’s refusal to pay dues, 
suggesting disorganization and incompetence. The goals of the leadership did not always make 
sense either: Drožijibob could not understand why the HRSS local organization was raising 
money for a library, since he was, in his own estimation, “not entirely literate.”  Not wanting to 
pay dues, he eventually left the organization. The speeches also apparently bored him, since he 
could recall little of their contents and left early. Moreover, one of the speakers apparently gave 
his speech entirely in Russian, which none of the Croats present could understand.559  
Mate Jurišić, Mije Jurišić, Janko Mejved, Jandro Grgić, other members of the same HSS 
cell, corroborated much of Drožijibob's account, including the numerical weakness of the 
organization, the incomprehensibility of the speeches, the drinking problem of the leadership, 
and the difficulty members had in paying dues. In particular, the organization seemed to be held 
together entirely by the charisma of Vlatko Radić, the son of Stjepan, who, like Košutić, had 
gone abroad to work in the emigration after 1929. There was apparently neither a rulebook for 
 
559 “Zapisnik od 6. Decembra 1934., Spisan Kod Sreskog Načelstvo u Karlovcu,” Report from the Karlovac District, 
December 6, 1934. Fond 1356, kut. 4, HDA.  




members nor clearly defined political aims, other than “to free Croatia from the Serbian yoke.”560 
This was a vague goal with equally ambiguous benefits for Croats living overseas. In short, 
although the HSS was able to establish a base of supporters overseas, the impression given by 
the sources is of a disorganized party bureaucracy and an unenthusiastic membership. Moreover, 
this is corroborated by Košutić’s earlier claims that 80% of Croats overseas were “apathetic.” 
Košutić’s earlier complaints about factionalism among Croats in the United States also 
proved prescient, as he faced pushback from the right (at least according to the Yugoslav 
legation, who were kept well informed by their mole561). The Croatian Circle, a right-leaning 
American-grown Croatian nationalist movement based in New York City, continuously feuded 
with the HSS organization in the United States,562 weakening the HSS’s attempt to appeal to the 
National Bloc in the Croatian Fraternal Union. Košutić’s attempt to mediate between the 
Croatian Circle and the Croatian Peasant Party ended in failure—their differences were 
apparently insurmountable. In the eyes of the Circle, Košutić was insufficiently committed to the 
cause of Croatian independence—to them, Croatian autonomy within Yugoslavia was a poor 
half-measure. Nor were the leaders of the Circle willing to share power—only the Circle could, 
in their view, legitimately represent the will of the Croatian emigration at the head of a “United 
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Croatian Front.”563 Before long, the Circle’s main newspaper, Hrvatska Danica (Croatian 
Morning Star), was printing vigorous broadsides against Košutić.564 
 Having failed to win over the Circle, Košutić decided to make his case to regular people, 
visiting Croatian enclaves across the Midwest, before ending his journey in California. In his 
speeches, Košutić appealed not to Croatian nationalism, but to class—it was Belgrade versus 
peasants and republicans, not Serbs versus Croats. He repeated this message several times during 
his stay in Chicago, calling for unity between Serb, Croat, and Slovene—Serbian peasants and 
Croatian peasants were still peasants, and had common interests.565 In appealing to class rather 
than nationalism, Košutić may have been adapting to the supposed “apathy” of American Croats.  
This tactical adjustment created friction with the head of the HSS organization in the 
United States, Ivan Horvat, who had been calling for Croatian independence prior to Košutić’s 
arrival.566 These tensions came to a head once Košutić reached the West Coast, with Horvat 
resigning his position and withdrawing into a private life as a music instructor. Horvat would be 
replaced by the more Košutić-friendly Juraj Abzac as editor of Hrvatski Glasnik. 567 This was the 
same Abzac whose daughter Consul Kolumbatović had deported back to Yugoslavia following a 
failed attempt at editorial blackmail, as documented in Chapter Three.  
Although Košutić’s trip to the United States had mixed results, the HSS organization in the 
US endured, despite the so-called “apathy” of American Croats, possibly due to Košutić’s pivot 
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away from nationalism and toward class. The HSS could also present itself as the moderate 
alternative to the Ustaša, which will be discussed in the second half of the chapter, and thereby 
benefited from anti-fascist sentiment. The antifascist stance of the HSS was reinforced by 
Krnjević, who, on a subsequent visit to the United States in 1935, made clear that fighting the 
Ustaša overseas was the duty of every HSS member.568  
Nor did the HSS limit its struggle with the Ustaša to the United States. Beginning in 1933, 
the HSS tried to expand into Belgium and South America, where the Ustaša, which had attained 
conspicuous success organizing migrants into so-called “Domobran” groups. In contrast to their 
mixed successes in North America, the HSS experienced undiluted failure elsewhere—the Ustaša 
were entrenched and acted decisively to marginalize the HSS. In Belgium, the HSS alternative to 
the Ustaša emigrant group quickly folded after Ustaša members falsely reported that it was a 
communist organization to the local police.569 The HSS did little better in South America, even 
though they sent Petar Radić there to agitate. The nephew of Stjepan Radić, the martyred leader of 
the HSS, Petar departed for South America in late 1933 from the United States, where he had 
previously been working to organize emigrants.570 Arriving in Brazil in November, 1933, Radić 
declared his intent to organize new HSS lodges in South America, denouncing the local Domobran 
leadership. Several days later, the Domobran and the HSS held competing assemblies, of which 
the HSS was much poorer attended, attracting a mere sixty people. Humiliated, Radić apparently 
gave up and fled to Uruguay.571 He achieved little in Uruguay either—in 1937 the Yugoslav 
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Legation in Buenos Aires reported that Petar Radić was living in poverty in Villa Mugueta and 
that they “had not heard anything about any sort of activity by the Croatian Republican Peasant 
Party.”572 The HSS was simply insufficiently organized, funded, or ruthless enough to compete 
with the Domobran outside of North America, especially given the Domobran’s two-year head 
start.  
Although archival research turned up no evidence that would allow a numerical estimate 
for HSS membership in the United States or in South America, measuring the footprint of the HSS 
in terms of its card-carrying members would be an oversimplification—the influence of the HSS  
was amorphous but ubiquitous—antimonarchism and republicanism permeate emigrant critiques 
of Belgrade. Within the Croatian Fraternal Union, it would be the HSS sympathizers, alongside 
with the communists, who would lead the charge against the attempts of the Ustaša to establish 
itself as a diaspora organization.  Moreover, the HSS inspired two other old country political 
parties to begin agitating in the diaspora, the Democratic Party and the Communist Party of 
Yugoslavia, both of which devised their own solutions to the challenges of maintaining a 
transnational political party.  
The Independent Democrats 
Originally an ally of the ruling Serbian Radical Party during the 1920s, the Demokratska 
Stranka, or Democratic Party, joined the Croatian Peasant Party in opposition to Alexander’s 
royal dictatorship during the 1930s. Deeply committed to a unified Yugoslavia, the DS fought a 
two-front war against outright Croatian separatism on one hand and greater Serbianism on the 
other. The pillars of the DS were the Pribićević brothers: Svetozar, Valerijan, Milan, and 
Adam,573 such that a common synonym for the Democratic Party is the “Pribićevići,” or 
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“Pribićević-ites.” After the Croatian Peasant Party, the DS was the earliest opposition party to 
become involved in diaspora politics. Of the four parties discussed, the DS’s overseas operation 
was the smallest. Nonetheless, the degree to which it resembles and departs from the HSS 
strategy suggest that the DS was watching and learning from the HSS’s mistakes.   
The Pribićevići’s campaign in the “tenth banovina” began in December 1931 with the 
sudden appearance of editorials by a mysterious “Argus” in Zajedničar (The Unionist), the main 
organ of the Croatian Fraternal Union.  “Argus’s” critiques of the dictatorship displayed an 
insider’s level of knowledge, so it was no surprise that this turned out to be the pen name of 
Svetozar Pribićević who had arrived in New York that same month, just six months after 
Košutić.574  
The CFU organ Zajedničar, with its circulation of around 60,000, was a shrewd choice 
for a mouthpiece.575 But it was also an unusual one—in Yugoslavia, the main base of the 
Democratic Party were Serbs, not Croats.576 Yet Svetozar’s decision to appeal to Croats rather 
than Serbs in the United States appears deliberate, as the other major émigré newspaper for 
which Svetozar Pribićević wrote for was Svijet (The World), which was also a Croatian 
newspaper. Edited by ‘Don’ Niko Gršković, Svijet aligned with the Yugoslav Committee during 
World War I and had remained loyal to the Yugoslav idea since then, although it opposed the 
dictatorship.577 Common enemies made Don Niko and Svetozar Pribićević natural allies. 
However, Svetozar Pribićević did not stay forever in New York City, eventually heading back to 
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Paris in 1933, where he published La Dictature du Roi Alexandre, a booklet denouncing King 
Alexander as a tyrant.578 In 1934, however, Svetozar did dispatch his son, Stojan, to the United 
States, where he would write for Svijet for the remainder of the interwar period.579 During the 
Second World War, Stojan, now writing for Time, would also become involved with the pro-
Titoist movement and Louis Adamic. Although Stojan is a subject for a later chapter, his 
example evokes the connection between Yugoslavia’s transnational political sphere in the 1930s 
and the formation of a Yugoslav emigrant lobby during the 1940s. 
Unlike the three other parties discussed in this chapter, the Democratic Party did not 
build an overseas party organization. They established no cells or lodges, perhaps recognizing 
that the political landscape was already saturated and the path to victory lay through the Croatian 
Fraternal Union. However, like the HSS, the DS chose to support a faction within the Croatian 
Fraternal Union. Svijet gave the Pribićevići a platform to do just that, through its editor, Don 
Niko, who led (although this may be too strong a term) a centrist faction within the Croatian 
Fraternal Union, the Prosvetaši, or “Educators.”580 Mediating between the National Bloc and 
Leftists, the Prosvetaši occupied the center, and were a natural fit for the liberal Pribićevići. 
Thus, if the Prosvetaši could overcome the other two factions in the HBZ’s annual convention 
(or make common cause with the leftists), Svetozar Pribićević’s influence over the emigration 
could grow even further.  
In Svijet, both Svetozar and Stojan Pribićević voiced many familiar criticisms of the 
dictatorial government of Yugoslavia—denunciations of monarchy, monarchism, and police 
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terror— but combining it with a full-throated defense of Yugoslav unity.581 But evaluating the 
success or failure of the Pribićevići is difficult. First, it is unclear how many emigrants read 
Svijet—unlike many diaspora newspapers, Svijet’s circulation was unknown to the Kingdom of 
Yugoslavia.582 Moreover, it is impossible to determine how much of the Prosvetaši success in the 
HBZ elections in 1935 and 1939583 was due to the writings of the Pribićevići in Svijet. Moreover, 
because the Democrats did not attempt to build a party organization overseas, counting 
membership numbers or donations is impossible. Yet for the same reason, the Pribićevići evaded 
many of the problems faced by the HSS—the logistics of transatlantic organizing seem to lead to 
ideological deviance, political apathy, and administrative corruption, unless one’s overseas 
operation was limited to a trusted family member. The Pribićevići, after all, understood the 
importance of family.  
The Communists 
 The approach of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (KPJ) toward diaspora politics, as 
will be shown, was a synthesis of the HSS and DS strategies. Like the DS, the KPJ focused on 
propaganda and cooption of civil society organizations in the United States, but like the HSS the 
KPJ sought to build a mass movement in places like Belgium or France, which had newer and 
less established migrant communities. Nonetheless, the KPJ distinguished itself from the DS and 
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HSS by building a rudimentary emigrant affairs bureau in whose language and tactics we see the 
echo of Yugoslav public diplomacy from the 1920s. Ironically, the KPJ, despite its revolutionary 
pretensions, ended up talking and acting very much like the state it wanted to overthrow.  
The Communist Party of Yugoslavia (KPJ) began its involvement with diaspora politics 
in 1932. Unlike the Croatian Peasant party or the Pribićevići, the KPJ’s decision to involve itself 
with “tenth banovina” politics had little to do with the ban on political parties in Yugoslavia—
the KPJ, after all, had been illegal since 1920. Rather, it was a reaction to the overseas activities 
of Svetozar Pribićević and August Košutić, whom Central Committee of the KPJ monitored. The 
Central Committee knew, for instance, that the Croatian Peasant Party had recently suffered a 
setback, after their main newspaper in the USA, Hrvatski Glasnik succumbed to pressure from 
the Yugoslav consul Kolumbatović (see Chapter Three).584 The KPJ also had someone in New 
York shadowing  Svetozar Pribićević, whom they nicknamed “professor,” perhaps a nod to his 
prolific writing.585 Lastly, the KPJ was also concerned about the influence of fascists in the 
emigration, the Ustaša in particular.586 The KPJ had to get in on the action. For these reasons, in 
1932, the KPJ repeatedly reached out to the Communist Party of the United States (CPUSA), 
which had a Yugoslav section, asking them to inform their membership about conditions in 
Yugoslavia and the struggle of the KPJ, to demonstrate against police terror in Yugoslavia, and 
to collect donations on their behalf.587 Much like the Pribićevići, the KPJ was more interested in 
coopting existing migrant associations in the United States, in this case the Yugoslav section of 
the CPUSA, rather than setting up KPJ cells in the United States.  
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 Working with the CPUSA was attractive because it was doing well. After the Stock 
Market Crash of 1929, many American citizens and residents, including Yugoslavs, joined the 
Communist Party. In Chicago in February 1930, for instance, 32,000 proletarians braved the cold 
to demonstrate against the existing order. Of course, the police crushed the demonstration in the 
usual manner. While it is difficult to estimate the percentage of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes 
present at the demonstration, five of the one-hundred and sixty arrested were of Yugoslav 
background.588 If we treat that as a representative sample, roughly three percent of the protesters 
were of Yugoslav origin, an impressive figure if one considers that South Slavs were less than 
one percent of the total population of the United States.  
Perhaps because of their overrepresentation within the CPUSA, Yugoslavs in the CPUSA 
had their own sub-organization, called the Yugoslav fraction, based out of Chicago. Its main 
newspaper, Radnik, (The Worker), had a circulation of around 4,000,589 although this an 
imprecise measure of the Yugoslav fraction’s numerical strength or number of sympathizers. For 
comparison, the most popular émigré newspaper, Zajedničar, had a circulation of around 60,000, 
even though the Croatian Fraternal Union itself had over eighty thousand members.590  
While some of the Yugoslavs in the CPUSA may have been concerned about events in 
Yugoslavia, the Yugoslav Fraction’s leadership were preoccupied with building socialism in the 
United States. When Yugoslav agents persuaded American authorities to deport one of those 
leaders in 1930, they found no discussion of conditions in Yugoslavia while ransacking his 
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personal papers.591 This should not be surprising, since these early activists had little connection 
with the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (KPJ). This would soon change.  
The KPJ, like the DS and the HSS, recognized the importance of the Croatian Fraternal 
Union from the outset. As the KPJ began its involvement in the “tenth banovina,” the Yugoslav 
fraction of the CPUSA was struggling to gain control of the Croatian Fraternal Union through 
their proxies, the levičari, or “leftists.”592 The levičari opposed the other two factions—the 
National Bloc because they believed them to be fascists and traitors, and the prosvetaši because 
they suspected that they were “agents of the Belgrade regime.”593  
Communist paranoia about moderates was reigned in in 1935, however, when the 
Seventh Congress of the Comintern adopted gave the green light to coalitions with liberal and 
social-democratic parties in broad, anti-fascist “popular front” movements. By 1937, the levičari 
and moderates in the Croatian Fraternal Union were allies on the basis of common 
antifascism.594 For the communists, a political alliance with the Croatian Peasant Party and the 
Democratic party was a matter of pragmatism, and vice versa. But there were ideological 
affinities as well. For instance, Svetozar Pribićević, in his 1933 book, La Dictature du Roi 
Alexandre outlined his vision of federally-organized and democratic Yugoslavia,595 which was 
also the Communist’s favored solution to the Serb-Croat issue in Yugoslavia. As for the Croatian 
peasant party, we have already seen how easily August Košutić shifted away from direct appeals 
to Croatian nationalism to underlining the common class interests of Serb, Croat, and Slovene 
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workers, peasants, and republicans in the United States.596 Class based rhetoric, antifascism, and 
opposition to the authoritarian government in Yugoslavia made it easier for these parties to 
cooperate.   
Popular-front tactics paid off outside the Croatian Fraternal Union as well, with the KPJ 
urging activists working in the emigration “to work in all existing mutual-benefit or cultural 
organizations in which Yugoslav workers can be found, in order to strengthen and widen the 
influence of communists and class-consciousness among workers.”597  What this meant, 
concretely, was that Serbian and Slovene fraternal organizations needed to be infiltrated as well. 
Ironically, the Slovene National Benefit Society (SNPJ) was more difficult to infiltrate, given 
that leftist Slovenes in the United States tended toward moderate socialism rather than full 
Leninism, at least according to the Central Committee.598 However, in 1935, the KPJ succeeded 
in uniting a coalition of left-wing and anti-fascist Serbs from the Serbian National Union in a 
new organization which called itself the Vidovdan Congress. Although much of the organization 
was built around the Serbian emigrant periodical Slobodna Reč, (Free Speech), which was edited 
by KPJ member Mirko Marković, three delegates at the Congress were priests, community 
leaders who aligned themselves with the Serbian Democratic Party (DS). Even more notably, 
Stojan Pribićević was instrumental in planning the conference, although he was later forced to 
withdraw by his father, Svetozar, who insisted that “we must not collaborate with communists.” 
The three DS delegates did not, however, withdraw from the Vidovdan congress alongside 
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Stojan599 and after Svetozar’s death in 1936 Stojan would return to left-wing circles. Although 
initially quite small, the Vidovdan Congress mattered, not only because it showcased the 
cooperation between the DS and KPJ, but also because the Vidovdan Congress would later join 
the Croatian Fraternal Union and SNPJ in a pan-Yugoslav anti-fascist organization during 
WWII. In other words, the Vidovdan Congress was a stepping stone to a “Yugoslav diaspora,” 
based around a common opposition to fascism.  
Like the HSS, the KPJ did not ignore the rest of the “tenth banovina.” In fact, the KPJ 
seemed to have a presence wherever there were Yugoslav emigrants. At the same time that it was 
trying to forge a partnership with the CPUSA, the KPJ began investigating Seraing, Belgium, to 
see if the small Yugoslav community there was friendly to the KPJ and if there were any 
organizational rivalries that it could exploit.600 The KPJ apparently also recruited among 
emigrants in South America, Czechoslovakia, Holland, France and Australia, with varying 
degrees of success.601 In an undated but probably genuine circular that Yugoslav agents 
intercepted in June 1933, the KPJ’s central committee put forth an additional justification for 
involving themselves in diaspora politics—“because in various European and other lands (North 
and South America, Australia, and New Zealand), work tens and hundreds of thousands of 
workers.” Workers were the KPJ’s natural base. Moreover, “these workers have neither merged 
themselves with domestic labor in the countries concerned, nor have they cut ties with the 
homeland, but rather intend to return to Yugoslavia.”602 Here we see an echo of the Yugoslav 
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government’s thinking on emigration—the KPJ, on the basis of the unassimilated character of 
migrants and their potential to repatriate, were proposing to treat them as an extension of the 
Yugoslav proletariat, just as the Kingdom of Yugoslavia treated the diaspora as an extension of 
their territorial domain.  
Migrants Workers and Socialism 
But how did the KPJ recruit immigrants? Unfortunately, unlike with the Croatian Peasant 
Party or the Ustaša, the interrogations records of returning migrants yielded little information. 
Among this group, almost no migrants confessed to having joined the communist party. And 
migrants who were recruited remained tight-lipped about their experience. Ivan Ružić, for 
example, who worked as a locksmith in the United States for several years before returning to 
Yugoslavia, vehemently denied joining any group other than the Croatian Fraternal Union. Like 
many returning migrants, Ružić was placed under surveillance. Those reading Ružić’s mail 
uncovered that he had been smuggling anti-regime literature into Yugoslavia with the help of his 
brother, who was in Russia.603 We see a similar pattern with Jakov Kovačević, who joined the 
communist party in Canada. After he returned to Yugoslavia, he admitted joining the 
organization, but denied any knowledge of its internal workings and refrained from any further 
action on behalf of the KPJ, knowing he was being watched.604 Both refrained from implicating 
others or explaining how they were recruited. On the one hand, the reluctance of migrants to 
become informants would suggest that the appeal of the Communists was their ideas—true 
believers would not betray “the cause.” And the harsh economic conditions of the 1930s 
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doubtless drove many Yugoslav migrants into the arms of those who promised economic and 
social justice.  
On the other hand, the theory that the KPJ’s main attraction was ideological is 
undermined by the fact that the KPJ constantly struggled with a muddled message. One KPJ 
assessment of Yugoslavs in Belgium from 1933 observed said that the general population had the 
characteristics of peasants: “a very low cultural level…widespread, extreme 
illiteracy…diminished interest in political questions…vulnerability to crude demagoguery…fear 
of repression, reluctance to undertake organized and systematic action…and so on.”605 They 
were the opposite of the disciplined, politically-conscious factory workers that the KPJ wanted as 
foot soldiers.  Heterodoxy among local activists was a problem everywhere, but was most 
pronounced in France, Belgium, and Australia, all relatively recent recipients of Yugoslav 
emigration. In one egregious example, in Paris, one local party leader, a worker, “considers our 
central assignment…to conduct a most-energetic war against Jews.” Another activist, also in 
Paris, embraced syndicalism (an Anarchist heresy), instead of building a nationalist-
revolutionary movement. A third activist there proposed that the class struggle be sidelined in the 
fight for national liberation for the peoples of Yugoslavia.606 There had also been instances 
where communist activists in Belgium had decided that the best way to combat the Ustaša 
organization was with actual violence, a stance the KPJ regarded as an error. The leadership of 
the KPJ emphasized picking their battles: “Our main adversary is neither…Pavelić, nor the 
emigrant Pribićević, nor the leadership of the H.S.S., but the military dictatorship of the greater-
Serbian authorities.” While fighting these organizations abroad was still important to the central 
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committee, they were not the primary target, which was Yugoslavia. Nor should they be 
combatted with fists or curses, the Central Committee argued, but by unmasking their hypocrisy 
and deconstructing their ideology.607  
One cause of the KPJ’s struggle with heterodoxy was logistics. As the Central Committee 
acknowledged in one meeting in 1933, “people [in the diaspora] are not informed about 
conditions in the Party, everyone is hermetically sealed from the Party, even though these people 
represent the most important source of cadres.” Rank and file party members from the 
emigration “that come here are often entirely ignorant of the most recent Party decisions.”608 
Imposing ideological conformity on an activist in Uruguay, Chicago, or Sydney from an office in 
Vienna, Paris, or Madrid was no easy task. Communist literature was piling up with nobody to 
transport it.  
To remedy this, the KPJ decided in 1933 to engage a heretofore neglected element of the 
Yugoslav diaspora—sailors.609 At that time, around 4,600 Yugoslavs worked aboard transatlantic 
steamers. Their pay was low, conditions aboard were wretched, and as a result many sailors, in 
the assessment of the KPJ, were inclined toward communism. By 1934, sixteen transatlantic 
steamers had communist agitators aboard working as deckhands, cooks, and stokers.610 With 
these couriers, the KPJ made sure that their political sympathizers, unlike those of the HSS, were 
kept constantly appraised of the Party line without having to rely on the infrequent visits of 
important party members like Košutić or Krnjević. 
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The KPJ and “Uncle Sam” 
In the United States, the KPJ faced different challenges. The proprietary attitude of the 
KPJ toward overseas workers, however, caused tensions with the Yugoslav fraction of the 
CPUSA. At the beginning, the CPUSA refused to work with the KPJ, ignoring their letters and 
refusing to meet in person. In one letter, the KPJ griped that “of all the [parts of the] emigration 
with whom we are in contact, only you in the United States show a lack of understanding for the 
difficult fight of the KPJ and the interconnectedness of the work in your country with the work 
of the KPJ.” The CPUSA, in their view, did not work to raise awareness about conditions in 
Yugoslavia nor did they exert themselves to help the beleaguered KPJ in other ways, like raising 
money.611 There is an echo here, too, of the Emigration Question, with its attendant worries 
about emigrants’ alleged disloyalty to the fatherland.  
According to the KPJ leadership, “the revolutionary element of our emigrants in the 
United States are among the best and most self-sacrificing fighters for the Communist 
Party...[and] understand well that their primary task is to assist the American proletariat in all 
actions against the American bourgeoisie. Unfortunately, the comrades over there do not 
understand nearly so well that this primary task is inseparable from their second primary task—
[providing] moral and material assistance for the struggle in the old country.” This, they 
believed, was the reason for the stonewalling from the CPUSA. 612  
To combat this, the KPJ dispatched an unnamed trio of trusted party workers in 1933 to 
bring emigrant activists under control. This commission was also given a letter from the KPJ 
leadership, along with an up-to-date statement of the KPJ line vis-à-vis emigrants. They were 
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tasked with observing problems in the KPJ’s emigrant outreach and proposing solutions to the 
KPJ leadership. The commission reported directly to Grgur Vujović, the representative of the 
KPJ in the Comintern,613 which showed the high priority the KPJ attached to the “tenth 
banovina.” Since the KPJ was a clandestine organization and rarely called people by their proper 
names, identifying all members of this trio was not possible. In fact, only one name could be 
confirmed, an individual who seemed to be the most prolific sender of reports to the KPJ. This 
was Nikola Kovačević, whose pseudonym was usually a variant of “Uncle Sam”—Serbo-
Croatian has several words for “Uncle.”614 As one might infer, “Uncle Sam” worked in the 
United States.  
“Uncle Sam” behaved as if he were a Yugoslav consul from the 1920s. Like his 
predecessors, he traveled around Yugoslav settlements in the United States, informing his 
superiors about local conditions—demography, economic conditions, and disposition toward 
communism, an activity that mirrored the “colony visits” of Yugoslav diplomats in the 1920s 
that I discussed in Chapter One.615 Even the language of these reports was similar, up to and 
including the use of the word “colony.” In Cleveland, for instance, ‘Uncle Sam’ summarized 
conditions thus: “Our colony here is large, Slovenes are in the majority, they say around sixty 
thousand. Our movement is adequately developed, although it is far from where it needs to 
be…these masses are good, but very crude politically.”616 ‘Uncle Sam’ also helped the KPJ 
establish and manage several new newspapers in the United States, while monitoring the state of 
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the left-wing press in Serbo-Croatian and Slovene in the United States. 617 It is worth noting that 
Yugoslav consuls also tried to manage and monitor the emigrant press.  
Uncle Sam struggled to interest Yugoslavs in the United States in the KPJ’s problems. 
The solution, Sam believed, was for the KPJ to pay more attention to workers in the United 
States. To that end, Sam proposed in 1934 that the KPJ organize an “Emigraciona Komisija” 
(Emigration Commission), based in Madrid and composed of Grgur Vujović, Lovro Kuhar, and 
several others. The Emkom did eventually get established, possibly as early as 1935, based on 
correspondence between Sam and Kuhar,618 although the Emigration Commission was forced to 
relocate to France in 1936 because of the Spanish Civil War.619  
The Emkom’s responsibility was “to collect material about the life and the work of the 
emigration in various countries, with an eye toward preparing these materials for press and 
conduct correspondence of political character [and to] study the emigration question [emphasis 
mine] and…publish popular brochures about the work and struggle of the party”620  The 
similarities between the Emkom and the Kingdom of Yugoslavia’s “Iseljenički Komesarijat” 
(Emigration Commissariat) are striking. Besides having similar names, both acted as hybrid 
press bureaus and research institutions into the “emigration question.”   
When the KPJ spoke about interesting the diaspora in the situation of the KPJ, they meant 
the issue of political prisoners. By publicizing conditions in King Alexander’s political prisons, 
the KPJ hoped to rally emigrants behind a cause célèbre, thereby pressuring Yugoslavia to 
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release the Central Committee members in the Sremska Mitrovica prison.621 This campaign got 
an unexpected boost with the release of Louis Adamic’s The Native’s Return in 1934. In his first 
bestseller, Adamic detailed the system of police surveillance, imprisonment, and torture which 
awaited political dissidents in Yugoslavia.622 Upon his return to the United States, moreover, 
Adamic supplied the International Committee for Political Prisoners (ICPP) with documentation 
about conditions in Yugoslavia’s prisons, prompting the ICPP to send the Yugoslav legation a 
sternly-worded letter cosigned by thirty-six American intellectuals.623 
 Although Adamic was no KPJ member, being more of a liberal “fellow-traveler,” the 
KPJ took full advantage of this boon, mobilizing their network of supporters in the Croatian 
Fraternal Union. In early 1936, ten lodges of the CFU took part in a conference in Chicago to 
discuss conditions of political prisoners in Yugoslavia. It would be this issue that cemented the 
alliance in the Croatian Fraternal Union between the Levičari and supporters of the Croatian 
Peasant Party, whose members likewise languished in Regent Paul’s prisons. Overall, this 
petition exemplified the KPJ’s new Popular Front strategy: besides the CFU, the Chicago 
conference attracted five International Workers of the World lodges and ten independent worker 
clubs and singing societies. After deliberations found overwhelming support for the release of 
political prisoners, the conference drafted and sent a protest resolution to the Yugoslav 
legation.624  Archival evidence suggest that this campaign against police terror was diaspora 
wide, with protest resolutions being sent from Yugoslav enclaves in Australia and France as 
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well.625 Although the KPJ was unable to secure the release of high profile Communists in 
Sremska Mitrovica, this campaign was nonetheless a promising beginning at coordinating 
diaspora-wide activity, especially for a clandestine organization. 
The KPJ’s overseas apparatus resembled that of a state in another respect as well—
military recruitment. After the prisoner campaign, the focus of Emkom shifted to smuggling 
overseas Yugoslavs over the Pyrenees to fight in the Spanish Civil War.626 The Spanish Civil 
War, which began on July 17, 1936, after right-wing elements in the military launched a putsch 
against a democratically-elected left-wing government, quickly became a theater for Berlin, 
Rome, and Moscow to wage a proxy war for their respective ideologies. To aid the Republic, the 
Comintern organized “International Brigades” composed of leftists and fellow-travelers, who 
would travel to Spain to fight fascism. The United States would be the source of two such 
brigades, the Abraham Lincoln Brigade and the George Washington brigade, the latter having 
Mirko Marković, a KPJ member, as a captain.627   
But despite the high profile of Marković, few Yugoslavs in the United States were 
attracted to the international brigades. Although Yugoslav communities in France, Belgium, and 
Yugoslavia itself would supply hundreds of recruits, judging by the dossiers of Spanish Civil 
War veterans in the Yugoslav archives, only eight Spanish Civil War veterans, counting Mirko 
Marković, came from the United States,628 although the number of Yugoslav volunteers from the 
U.S.A. who did not survive the conflict was probably somewhat higher.   
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Nonetheless, given that there were roughly ten times as many Yugoslavs in the United 
States as there were in France or Belgium, this is a noteworthy discrepancy that requires some 
explanation. The most obvious is that naturalized Yugoslav immigrants in the United States were 
loath to jeopardize their citizenship or their legal residency in the United States by travelling 
illegally to Spain, thereby outing themselves as a Communists. They had much more to lose than 
their counterparts in France or Belgium, who typically stayed in those countries to work for a 
few years at most before returning to Yugoslavia. Moreover, it was Communist practice to 
confiscate the passports of all Spanish volunteers,629 thereby making it difficult for them to 
return home once the conflict ended. Given how difficult it was (and still is) for migrants to 
obtain American citizenship, the reluctance of Yugoslav migrants to throw it away is 
understandable.  
At least one Spanish volunteer from the United States experienced difficulties because of 
his participation in the Spanish Civil War, that being Mirko Marković.  Fleeing Spain with 
neither papers nor money, he was forced to stow away on a ship leaving the port of Le Havre, 
where he was found by the captain and turned over to the immigration authorities in the United 
States. Although Marković was obligated to leave the United States, he faced a catch-22: without 
a passport, he could not obtain travel documents to travel to Cuba and back to the United States, 
which would have regularized his immigration status. As a result, Marković faced the threat of 
deportation back to Yugoslavia, which for him meant prison, torture, and possibly death. To 
deport Marković, however, the US immigration service needed authorization from the Yugoslav 
consulate, which, ironically, the consulate declined to give—apparently, Yugoslavia did not want 
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Marković either, ultimately deciding to revoke his citizenship.630 Ultimately, Marković was able 
to stay in the United States, although how (or if) he had permission remains unclear.631 
The relative inability of the KPJ to recruit volunteers for the Spanish Civil War in the 
United States can also be attributed to bad timing—the Spanish Civil War coincided with a 
power struggle within the KPJ which eventually resulted in overseas work being deprioritized. 
During Tito’s takeover of the KPJ following KPJ General Secretary Gorkić’s death in Moscow 
in 1937, the KPJ downsized its operation in the United States. On January 15, 1938, the Central 
Committee of the KPJ removed several party members from their position overseeing agitation 
among migrants, citing their “sectarian errors” and “incapability for collective work,” replacing 
them with Tito loyalists.632 Although “Uncle Sam” escaped the purge and remained in the United 
States, after 1938, the number of central committee documents dealing with overseas agitation 
dramatically declined, which suggests that Sam was increasingly cut off from the party 
leadership.  
Additionally, Tito may not have seen diaspora agitation as important—ironic, given the 
diaspora enthusiasm for Tito during World War II. Ivan Marić, one of Tito’s rivals during the 
interregnum after Gorkić’s death, recalled that Tito criticized what he saw as Gorkić’s 
overemphasis on overseas work. Unlike Gorkić, Tito believed that a communist revolution in 
Yugoslavia could not be orchestrated from Paris or Vienna—activists had to be in Yugoslavia, 
seeing conditions firsthand.633 It probably also did not help that the Emkom was too associated 
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with Marić, who began overseeing Emkom’s work in 1937,634 and had been implicated with 
opposition within the party to Tito’s ascent. For instance, Marić’s “Parallel Center,” a rival group 
to Tito’s clique, was based in Paris, just like Emkom.635 Thus, despite the Emkom’s promising 
successes in coordinating activity by communists on four continents, it would be undone by the 
communist proclivity toward factional infighting.    
From a broader perspective, however, one could argue that the ambitions of KPJ activists 
to replicate aspects of Yugoslavia’s emigration apparatus (the Emkom, “colony visits,” 
fundraising, educational work, and military recruitment) were incompatible with the clandestine 
nature of the KPJ. KPJ ambitions outstripped logistical capabilities, and it quickly emerged that 
that the party line of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia could not be enforced, especially given 
the difficulty of transatlantic communication. Even after the KPJ began using sailors as couriers, 
the Central Committee was frequently in the dark about its overseas operation. A Central 
Committee letter to “Uncle Sam” from 1935, for instance, complained that it was impossible to 
critique Sam’s work editing Slobodna Reč because the Central Committee had not received a 
copy in a long time.636  
In short, the KPJ encountered the same problem as the HSS—ideological deviancy 
among its overseas activists. Although a party like the HSS could tolerate some incoherency in 
its message (which tended to be quite simple: “free Croatia”), this was impossible in a party like 
the Communists, where quibbles over the Marxist canon could lead to deep and bitter schisms 
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(e.g. Kautskyites, Trotskyites, Maoists, etc). Unlike the Third Internationale, the diaspora could 
not be rigidly controlled. 
The Ustaše Abroad 
 
Fig. 4: Leaflet depicting Branimir Jelić, found in the United States. “Without an independent 
Croatian state there is no salvation for the Croatian people! Without the Hrvatski Domobran 
there is no Croatian state!” Fond 371, fasc. 51, BO 66, AJ. 
 
 Of the four parties discussed in this chapter, the Ustaša, a fiercely chauvinistic terrorist 
organization devoted to Croatian independence, is the most unusual. It is also the party that has 
attracted the most scholarly attention. Before 1991, studies of the Ustaša were mainly authored 
by conservative emigres or anti-fascist historians living in Communist Yugoslavia. In both cases, 
the focus was on the years the Ustaša were in power in Croatia (1941-1945), rather than the years 
spent in political exile. In Jelić-Butić’s 1977 study of the Ustaša, a scant thirty pages deal with 




the interwar Ustaša. Of this thirty, only four pages deal with the Ustaša's intervention into émigré 
politics. This short space contains no explanations of why migrants would want to join the 
Ustaša or why the Ustaša organization thrived in Argentina but foundered in the United States.637 
We see a similar pattern in Bogdan Krizman’s 1978 opus, the lengthiest and most authoritative 
monograph on the Ustaša. Although Krizman provides a more complete overview of Ustaša 
activity during the interwar years, he nonetheless concentrates on Pavelić and his coterie in Italy 
and Hungary rather than the rank and file members in emigrant communities in Belgium and 
South America.638 It is possible that these writers were hamstrung by restrictions on their source-
base. After all, the Ustaša was a sensitive subject that could inflame nationalist tensions in 
Yugoslavia, and so communist authorities restricted access to some archival material. 
Alternately, these works might reflect a mentality characterized by a top-down approach to 
political history—what matters in political parties are the activities and writings of party leaders 
and what they do when they attain power, rather than seemingly mundane things like recruitment 
practices or the logistical challenges of running a trans-national organization. 
 As a result, after 1991 this top-down pattern persisted. In addition, nationalism distorted 
scholarship. A good example of this can be found in Srdja Trifković, a Serbian-American 
historian (and a paleo-conservative who defended Radovan Karadžić at his trial in The Hague) 
who published a tendentious account of the Ustaša movement in 1998. Trifković treats the 
decision of Croatian migrants to join the Ustaša as self-evident, stating at one point that the 
migrants in question came from a region with “a long tradition of national and religious 
atavism.”639 Having thus presupposed that economic migrants left Croatia as radical nationalists 
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(a view I argue against), Trifković devotes little further space to this topic, focusing, again, on 
the 1941-1945 period.  
In fact, the first monograph to deal exclusively with the Domobran, the Ustaša’s emigrant 
contingent, was not published until 2007. Its author, Mario Jareb, argues that the Domobran was 
an “integral and important part of the Ustaša-Domobran movement“ and therefore “deserves 
much more attention.” Heretofore, the Domobran had essentially been treated as a sideshow to 
studies of Ustaša leaders or their time in power.640 While a rich source of information, Jareb was 
hampered by his source base. For example, because Jareb was unable to access the Archive of 
Yugoslavia, Jareb was unable to obtain reliable estimates of the Domobran’s membership in 
South and North America641—primarily because Ustaša-produced sources tended to embellish 
their numbers to project strength. These inflated membership totals, combined with Jareb’s own 
desire to justify the Domobran’s importance to scholars, leads him to conclude that the 
Domobran created a successful mass-organization of emigrants in the United States that only 
ended because the FBI shut it down in 1941.642 In contrast, I argue that the Domobran 
organization in North America (unlike its South American counterpart) was both marginal and 
dysfunctional, having collapsed even before the FBI intervention. Moreover, the cross-party 
comparative approach used in this chapter can help us understand why the Domobran succeeded 
and failed where it did.  Although it became a diaspora organization at around the same time as 
the HSS, DS, and KPJ, the Ustaša’s approach to diaspora politics, as will be shown, was 
radically different, both in terms of its focus on South America and the Benelux rather than 
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North America, and in terms of its combative, rather than conciliatory, approach to emigrant 
civil society organizations. The Domobran thrived only where it had no competition.  
The Domobran: Beginnings until 1934 
In early 1931, Ante Pavelić dispatched Branimir Jelić, his second in command, to South 
America. First arriving in Montevideo, Uruguay, on a Hungarian passport, on March 8, Jelić 
declared his intent to become a leader of the emigration.643 In order to avoid explicit association 
with Pavelić, the Ustaša’s overseas contingent adopted a new name: Domobran, or Home Guard,  
a name borrowed from Austro-Hungarian honvéd units recruited in Croatia and Slavonia before 
the Great War.644 Despite the name, the Domobran aimed not toward Habsburg restoration, but 
was rather an association of “energetic youths…ready to sacrifice their lives for a free Croatia.645 
What “free” meant was left ambiguous—the Domobran offered a simple message for simple 
people. 
  After setting up several Domobran lodges, Jelić headed south to Buenos Aires, 
Argentina on April 10.646 South America was fertile soil for the Domobran. As the Yugoslav 
legation wrote at the beginning of 1931, 
The basic principle among the broader emigrant masses is the total 
misunderstanding of the relationship between citizens and state. According to the 
emigrant ideology, the state only has obligations, unlimited obligations, to feed 
them, cloth them, nurture them, pamper them—and they only have to live, not 
feeling any obligation or duty toward that same state.647   
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More than just revealing the contempt the Yugoslav legation felt for Yugoslavia’s overseas 
residents, this quote also reveals the reluctance of the legation to help emigrants, now suffering 
during the Great Depression—they believed that migrants should help the state, not vice versa. 
This attitude won them little love. A few months before Jelić’s arrival in Montevideo, the 
consulate there had been attacked by a mob of “separatists and communists,” who pelted the 
building with stones.648 Minor damage was inflicted (to the consul’s outrage) but soon Yugoslav 
diplomats in South America would have bigger things to worry about.  
 
Fig. 5: Photograph of the aftermath of the “attack” on the Montevideo consulate. January, 1931. 
Fond 385, fasc. 6, BO 37, AJ. 
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Many of the Domobran’s early recruits in South America were poached from an indigenous 
emigrant organization calling itself the Hrvatski Iseljenički Dom, or Croatian Emigrant Home. 
Previously sympathetic to the Croatian Peasant Party, HID was nonetheless glad to host Jelić in 
Montevideo, at least until orders came in from the HSS leadership in Geneva ordering them to 
cut ties, triggering a schism within the organization, with the more radical members joining the 
newly-founded Domobran.649  
The Domobran found an enthusiastic collaborator in the HID’s leader, Marko Fil Vujeva, 
a man who drifted from continent to continent and ideology to ideology. Born to a peasant 
family in Herzegovina, Vujeva perambulated around Europe following the first World War 
before finally ending up in South America. Vujeva first aligned himself with first-wave 
feminism, then the Croatian Peasant Party, anti-Catholicism, and pan-Slavism.650 When 
approached by Branimir Jelić in Montevideo in 1931, Vujeva became a convert to fascism.651 
Jelić did not reward Vujeva with leadership of the South American Domobran, however, 
entrusting this position instead to Ante Valenta, an Ustaša activist brought in from Europe.652  
Although Vujeva did oversee the Domobran in Uruguay and later Brazil, he was never permitted 
into the higher echelons.653  
By late 1933, Vujeva was of no further use to the Ustaša, which apparently had him 
killed and thrown into the ocean.654 Why they did so was left unexplained. Nonetheless, 
Vujeva’s murder epitomized the Domobran approach—instead of allying with more moderate 
 
649 Report from the Yugoslav Legation in B.A to Vojislav Marinković, March 30, 1931. Fond 385, fasc. 6, BO 37, AJ. 
650 Marko Fil Vujeva, “Moj Politički Životopis,” [Pamphet], found with 1928. Fond 385, fasc. 5, BO 34, AJ. 
651 Orders from the Yugoslav Legation in B.A. to the consulate in Rosario de Santa Fe, April 24, 1931. Fond 385, 
fasc. 6, BO 37, AJ. 
652 “Akcija Hrvatskih Separatista,” Report from Yugoslav legation in B.A. to MIP, February 14, 1933. Fond 385, fasc. 
6, BO 39, AJ. 
653 Report from the Yugoslav Legation in B.A to Vojislav Marinković, July 4, 1931. Fond 385, fasc. 6, BO 37, AJ. 
654 Report from the Yugoslav Legation in B.A to MIP, May 3, 1940. Fond 385, fasc. 7, BO 46, AJ. 




nationalist groups, the Domobran preferred to set up an independent organizational structure and 
maintain ideological purity—with violence, if necessary. 
Initially, the Yugoslav delegation in Argentina thought that Jelić “did not represent any 
sort of threat to the state.”655 Montevideo, they thought,  
does not offer enough organizational material for a group such as the Domobran. 
Although there are admittedly separatists in Montevideo—in fact, one could say 
that most emigrant Croats that are not communists are inclined toward 
separatism—these separatists are all people without any intelligence or money, 
who join the separatist masses more out of disappointment and dissatisfaction 
with the suffering here in America than any real understanding of the political 
meanings of separatism.656 
 
Even as late as 1939, there were just two university-educated emigrants from Yugoslavia 
in South America, both of them Slovene—the population was overwhelmingly working 
class and agricultural, working in virtual “peonage” on the countryside or as factory 
workers in the cities. No intelligentsia and no money meant, in turn, meant few 
newspapers or large self-help societies.657 South America had no equivalent to the 
Croatian Fraternal Union, or any of the other large and wealthy self-help societies in the 
United States. This, in turn, led the Yugoslav delegation to dismiss this large mass of 
discontented people as politically harmless. The weakness of emigrant civil society, 
however, could work to the Domobran’s advantage—given that their approach toward 
civil society was parasitic or even antagonistic, they would face little resistance from this 
quarter.  
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Nor did the host country governments pose a threat—the police in Argentina or Uruguay 
were disinterested in meddling in emigrant affairs or policing the speech of emigrant groups.658 
As a result, Argentina rapidly became an Ustaše stronghold, even though most Croats there shied 
away from the fascist organization. According to the Yugoslav governments network of 
informants, the first Domobran congress, held in 1931 in Buenos Aires’s Dock Sud district, 
attracted an audience of five-hundred people out of a total urban population of roughly ten-
thousand Yugoslavs (of which eighty percent were Croatian).659 By 1935, Yugoslav intelligence 
put the number of active Domobranci in all of Argentina to be twenty-eight hundred, with 
Buenos Aires alone contributing over a thousand. In other words, roughly one in ten Croats in 
Buenos Aires were in the Domobran. Lodges had also appeared in Brazil and Uruguay, but 
Yugoslav intelligence services were unable to ascertain how many or how many members these 
lodges had.660 Jelić also set up two newspapers for his burgeoning organization in Argentina, the 
Spanish-language Croacia and the Croatian-language Hrvatski Domobran.661 These newspapers 
would continue to be published until the outbreak of World War II in 1939.662  
In 1932, the Domobran spread to Belgium, where it called itself the “Hrvatski Savez,” or 
Croatian Union. Its main base was in Seraing, where Croats guest workers toiled in the 
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Wallonian ironworks.663 According to the Yugoslav legation, Belgium had a population of 
around fifteen thousand “Yugoslavs,” of which around half were Croats.664 
Beginning in 1932, the Ustaše began recruiting foot soldiers in Belgium and South 
America. 665 Training camps existed in Uruguay and Brazil where recruits practiced military 
drills.666 Although some of these drills were rather outdated—hussar charges in 1937!667 —these 
camps periodically dispatched recruits in groups of around thirty for further training in Ustaša 
camps in Hungary and Italy.668 These numbers added up. One informer in Belgium estimated 
that, between 1932 and 1934, three-thousand Croat emigrants received subsidized trips from 
Belgium to Ustaša training camps in Italy,669 a number that was probably inflated, but still 
represents a shockingly high percentage of the roughly seven-thousand Croats in Belgium.  
Put in context, however, these numbers are plausible. These Croatian migrants were hit 
particularly hard by the Great Depression, and even those who were able to hold on to their jobs 
had their hours dramatically cut.670 It is no coincidence that Seraing, the headquarters of the 
Hrvatski Savez, was significantly affected by the depression, accounting for two-thirds of 
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Yugoslav unemployment in Belgium.671 Yugoslav factory workers in Belgium lacked strong 
fraternal organizations on which to rely and so joining the Ustaše may have been their only 
option.  
Migrants into Fascists 
In general, the Domobran did best where migrant civil society organizations—sokols, 
self-help societies, singing clubs, language schools—were weakly developed. In Belgium, there 
were only thirty such groups. Similarly, in France there were only one-hundred eighty and in 
Central and South America there were merely three hundred. The United States, in comparison, 
had nearly six thousand (!).672   
Why did the Domobran do best where civil society was weakest? Why do immigrants 
become Ustaše? Variants of this question have long preoccupied scholars of fascism, who 
dispute the relative importance of ideology versus economics: did the brownshirts believe, or 
were they just cashing in on fascism? Peter Fritzsche, for instance, in Germans into Nazis, argues 
that fascist parties appeal to different classes for different reasons. For workers, the Nazi party 
promised economic prosperity on a national basis.673 For the middle class, the Nazi appeal was 
more ideological, blending nationalism, antisemitism, and the promise of future utopia, setting 
them apart from traditional conservatism, which favors either the preservation of the status quo 
or the return to a past “golden age.”  Of course, workers were not insensitive to Nazi ideology 
either.674  
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Conversely, Max Bergholz, in his study of Ustaša violence in Kulen Vakuf during the 
Second World War, argues that in explaining the outbreak of interethnic violence, “nationalist 
ideology and ‘ethnic hatred’ was much less important than one initially might assume,” at least 
on the local level. While ideology mattered to the party leadership around Pavelić, for Ustaša 
footsoldiers the true appeal of the movement were the opportunities for plunder: opportunistic 
merchants who wanted to put their Serb rivals out of business, farmers who wanted to settle old 
scores with Serbian neighbors, down-and-out people who saw in Pavelić’s movement the 
opportunity for legalized banditry. 675 In short, greed outweighed hate.   
But how would this translate to an emigrant context? Since fascist parties build their 
appeal on what they will offer loyalists once they take power in their homelands—steady factory 
jobs in the war industries, an opportunity to rob Jews or Serbs, etc, migrants living overseas 
would see few of the benefits thereof.  
Some insight can be gained by looking at Domobran recruiting policies, about which we 
can learn by examining the interviews Yugoslav police conducted with returning migrants. In a 
typical interrogation, emigrants were asked where and with whom they worked while abroad. 
Returnees were also asked whether they joined or were recruited by any political parties or 
emigrant associations while abroad. Lastly, emigrants were asked if they subscribed to any 
emigrant newspapers.676 Although in most cases, this inquest turned up nothing,677 some 
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migrants freely confessed experiences with the Domobran overseas. Being interrogations, these 
accounts should be read with some skepticism. Nonetheless, they provide a rare first-hand look 
at Domobran recruitment practices.  
The Domobran lured in migrants by acting as a fraternal society where “normal” self-
help groups were absent. Ćiril Mikeloti, who left his village in Slavonia to work as a miner in 
Aisden, Belgium in 1929, noted that when he arrived there were no political or cultural 
organizations in Aisden for Yugoslav emigrants. That changed in December 1930, when Ustaše 
organizers from Seraing arrived to set up a branch of their organization, with the vaguely 
patriotic name “Hrvatski Savez,” or Croatian Union. Within a year, most Croats in Aisden had 
joined the organization, which acted as a self-help society, offering health insurance for workers 
at very reasonable rates. For five Belgian francs per month, a worker could be guaranteed a 
payout if he got injured or sick. For comparison, Ćiril was earning sixty to eighty francs each 
day, so this was quite affordable.678 For regular members, the Ustaša, at least in Seraing, 
maintained a canteen where members could both eat and sleep.679 For many regular people, the 
Ustaša movement did not mean blood and soil, but soup and beds.  
The leadership of Domobran in Belgium, in turn, seems to have been attracted by a 
mixture of money and social status. The former held true for one leader of the Hrvatski Savez in 
Seraing: Ivan Milas, a twenty-seven-year-old student from Herzegovina, had his studies paid for 
by the Ustaša, with a monthly stipend of seven hundred Belgian francs.680 Another two 
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ringleaders had been prominent community figures since the late 1920s. One, named Stipe 
Marušić, was a former worker who became a foreman after his employer noticed his ability to 
speak both French and Serbo-Croatian. The other, named Luka Čulić, arrived penniless in 
Seraing but attained modest wealth and local notability as the community’s barber. Although 
neither professed to any ideology before the Great Depression, becoming fascists allowed them 
to maintain their position as community leaders as part of the Domobran.681  
Ustaša recruitment depended on occupying the niche of fraternal societies, and so it made 
sense that the Ustaša would seek to destroy their few competitors. In 1932, the Croatian Peasant 
Party attempted to establish their own self-help society among emigrants in Seraing, called the 
Hrvatski Seljački Savez, or Croatian Peasant Union. To destroy this new organization, the 
Hrvatski Savez libeled the HSS as communists, collecting signatures for a petition which they 
submitted to the constabulary. The police then raided the HSS offices. Branded as communists, 
the HSS organization in Belgium did not survive long.682 The Hrvatski Savez  also launched a 
campaign against a recently-founded self-help society called Jugoslavensko Jedinstvo, or 
Yugoslav Unity, accusing members of being traitors to the Croatian nation.683  
Being labeled a traitor by the Ustaša carried the risk of a beating or worse. Marko Šandr, 
a Bosnian, went to Belgium in 1929 to work in the ironworks of Seraing. According to his 
testimony (which was so revealing that it was distributed to municipal governments and police 
stations across Yugoslavia) soon after he arrived, Ustaša activists moved in and quickly managed 
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to enroll “almost all” of the Croatian workers, likely with the promise of health insurance, 
although that was not mentioned in his testimony. Although the organization also reached out to 
Bosnians, Marko stayed aloof. Shortly thereafter, Marko and his roommate Ilija (a Montenegrin) 
were set upon by Ustaše thugs with knives in their apartment. Marko was wounded in the brawl 
and Ilija fled after his revolver misfired. Marko fled Seraing shortly thereafter.684  
This was not the only documented violent incident. According to Djuro Gojak, a returnee 
from Argentina, one of his fellow returnees ,Matije Živčić, repeatedly pestered him about joining 
the Domobran. After being rebuffed several times, Živčić assaulted Gojak and was subsequently 
detained by the Argentine police.685 Nikola Beljan, a returning worker from Eisden, Belgium, 
also reported having been pressured to join the Domobran and beaten up after he demurred. He 
also reported being cursed at and attacked after he informed on the Domobran organization to the 
Yugoslav legation in Brussels, although he may have added that detail to ingratiate himself with 
the Yugoslav police interrogating him.686   
In 1935, Yugoslav police detained and interrogated a group of nine returnees from 
Belgium who confessed to having joined the Ustaša in Seraing. All claimed that they had been 
pressured to join the Hrvatski Savez. Namely, members of the organization told them that “when 
Croatia becomes independent they will set their homes on fire, and they will not dare to return to 
the fatherland.” Moreover, the nine added, the Hrvatski Savez “presented itself as a professional 
organization with the goal of helping its members in case they were laid off, became sick, 
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etc.”687 Taken together, these personal stories suggest a pattern of recruitment that could be 
euphemistically called “carrot and stick.” 
Why Belgium and South America?  
But what about Belgium and South America made these countries such fertile soil for the 
growth of Croatian fascist movements? The weakness of emigrant civil society in these places, 
as has been noted, certainly played a role. But it is not the whole story—the Domobran 
movement did not grow in a bubble. In much the same way that the emerging Yugoslavist 
movement in the United States was shaped by anti-fascist, pro-democratic, and pro-federalist 
tendencies in American political discourse, so too was the Domobran in Belgium and South 
America influenced by governments that tolerated or were friendly to fascist movements.  
 In 1930, Argentina’s democratically elected president, Hipólito Yrigoyen, was 
overthrown by General José Felix Uriburu, an authoritarian with fascist tendencies. That same 
year, military coups elevated Getúlio Vargas, a nationalist and a populist, to the presidency of 
Brazil and Luis Miguel Sánchez Cerro to the presidency of Peru. In 1933, Gabriel Terra declared 
a dictatorship in Uruguay, with David Toro and Rafael Franco following suit in Bolivia and 
Paraguay in 1936.688 While none of these dictatorships were exactly alike, most shared a similar 
ideological underpinning in corporatism. A school of thought now associated with fascism, 
corporatists seek the abolition of any institutional barrier between labor unions and management 
in the form of state-run unions. More broadly, corporatists sought the abolition of any 
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independent civil society—all organizations had to serve the nation-state.689 In short, the ability 
of Croatian emigrants to organize on non-fascist lines was sharply curtailed in Latin America. 
Aside from corporatism, Latin-American dictatorships modeled themselves after the 
dictatorships of Primo de Rivera in Spain, António Salazar in Portugal, and Benito Mussolini in 
Italy. During the 1930s, dozens of small fascist parties emerged in Latin America, particularly in 
Argentina, which had a large population of Italian and German immigrants who brought their 
politics with them.690 Diplomats from these countries may have also contributed to the 
transnational spread of ideas—the Spanish ambassador to Argentina in the late 1920s, Ramiro de 
Maeztu, was the theorist behind the Primo de Rivera dictatorship and a vocal critic of liberal 
democracy.691 Given that Argentina was also the center of Domobran activity in South America, 
it seems clear that the Domobran was influenced by the broader social context, which also 
enabled its aggressive style of recruitment. Fascism had become normalized. 
Another mechanism of ideological transmission was the Roman Catholic Church. In 
1932, the head of the Vatican foreign ministry, Cardinal Pacelli (who in 1939 became Pope Pius 
XII) launched a transnational campaign against Communism, a “Catholic International” to 
combat the Comintern. In 1933, the Vatican established a single organization to coordinate this 
activity, the Secretariat on Atheism. Working through a global network of bishops and through 
partnerships with Catholic organizations around the world, like Catholic Action, the Secretariat 
on Atheism hoped to discredit and demoralize leftist movements around the world. The 
Secretariat on Atheism emphasized that their movement was distinct from Fascist anti-
communist diplomacy, in that it was not anti-Semitic. To wit, Communism was bad not because 
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it was a “Judeo-Bolshevik” global conspiracy, but because it was an atheistic global conspiracy. 
However, it should be emphasized that the Catholic Church is more oligarchy than absolute 
monarchy—the Pope may issue encyclicals, bulls, and briefs, but bishops are mostly sovereign 
within their diocese. As a result, the fine distinction between Catholic and Fascist anti-
communism was sometimes blurred in practice. Anti-communist Catholics, when implementing 
Rome’s directives, often sided with or even collaborated with ultranationalists.692 In Argentina 
for instance, Catholic priest and activist Gustavo Franceschi articulated a vision of the Argentine 
nation based on the principle of “national Catholicism” and anti-communism.693 In Brazil, 
(another country where the Domobran did well), the archbishop of Rio de Janeiro, Sebastião 
Leme, praised the quasi-fascist Vargas dictatorship as “consistent with the Church’s hierarchical 
vision of society.”694Moreover, corporatism had a strong following within the Jesuit order, and 
many Jesuits from Europe vocally advocated for corporatism in the Catholic press.695 
 While Belgium was not a fascist country or even a dictatorship, it did have Nazi Germany 
on its eastern flank. Acting against fascist parties, which Germany would take as a diplomatic 
insult, would have been tremendously risky. Complicating matters further, Catholicism was also 
central to Belgian politics. Interwar Belgian politics were dominated by the divide between the 
Catholic Union, which was socially conservative but somewhat economically liberal, the Liberal 
Party, which was centrist and anticlerical, and the Socialist Party, who were reform socialists a la 
Eduard Bernstein. Aside from the usual debates over economic policy, we can see the Catholic 
Church was central to political debates in Belgium. the Catholic church. Interestingly, Belgium’s 
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own pseudo-fascist movement, the Rexists, was likewise rooted in Catholicism and had a strong 
base, like the Domobran, in Wallonia. Founded in 1935 by Léon Degrelle, formerly of the 
clericalist Catholic Union party, the Rexists called for an authoritarian corporatist state based on 
Christian values. In the 1936 election, the Rexists won 31.1 percent of the vote in Luxembourg 
and 9.4 percent in Hainaut, both subregions of French-speaking Wallonia. Rexists did well 
especially among the more fervent Catholics (as measured by Church attendance). 696   While the 
Rexist movement postdates that of the Domobran, its geographic distribution and clerical 
background nonetheless speaks to a conservative, Catholic social climate that was not intolerant 
of fascism. 
 Given that Croats are overwhelmingly Catholic, it is easy to see how this zeitgeist could 
have spilled over into the Croatian emigration in Belgium and Argentina. Moreover, the relative 
lack of fraternal organizations among Croatian emigrants would only increase the relative 
importance of organized religion. There is, moreover, evidence that Croatian Catholic priests in 
South America were enthusiastic collaborators with the Domobran movement. On January 20, 
1931, for instance, the Yugoslav legation in Argentina reported that a number of “anti-Yugoslav” 
Croatian Catholic priests had been causing trouble within the emigrant community.697 A more 
detailed report from 1937 details how a Croatian Catholic, Father Rusković, hosted a Domobran 
meeting in the Dock-Sud district of Buenos Aires. Also at that meeting was Cardinal Coppello, 
the Archbishop of Buenos Aires, showcasing the degree to which the Domobran enjoyed the 
support of Catholic institutions in Argentina. Copello even gave a speech! In his address, 
Coppello argued that Croatia was the “antemurale christianitatus,” the bulwark of Christiandom, 
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defending “western civilization” from the “threat” of Serbs and Orthodoxy. The Catholic clergy 
in general and Copello in particular wielded enormous power within Argentina, the Yugoslav 
consul lamented—“here in Argentina you cannot do anything without Cardinal Copello’s 
permission and you cannot do anything against his will.”698 This made Yugoslav officials 
powerless to get Rusković recalled or to rid themselves of other “turbulent priests” such as 
Father Blaž Štefanić, a Franciscan monk from Croatia invited in 1939 by the Domobran 
organization in Argentina to serve as a “national missionary.”699 We see a similar pattern of 
cooperation in Belgium. When Yugoslav diplomats attempted to organize a Yugoslav fraternal 
society in Seraing in 1930, Father Bilobrk, the local Croatian Catholic priest, was front and 
center in the campaign against it. Not only did he fulminate against it in his sermons, he also met 
secretly with Croatian ultranationalists behind the scenes to coordinate his criticisms with 
theirs.700 In short, the reason the Ustaša did so well in Argentina and Belgium was that the 
Catholic church, a strong organization in both countries, was a major network for the 
transmission for conservative, nationalist, and fascist ideas to the broader public. This resonated 
as well with the Ustaša’s political program, which was pure clerico-fascism.  
 It is also worth contrasting the situation in Belgium and South America with that in the 
United States, where the Domobran would not prosper. To begin the Catholic Church apparatus 
in the United States was nowhere near as influential as its Belgian or South American 
counterparts. Both Belgium and South America were majority Catholic countries; the United 
States was not. Moreover, despite the arrival of millions of Irish and Italian migrants during the 
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19th century, anti-Catholicism was still a feature of American political life. It torpedoed, for 
instance, the ambitions of Al Smith, who ran for president as a Democrat in 1928. As a result, the 
Catholic church had to tread lightly to avoid offending American sensibilities. Take, for instance, 
the case of Charles Coughlin, a Catholic priest in Detroit, Michigan. Before Father Coughlin 
became a vocal anti-Semite during the late 1930s, his public pronouncements concerned the 
Vatican mainly for their “Communistic” content. Rome could do little to reign Coughlin in, 
however—not only did Coughlin have the support of his direct superior, Bishop Gallagher of 
Detroit, even publicly censuring Coughlin would have raised American fears about Papal 
interference with Coughlin’s “free speech.”701 So much for the Secretariat on Atheism!  
It is debatable, however, whether Catholic bishops in the United States were less friendly 
to fascism than their South American counterparts. On the one hand, Cardinal Mundelein of 
Chicago, for instance, when addressing the priests of his diocese at a conference in 1937, issued 
a scathing denunciation of Hitler and fascism, calling him “an Austrian paperhanger, and a poor 
one at that” and questioning his right to “dictate every move of the people’s lives.”702 Mundelein, 
it should be noted was Archbishop of Chicago, which had a sizeable Croatian population. 
Mundelein’s remarks were widely circulated in the press, sparking a diplomatic incident between 
the Holy See and Nazi Germany. In the ensuing brouhaha with the Nazi Foreign Office, 
Mundelein’s denunciation of the Reich was supported by other American bishops of German 
ancestry, as well as the main Catholic newspapers. American Catholic public opinion was behind 
Mundelein as well.703 But while this episode suggests Mundelein was critical of German fascism, 
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which was militantly atheistic, there is no evidence that Mundelein was hostile to Croatian 
fascism as well. According to a 1936 report from the Yugoslav general consul in Chicago, the 
consul noted that the Domobran movement in the Chicago was in marked decline (for reasons 
that will be explored in the next section). Despite the Domobran’s organizational weakness, it  
“had been morally and materially supported by all the local Croatian Catholic priests, almost 
without exception.” In particular, the consul highlighted the activities of Blaž Jerković, a 
Franciscan monk from Mostar, who, as the priest for a parish in Chicago, fell under Mundelein’s 
jurisdiction. After years of protests from the consulate, Mundelein finally took action in 1936, 
shuffling the priest off to a different parish in Minnesota. Not only did this fail to curb Jerković’s 
activities, Jerković’s replacement in his old parish, Father Spiro Andrijanić, was apparently just 
as bad. Andrijanić, like Jerković and the pro-Ustaša priests in South America and Belgium, 
supported the Domobran in his sermons. He also attended Domobran meetings.704 And when the 
consulate wrote to Mundelein to complain about Andrijanić,705 the consul received a terse 
acknowledgement and no promise to do anything about Andrijanić.706  Although Mundelein, 
unlike Copello in Buenos Aires, never spoke at Domobran meetings, he also seemed unwilling to 
do anything about his subordinates’ support for a terrorist organization.  
As the case of Jerković and Andrijanić indicates, the weakness of the Domobran 
movement in the United States was not a matter of American Catholic opposition to fascism. 
Moreover, that the Catholic Church was unable to prop up the Domobran in the United States 
suggests, again, that the Catholic church was less influential in the United States. Moreover, the 
Catholic Church had weak links to Yugoslav emigrant institutions in the United States, hindering 
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the Domobran’s ability to win over migrants. The two largest Yugoslav fraternal organizations, 
the Croatian Fraternal Union and the Slovene National Benefit Society, were both secular, the 
latter militantly so. While the Carniolan Slovene Catholic Union and the Yugoslav Catholic 
Union were both Catholic organizations, they were, for obvious reasons, of little interest to a 
Croatian fascist movement. In 1931, the only hardline conservative Croatian Catholic fraternal 
union of any significance, the Croatian Catholic Union, had 4,758 members to the CFU’s 
92,458.707 While Catholicism may have been important to immigrants on a personal level, the 
disconnect between the Catholic church and emigrant fraternal organizations made it difficult for 
the Vatican to work with anti-communist forces among American Croats. This was not the only 
reason for Domobran weakness in the US, however. As will be shown, the failure of the 
Domobran in the United States had a variety of causes.  
The Domobran Defeated 
The Domobran’s efforts to expand into North America began in July 1934, when 
Branimir Jelić gatecrashed a Croatian Day celebration in Cleveland. Despite being given only a 
few minutes speaking time, Jelić ended up speaking for two hours. Few present knew who he 
was.708  Subsequently, Jelić decamped to Pittsburgh, setting up an office in the Croatian Fraternal 
Union’s headquarters, apparently with either the consent or connivance of the CFU’s president 
Ivan Butković. Jelić’s intentions for the Domobran organization in North America appeared to be 
identical to those of its counterparts in South America and Europe: namely, it was to be an 
 
707 See: Berislav Angjelinović and Ivan Mladineo, Jugoslovenski Almanak: Jugosloveni u Sjedinjenim Državama 
Amerike  (New York, 1931), 4-5. 
708 Report from Michael Cerrezin to the Yugoslav Legation, July 2, 1934. Fond 371, fasc. 51, BO 66, Arhiv 
Jugoslavije. 




organization that recruited and raised money from the diaspora, and which bolstered its numbers 
through a mix of intimidation of other fraternal societies and offering generous benefits.709  
However, the Domobran did not flourish in the United States. One estimate of its 
membership, acquired by obtaining a list of subscribers to the Domobran’s main newspaper in 
the United States, put their numbers at around four hundred in 1937.710 This type of estimate is 
unreliable: not all subscribers to the Domobran newspaper subscribed to its views, and not all of 
the Domobran faithful subscribed to its newspaper. A more accurate estimate is provided by a 
list of dues-paying members, which the Yugoslav consulate in Pittsburgh obtained that same 
year. The Domobran organization in 1937 was quite small: around seventeen-hundred 
members.711 Whereas in Buenos Aires one in ten Croats were Domobranci, in the United States 
roughly one in two hundred were, if we put the number of American Croats at 350,000, based on 
FLIS’s 1923 data.712 Although the population of American Croats could have swelled since 
1923, growing the pie only makes the Domobran’s share look smaller.    
With so few dues-paying members, the Domobran’s finances suffered. The Domobran’s 
1937 convention, held on Memorial Day in Akron, Ohio, revealed an organization in disarray. 
Around a thousand attended, although many, according to the Yugoslav legation, were there only 
for the buffet and spectacle, to gorge and gawk. Moreover, the Domobran’s treasurer reported 
that the Domobran organization in the United States was running a deficit of around $1000, that 
their rainy day fund, intended to cover the legal fees of arrested members, contained a mere 
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$600, and that financial contributions to the organization had sharply declined over the last 
year.713  Moreover, the treasurer and president refused to speak to one another, each blaming the 
other for the organization’s financial troubles.714  
The leaders of the Domobran organization in the United States were a colorful group. 
Franjo Budak, the treasurer, was known in his hometown of Youngstown, Ohio as the “Tsar of 
racketeering,” organizing illegal bets on various games of chance and horse races. He was also 
reputed to have been in a shootout with revolvers.715 In addition, Budak operated a brothel and 
illegally sold liquor, back when Prohibition was still in force.716   Although his “entrepreneurial” 
background naturally suited him for the position of treasurer, Franjo Budak probably gained his 
position through nepotism—Mile Budak, the later architect of the Independent State of Croatia’s 
genocidal campaign against Serbs and a highly ranked member of the Ustaša, was his uncle. 
Blood ties also distinguished the president of the Domobran organization in the United States, 
Ante Došen, who was the son of Marko Došen, the organizer of the Velibit uprising who would 
go on to become president of the Parliament in Nazi-puppeted Croatia during the Second World 
War.717 Compared to Budak, Došen had a relatively clean criminal record, with only two 
indictments for perjury and one for inciting violence.718 Luka Kalanj and Ante Zubak also had 
criminal records, the former for fraud, and the latter for embezzling money from the Croatian 
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Fraternal Union.719 Zubak was also a double agent (although nobody knew this at the time), 
working as a mole for the Yugoslav government.720 Luka Grbić, editor of the party organ of the 
Domobran in the United States, Independent State of Croatia, had a clean record, however, as 
did Nikola Sulentić, the proprietor of a machine tool factory in Iowa .721 However, a common 
theme running through this rogue’s gallery is fraud—everything seems to indicate that most of 
the Domobran’s leadership saw this organization as an opportunity to defraud ultranationalists, 
rather than as an ideological calling.  
In this regard, the Domobran can be productively compared to the German-American 
Bund, a contemporary organization among German-American immigrants sympathetic to 
fascism. During its peak years between 1935 and 1939, the Bund was led by a naturalized 
German-American named Fritz Kuhn.722 Although outwardly a zealous devotee of National 
Socialism and Hitler, Kuhn treated the Bund as a money-making operation, eventually 
embezzling thousands of dollars to pay for gifts for several mistresses.723 In addition to regular 
dues, members of the Bund were faced with voluntary-mandatory uniform purchases, newspaper 
subscriptions, book sales, pins, badges, armbands, bookends, dishware, and music records. All 
payments were made out to Fritz Kuhn, who, according to the Führerprinzip, could treat the 
treasury of the Bund as his personal checking account, disposing of the money as he saw fit.724 
Although the Domobran did not have the Führerprinzip as such, its rulebook contains many 
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similar practices, including requiring uniform purchases for members and absolute obedience to 
the leadership and the poglavnik, 725 Fascist movements can be lucrative for their leaders, and 
thus it is not surprising that they attract the avaricious and unprincipled.  
Given the pecuniary motives of the Domobran leadership, it was not surprising that the 
infighting grew as the treasury shrank. Toward the end of 1938, the President, Ante Došen, faced 
open insurrection, accused by fellow Domobran leaders of illegally misappropriating 
organizational funds for his personal use.726 The leader of the internal opposition to Došen 
appears to have been Budak, the treasurer,727 and a far more likely culprit who was, moreover, in 
a position to manipulate the ledger to incriminate Došen. Finally, in January 1939, Došen was 
removed from the leadership of an organization that he had founded and led.728 Then, a few 
months later, he was expelled from the organization entirely, forced to return a Ford Coupe, two 
typewriters, a microphone, and a “Dario set”.729 While this bolstered the Domobran’s immediate 
resources, it also cut them off from Jelić, who seemed to relay most of the organizations 
information and orders through Došen.730 As a transnational network, the Domobran was quite 
fragile.  
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As a result, the new leadership found out only belatedly that Jelić had been interned on 
Ellis Island while attempting to visit the United States in 1939.731 Jelić would eventually be 
allowed entry to the United States. Jelić’s return visit had been intended to set the American 
Domobran’s affairs in order: to reinstate Došen, quell infighting, expand the subscribership of 
the Domobran newspaper, and to found new lodges.732 Despite having apparently unlimited 
financial resources at his disposal, possibly supplied by Hungary, with which to fund these 
activities,733 Jelić’s second visit accomplished relatively little. Despite boasting that he would 
soon establish twenty-five new branches of the Domobran in North America, by the end of his 
visit he had established only three, none with more than fifteen members.734 Jelić’s speeches 
were weakly attended due to a general boycott of his brand of politics by Croatian leftists, 
moderates, and the non-fascist traditional right.735 Moreover, several of his planned assemblies 
were disrupted by other Croats hostile to his message: socialists and followers of the Croatian 
Peasant Party.736  Antifascism drew them together. Shortly after, Jelić would be removed from 
the picture entirely. On his way back to Europe after his failed attempt to resuscitate the 
 
731 “Dr. B. Jelić on Ellis Island,” Announcement from the Domobran headquarters, undated, found with 1939. Fond 
371, fasc. 54, BO 70, AJ.  
732 Letter from Jelić to the leadership of the Domobran movement in the United States, March 5, 1939. Fond 371, 
fasc. 54, BO 70, AJ; Report from Kosto Unković to the Washington Legation, April 4, 1939. Fond 371, fasc. 54, BO 
71, AJ. 
733 “Dr. Br. Jelić u Sj. A. D. i akcija domobranaca,” Report from the Washington Legation to MIP, April 11, 1939. 
Fond 371, fasc. 55, BO 71, AJ.  
734 Report to the Yugoslav Legation in Washington, August 20, 1939. Fond 371, fasc. 54, BO 70, AJ.  
735 “Br. Jelić, agitacioni put po USA,” Report from the Washington Legation to MIP, May 31, 1939. Fond 371, fasc. 
54, BO 70, AJ. 
736 Letter from the General Consulate of Chicago to the Washington Legation, May 6, 1939. Fond 371, fasc. 54, BO 
70, AJ; “Neuspeli Jelićevi zborovi,” Report from the Washington Legation to MIP, May 26, 1939. Fond 371 fasc. 54, 
BO 70, AJ. 




Domobran organization in the United States, Jelić was arrested by British authorities in 
Gibraltar.737 Jelić would remain in British custody for the entirety of the Second World War.  
The weakness of the Domobran branch organization (and possibly the cupidity of its 
leadership) diminished official funds still further. By 1940, the Domobran in North America 
were over fourteen hundred dollars in debt. Many members had stopped paying dues. Although 
some lodges had independent treasuries, Budak had no idea who had how much (not much of a 
treasurer!). 738 Responding to the central organization’s financial emergency, Budak pillaged the 
financial reserves of Domobran branches to cover immediate expenses, although how much 
money this raised is unclear—Budak’s bookkeeping was not the best.739 Recognizing that their 
financial situation was untenable, the remaining leaders of the Domobran organization began 
meeting in the first half of 1941 to discuss shutting down branch organizations but to continue 
publishing the newspaper. In the face of widespread apathy or hostility to their message, 
Nezavisna Hrvatska Država ceased publishing in February 1942.740  
The deathblow was delivered by the FBI several months later, after they were warned by 
Michael Cerrezin, a Croatian-American acting as Vice-consul in Pittsburgh, that the Domobran 
were a subversive organization potentially harmful to the war effort.741 In prosecuting 
organization, the FBI chose to focus on four ringleaders: Došen, Sulentić, Budak, and Grbić, 
rather than the rank-and-file, whom the FBI considered dupes and small fry. As unregistered 
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foreign agents and propagandists in a country with which the United States was at war, the 
Domobran ringleaders faced potentially steep penalties under the Voorhis Act.742 Došen, 
however, was well connected: both Senators from Pennsylvania came to his defense. Although 
Došen was initially indicted for perjury, he would ultimately serve only six months in jail on a 
technicality relating to his immigration status. 743 The FBI also faced problems prosecuting 
Budak for his work with the Domobran, but would eventually convict him of income tax-
evasion, presumably from his sideline as an illegal gambling magnate.744 Of course, by the time 
the FBI stepped in, the Domobran in the United States was moribund—we cannot credit state 
intervention for its destruction. 
One could argue that the Domobran failed in the United States because of a political 
discourse that was, at that time, hostile to fascism. To be sure, the Domobran faced no shortage 
of hecklers at its meetings. On the other hand, this environment did not deter the German-
American Bund. On February 10, 1939, for instance, the Bund held a rally inside Madison 
Square Gardens that attracted twenty-thousand people.745 While there was an even larger crowd 
of protesters outside the Gardens (some estimate one hundred thousand), the Bund was a 
prosperous and self-sufficient organization consisting of  six to twenty-thousand members (and 
an even larger number of sympathizers) before the FBI shut it down.746 The American 
Domobran, in comparison, never had more than 1,700 dues-paying members.747 Nor did the 
embezzlement of funds by the Bund’s leader, Fritz Kuhn, prove an obstacle to success. Similar to 
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the Domobran, the Bund was badly led and widely hated—why did the Bund succeed and the 
Domobran fail?  
The key to the Bund’s success was its ability to exploit the dense network of German 
emigrant civil society organizations in the United States. Founded in 1933 as the Bund der 
Freunde des Neuen Deutschland, the original founder of the Bund, Heinz Spanknöbel, quickly 
reached out to previous fascist and far-right German immigrant associations such as Teutonia 
and Gau-USA, absorbing these small and declining organizations into his own. In summer of 
1933, the Bund absorbed the similarly named Friends of New Germany organization, and in the 
fall the Bund forced its way into the mainstream by acquiring a seat on the United German 
Societies, an umbrella organization of German migrant groups. In 1934, the Bund won over 
members of the German-American Business League, recruiting storeowners in German-
American enclaves to their cause. These businessmen then proudly displayed their affiliation 
with the Bund in their store windows, spreading awareness of the Bund to their customers, many 
of whom also joined the Bund.748  
By coopting sympathetic elements of German-American civil society, the Bund was able 
to expand beyond a core group of extremists, acquiring enough members to be taken seriously, 
and thereby acquiring a veneer of respectability. The Bund even acted as a “normal” emigrant 
self-help organization—it ran summer camps, coordinated various “cultural” activities, and acted 
as a hub for socializing.749 All this destigmatized fascism, at least enough to lure twenty 
thousand people in New York to a Nazi rally.  
In contrast, the Domobran’s approach to existing emigrant groups was more belligerent—
it sought to compete with them and poach their members, rather than swallow them outright. 
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After all, these tactics had worked in South America and Belgium. As a result, the Domobran did 
not seek to absorb an ideologically-similar immigrant organization, the Hrvatski Kolo, or 
Croatian Circle. Although the Circle shared the Domobran’s goal of an independent Croatia, 
were indigenous to the US, having no affiliation or guidance from old-country parties.750 This 
was the Croatian counterpart to the Teutonia organization that the Bund assimilated. Shortly after 
Jelić’s surprise arrival in the United States, Circle leaders invited Jelić to speak with them in 
Youngstown, Ohio and proposing an alliance. Jelić, however, rebuffed their offer. Instead of 
using existing emigrant societies, Jelić apparently thought it better if the Domobran founded its 
own lodges, rather than piggybacking off of the Circle. Moreover, the Circle was a relatively 
small organization and Jelić believed the Domobran would be able to recruit more effectively on 
its own.751 After all, this strategy of independent organizing had worked well in South America. 
Nevertheless, the Croatian Circle and the Domobran, despite their ideological similarities, soon 
became bitter enemies, with the main Circle newspaper, Danica Hrvatska, started issuing sharp 
polemics against Jelić. 752 With both the HSS and the Domobran as enemies, the Circle seemed 
to have trouble making friends.   
The Croatian Circle’s press attacks on the Domobran and Jelić were soon supplemented 
by the communist and socialist-minded Croats, who began to publicly assert that the Ustaša 
movement was funded by Mussolini and served the interests of Italian expansionism into the 
Balkans. A Croatian Day event in Chicago in October, 1934, at which Jelić was scheduled to 
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speak, was hijacked by Communists, who passed a resolution denouncing both Mussolini and 
Jelić as Mussolini’s collaborator. Shortly thereafter, Jelić essentially became a persona non grata 
among a majority of American Croats. Ironically, this backlash against the Domobran had the 
effect of pushing the Croatian Circle slightly toward the center, such that their primary 
newspaper, the Danica Hrvatska, renounced their support for Mussolini. The shelter of the 
Croatian Fraternal Union was likewise forcefully withdrawn as Jelić and his staff were expelled 
from their office in the Croatian Fraternal Union headquarters in 1934,753 a move that took place 
on the authority of William Boyd/Boić, the pro-Yugoslav Vice President of the Croatian 
Fraternal Union, who also served as an Ohio State Senator.754  
The tactic of linking the Domobran and Italy proved so effective that it was also adopted 
by the Yugoslav diplomatic service, who, by 1935, were continuously supplying the entire 
émigré press, including “separatist” newspapers otherwise unfriendly to the Yugoslav 
government, with material alleging that the Domobran movements organizers were subsidized by 
Mussolini.755 As unpopular as the Yugoslav monarchy was with American Croats, Mussolini and 
Italy were still seen as greater threats. 
 The Domobran movement faced a more mundane hurdle as well, according to 
Kolumbatović: “those few Croats who still occupy themselves with old-country politics have 
already aligned themselves with the Croatian Circle or the Croatian Peasant Party, or the 
Clericals, or, as is most common, the Communists, and as a result the Ustaša movement can only 
act as a spoiler, poaching members from these other groups.”756 In general, Kolumbatović did 
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not regard the Domobran as a serious threat, cynically noting in a separate report that “it is 
difficult to believe that they will send assassins from America, because such an action requires 
the kind of financial means that few organizations here possess, especially the local leaders of 
Croatian separatists, who are generally the type that collect money in the name of patriotism and 
then find a pretext to keep it all to themselves.”757 In other words, the financial resources of 
migrants interested in old country politics were already being tapped by organizations like the 
Croatian Circle. As such, existing emigrant organizations had both a financial and an 
organizational reason to quash the Domobran.  
Based on the FBI investigation, it appears as though the Domobran continued to employ 
the same pressure tactics, threats of violence, and so on, in order to keep members loyal to the 
organization.758 Intimidation tactics may have been less effective in the United States, where 
migrant associations had more members—it is one thing to beat and threaten a member of an 
organization with two-hundred members, and quite another to do the same thing to a member of 
an organization like the Croatian Fraternal Union with ninety thousand. Moreover, large fraternal 
unions were also better able to weather the Great Depression and provide insurance and various 
social welfare benefits to their members, thereby negating the main attraction of the Domobran 
organization in Argentina and Belgium. And lastly, large fraternal unions, in contradistinction to 
their counterparts in South America, had their own newspapers with a much greater circulation 
than the Domobran newspapers, meaning that they could win any polemical contest with the 
Domobran.  
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As a result, the Domobran, unlike the Bund, never acquired the critical mass of dues-
paying members needed to become self-sufficient or respectable. Moreover, unlike the 
Domobran, the Bund did not rely on subsidies from the German (or Italian) government—the 
German chancellery considered the Bund an embarrassment and avoided any organizational 
ties.759 Being funded from abroad, in turn, exposed the Domobran to the charge of being agents 
of a foreign power. The Bund, in comparison, could not be disbanded in this way, and so the FBI 
had to resort to the Al Capone gambit: nailing the Bundesführer for tax-evasion and 
embezzlement.760  
Of course, the Domobran might have been more successful if it had tried to infiltrate 
existing civil society organizations, rather than compete with them. Besides working for the 
Bund, this strategy proved to be fruitful for several European fascist movements, as Dylan Riley 
documents. Success depended on whether the existing leadership of these organizations can be 
coopted or forced out—the rank and file generally follow suit so long as their self-help 
organization continues to provide benefits. For instance, the early Italian fascist movement, the 
squadristi, when faced with direct competition from various socialist and peasant organizations, 
opted to assassinate the leaders of these organizations, inheriting their membership, and retaining 
the rank and file by continuing to provide many of the same welfare services: health insurance, a 
mutual fund, youth excursions, and so forth.761  Likewise, in Spain, Carlists drew upon an 
existing dense network of Catholic civil society organizations, who were threatened by the anti-
Clerical policies of a leftist government.762 Conversely, the traditional organization of 
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conservatives in Catalonia, the Lliga, was not threatened with extinction by the Catalan left, and 
thus had no reason to turn to fascism.763 Cooption and infiltration of existing civil society 
organizations and their leaders works best when traditional conservatism appears illegitimate and 
unrepresentative of the will of the people, a vacuum that fascist organizations can fill.764   
For the Domobran in the United States, this strategy meant winning over the leader of the 
Croatian Fraternal Union, Ivan Butković, who had previously given the Domobran office space 
in CFU headquarters. But although Butković-as-a-person may have been sympathetic to the 
Domobran, Butković-as-a-politician had little to gain and much to lose from cooperation with the 
far right. In fact, this was the assessment of Došen himself. Confiscated correspondence in his 
FBI file expresses Došen’s repeated disappointment with Butković’s failure to fully commit to 
the Ustaša cause. On September 22, 1937 Došen complained that Butković was attempting to 
influence the coverage of Nezavisna Hrvatska Država in order to make it friendlier to the 
Croatian Peasant Party.765 On that same day, in his diary, Došen called Butković a “bum.” A 
week later, Došen called Butković a “beast” in his diary, following a pro-Maček editorial in 
Zajedničar.766 Butković’s fickleness had political motivations. His political base within the CFU, 
the nationalists, tended to sympathize with either the Frankists, a traditional conservative party, 
or the Croatian peasant party.767 Moreover, the hold of the nationalist bloc over the CFU was 
somewhat precarious—the left and center wings of the CFU gained ground in the 1935 and 1939 
conventions of the CFU, winning the vice presidency and a host of administrative positions, 
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including the editorship of the English-language section of Zajedničar.768 By aligning himself 
entirely with the Domobran, Butković risked splintering the nationalist bloc and falling from 
power. Thus, it is not surprising that his flirtation with the Domobran remained just a dalliance.  
Conclusion 
Each of these four parties—the Pribićevići, Croatian Peasant Party, Communists, and 
Ustaša—approached diaspora politics differently. Yet, through these different approaches ran 
several common threads. First, the KPJ, HSS, and Ustaša all struggled with independent-minded 
activists in the “tenth banovina.” Both the Domobran and the Croatian Peasant Party fought the 
Croatian Circle, just as the KPJ struggled with the CPUSA. 
 Second, these parties articulated similar complaints about the common people—about 
their low cultural level and disinterest in conditions in Yugoslavia. This ties back to a question 
posed in the introduction about what motivates economic migrants to become national activists. 
As we see in the various recruitment narratives, emigrants who joined national organizations 
were often motivated by their material concerns as migrant workers (the need for insurance, a 
social hub, or a political platform that promises workers liberation) than by outright nationalism. 
 Third, to combat heterodoxy and indifference, each party realized the importance of 
physically stationing trusted non-emigrant party figures, i.e. Jelić for the Domobran, Košutić for 
the HSS, Stojan Pribićević for the DS, or “Uncle Sam” for the KPJ, to ensure that immigrant 
activists were kept informed about the Party line. This, in turn, answers another of our research 
question about how transnational networks are maintained. Using family members to forge 
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durable transatlantic ties was a common strategy, particularly for the Domobran, many of whose 
members were relatives of Ante Pavelić’s inner circle. The major exception to this trend were the 
KPJ, which developed a rudimentary bureaucracy, the Emkom, and a courier/smuggling system 
based on sailors. Within this network, travel and travelers, once again, occupied an outsized role. 
The continued existence of these parties overseas depended on regular infusions of capital, both 
symbolic and financial, that were related by political figures crossing the Atlantic. Their 
credibility and authority within emigrant communities depended on their ability to speak from 
personal experience about conditions in the ‘old country.’ This, in turn, made them able to 
smooth over the differences between various emigrant factions, such as the left and center wings 
of the CFU or the various squabbling individuals within the Domobran organization. In short, 
travel and travelers made denser the network of emigrant organizations necessary to the 
functioning of a “diaspora.”   
And fourth, all four Yugoslav parties regarded the Croatian Fraternal Union as the key to 
the “tenth banovina,” although the KPJ also meddled in the politics of the Serbian National 
Federation and the SNPJ. These similarities are not coincidental. A recurrent theme of this 
chapter has been that all four parties paid attention to what the others were doing and sought to 
learn from the others’ mistakes. All four political parties, both through their cooperation and 
their competition, helped reshape the political geography among emigrants in North America. 
Spurred on by the advocacy and speeches of old country politicians and activists like Košutić, 
Krnjević, Pribićević, and “Uncle Sam,” Communists, socialists, liberals, and HSS-sympathizers 
overcame mutual suspicions and forged an alliance against the tyranny of Belgrade and the 
fascism of the Domobran. Common enemies make for steadfast friends. In fighting against the 
Domobran with one hand and the Belgrade regime with the other, partisans of the HSS, DS, and 




Communists in the United States helped shift the political mood toward Yugoslavism and 
antifascism. This is critical to understanding the development in the second half of the 1930s of a 
broad leftist coalition in the United States that favored preserving Yugoslavia but overthrowing 




























CHAPTER FIVE: ON THEIR OWN: YUGOSLAV CULTURAL POLITICS FROM 1934-1941 
 
On October 9, 1934 in Marseille, King Alexander of Yugoslavia was assassinated by a 
member of the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization, who was working in concert 
with Ante Pavelić’s Ustaša movement. The first assassination to be caught on film, Alexander’s 
death stunned a worldwide audience. While Louis Adamic may have also been shocked, he was 
not surprised. The day after the assassination, Adamic was quoted in the New York Times stating 
that he “predicted the end of King Alexander nearly a year ago,” and that “Alexander, with his 
absolutist and tyrannical character and his terrorism over the last six years, is far more to blame 
for his own death than is the man who fired the shots.”769 Indeed, in the conclusion to his 
bestseller, The Native’s Return, Adamic had predicted that Alexander would be violently 
overthrown á la Nicholas II.770  
But while the death of the Russian Tsar heralded political revolution, what would follow 
Alexander was unclear. In a follow-up essay in The Nation titled, “What Next in Jugoslavia,” 
Adamic predicted that, following a few years of regency under Prince Paul (whom Adamic 
characterized as a “decadently handsome fellow…with no outstanding qualities”), Yugoslavia 
would become a “union of four semi-autonomous republics—Slovenia, Croatia, Serbia, and 
Macedonia—with Belgrade as federal capital.” This union would soon also include Bulgaria, all 
following another revolution. Russia, Adamic believed, would be this federation’s natural ally, 
and if war in Europe broke out, Adamic predicted that the communists would win.771 All of this, 
save the inclusion of Bulgaria in a Yugoslav federation, would come to pass by 1945.  
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771 Louis Adamic, “What Next in Jugoslavia,” The Nation, vol. 139, no. 3616, October 24, 1934, p. 470-471, in Arhiv 
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Although Adamic was off by a decade, his anti-monarchist, leftist, federalist, and pan 
Slavic prescription for Yugoslavia would, by Yugoslavia’s destruction in April 1941, become a 
unifying political view within the “tenth banovina.” But this was hardly predetermined. As 
Chapter Four argues, the emergence of a “Yugoslav diaspora” was partly a reaction to the 
overseas intrigues of activists from four old-country political parties: the HSS, DS, KPJ, and 
Ustaša. But it also depended on whether the Kingdom of Yugoslavia could right the ship, 
transcending the excesses of the dictatorship that were documented in Chapter Three, thereby 
allowing advocates of Yugoslav unity an official outlet.   
As this chapter will argue, the Kingdom of Yugoslavia was unable to salvage its failing 
attempt to win the loyalty of the “tenth banovina.”  Although Yugoslav diplomats during 
Alexander’s dictatorship created much ill will through their clumsy efforts to censor and 
intimidate overseas critics, this chapter will show that Yugoslav diplomats during the regency of 
Prince Paul blundered by underfunding emigrant efforts to articulate and commemorate 
Yugoslav culture. Emigrant commentators began arguing that, in official eyes, the “Yugoslav 
diaspora” existed only as a source of money and staged displays of national loyalty that could be 
used for internal Yugoslav propaganda. They were not wrong, as this chapter will show through 
a brief excursion through the Emigration Museum in Zagreb, which was open between 1934 and 
1941, as well as the Yugoslav Pavilion at the 1939 World Fair in New York.  
Yet migrants in this period would also erect their own monuments: a Yugoslav Room in 
the Pittsburgh Cathedral of Learning and a Yugoslav Garden in Cleveland. Emigrant efforts, 
these cultural projects showcased not only the initiative of migrants who understood that they 
could no longer rely on the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, but also the cooperation between emigrant 
self-help societies. The imagined community of the “Yugoslav diaspora” was increasingly 




interlinked by joint fundraising efforts for these projects, a common immigrant narrative, and 
even a Yugoslav Radio Station. These habits of cooperation would ease the way toward 
Adamic’s envisioned pro-Yugoslav, anti-regime diaspora coalition, whose outlines were already 
beginning to emerge in 1939 in the context of a rising tide of panslavic sentiment.  
From Yugoslavism to Serb Chauvinism? 
Although Yugoslav diplomats always doubted the loyalty of American Croats, 
Alexander’s murder hardened suspicions into paranoia. For instance, the Yugoslav legation’s 
survey of emigrant press attitudes toward Alexander’s death reveals how Yugoslav diplomats 
increasingly thought about loyalty in ethnic terms.  The Serbian National Union mourned, 
“except for a small Bolshevik and extreme separatist minority.” Most American Slovenes, the 
charge d’affaires was confident, also grieved, although this conclusion was based on a few 
conversations and may have been wishful thinking. Meanwhile, the leadership of the Croatian 
Fraternal Union and their main organ, Zajedničar (The Unionist), was jubilant. Even more 
concerning, Nezavisna Hrvatska Država (The Independent State of Croatia), an organ of the 
fascist Domobran, had begun to be printed and distributed in Pittsburgh. It too rejoiced (for 
obvious reasons). But the most common reaction was indifference—few Croats mourned 
Alexander’s passing, the legation believed.772 Serbs, however, were another matter. The next 
month, the charge d’affaires enthused in a report to MIP minister Bogoljub Jeftić, “in all colonies 
where one can find our national churches and organizations, wherever Serbs live [emphasis 
mine], memorial services for our blessed King Alexander I were held.” The Slovenes also held 
services, although their participation was more muted, whereas American Croats, “poisoned by 
 
772 Report to the charge d’affaires of the Washington Embassy, October 24, 1934. Fond 371, fasc. 51, broj opis 66, 
Arhiv Jugoslavije. 




Catholic priests and foreign mercenaries,” manifested either indifference or defiant 
schadenfreude.773  
A less biased portrait of loyalty to the Yugoslav regime can be extracted from the list of 
roughly forty organizations in North America that sent their condolences to the Royal 
Chancellery in Belgrade, a list that contains only a few “Yugoslav” named organizations and not 
one Slovenian or Croatian organization!774  
But while Yugoslav diplomats may have thought about the diaspora as composed of loyal 
Serbs, slightly less loyal Slovenes, and traitorous Croats, this ethnic conception of loyalty would 
lead Yugoslav diplomats and their program of diaspora Yugoslavization down a dangerous road, 
a bias that would be reinforced by a personnel reshuffle in the Yugoslav diplomatic apparatus in 
the United States in 1934. Kolumbatović, the Chicago consul responsible for the anti-press 
campaign of the dictatorship period, was reassigned to the Chilean embassy, where he could do 
less damage.775 Since Kolumbatović had been the driving personality behind Yugoslav cultural 
diplomacy in the United States, the Yugoslav diplomatic service in the United States drifted 
along rudderless for most of 1934 and 1935.  
 In 1936, however, a new helmsman appeared:  Konstantin Fotić, who was appointed 
head of the Yugoslav Legation in Washington in 1936 by Milan Stojadinović.  Stojadinović’s 
controversial tenure as prime minister of Yugoslavia was characterized by the pursuit of closer 
relations with Nazi Germany and Italy, which he viewed as existential threats to Yugoslavia that 
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needed to be appeased. Fotić, the first Serb to head the Washington embassy,776 was part of that 
effort. Formerly the permanent Yugoslav representative to the League of Nations, Fotić was 
famously inscrutable, rarely articulating his personal views regarding Croats or fascism. 
Although the full extent of Fotić’s activities during World War II will be discussed in the next 
chapter, it will suffice to note that after 1941, when Germany invaded Yugoslavia and set up 
puppet governments in Serbia and Croatia, Fotić stoked ethnic tensions by supplying Serbian 
nationalist groups with information about Croatian atrocities.777 Additionally, Fotić was a blood 
relation of Nedić, the Nazi quisling in occupied Serbia, and Dmitri Ljotić, leader of a fringe 
Serbian fascist party in interwar Yugoslavia, whom Fotić in 1942 called “a good patriot.”778 As 
such, Fotić’s commitment to Yugoslavism was weak and his appointment as head of the 
Yugoslav diplomatic apparatus in the United States boded poorly for national unity.  
However, in 1936 few knew where Fotić stood politically, and his arrival was greeted 
with optimism by some, like John Palandech’s newspaper Yugoslavia, which expressed the hope 
that Fotić’s appointment heralded a “new era in the emigration—where the Yugoslav state would 
care for us emigrants.” After all, Yugoslavia had just recently paid for the funeral of Ante 
 
776 The first Yugoslav to head the legation, Ante Trešić-Pavičić, was a Croat. His successor, Leonid Pitamić, who took 
over in 1929, was a Slovene.  
777 Fotić initially believed he had official support for this course of action, and reported it to his superiors in MIP, 
who rebuked him and ordered him to halt newspaper polemics between Serbs and Croats in the US. Fotić 
subsequently denied responsibility for the offending article in Srbobran. See: Letter from Konstantin Fotić to MIP, 
November 12, 1941. Fond 371, fasc. 81, BO 104, AJ; Letter from Ninčić to Fotić,  November 20, 1941, Fond 371, 
fasc. 81, BO 104, AJ; Letter from Konstantin Fotić to MIP, November 21, 1941. Fond 371, fasc. 81, BO 104, AJ. 
Lastly, in 1945, Additionally, in 1945 the Yugoslav embassy in Washington, now under new leadership, collected 
depositions from several of Fotić’s subordinates, including Bogdan Radica, who worked for the Yugoslav 
pressbureau in New York, stating that Fotić had aligned himself with far-right Serb groups in the United States and 
had been supplying them with details about Croatian atrocities in Yugoslavia and opposed the recreation of 
Yugoslavia on the grounds of anti-Croat animus. See: “Proces Fotić ‘P.M’,” Report from the Washington Embassy to 
MIP, August 11, 1945. Fond 371, fasc. 81, BO 104, AJ.  
778 David Williamson,“Political Activities of Yugoslav Officials in the U.S.,” Office of Strategic Services Report, June 
29, 1942. National Archives Microfiche Collection, OSS Foreign Nationalities Branch Files,  INT-30-YU, Slide 149. 




Biankini, a Croat and Yugoslav activist.779 Moreover, speaking at the opening of a Yugoslav 
Pavilion at the Pacific Internation Exposition in San Diego, Fotić had promised the emigrants 
present that “your fatherland has not forgotten you.”780However, Yugoslavia’s first impression 
would prove misleading, as many émigré Yugoslav cultural initiatives over the next half-decade 
would suffer from financial neglect. 
Jurisdictional Disputes 
Language schools for second generation of American Yugoslavs were a case in point, and 
it is worth contrasting Yugoslav support for emigrant schools in the early and later half of the 
thirties. Parochial language schools had, of course, existed prior to 1934, being the dominant 
venue for language education among the second generation, particularly among Croats and 
Slovenes—the Catholic church had more financial resources to fund such schools than did the 
Serbian Orthodox Church. Even so, these parochial schools had their share of problems, 
including shortages of money and reading materials. They also met infrequently, typically once 
or twice a week. As a result, many children of emigrants were growing up ignorant not just of the 
sound of their parent’s language, but also of the culture and history of the old country.  Writing 
to the ministry of Social Policy and National Health, which oversaw the Emigration 
Commissariat (IK) in Zagreb, Adela Milčinović, the Yugoslav Emigrant Commissioner in New 
York, requested new textbooks, preferably with pictures, as her students’ grasp of Yugoslav 
culture was often weaker than their command of the language.781 The IK complied, sending 
textbooks to an unspecified number of schools in the United States.782  
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Fortunately, the IK did identify the title and publisher, making it possible to track down a 
copy. Produced by a Slovene press based in Ljubljana, these were high-quality textbooks whose 
content did not inordinately privilege Serb, Croat, and Slovene culture. Predominantly picture 
books, these textbooks contained several maps and hundreds of black-and-white photographs of 
Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes in folk costumes, archeological and geographical sites of interest 
from across Yugoslavia, as well as depictions of mines, factories, farms, and government 
buildings. Interestingly, the captions for many of these pictures are not in the local dialect—
locations in Serbia, Bosnia, and Croatia (but not Slovenia) are captioned in both Cyrillic and 
Latin script, with subcaptions in French, German, and English. The production quality was high, 
as well—although the pages have yellowed ninety years later, the binding remains intact, the 
typeface crisp and the pictures glossy.783 In short, the IK spared no expense to promote a 
synthetic Yugoslav patriotism among migrants, at least in North America. The IK also sent 
textbooks to South America, although there were very few schools there for them to support. In 
fact, in South America there was only one formal Yugoslav school, in Antofagasta, Chile,784 
although by 1939, that number had improved, such that there were now five in Argentina as 
well.785  
Over the second half of the 1930s, however, the IK’s outpost in New York suffered a 
series of setbacks that stemmed from a decade-old interbureaucratic rivalry. Established in 1923, 
the iseljenički izaslanstvo, or “emigrant deputation,” was a bureau in New York responsible for 
propaganda work among the diaspora and collecting demographic information  As a distant 
appendage of the Department of Social Policy and National Health, the Emigrant Deputation had 
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many of the same responsibilities as the Yugoslav Consulates, which were under the Department 
of Foreign Affairs.786 The stage was set for a jurisdictional dispute.  
The Yugoslav foreign service repeatedly petitioned their superiors to abolish the 
deputation, citing its redundancy and expense—once in 1923,787 again more forcibly in 1928,788 
again in 1930,789 and again in 1932.790 In 1931, the general consulate in New York also asked the 
Minister of Education to fire Adela Milčinović, a Croat, on the unsubstantiated contention that 
she “did not relate to the Yugoslav question as if she belonged to our people” and had 
consequently “done nothing to shield our children from denationalization.”791 In short, an anti-
Croat dogwhistle.  
Some time after, she was replaced as head of the Emigrant Deputation bureau by Slavoj 
Trost, a Slovene, who had an unstable and choleric temperament. Simultaneously, the budget of 
the Emigrant Deputation was slashed and many of its responsibilities were transferred over to the 
consulates. Finally, in 1935, Trost lost his temper and hit a consular employee in the nose during 
a heated argument.792 Trost was then transferred to a different posting.793 This incident probably 
did not enhance the prestige of the Yugoslav diplomatic service. Moreover, it seems to have 
coincided with a transfer of jurisdiction over migrant schools from the Emigration Deputation to 
the Yugoslav Legation. As we will see, they would not be as generous as the IK. 
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Yugoslav Language Schools 
This shift in jurisdiction coincided with a new emigrant drive for Yugoslav language 
schools that would be independent of the Church. The first organization of this type was the 
“Yugoslav School” in New York City. Founded in either 1934 or 1935, little record remains of 
its origins—it was not on the radar of the Yugoslav consulate. In a subsequent investigation from 
1936, New York Consul Radoje Janković discovered that shortly after its founding, the Serbian 
students split off from this group to found a Serbian school, which soon collapsed.794 We can 
presume the remaining students were primarily Croat and Slovene. In contrast to the Serbian 
school, this Yugoslav school prospered, at least for a short time.795 Although the reason for the 
Yugoslav school’s success was left unexplained, the Croat and the Slovene communities in the 
United States were more numerous, and thus better able to share the financial burdens of 
supporting a school. 
This drive to educate the second generation spread memetically, illustrating the degree to 
which the Serb, Croat, and Slovene communities already intermingled and worked together. In 
Cleveland, in 1936, thirty-five youths of Croatian, Slovene, and Serb ancestry, who belonged to 
an English-speaking lodge of the Croatian Fraternal Union in Cleveland, pooled their resources 
to hire someone to teach them Serbo-Croatian. Although their first choice, a Croatian professor 
at Cleveland College, demanded too high a price for his services, ($5 per evening) they 
eventually found a Serbian Orthodox priest who was willing to work pro-bono. Notwithstanding 
the Serbian instructor, the Croatian Fraternal Union contributed $25 to the running of the school, 
as did several unnamed local notables. The prospective students benefitted from the connections 
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of Michael Cerrezin, a Croatian-American working as vice-consul. It would be Cerrezin who 
helped the prospective students solicit donations from his contacts, and found them a classroom 
and an instructor.796 
Continuing the trend, in 1937, a national activist and teacher established in San Pedro the 
Yugoslav-American Educational Society, which set up biweekly afterschool programs in Serbo-
Croatian for both adults and children at the local high school, again the first of its kind. The 
Croatian community in San Pedro was large and affluent, and seemed willing to support not only 
this school, but also a new Yugoslav-oriented newspaper. The major bottleneck was an 
insufficient supply of language textbooks, a shortage that motivated this activist to write to 
Konstantin Fotić.797 Aside from timing, the thread running through these examples is how these 
schools emerged organically through the efforts of diaspora activists, and often enjoyed the 
support of local Croats, whom the diplomatic service tended to regard as disloyal.  
Community support for all three organizations dried up shortly after they sought the 
backing of the Yugoslav diplomatic service. The first to fail was the Yugoslav School in New 
York City. According to its president, Anka Sarapa, it could not raise enough money from the 
diaspora community to support its activities and was forced to request assistance from the 
Yugoslav Legation in Washington.798   
A similar pattern held for the Yugoslav School in Cleveland.  Cerrezin wrote to Fotić 
suggesting the the Yugoslav government contribute financially as well, asking for $150. But the 
wording of his proposal for doing so suggested the degree to which consular money had become 
tainted. He wrote, “in giving this donation, for perhaps political and other reasons, it may be best 
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not to mention the source from which this money is coming. If the matter is handled through me, 
I can very well say that some American friends contributed the money [emphasis mine].”799 As 
an well-to-do attorney in Cleveland who worked pro-bono as a vice-consul, Cerrezin was known 
for various acts of charity, although he did not advertise his sideline as a Yugoslav diplomat.800 
In other words, donations from the diplomatic service had to be laundered before they could be 
accepted! Cerrezin’s advice for discretion was ignored, and a smaller sum of $50 was 
ceremoniously presented to the class with Fotić named as a donor. The students were apparently 
surprised to learn the donation’s source,801 and no doubt confused as to why a ceremony was 
needed for such a small sum.  
Roughly a year later, vice-consul Cerrezin wrote his superior Fotić a three-page letter 
angrily complaining that Fotić had unfairly accused him (a Croat), of ulterior motives and 
disloyalty in his scheduling of the 1937 Yugoslav Day celebrations. Another anti-Croat slur, 
similar to the insults directed against Adela Milčinović—showing that the loyalty of Croats was 
suspect to the Yugoslav diplomatic service. Cerrezin presumably resigned shortly thereafter, 
stating: “I personally feel like I am not being treated fairly…Candidness compels me to inform 
your excellency that as long as I feel the way that I do, it would be most difficult for me 
to…carry on the program for Yugoslav Day or other things that had been planned.”802 As with 
Adela Milčinović, Croats in the diplomatic service were slowly being driven out. The subsequent 
fate of the school is unknown, but without Cerrezin to act as a go-between, it surely experienced 
difficulties.  
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Cerrezin’s comment about the need to conceal the source of governmental donations 
does, however, illuminate the cause of the failure of the Yugoslav-American educational society. 
At one school that they had set up to serve the large Yugoslav enclave in San Pedro, California, 
enrollment had collapsed from 175 to 38 students. Even worse, the Yugoslav club in San Pedro 
had cut the school’s monthly subsidy to $15, which could only cover rent. This was not for lack 
of resources—writing to Minister Fotić, the president of the Yugoslav-American educational 
society observed that “it is a regrettable fact that, in this large and rich colony of ours, it is not 
possible to get enough support from either individuals or organizations to achieve the cultural 
successes that the reputation of our nation demands. The reasons for this lie both in prewar 
ignorance and confusion and in the present-day influence of separatism and partisanship 
[emphasis mine].” In other words, political opposition to the Yugoslav state made it difficult for 
this group to solicit donations from the emigration, which had heretofore funded a full-time 
language school for second-generation Yugoslavs. These conditions forced the Yugoslav-
American educational society to seek assistance from the Yugoslav Legation.803  
But in typical fashion, Fotić’s help was a counterproductive half-measure. Instead of 
money, the Yugoslav Legation contributed seventy textbooks and ten readers. Not only was this 
donation smaller than had been sent in previous years, but half the textbooks and every reader 
were useless to an overwhelmingly Croatian group of students, having been printed in Cyrillic, 
which the Latin-alphabet-using Croats could not read!804 These presented a stark contrast to the 
textbooks sent by the IK, which were printed in both Latin and Cyrillic. 
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Yugoslav support for higher education was similarly deficient. Take, for instance, the 
case of Anthony Joseph Klančar, a second-generation Slovene and a graduate of the University 
of Illinois, where he worked to translate the Slovene nationalist literary canon into English. In 
1934, Klančar wrote to the Yugoslav legation asking for a graduate fellowship to study Slavic 
literature at the University of California. In his request, Klančar explained that “I have always 
felt that my mission in this country lay in showing our American friends what the Jugoslav 
stands for. I have, therefore, interested myself  profoundly in Jugoslavia [and]…hope one day to 
become an expert on Jugoslavia.”805 Here was someone who, like Adamic, demonstrated that 
acculturation was not incompatible with Yugoslavism, and, moreover, appeared poised to 
become a spokesperson with the Yugoslav idea. Nor did the similarities with Adamic end there. 
After the Yugoslav legation rejected his request (with no explanation), Klančar wrote back: 
Before I received your letter of June 25th, 1934, I was in the hope of having a life-
long ambition realized. Frankly, I must say that I am deeply disappointed. I wrote 
out of a naïve hope that His Excellency or you, Mr. Stoianovich (the charge 
d’affairs) would recognize the value of my work and deal with it accordingly. It 
seems my fate will be such as Louis Adamic’s…[emphasis mine]806 
 
Clearly new to graduate student life, Klančar had not yet become inured to rejection letters. 
Despite his prediction, Klančar never quite became another Louis Adamic, although in 1939 he 
did translate into English Dragotin Lončar’s The Slovenes: A Social History, which interpreted 
Slovene history through a populist lens.807 Nonetheless, Klančar's irate response illustrated how 
Adamic had already become a symbol of emigrant discontent with Yugoslav’s neglect toward its 
overseas population, as well as its expression in a critique of Yugoslavia’s government. 
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Shaken by Adamic’s example, Yugoslav officials were also wary of supporting any 
emigrant group that was critical of the royalist government. We see this, for instance, in the 
emergence of exchange programs for Yugoslav-American students. In 1934, the Serbian 
National Union founded a scholarship fund that sent twelve students of Serbian heritage to study 
at Belgrade University for four years. The Ministry of Social Politics and National Health in 
Belgrade got wind of this initiative the following year, arguing that it could be a bulwark against 
the “danger of assimilation.” The ministry then contacted the emigrant deputation in America, 
asking them to persuade Croatian and Slovenian fraternal organizations in the United States 
should follow suit.808 A spokesperson for one of the Slovene colleges proposed for the exchange 
program was skeptical, however. The members of the SNPJ, the Slovene Mutual Benefit Society, 
they argued, “were all extreme socialists, practically communists,” and their newspaper presses 
had “reprinted Adamic’s infamous book.” Even if they were to agree to set up a study abroad 
program, the emigrational deputation argued, exchange students would need to be politically 
vetted to ensure they were not communists.809  
Croatian and Slovene fraternal organizations in the United States were also reluctant to 
cooperate. Ivan Butković, president of the Croatian Fraternal Union, expressed his wish that 
students be sent only to Croatian territories where they would study Croatian history and 
customs.810 The KSKJ, a conservative Slovene organization, was likewise non-committal, only 
promising to raise the issue with the central committee.811 And the SNPJ never replied at all. The 
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Yugoslav consul in Chicago relayed the reasons for their reluctance. The main problem, he 
argued, was that “there has not been sufficient support on our part for this sort of action.” After 
all, Yugoslav authorities had made no offer to subsidize these programs, hoping emigrant 
associations would do it themselves. Moreover, the parents of prospective students were 
concerned that their children would be drafted into the Yugoslav army—it should be recalled that 
Yugoslavia had extended citizenship to emigrants and their children in 1928, making young men 
draftable if they entered Yugoslavia.812 In other words, Yugoslavia’s legal attempts to claim its 
immigrants were only driving them away. Moreover, their reluctance to spend money on 
immigrant outreach, combined with their fear of criticism, made it difficult for them to win back 
alienated emigrants.  
The Maksimović Brothers Go to Hollywood 
Yugoslav diplomats also failed to adequately support cultural missionaries from 
Yugoslavia. In 1936, the Maksimović Brothers, a quartet of music students from Belgrade, 
traveled to the Midwest to perform Serbian folk music for emigrant communities. They were 
quite popular, according to contemporary accounts.813 A year later, however, the Yugoslav 
legation received a letter from a woman working in the motion picture industry. As it turned out, 
the Maksimović brothers, following their successes in the Midwest, had traveled to Los Angeles 
and auditioned with several Hollywood studios. Although they had been rejected everywhere, 
they could not, the letter writer averred, “be made to realize that they aren’t to have a ‘break in 
pictures.’” Broke, visibly undernourished, and wearing threadbare clothes, they had worn out 
their welcome in Hollywood.814 The quartet also wrote to Fotić directly to ask for money—
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apparently they had been living entirely off ticket sales from concerts.815 In his reply, Fotić 
thanked them for their efforts, informed them that he could not extend them credit, and assured 
them that they “will find some sort of work in the United States and the financial means to return 
to the Fatherland.”816 In other words, “get a real job, musician!” The Maksimović brothers would 
have the last laugh, however. After having their request rejected by the legation, the Maksimović 
Brothers nonetheless promised their landlady that they were “wards of the Jugoslavian 
government” and were certainly going to pay the two-months back rent they owed. They then 
skipped town, leaving Fotić a tremendous mess to clean up when their landlady, along with the 
other people they borrowed from, came to the Yugoslav legation to collect.817 The brothers, on 
the other hand, had a “Hollywood ending,“ enrolling later that year at Temple University in 
Philadelphia, where they exchanged their musical services for reduced tuition.818 At the end of 
this amusing saga, the penuriousness of Yugoslav diplomats had cost them four talented national 
activists who could have worked to promote national consciousness among emigrants.   
The Reverse Midas Touch: the Case of the Zora Singing Society  
 Even when it was not inadequate, any support that the Yugoslav diplomatic service gave 
to emigrant cultural projects tended to discredit and destabilize those same projects, due to the 
widespread antipathy toward Yugoslav diplomats. Take, for instance, the case of the Croatian 
singing society “Zora,” which, in 1937, petitioned the Chicago general consulate for help paying 
their travel expenses for a singing tour of Yugoslavia. Although “Zora,” one of the most 
venerable singing societies in the United States, preferred Croatian songs, its members supported 
Yugoslavia’s continued existence, according to the consulate, and, moreover, their proposed tour 
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could be held up as proof of the “tenth banovina’s” patriotism. Moreover, upon return, they 
could tell emigrants in the United States of their warm reception in Yugoslavia. They were also, 
in the assessment of Fotić, quite talented.819  A “Zora Tour” had propaganda potential, 
particularly since they intended to visit every major city in Yugoslavia, from Maribor in Slovenia 
to Skoplje in Macedonia. Consequently, “Zora” received very generous subsidies: in addition to 
paying the fare for the transatlantic passage and giving them free tickets for Yugoslavia’s trains, 
Yugoslavia contributed over six-thousand dollars to their travel fund (!).820  
Some within “Zora,” however, saw this as a Faustian bargain, prompting a fierce internal 
debate. The members first passed a resolution against the leadership, accusing them of 
highhandedness and negligence in their handing of the society treasury and of having ignored the 
wishes of their membership to visit all parts of Yugoslavia. The issue for these revolting 
members, then, was not so much a lack of support for Yugoslavia, but rather the way this trip 
was paid for and arranged. 821  
As a result, “Zora”’s old leadership was deposed and were the target of a criticial 
resolution that was published in the newspapers. Although the new leadership was reportedly 
Yugoslav-oriented, they were wary of appearing to be too closely tied to the Yugoslav state, an 
association that had badly damaged the prestige and social standing of “Zora” among their fellow 
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migrants.822 In short, Yugoslav diplomats had a reverse Midas touch—even when they meant 
well, their subsidies damaged the reputations of their recipients. 
The “Emigration Question” Evolves 
Although Yugoslav diplomats could not openly subsidize emigrant projects without 
undermining them, their lack of financial support nonetheless generated ill will toward a country 
that seemed only to take, never to give. In this discussion, we see the echo of the Emigration 
Question, the debate in the 1920s about how the resources of the diaspora could be tapped to 
benefit Yugoslavia, ideally through repatriation or financial or intellectual remittances. This 
time, migrants were challenging the extractive logic of Yugoslav emigrant outreach. Instead of 
giving more to the fatherland than they received in return, these editorial writers argued that the 
relationship between ‘tenth banovina’ and Yugoslavia should be more reciprocal. 
From 1934 onward, complaints about official tight-fistedness began appearing in a 
variety of émigré newspapers, many otherwise pro-Yugoslav in character. The first such 
complaint appeared in 1934 in Yugoslavia, a newspaper edited by John Palandech, a pro-
Yugoslav Montenegrin, criticizing the efforts of national missionaries from Yugoslavia to teach 
the diaspora patriotism when, in fact, “the three branches of our people have created much with 
our own efforts. We have built national institutions that could not have existed in Yugoslavia 
without state support. In our colonies we have erected churches, schools, cultural centers, and 
reading rooms…all this without the help of the Yugoslav state…Now, let those lords…who send 
us missionaries to teach us ‘patriotism’ open their eyes and see the people who now suffer 
because of their negligence.”823  
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A former member of a Yugoslav sokol, writing in Jugoslavenski Glasnik (The Yugoslav 
Herald) several months later, directed his ire toward the phrase “Tenth banovina,” noting that 
“anyone who follows news from the homeland can always find nice words and phrases about us 
emigrants, calling us the ‘tenth banovina.’” Nonetheless, in practice, “we Yugoslav emigrants 
are, in short, a milking cow (krava muzara) for the homeland,” a phrase with harshly negative 
connotations in Serbo-Croatian—cows are known for docility, not intelligence.  Yugoslavs 
abroad, the author argued, have repeatedly shed blood and donated money to the homeland, 
which had done little in return. From the efforts of the emigration during World War I, to 
postwar relief, the efforts of emigrants on behalf of the old country had only resulted in the 
elevation of a pro-German political elite, who “don’t look at us, but at our dollars.” Nonetheless, 
the author did not abandon his belief in the Yugoslav idea, believing, perhaps naively, that by 
articulating these sentiments he could reach and persuade “the Yugoslav people in our homeland 
Yugoslavia.”824  
 This idea would be developed further by the veteran Yugoslav activist Niko Gršković (a 
Croat) in a series of editorials, titled “Domovina i iseljeništvo,” or “the Homeland and the 
Diaspora,” published in his newspaper Svijet (The World) in 1938. In the first, Gršković argues 
that emigrant cultural life, especially newspapers, is oriented around a sense of nostalgia for and 
interest in events in the homeland, a sentiment that is not reciprocated by the intelligentsia and 
political elite of the homeland. As evidence, he cites the different reactions to two floods, one in 
the Yugoslavia in 1926 and another which had happened in Pittsburgh in 1936, a major 
population center of American Croats. After the first flood, practically every emigrant newspaper 
took up the call for donations to mitigate the suffering of “the old country.” Whereas the old 
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country newspapers, in 1936, raised “not one Dinar” for flood relief in the United States. More 
broadly, emigrant donations to the homeland had been enormous, Gršković argued, numbering in 
the millions of dollars during and after World War I. One could also add investments of wealthy 
emigrants in Yugoslavia, like Paško Baburica, who built a church tower in Dubrovnik, or 
Mihajlo Pupin, who had given vast sums to Yugoslav charities.825 Yugoslavia, Gršković implied, 
needed to make similar investments in poor emigrants.  
In his second article, Gršković argues that further proof of the old country’s 
“indifference” and “selfishness” can be found in its school textbooks, which barely mention the 
tenth of Yugoslavia’s population living overseas, and in the disinterest of its elite in emigrant life 
apart from parades, banquets, and public celebrations, which are only used for propaganda in the 
old country.826  
And in the third editorial, Gršković turned his ire on Yugoslav citizenship laws, noting 
that even though, according to the law, emigrants and their children are Yugoslav citizens, this 
citizenship gives them no rights, only obligations, up to and including conscription should they 
visit Yugoslavia before they turn thirty. Moreover, Gršković argues, this measure makes it more 
difficult for emigrants to obtain citizenship in the US, which does not allow dual citizenship.827  
In these editorials, we see, in compact form, how almost every ordinance introduced over 
the last fifteen years to promote emigrant loyalty, from the Law on Holidays to the Law on 
Citizenship, has backfired, uniting overseas Yugoslavs in their sense of grievance to an old 
country that sees its “tenth province” as a resource to be mined rather than an investment to be 
cultivated.  
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The Emigration Museum 
 Gršković’s complaint that Yugoslavia was interested in emigrant life only to the extent 
that it made for appealing photographs in old-country newspapers was particularly insightful—
nowhere do we see this tendency exemplified more than in the opening in 1934 of a museum in 
Zagreb that milked the “Yugoslav Diaspora” for propaganda. As Benedict Anderson has 
observed, “museums, and the museumizing imagination, are both profoundly political.”828 The 
museum, along with censuses and maps, are ways in which the nationalizing state thinks about 
its domain, claims its past, its people, and its territory, and uses all three, through a process 
Anderson dubs “logoization,” to produce and disseminate the national idea. Artifacts are turned 
into easily recognized symbols of the nation.829  
Although the Emigration Museum opened in 1934, preparations for the museum’s 
opening had been going on for several years, having been initiated by the Emigration 
Commissariat in Zagreb, which, on October 31, 1930, ordered all Yugoslav consulates situated 
near emigrant colonies to begin collecting material for a museum. The consulates, in turn, 
solicited the help of the major emigrant self-help societies: the Yugoslav Catholic Union, the 
Carniolan Slovene Catholic Union, the Holy Name Society,  the Slovene Freethinkers Support 
Society, the Slovene-Croat Union, the Croatian Union of the Pacific, the Serbian Support Society 
“Unity,” the Croatian Brotherhood of North America, the Yugoslav Support Society “Harmony,” 
the Slovene Women’s Union, the Serbian National Union, the Slovene National Support Union, 
and of course, the Croatian Fraternal Union.830   
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 Concretely, the consulates were supposed to obtain copies of emigrant newspapers, 
books, leaflets, prayer books, and song books, as well as rulebooks for the major emigrant self-
help groups and cultural associations. Additionally, the Emigration Museum needed pictures of 
emigrant notables, of emigrant clubs, banks, orphanages, churches, newspaper offices, and  
neighborhoods, and of emigrant national manifestations like parades, dances in folk costume, or 
church services.831 Based on the type of artifacts requested, the museum’s narrative was obvious: 
that emigrants were preserving and reproducing Yugoslav culture overseas—and that the 
audience, the “Yugoslav people,” should be proud. The founders of the museum admitted as 
much in 1934, stating that the “museum would be a mirror of our national organization, 
unification [between Serb, Croat, and Slovene], and our effective work in the hard fight for 
survival in alien lands, just as it would be enduring proof of…the development of Yugoslav 
settlements in a national, political, cultural, and economic respect.”832 In another flyer, the 
organizers wrote that mission of the Emigration Museum was “to interpret to our people 
(Yugoslav citizens) what the Yugoslav emigration is.”833 Answering their own question, the 
Emigration Commissariat continued:  “Emigrants are…the strongest fortress for the present and 
future…[and are] a foundation from which we can live as a Nation around the world…In this 
repository of valuables, the Museum will describe and delineate the importance of the emigration 
as an organic part of our general life.”834   
 
sent between April 5th and March 16th, 1938. Fond 1619, k. 1, HDA; “Darovi za Iseljenički Muzej,” Novi Iseljenik, 
May 1st, 1936. Fond 1619, k. 1, HDA.  
831 “’Iseljenički Muzej’-Osnivanje.” Directive addressed to all consulates in the lands of emigration from the 
Emigration Commissariat. October 31st, 1930. Fond 1619, k.1, HDA.  
832 Obavijest o Organizovanju Muzeja,” October 30th, 1933. Fond 1619, k. 1, HDA. 
833 “Iseljenički Muzej,” supplement to Novi Iseljenik, March 3rd, 1935. Fond 1619, k. 1, HDA. 
834 Ibid.  




Just as Anderson predicted, this museum was about claiming emigrants as part of the 
national body, as well as about creating an impression that South Slavs overseas functioned as a 
cohesive community, a “tenth banovina” of Yugoslavia.835  But how was that message 
conveyed? What artifacts of emigrant life did visitors see, and how were they presented?  
The most prominent exhibits of the Emigration Museum were the maps, which visualized 
the “tenth province” as Yugoslav territory. This is most explicit in the map titled Naša Deseta 
Banovina (our tenth province).836 With the tagline of “1,000,000 Yugoslavs around the world,” 
this map extended Yugoslav borders far beyond the Western Balkans, depicting a global network 
of Yugoslav settlements, asserting possession over them, and making a statement about emigrant 
national identity (see Figure 3). It was a propaganda masterstroke. Reinforcing this message, the 
emigration museum also produced other maps tracking various bellwethers of diaspora 
nationalism. There was a map depicting overseas Serb, Croat, and Slovene churches and 
parochial schools, which, the map declared “are the greatest contributors to the preservation of 
national consciousness among emigrants” (see Figure 4).837 Another map showed the 
geographical distribution of “Yugoslav” newspapers around the world, which, as an ethnic press, 
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implicitly reflected emigrant national identity (See Figure 5).838 A fourth map tracked secular 
emigrant schools, another bulwark against assimilation (See Figure 6).839  
Aside from these, there were a number of smaller maps depicting the overseas settlement 
of “Yugoslav” emigrants for separate regions like the United States, Canada, Central and South 
America, or Australia, allowing visitors to learn, for instance, that “Yugoslavs” in the United 
States favored the Midwest or that ‘Yugoslavs’ in South America tended to live in Argentina.840 
Again, this conforms entirely with Anderson’s thesis about maps, which reify and logoize 
national territory, just as a museum does with a national past.  
 
838 The Emigrant Press of Yugoslavs (Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes) around the world [map], Scale not given, Zagreb, 
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Fig. 6, “Our Tenth Province,” Fond. 1619, Kut. 3, HDA.  





Fig. 7: “Emigrant Churches,” Fond 1619, kut. 1, HDA. “Our emigrant churchs are the greatest 
preservers of national consciousness among the emigration.” 





Fig. 8 The Emigrant Press of Yugoslavs (Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes) around the world [map], 
Scale not given, Zagreb, Yugoslavia, Emigration Museum, no year given, Fond 1619, kut. 1, 
HDA. 





Fig. 9 Emigrant Schools, [map], Scale not given, Zagreb, Yugoslavia, Emigration Museum, no 
year given, Fond 1619, kut. 1, HDA. 





Fig. 10 Đurđa Juršić, “Visit to the Emigration Museum,” November 5th, 1940. Fond 
1619, kut. 2, HDA.  
 
The museum was not always on message, however, as not all maps dealt with 
“Yugoslavs.” Several maps were devoted to Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes individually, muddling 
the museum’s message of Yugoslav overseas unity. There is, for instance, one map tracking the 
Serbian Fraternal Societies in the United States and Canada841 and another doing the same for the 
Croats.842 One map even  asserted that there are 1.2 million “Croats” around the world, which, 
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coincidently, was the number of “Yugoslavs” or “Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes’ in other maps.843 
Clearly, there was a slippage of meaning.  
Whatever it was, the political message of these maps was not lost on visitors. One of the 
most valuable (and charming) sources about the Emigration Museum is a collection of essays 
written by schoolchildren who had visited the museum on a field trip in 1940, allowing us to see 
the museum through the eyes of nationally-suggestible children. The maps made a strong 
impression, as several of the schoolchildren recreated them as colored-pencil sketches in their 
essay headers, albeit with some geographical distortions (See Figure 5).844 But the key element, 
the visualization of Yugoslav territory as a constellation of emigrant enclaves spread across 
North and South America, was retained with remarkable fidelity. 
 But was it the right impression? Young Đurđa’s essay, whose header is depicted above, 
fixated on statistics but repeatedly conflated “Croat” with “Yugoslav.” One example: “Today in 
America there are around 800,000 emigrant Croats,” a number that he could have reached only 
by counting Serbs and Slovenes as Croats as well.845 Students Ružica Koprivnjak, Zlata Bouška, 
Marica Ključarić, Marija Kocijančić, Elza Toplek, Zolenka Mesarić, Štefanija Glad, Marica 
Embreuš, and Ivka Gustec all made the same conflation and several repeat that same figure of 
800,000 “Croats” in the United States. They were probably parroting their schoolteacher or 
museum guide.846  
 
843 Emigration of Croats around the World Canada [map], Scale not given, Zagreb, Yugoslavia, Emigration Museum, 
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Others such as Nada Novačić, Kota Kovač, Boža Zorbas, Đurđica Drevenšek, Ivanka 
Čerovšek, or Mira Ilić, refer to “our emigrants” or “our people” but do not say whether they were 
Croats or Yugoslavs. But not one of the essays referred to emigrants as Yugoslavs—despite the 
titles of the maps. Put in context, that is not surprising—Croatian identity had been officially 
recognized in the Cvetković-Maček Sporazum of 1939, which reestablished Croatia as a 
province within Yugoslavia and gave it substantial political and cultural autonomy. This broader 
environment of Croatian assertiveness might have inflected the museum’s presentation. Still, it 
was better for Yugoslav unity for the children to call Serbs and Slovenes “Croats” and “our 
people” than to exclude them entirely from their imagined community. And in that regard, the 
maps functioned as intended.  
The Emigration Museum did not merely cite statistics, but also individuals in its 
argument that the “tenth banovina” were good Yugoslavs. To that end, the Emigration Museum 
prominently featured figures involved with the Yugoslav Committee, a WWI-era group of 
émigré politicians and intellectuals that lobbied for the creation of a federal Yugoslav state. The 
Yugoslav Committee’s agreement of the Corfu declaration, the Serbian government’s proposal 
for a Yugoslav state, in 1917 laid the foundation for the creation of Yugoslavia. Consequently, 
several émigré intellectuals in the United States and South America who supported or 
participated in the committee were represented in at least two exhibits, one of which is pictured 
below. (see figure 6). 





Fig. 11 “Champions and Leaders of the Yugoslav Liberation Movement in South and 
North America, 1914-1919” Fond 1619, Kut.1, HDA. 
 
In captions the museum explained each activist’s role in the Yugoslav liberation 
movement, as well as their geographic location, thereby creating the impression of a network of 
overseas Yugoslavists.847 The second exhibit, not pictured due to its poor condition, likewise 
aggregated North and South American efforts on behalf of the Yugoslav Committee into an 
“Emigrant Patriot” collage featuring group portraits of Yugoslav Committee affiliates in North 
and South America, alongside figures detailing how much North and South American donated 
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for a “Free and United Yugoslavia.”848 In both exhibits Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes were given 
equal representation.  
The other pillar of the Emigrant Museum’s narrative was the “emigrant success story,” 
which the museum cleverly linked to support for Yugoslavia. This comes out clearly in the field 
trip reports. Ružica Koprivnjak, for instance, retelling the museum’s version of the history of the 
“Yugoslav emigration,” recounted how “more and more people went [overseas], and many 
became millionaires, like our scientist Tesla, who now lives in New York, Baburica (Baburizza) 
from Dubrovnik, Pupin, Gršković, Mihanović, and many others.”849 Several of the other essays 
likewise mention Tesla, often in the same breath with Paško Baburica, a Croatian business 
magnate in Chile. The implication was that Tesla was also successful. He was not. Tesla was 
never good with money and was, by 1940, a pauper. The Yugoslav government knew this—they 
were paying him a monthly stipend of six-hundred dollars.850 The children were not told this. 
After all, admitting that Tesla was a pauper would have interfered with the museum’s attempt to 
mythologize “Yugoslav emigrants.”  
Other reports, like that of Marica Ključarić, likewise focused on the emigrant success 
story.  In her words: “Our Croats went to foreign lands impoverished, but became rich over 
there, and some even became millionaires. They founded schools and churches…The first 
emigrant newspapers [sic] were founded by Dalmatians…many Croats became rich over there 
and returned to their fatherland and erected beautiful houses and palaces.”851 Although outwardly 
dazzled by the emigrant success story, Marica repeatedly linked emigrant success with support of 
cultural institutions overseas, such as newspapers, and with returning to Yugoslavia to spend 
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their earnings.  Emigrant success and national awakening were intertwined. Thus, impoverished 
Tesla had to be transformed into a milijoner (millionaire).  
Overall, the purpose of the Emigration Museum was propagandistic. In creating a 
narrative about a “Yugoslav diaspora” that was loyal to the monarchy, the museum’s creators 
hoped to show that the divisions between Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes could be overcome and 
that this diaspora supported the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. In tying narratives about economic 
success and technological innovation with emigrant displays of Yugoslav loyalty, the Emigration 
Museum tapped the discourse of the Emigration Question, positioning of the “loyal Yugoslav 
emigrant” as a source of national renewal. The migrant was made into a metaphorical subject of 
Yugoslavia whose economic success and patriotic loyalty could serve as a model for 
Yugoslavia’s de jure citizens. 
Yugoslav Pavilions  
 Ironically, while the Emigration Commission was using emigrant displays of loyalty to 
promote Yugoslav consciousness in Yugoslavia, several of those displays were actually staged 
by the Yugoslav foreign service to promote Yugoslav consciousness among emigrants. The 
Emigrant Museum in Zagreb can be productively compared to the Yugoslav Pavilion at the 
World Fair in New York in 1939. Although, as Chapter Three shows, the pavilion for the 
Chicago World Fair in Chicago in 1934 was largely an emigrant effort spearheaded by John 
Palandech, Yugoslav diplomats insinuated themselves into the planning process for future 
pavilions.  
For the California Pacific International Exposition, held in San Diego in 1936, the New 
York and Chicago General Consuls, the head of the Washington legation, and the charge 




d’affaires were present on the planning committee as honorary members.852 This was probably in 
return for their financial contribution—the planning committee, composed of naturalized 
emigrants, had called the response to their original call for donations “very weak,” writing to the 
General Consul of Chicago for additional support.853 Apparently, Yugoslavia’s original donation 
of $1,200 had not been enough.854  
By 1939, however, Yugoslav diplomats had successfully risen from honorary to full 
members of the planning committee, which was headed by Konstantin Fotić.855 Additionally, 
material for the exhibition itself was collected not by emigrants, but by the Yugoslav Emigration 
Service of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia and its subsidiary, the Emigration Museum in Zagreb.856 
In large part, the reason was fiscal—this fair was very expensive. Each participating nation, 
Yugoslavia included, contributed millions of dollars to the fair.857 This time, the cost could not 
be offloaded onto Yugoslavia’s emigrants.  
According to Ambassador Fotić, the intent of the Yugoslav pavilion was to show 
Americans  
not only the beauty and natural resources of this country [Yugoslavia] but also the 
efforts of the people of Jugoslavia under the leadership of Prince Regent Paul to 
contribute their part towards peace and progress…The exhibit will present a 
general view of the social and economic institutions of Jugoslavia, beginning with 
the historical organization of the peasants and ending with the most modern 
exhibits in the fields of social welfare, public health, sports, and public 
education.858  
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In other words, the exhibit would focus on the technological and economic achievements of the 
“Yugoslav people”—mainly to impress Americans.  
But Yugoslav emigrants were also a target audience. To attract them, a special section 
would be devoted to the achievements of “people of Jugoslav origin living in the United States.” 
The content was very similar to the Emigrant Museum, with portraits of Nikola Tesla, Mihailo 
Pupin, Henry Suzzalo, and Bishop Baraga.859 Another graphic listed the number of “Yugoslav 
settlements” around the globe.860 Lastly, maps showing the relative concentrations of 
‘Yugoslavs’ in each American state were donated by the Emigration Museum.861 Also just like 
the Emigration Museum, the “emigrant success story” was coupled with devotion to the 
Karadjordjević monarchy and a territorial conception of Yugoslavia. A bust of King Peter the 
Second occupied a central position, as did an enormous map of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia and 
the National Crest862 —reminding emigrants of “their” King and “their” old country. 
Yugoslavism in the United States: Rooms and Gardens 
 The Yugoslav government, however, was not the only curator of the public image of 
emigrants from Yugoslavia. During the 1930s, American Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes erected 
several monuments during the same period, creating a narrative about themselves that differed 
markedly from Yugoslavia’s monarchist mythmaking.  
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In Pittsburgh, for instance, American Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes collaborated to design 
and construct a Yugoslav nationality room in Pittsburgh’s Cathedral of Learning. A classroom 
with themed décor, the nationality rooms in the Cathedral of Learning function as a space for 
immigrant groups in Pittsburgh to memorialize their ethnic heritage—in 2018, there were thirty, 
and rooms are still being added.  
The campaign to build a Yugoslav room was initiated in 1926 by the then-president of 
the Croatian Fraternal Union, Anton Gazdić. 863 American Serbs took note—one article in 
Srbobran, the main Serbian newspaper, asked whether “we will be adequately represented in [the 
proposed room],” claiming that “our brother Croats…do not intend [to make] this section [of the 
Cathedral of Learning] to be exclusively Croatian, but rather Yugoslav, thereby opening the door 
of cooperation to their brother Serbs and Slovenes.” The solution, they argued, would be to 
match the fundraising efforts of “our brother Croats and Slovenes.”864 It would be hard to find a 
more clear-cut example of how the Serb, Croat, and Slovene communities thought and acted as 
part of a broader Yugoslav community while still maintaining their national distinctiveness.  
Although largely funded by immigrants, the Kingdom of Yugoslavia did contribute. Not 
the Foreign Ministry, however. Instead, the Yugoslav Ministry of Education donated 
approximately $5,000 dollars to support the room’s construction, funds which were 
supplemented by the efforts of immigrants like Zlatko Baloković, a Croatian-American violinist, 
who raised money by giving concerts.  
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The architect Vojta Braniš, who was director of the Industrial Art School in Zagreb, 
based his design on motifs that he had observed in peasant villages across Yugoslavia. Hand-
carved Slavonian oak featured prominently, as did portraits of various Yugoslav figures:  Vuk 
Karadjić (a Serb), Josip Strossmayer (a Croat), Jurij Vega (a Slovene), Petar Njegoš (a 
Montenegrin), Rugjer Bošković (a Dalmatian Croat), and France Prešeren (a Slovene). The two 
Slovene portraits were provided by a committee in Ljubljana, the two Croatian portraits by Ivan 
Meštrović, and the Serb and the Montenegrin portraits by Mihajlo Pupin. Despite their ethnic 
diversity, every person depicted in portrait was an intellectual of some sort—linguist, 
mathematician, poet, or astronomer. In contrast, several portraits are conspicuously absent—
Karadjordje is missing, as are his descendants, the Kings of Yugoslavia, which suggests an 
attempt to divest Yugoslavism as an intellectual project from its (unsatisfactory) political 
manifestation. Moreover, the Yugoslav room quietly resists a Serb-dominated vision of 
Yugoslavia:  besides in the portraiture, Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes were deliberately represented 
equally in the display of the national crests and in the book cabinet, which contained books 
written in both the Latin and Cyrillic alphabets.865  The room opened in 1939 and remains open 
to this day under its original name—a lonely remnant of a forgotten Yugoslav moment in the 
United States. 
 The same cannot be said for the Yugoslav Garden in Cleveland, which became the 
Slovene Garden in 1991. The Yugoslav Garden opened in 1935, although new statues would be 
continuously added to it over the next few years. Like the Yugoslav room in Pittsburgh, the 
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Yugoslav Garden in Cleveland allotted equal representation for Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes in 
the statuary, which featured statues of various Yugoslav figures: Njegoš, Strossmayer, Simon 
Gregorčič, (a Slovene poet) Ivan Cankar (a Slovene writer), and Bishop Baraga, whose inclusion 
attests to differences between diaspora and homeland nationalism. 866 Again, intellectuals, not 
Karadjordje and his royal descendants. The inclusion of Baraga is particularly telling. Baraga, a 
Catholic priest of Slovenian origin, was sent as a missionary to North America in the nineteenth 
century, where he ministered to the Ottawa and Ojibwe people in upper Michigan.867 In effect, 
Baraga helps to situate Slovenia within the history of the United States, just as his bust in the 
Yugoslav Garden signified that Slovenians were part of the Yugoslav people.  
Although its message was simple, the Yugoslav Garden is significant because its 
creation, like the establishment of the Yugoslav Room, demonstrates how the Serb, Croatian, and 
Slovene communities in Cleveland maintained a fraternal rivalry, effectively functioning as an 
interconnected community split into three sections. Planning for the Yugoslav Garden in 
Cleveland was initiated by the Slovene community, who then invited the Serbian and Croatians 
of Cleveland to cooperate. Each group would fundraise for their own statues separately, although 
costs for the trees (linden, of course), grass, and flowers were shared. This equal division of 
responsibility caused some difficulty for the Serbs, as there were around forty-thousand Slovenes 
living in Cleveland, but only thirteen-hundred Serbs, and thus fewer donations. The Serbs, 
worried that they would be outdone by the Slovenes, eventually wrote to the Yugoslav Legation 
for financial assistance.868   
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Yugoslav “colonies” in different cities were also, it seems, aware of one another—the 
head of the Slovene part of the planning committee, Jože Grdina, also wrote to the General 
Consulate in Chicago, pointedly noting that the Yugoslav Room in the Pittsburgh Cathedral of 
learning had received financial support from the Yugoslav government, whereas the Yugoslav 
Garden, so far, had not.869 It is unclear whether the Yugoslav Garden subsequently received 
support. Likewise, Srbobran, which was published in Pittsburgh, ran an article about the 
Yugoslav cultural garden in Cleveland, noting what the Croats and Slovenes had already 
accomplished and calling on Serbs to do their part to support the garden.870 While not as rigorous 
as a survey of public opinion, the case of these monuments does suggest that politically-engaged 
American Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes saw themselves as part of a larger diasporic community.   
Building a Yugoslav Address Book 
 The increasingly interconnected nature of Serb, Croat, and Slovene groups also 
manifested in a book: Ivan Mladineo’s Narodni Adresar (National Directory), published in 1937. 
A directory of Serb, Croat, and Slovene organizations, institutions, businesses, and prominent 
figures in North America, the Narodni Adresar marked the conclusion of Ivan Mladineo’s 
attempts to conduct a pseudo-census during the 1920s of the North American Serbs, Croats, and 
Slovenes. An owner of the Narodni Adresar could (if they lived in the 1930s) move to any city 
in the United States and Canada and immediately know which local restaurants, grocery stores, 
florists, dancing halls, churches, legal offices, barbershops, funeral parlors, and churches were 
operated by “Yugoslavs” (the book does not distinguish between Serbian, Croatian, and Slovene 
establishments). Although this should be no surprise by now, Mladineo’s Narodni Adresar 
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received little support from the Yugoslav government. By his own account and that of the 
Yugoslav government, Mladineo compiled all this information himself, with no outside 
assistance,871  and died soon after the publication, apparently with an outstanding debt to the 
printing house,872 having drained his bank account and exhausted himself in the process of 
creating a twelve-hundred-page tome. Belatedly recognizing the value of such a book for their 
work, the Yugoslav foreign ministry in Belgrade bought up most of the copies. As a strange but 
probably meaningless coincidence, the purchase was orchestrated by Ivo Andrić, a Bosnian 
writer who would become famous after World War II for The Bridge on the Drina, a pro-
Yugoslav historical novel.873 Regardless, Mladineo’s death provides was a particularly 
expressive of Yugoslavia’s stingy approach to diaspora relations. 
 The extent to which this directory influenced people to think of themselves as part of a 
“Yugoslav diaspora” cannot be determined. Nonetheless, its introduction, a history of the 
Yugoslav diaspora in the United States, reveals that the Narodni Adresar was also a political 
statement about what it meant to be a Yugoslav in the United States, a narrative in which many 
of the figures and themes from the Yugoslav Room and Garden are reprised and expanded. 
Mladineo’s narrative begins by debunking the notion that Yugoslavs were newcomers to 
the United States, asserting that several sailors on Columbus’s ship were Dalmatians, and that a 
wrecked Croatian ship, whose survivors may have been assimilated to the local Native-American 
population, gave its name to Croatan County in North Carolina in the 16th century and to the 
cryptic “CROATAN” inscription found on a tree in the remains of the Roanoke colony. 
Mladineo also names several missionaries and explorers of south-Slavic background, including 
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Frederick Baraga who was commemorated in the Yugoslav Garden and Yugoslav Room.874 
Although some of this information is apocryphal (particularly Mladineo’s explanation for the  
CROATAN inscription), its purpose is clear: to establish for the Yugoslavs a similar place in 
American history to that occupied by the English, Scots, French, Germans, Dutch, and Spanish—
to establish that America’s southern Slavs are “true Americans,” whatever that might mean, as 
well as Yugoslavs. After this, Mladineo cites several contemporary figures in the Yugoslav 
community as evidence of “the inventive genius of the Yugoslavs in America”: Nikola Tesla, not 
surprisingly, appears first, followed by Mihajlo Pupin, Henry Suzzalo, and Dr. Radosavljević. 
Yugoslavia had also, Mladineo argued, supplied the United States with a famous writer, Louis 
Adamic (whose inclusion the Kingdom of Yugoslavia would not have approved), as well as 
several sculptors and musicians, most prominently Zlatko Baloković.875  
Not once does Mladineo mention the Yugoslav Committee or its role in creating the 
Kingdom of Yugoslavia, although Pupin was a notable member of the former. Instead, when 
discussing their political activities, Mladineo states “the activities of Yugoslavs in America are 
by no means confined to their own group. Their names are prominently mentioned in many fields 
of our national life. Their loyalty to the country of their adoption has been attested to by the 
thousands of Yugoslav immigrants who enlisted in our Army and the Navy during the World 
War.”876 In other words, what mattered was not loyalty to Yugoslavia, but loyalty to the United 
States, loyalty that was balanced with preserving their ethnic heritage through schools, churches, 
singing societies, and fraternal organizations.877 
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 Not forgetting about the average laborer, Mladineo also argues that, “Yugoslavs as 
industrial workers have contributed their full share to the development and upbuilding of this 
country,” particularly as coal and steel miners.878 This recitation serves much the same purpose 
as that of the Dalmatian sailors on Columbus’s ship or Frederick Baraga—to create a narrative 
that the Yugoslavs, “individually and collectively…may well stand alongside any other racial 
group…that the Yugoslav immigrant belongs to a young and vigous race…[and] our American 
national entity…will find this group a valuable asset toward the creation of a better American 
civilization.”879  
Mladineo’s story about the Yugoslav emigration reveals how the desire for American 
belonging could lead migrants down the path of Yugoslavism. To wit, to make the strongest case 
for the belonging of South-Slavic emigrants in the United States, one needs Serb, Croat, and 
Slovene “heroes.” To establish the antiquity of Yugoslav settlement, one needs Columbus’s 
Croatan sailors and the Slovene Bishop Baraga. To establish the scientific brilliance of one’s 
nationality group, one needs the Serbs Tesla and Pupin. And to make the case for one’s national 
creativity, one needs the Slovene Adamic, the Serb Savine, and the Croat Baloković. In other 
words, to make the strongest argument that they are Americans, American Serbs, Croats, and 
Slovenes also needed to be Yugoslavs. This is one possible explanation for the parallels in 
representation between Mladineo’s book and the various Yugoslav-themed structures produced 
in the latter half of the thirties.  
Yugoslavism and Cultural Pluralism 
Louis Adamic’s A Nation of Nations, a history of the “new” migration to the United 
States that he published in 1944, offers corroboration to this hypothesis. In his chapter on 
 
878 Ibid, xxvi-xxvii. 
879 Ibid, xxviii. 




“Americans from Yugoslavia,” Adamic almost exactly reproduces Mladineo’s story about 
Yugoslav Americans: Columbus’s Dubrovnik Sailors, the CROATAN inscription on Roanoke 
Island, Bishop Baraga, the Croats and Serbs drawn into the mines and steelworks of the 
Midwest, Tesla, Pupin, and Zlatko Baloković. Of course, Adamic added some more names to the 
list of notables, such as Baron Ivan Rataj, a Croatian Catholic missionary who got scalped by the 
indigenous people of New Mexico in 1683.880 Still, the basic outline was the same. And yet, 
there is no evidence Adamic ever interacted with Mladineo—he certainly did not cite him in his 
bibliography.881 Instead, the similarities between the two accounts can be chalked up to 
convergent evolution—similar authorial motives produced a similar product. As he explained in 
the preface, Adamic believed that “there was an enormous mass of American history..that had 
been ‘suppressed,’ that did not appear in the standard books.” In schools, migrants had been told 
“that the United States was an Anglo-Saxon country with a White Protestant-Anglo-Saxon 
civilization struggling to preserve itself against infiltration and adulteration by other civilizations 
brought here by Negroes and hordes of ‘foreigners.’” As a result, “the immigrant and his 
children and grandchildren find their continuity cut off not only from the land of his origin and 
their descent, but from their heritage here, bequeathed them through the share their 
forebears…had in building America.”882In short, highlighting the achievements of these 
“Yugoslav” migrants (even those that got scalped) was a way for Adamic and Mladineo to stake 
a claim to the United States on behalf of their co-nationals.  
Popularizing the achievements of American Yugoslavs also resonated with the broader 
mood within the United States at that time. The wave of xenophobia in the 1920s that had found 
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its expression in restrictive immigration quotas, the (re)birth of the Ku Klux Klan, and the trial of 
Sacco and Vanzetti had ebbed (somewhat) by the mid 1930s. A combination of economic crisis 
and the rise of ultranationalist movements in Europe moved some to reconsider their 
assumptions about what it meant to be “American.” Was America a White, Anglo-Saxon 
Protestant nation, or something else?883 A new idea had emerged: “cultural pluralism.” Rejecting 
assimilationism and demands for cultural homogeneity, some public intellectuals in the United 
States, Adamic among them, instead called for celebrating the achievements and culture of 
immigrants and African Americans. Cultural pluralism had another advocate in the CPUSA, 
which spread cultural pluralist ideas into both leftist organizations, like the International Workers 
Order, and into various immigrant fraternal organizations during the era of Popular Front tactics. 
Blue-collar migrant workers and African Americans, as part of the New Deal coalition that 
brought Roosevelt to power in 1933, now had a voice in government.884 The Roosevelt 
administration gave institutional support to cultural pluralism via the Common Council for 
American Unity, established in 1939. Adamic was a founding member of the CCAU and would 
edit its journal Common Ground. Like the Foreign Language Information Service that preceded 
it, the CCAU sought to highlight the history, culture, and achievements of non-Anglo 
Americans. The CCAU had a louder megaphone, more funding, and more clout than FLIS, 
however, pressuring public schools to update their curriculum to include more on non-Anglo 
Americans..885 Moreover, the CCAU also enhanced Adamic’s position within a diasporic 
network. By necessity, journal editors develop thick Rolodexes of contacts from whom they can 
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solicit articles, reviews, and submissions. Although the Rolodex would not be invented until 
1956, Adamic, as editor of Common Ground from 1940-1942, nonetheless forged connections 
with many powerful and influential people, including Eleanor Roosevelt, Woodie Guthrie, and 
Langston Hughes.886 These connections would prove useful for Adamic’s Yugoslav activism 
during the Second World War.   
It was no coincidence that Adamic was so involved with both the cultural pluralist 
movement and with Yugoslavism—there was an ideological affinity. Both cultural pluralism and 
American Yugoslavism shared a similar origin. Cultural pluralism was, as has been mentioned, 
partly a reaction to fascism and authoritarianism in Europe and partly a product of working-class 
immigrant activism. Similarly, American Yugoslavism grew out of immigrant discontent with 
the royal dictatorship in Yugoslavia, as outlined in Chapter 3, as well as the activism of 
Yugoslav communists, as outlined in Chapter 4. Moreover, both the cultural pluralists and 
American Yugoslavists were committed to a liberal democratic society. Finally, both the cultural 
pluralists and American Yugoslavists like Adamic viewed national identity as a “salad bowl” 
rather than a “melting pot.” The creation of an “American” or “Yugoslav” people did not require 
Anglicization or Serbianization, but the conceptual inclusion of every ethnic group’s history with 
a common national imaginary. 
The Emergence of “Yugoslav Radio” 
Although past cultural achievements linked American Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, so did 
a new technology—radio.  Beginning in 1934, every Sunday morning, from 9 to 9:30 AM, and 
later, every Wednesday from 11AM to 12 PM listeners could tune in to “Yugoslav Radio Hour.” 
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Yugoslav Radio Hour was the creation of George Marčan, a Chicago Croat who paid the start-up 
costs out of pocket (again, no surprise) and worked tirelessly to find new material for his radio 
program, according to Jugoslavenski Glasnik (The Yugoslav Herald), which called Marčan’s 
radio station “one truly great Yugoslav institution little discussed by the media.” 887 
Jugoslavenski Glasnik and Yugoslavia, emigrant newspapers owned by the naturalized 
Montenegrin-American John Palandech, also helped advertise Marčan’s the new radio station.888 
Additionally, Yugoslav Radio Hour’s founding received blurbs in one Serbian and one Croatian 
newspaper, suggesting that this was not merely Serbian or Croatian nationalism, but genuinely 
Yugoslavist.889 Yugoslav Radio Hour broadcast a variety of Yugoslav-themed content, which 
was generally apolitical—what went on the airwaves depended on who walked into Yugoslav 
Radio Hour’s offices. As a result, Yugoslav Radio Hour usually functioned as a venue for 
emigrant singing societies or tamburica orchestras to perform and reach a broader audience.890 
Not all submissions were musical—Yugoslav Radio Hour sometimes featured lectures about 
specific topics in Yugoslavia, like national health, and sometimes even political speeches, such 
as one speech arguing that Governor Horner of Illinois ought to be replaced with someone 
better.891  
As its profile increased, Yugoslav Radio Hour’s cultural cachet grew, and it began to get 
submissions by more famous emigrants.  The year 1936 was a turning point. Alexander Savine, a 
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Serbian-American composer, used Yugoslav Radio Hour for the debut of his new opera.892 The 
Yugoslav Radio Hour also attracted the attention of musicians in Yugoslavia, with performances 
from musicians in Zagreb, Belgrade, and Ljubljana.893 That same year, Yugoslav Radio Hour 
broadcast a soloist (presumably a bass or baritone) from the Chicago Opera who sang the Volga 
Boatman Song and an aria from Faust. These classical offerings accompanied the usual fare of 
folk tamburica music.894 Zlatko Baloković, a world-renowned Croatian violinist with the New 
York Philharmonica, was a regular listener of Yugoslav Radio Hour, according to an interview 
given in 1937.895  
Yugoslav Radio Hour was even known outside the Yugoslav community, featuring 
prominently in the Chicago Sunday Times front-page article about “Yugoslavia in Chicago,” a 
human interest piece showcasing the various sights, sounds, and, most importantly, recipes of 
Chicago’s “Little Yugoslavia.”896 The Serb, Croat, and Slovene communities were 
interconnected in the eyes of outsiders as well. 
Even though Yugoslav Radio Hour was an emigrant initiative, the Yugoslav state also 
tried to use radio broadcasts to link the diaspora to the homeland. Although Yugoslavia would 
not invest in a full-time radio station for the diaspora until 1940,897 beginning in 1934 specific 
transatlantic radio broadcasts were treated as a symbolic bridge linking the diaspora and the old 
country. The earliest such broadcast occurred in 1934, using NBC’s radio transmitters in the 
United States to broadcast from Zagreb and Ljubljana thirty minutes of folk songs. Opening with 
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the statement “Halo Amerika, this is Jugoslavija! We greet our brothers in America and send 
them greetings from the fatherland,” this broadcast was explicitly framed as the voice of a 
nation, rather than of the musicians and performers.898 The broadcast, and the reactions to it from 
emigrants, made for good propaganda in Yugoslavia—Jutarnji List ran a two-page article 
consisting entirely of emigrant letters “that showed how our nation in the United States were 
happy to hear the voice of the old country, even for such a short time.”899   
Nonetheless,Yugoslav-Americans were slow to broadcast back to Yugoslavia—the first 
west-to-east transatlantic broadcast did not occur until September 1936, a short message of 
greeting to Yugoslavia during the dedication of a monument to Njegoš in the Yugoslav Garden 
in Cleveland.900 Nonetheless, it was dutifully reported in the South Slav Herald in Belgrade901 
and Jutarnji List in Zagreb, which called it “an opportunity for our radio listeners to hear how 
our people far away across the sea are trying to maintain connections with the old country, such 
that they are not completely drowned in the American sea.”902 Radio waves, in other words, 
could serve as a lifeline and perhaps prevent assimilation.  
In 1939, radio was used to broadcast a short speech from Regent Paul, another first, 
congratulating American “Yugoslavs” on their pavilion at the 1939 World Fair. Radio now had 
royal approval.903 In March 1940, Yugoslavia set up a regular radio station, broadcasting out of 
Belgrade folk and classical music, news, short lectures, and national hymns.904 By that point, 
however, Yugoslavia had little time remaining—the April War was a year away. Moreover, 
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broadcasts from Yugoslavia could hardly compete with the more professional Marčan’s 
Yugoslav Radio Hour for more discerning and sophisticated listeners in the United States. Even 
Srbobran, the most loyalist of émigré newspapers, called one Yugoslav broadcast a 
“disappointment,” complaining that  
The preciseness of American radio programs was unknown to them. We heard 
many opera singers singing national songs that did not fit them at all. Speakers, to 
some extent, were interesting, but could hardly be heard. Once, they gave some 
poetry at which everyone here could hardly keep from laughing because of the 
“melodramatic” passion in which it was given.905  
 
If even Srbobran found these broadcasts “absurd” and “laughable,” the government of 
Yugoslavia was surely in trouble. After all, the Serbs were supposed to be the most loyal section 
of the emigration, according to Yugoslav diplomats. Yet even some Serbs were beginning to 
question the Yugoslav monarchy. And while ridiculous radio programs probably did not spark 
this crisis of faith, they certainly did nothing to prevent it.  
Yugoslavism and Panslavism 
 As distasteful and ridiculous as the Kingdom of Yugoslavia may have seemed to 
migrants, who mocked its broadcasts and shunned its diplomatic representatives, opposition 
generally did not take the form of ethnic separatism. This emerges clearly, for instance, from an 
examination of the conventions of the Croatian Fraternal Union in the mid-to-late 1930s. At the 
1935 convention, for instance, the delegates passed a resolution denouncing both the government 
of Yugoslavia as well as Mussolini and Hitler, a statement that was clearly intended to group the 
former with the latter.906 In other words, Prince Paul’s principal flaw was not that he was 
Serbian, but that he was a “fascist.” As argued in Chapter Four, this anti-fascist rhetoric was 
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linked to the interventions of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, the Croatian Peasant Party, 
and the Serbian Independent Democrats in the Croatian Fraternal Union. It also overlapped with 
American press’s coverage of the Yugoslav government (see Chapter 3), which tended to 
compare the dictatorship in Yugoslavia with Mussolini’s Italy. 
In the 1939 convention, advocates of Croatian independence suffered a major setback, 
with an alliance between the leftist and moderate factions taking half the seats in the 
administrative and oversight committees and a majority in the legal committee. The power of the 
editor of Zajedničar to determine the paper’s ideological stance, which had previously been 
deployed in a Croatian nationalist direction, was likewise curbed, and a moderate was employed 
to edit the English-language section of Zajedničar.907  Further evidence of the rising leftist tide 
was evinced by Butković’s concealment of his personal ties to the leader of the Domobran 
movement in America908 and his opening of the convention with a moderately left-wing speech, 
denouncing all dictatorships, including that of Prince Paul and Mussolini, and praising the CFU 
as a workers’ organization so that he could retain the presidency of the CFU.909 Furthermore, 
earlier that year in May, the Croatian Fraternal Union, the Carniolan Slovene Catholic Union, 
and the Serbian National Union, together representing the three largest South-Slavic fraternal 
societies, had held a joint celebration in Pittsburgh to manifest “how much we love our dear 
homeland, its freedom, and unity.”910 Even Butković signed this declaration, which he would not 
have done unless there was great pressure on him to do so. 
 
907 Letter from Kosto Unković to the Washington Legation, September 18, 1935. Fond 371, fasc. 54, BO 70, AJ.  
908 “Jelićev boravak u S.A.D. i aktivnost domobranaca,” Report from the Washington Legation to MIP, August 15, 
1939. Fond 371, fasc. 54, BO 70 
909 “Izveštaj o Radu i Resultatu V Konvencije Hrvatske Bratske Zajednice u Pittsburghu, PA,” Report from Dr. 
Stanojević to MIP, September 23, 1939. Fond 371, fasc. 54, BO 70, AJ.  
910 Telegram from the Washington Legation to Belgrade, April 28, 1939. Fond 371, fasc. 54, BO 70. 




 Of course, when one considers developments in Europe in 1939, this support for 
Yugoslavia and its independence is not surprising. Slavdom was very much under threat. This 
panslavist and antifascist mood had been building since September 1938, when the governments 
of Great Britain and France permitted Hitler’s annexation of the Czech borderlands at the 
Munich conference. The reaction in the United States was immediate and fierce. American 
Czechs and Slovaks held what the Chicago consul called a “monster meeting,” where over 
50,000 gathered to protest the Western powers’ abandonment of their ally Czechoslovakia. 
Although the leaders of the Serbian community in Chicago were relatively quiet regarding the 
annexation of the Sudetenland, the Croats and the Slovenes vocally sided with the Czechs.911 A 
few weeks later, from the Croatian Day celebrations in San Francisco, the Yugoslav Legation in 
Washington received the first of many resolutions condemning both the Nazi annexation of the 
Sudetenland and the continued “unslavic” dictatorship in Belgrade, calling for panslavic 
solidarity, freedom of speech, assembly, and press, and free elections in Yugoslavia.912  
But supporters no less than opponents of the Belgrade government were shocked by these 
events. On the annual Yugoslav Unification Day celebrations in New York, on December 4, 
1938, the organizers expressed their solidarity with Czechoslovakia by holding the celebrations 
in the Czech Sokol building and by inviting Edvard Beneš, the president of Czechoslovakia, as a 
guest speaker. This, too, was infused with panslavism, with the brochure hyperbolically calling 
Beneš “the greatest living Slav, democrat, and supporter of justice and freedom.”913 And at the 
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Unity Day celebrations in Pittsburgh, the organizers invited the Czech consul as a guest 
speaker.914  
The government of Yugoslavia’s attempts to befriend, or at least appease, Nazi Germany 
put its diplomats in an awkward position during this wave of anti-Nazi sentiment, particularly the 
head of the Yugoslav Legation, Konstantin Fotić, a Stojadinović appointee, who found the 
presence of the Czechoslovak consul at the Pittsburgh celebration “inconvenient.”915 
Stojadinović’s tenure as Prime Minister was characterized by German appeasement, and so it is 
not surprising that his protégé in Washington would realize that the presence of the Czech consul 
at such a time could be viewed as a diplomatic insult by Nazi Germany. But such caution was at 
odds with the popular mood, both overseas and in Yugoslavia. In Yugoslavia, appeasement of 
Germany would precipitate mass demonstrations on March 26, 1941, with crowds in Belgrade 
shouting “Bolje Rat Nego Pakt” – “Better War than the Pact,” which was followed, in turn, by a 
coup d’etat by anti-German military officers. War with Germany ensued. 
Less inhibited by censorship and the fear of arbitrary arrest, Yugoslavs in the United 
States had begun articulating their opposition to Yugoslavia’s pro-German policy years earlier. 
Beginning with in 1938, emigrant groups began petitioning Yugoslav diplomats to cut ties with 
Nazi Germany and implement democracy. One of the first such petitions came in April 1938, 
following the German annexation of Austria, from the Club of Serbian Progressive Workers. 
This petition called for an end to “Italianophile” and “Germanophile” diplomacy and the 
formation of a “panslavic policy, carried out in a democratic spirit,” which concretely meant a 
military alliance with Czechoslovakia and diplomatic recognition of the Soviet Union.916 On 
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April 14, 1939, for instance, an assembly of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes in Cleveland sent the 
Legation a resolution again calling for severing diplomatic ties with Hitler and Mussolini, 
autonomy for Croatia and Slovenia, and an alliance with the European democracies against the 
fascists.917 In May and in June, the Legation received four nearly identical petitions from four 
heavily-Yugoslav lodges of the International Workers Order, again calling on Yugoslavia to 
align herself with Europe’s democracies against fascism, implement democracy, preserve 
Yugoslavia’s borders, and the resolve the Croatian question by plebiscite.918 In the archives one 
also finds an ungrammatical but passionate letter written by a Montenegrin-American in English 
to the legation asserting that “The Yugoslavian nation joining in the Hitler, Mussolini Fascists 
regime. That slaps the Yugoslav Nation in the Face,” and calling, like the others, for Yugoslavia 
to cut ties with Berlin and Rome and align herself with Europe’s democracies.919 An assembly of 
Serbs, Croats, and, surprisingly, Macedonians, in the Canton-Massillon metropolitan area in 
Ohio likewise sent the Legation a sternly-worded resolution calling for a Croatian plebiscite, 
alliance with Europe’s democracies, diplomatic recognition of the Soviet Union, and 
“Brotherhood and Unity” among Yugoslavia’s peoples.920 As early as 1939, the slogan of Tito’s 
Yugoslavia was being aired in America—a coincidence, but evocative nonetheless. 
Despite coming from organizations spanning the ideological spectrum, the demands from 
all these petitions are remarkably consistent, and suggest a broader consensus among Yugoslav-
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Americans on what Yugoslavism meant, namely, democracy, panslavic solidarity, and 
opposition to fascism.  
Yugoslavia’s Final Years 
 The outbreak of World War II on September 1, 1939 reinforced this anti-fascist tendency, 
even though Yugoslavia would not become involved in World War II until April 1941. News 
from Europe was avidly read and discussed, both among Yugoslavs and the general public. Yet 
this too provided another manifestation of hybrid nationality. As Fotić reported on October 14, 
1939, Yugoslavs in the United States were influenced by a general milieu of 
“Americanized…elements and by constant public discussion about the importance of freedom 
for [Europe’s] peoples, particularly the small ones.” The fate of Yugoslavia, despite its 
neutrality, attracted particular interest—except for the few remannts of the Domobran movement 
in the United States, Yugoslav newspapers in the United States all expressed concern for their 
homeland in an increasingly dangerous Europe. Furthermore, calls for an independent Croatia 
had virtually ceased. Influenced by the broader American media milieu, an anti-German and 
anti-Italian mood prevailed. Having read a number of editorials from migrant newspapers, Fotić 
also concluded that, despite the Soviet Union’s pact with Nazi Germany and its complicity in 
partitioning Poland once more, many continued to see Russia as a “Slavic Big Brother” and the 
principal obstacle to German expansion into Eastern Europe. Affection for Russia was driven by 
panslavic sentiment, rather than agreement with the principles of Bolshevism. 921 
 In the spring of 1940, Hitler turned his attention toward Western and Northern Europe. 
On June 4, France surrendered—Hitler’s ambitions for pan-European conquest were becoming 
increasingly apparent, aspirations which boded ill for Yugoslavia. Reporting on the response 
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among Yugoslav migrants three days later, Fotić observed that everyone was “constantly 
discussing conditions in the ‘old country’… the attachment our emigrants feel toward their home 
country grows stronger every day, just as the idea of united life (between Serbs, Croats, and 
Slovenes) sinks deeper roots.” Croatian newspapers such as Zajedničar increasingly advocated 
working and living together with Serbs and Slovenes in the US to preserve the Yugoslav state in 
the face of the German and Italian threat. A proposal to form a committee to coordinate activity 
of the fraternal organizations was once again floated.922 Of course, given the increasingly 
interconnected nature of the Serb, Croat, and Slovene communities in the United States over the 
late 1930s, a federation of fraternal unions was a logical next step. 
Despite the increasingly precariousness of Yugoslavia’s international position, however, 
official celebrations like “Yugoslav Day” and “Unification Day” continued to be poorly 
attended. Although the Fifth Annual Yugoslav Radio Hour picnic, held in Hibbing, Minnesota in 
May, 1940 was attended by over ten-thousand Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes,923 Unification Day in 
Chicago that same year attracted a mere three thousand people.924 While Hibbing was a remote 
and obscure location compared to Chicago, the Radio Hour Picnic was a beloved emigrant 
institution and funded by donations from migrants rather than from the Yugoslav foreign service. 
Moreover, given that Yugoslav diplomats only learned of this celebration in 1940 and had to be 
introduced to it, this event had probably not been visited by consuls, thus avoiding conspicuous 
association with the government of Yugoslavia. The combination of these factors allowed the 
Radio Hour celebration to avoid any backlash from Croatian groups opposed to working closely 
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with the Yugoslav state. Indeed, the Croatian boycott of official holidays continued. Unification 
Day in New York City in 1940, for instance, counted only a single Croatian organization among 
its fifteen sponsors.925 Despite the looming war, the Kingdom of Yugoslavia had remarkably 
little non-Serb support overseas. 
Conclusion 
Nonetheless, on the eve of Yugoslavia’s involvement in World War II, and the 
subsequent formation of the United Committee of South Slavic Americans, substantial progress 
had been made toward uniting the Yugoslav diaspora. Although a unified diaspora political 
lobby had not emerged, the latter half of the 1930s had seen collaboration between Serb, Croat, 
and Slovene groups in a wide variety of cultural endeavors: a room in the Pittsburgh Cathedral of 
Learning, a garden in Cleveland, language schools, a common directory of organizations, and 
even Yugoslav Radio Hour. As Rogers Brubaker argues, diaspora ethnicity is often embedded in 
routines and institutions.926 Not only did these cultural endeavors sustain the habits of 
organizational cooperation that are so important to the functioning of a diaspora according to 
Peggy Levitt and Nina Glick-Schiller,927 they also proved that American Serbs, Croats, and 
Slovenes did not need subsidies from the consulates, that their resources were sufficient to chart 
their own course in the cultural sphere. In this, we find an answer to Gabriel Sheffer's question, 
posed in the introduction, about the sorts of tensions between the 'old country' and a diaspora that 
is treated like “a milking cow” rather than an ally.928 Although Yugoslavia’s transactional 
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approach drove a wedge between Yugoslavia and “its” emigration, it also led to a diaspora that 
was more independent, politically assertive, and interconnected on an organizational level.  
  Moreover emigrant cultural projects during this period reveal that the Serb, Croat, and 
Slovene communities in the United States shared a common symbolic vocabulary. There was a 
common pantheon of figures that nationalists could cite as proof of national greatness—Tesla, 
Pupin, Baraga, Adamic, and Baloković, as well as a host of anonymous figures: Columbus’s 
Ragusan sailors, the Roanoke colonists, and the hundreds of thousands of migrants whose labors 
made the United States an industrial society. Being a Yugoslav became a way to stake a claim to 
America, a claim that was based not on martial feats of the Serbian army during World War I or 
the Karadjordjević dynasty, but scientific genius, artistic creativity, and hard work. This 
tendency was reinforced by the cultural pluralist zeitgeist in the United States during the late 
1930s. As such, Yugoslavism in the United States was both an example of the syncretic 
influence of homeland nationalism, but also a demonstration of how acculturation to the host 
country did not weaken diaspora nationalism, but invigorated it. Yugoslav diaspora nationalism 
had become distinct from its manifestation in Yugoslavia. If we continue the theoretical 
approach of treating “diaspora” as a transnational network of emigrant organizations, the 
foundation for the “Yugoslav diaspora” already existed by the late 1930s—all that remained was 
for a political cause to mobilize this incipient network.  
This, too, acquired a firm outline during the late 1930s. Perhaps as a syncretic influence 
from other Slavic groups in the United States, American Yugoslavism seemed increasingly based 
on an advocacy for panslavism, antifascism, and democracy. As such.World War II, covered in 
the next chapter, did not create the Yugoslav diaspora, it merely redirected its activity from 
cultural activism to political lobbying. 




CHAPTER SIX: YUGOSLAVS UNITE!: THE SECOND WORLD WAR AND THE 
YUGOSLAV DIASPORA 
 
 On April 6, 1941, following a coup d’état that ousted the pro-German government of 
Yugoslavia, Nazi Germany declared war on Yugoslavia. On April 18, Yugoslavia surrendered. 
While no mainland European country long withstood the German steamroller (Poland and France 
lasted little more than a month), Yugoslavia’s swift defeat was hastened by desertions and 
defections by Croatians within the Yugoslav army, many of whom surrendered without fighting. 
On the approach to Zagreb alone, the Wehrmacht captured over twenty generals and fifteen 
thousand soldiers.929 To control their newly-captured territory, Germany set up a Croatian puppet 
government headed by Ante Pavelić in Croatia and Bosnia. Another puppet government was 
established in Serbia, headed by Milan Nedić, a Serbian general with pro-German leanings. 
Finally, Italy annexed Dalmatia and Montenegro and Germany annexed Slovenia. Yugoslavia’s 
government went into exile, eventually settling in London. 
 Although Yugoslavia’s government had lost control of its European territory, it still had 
the metaphorical “tenth banovina.” In early 1942, the government-in-exile took its proprietary 
attitude toward the diaspora to its logical conclusion—military recruitment. After all, as 
discussed in Chapters 1, 2, 3, and 5, Yugoslavia had already created an emigrant census, an 
emigrant museum, and maps of the major centers of population, while also seeking to censor 
speech and tap remittances, a form of indirect taxation. Using a new American law that made it 
possible for emigrants to either serve in the military or form international battalions under the 
authority of Allied or co-belligerent governments, Yugoslav diplomats sought to create a 
 
929 J. B. Hoptner, Yugoslavia in Crisis, (New York: Columbia UP, 1962), 288. 




“Yugoslav legion” in the United States.930 The Yugoslav Legation in Washington directed all 
consulates to inform “our citizens” of this new law, hoping that overseas Yugoslavs could carry 
on the fight.931 Owing to Yugoslav laws which made their citizenship hereditary and difficult to 
renounce, Yugoslavia had a wide pool of potential recruits, maybe even enough for a full 
division of ten thousand soldiers. The response from emigrants, however, was comically weak—
Chicago, one of the largest population centers of American Yugoslavs, supplied only four 
volunteers!932 Serving in the American army was simply more attractive—American soldiers 
were better equipped and better fed, and, more importantly, military service was a shortcut to 
American citizenship. The “Yugoslav diaspora” would not serve as cannon fodder for King Peter 
II Karadjordjević, particularly considering their alienation from the royalist government of 
Yugoslavia. However, the failure of a “Yugoslav legion” does not suggest that that emigrants 
had no attachment or loyalties to Yugoslavia. Rather, it illustrates the central theme of this 
chapter, namely, that migrants had loyalties to their host nation as well as their old country, 
something that is reflected in their support for the resistance to the Nazi occupation.  
 This chapter chronicles diaspora agitation for and against Yugoslavia during World War 
II, from its beginnings, when support coalesced around Draža Mihailović, to its conclusion, the 
United Committee of South Slavic Americans (UCSSA), which was supported by several major 
Croat and Slovene organizations, along with a disparate coalition of Serb liberals and leftists. 
While focused primarily on the United States, this chapter also includes for comparison a similar 
effort to create a Yugoslav emigrant lobby in South America, an effort that ended in failure. The 
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other half of this chapter’s argument concerns UCSSA’s opposite number, a small far-right 
Serbian organizations called the Serbian National Defense, and more broadly the Serbian 
National Federation, which backed the Serbian National Defense. Arguing against previous 
scholars who have presented Yugoslav émigré politics during the Second World War as an 
expression of the “Serb-Croat conflict,” wherein the Serbs moved toward nationalism and the 
Croats toward leftism,933 this chapter contends that this portrait is inaccurate for several reasons.  
First, UCSSA (and its organizational predecessors) were not “Croatian” but “Yugoslav.” 
As a political coalition of a sufficiently large and diverse group of Serb, Croat, and Slovene (and 
later Macedonian) organizations, UCSSA meets Gabriel Sheffer’s definition of a “diaspora:” a 
sociopolitical formation created by migration whose members regard themselves as part of a 
national community and who form a trans-state network. This definition does not require 
unanimity or active participation of every member of a “diaspora,” but rather the political 
activity of a core group of activists on behalf of their homeland.934 By the same token, the 
diaspora does not need to exist everywhere there are migrant communities: Donna Gabaccia, 
who famously applied this theory to Italian migrants, postulates the existence of several “Italian 
diasporas,” transnational networks, at different times and in different parts of the world.935 As 
such, the “Yugoslav diaspora” as represented by UCSSA was limited to emigrant communities in 
North America. The reason for this will be explained through a comparison to an unsuccessful 
contemporary attempt to organize “Yugoslav” migrants in South America.  
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Another issue with the “Serbo-Croat conflict” framing is that both “sides” were not 
evenly-matched. As this chapter will show, opponents of Yugoslavism were a definite minority, 
and American Serbs were not a political monolith. Secondly, this chapter argues that UCSSA’s 
political program was fundamentally left-liberal, rather than socialist, representing a syncretic 
blending of American political prescriptions and Yugoslav ideology. Support for Tito did not 
make UCSSA communist. Moreover, UCSSA’s platform was as much an expression of 
American nationalism as it was of Yugoslav patriotism and builds on the previous chapters’ 
argument that American and Yugoslav patriotism were complementary and mutually-reinforcing.   
And third, this chapter argues that the Serbian National Defense was not the expression 
of latent Serbian diaspora national chauvinism, but rather the work of a small group of Serbian 
nationalist ideologues from the ‘old country.’ Comparing the relatively successful Odbrana to the 
ineffective Domobran, this chapter argues that the explosive development of a Serbian far-right 
movement was a consequence of the Serbian National Federation’s close relationship to the 
Yugoslav Legation in Washington and the Serbian Exarchate. This gave Serbian chauvinists a 
backdoor to emigrant institutions, allowing them to escape from the political margins into 
leading roles in Serbian newspapers, churches, and fraternal societies. These activists then used 
their offices to marginalize pro-Yugoslav voices among émigré Serbs. Ironically, the institutions 
that were supposed to promote Yugoslavism ended up undermining it among the Serbs, whom 
Yugoslav diplomats considered the most loyal. Only where emigrant institutions remained 
autonomous from the Yugoslav government did Yugoslavism flourish. 
 Nonetheless, as the outcome of the rivalry between UCSSA and the SNO indicates, 
Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes were more influential together than apart, winning over both the 




public and politicians to their vision for Yugoslavia which, despite their support for Tito, was 
fundamentally liberal and democratic.    
The Origins of the United Committee of South Slavic Americans 
 Although it would take some time for UCSSA to mobilize a “Yugoslav diaspora,” the 
foundations for the committee were laid almost immediately after the German attack by the 
major Serb, Croat, and Slovene fraternal unions. Following the pattern set by the Yugoslav 
Fraternal Federation a decade earlier, attempts were begun to establish a pan-Yugoslav umbrella 
organization to coordinate the charitable and lobbying efforts of these emigrant groups. Even so, 
coaxing the leaders into such an organization took some maneuvering. Galvanized by the 
German declaration of war in April 1941 and Yugoslavia’s rapid collapse, the head of the 
Serbian National Union and the two major Slovene fraternal unions approached Ivan Butković, 
the president of the Croatian Fraternal Union (CFU), proposing federation into a united relief 
effort. This organization called itself the Jugoslovenski Centralni Odbor, or Yugoslav Central 
Committee (an allusion to the Yugoslav Committee which had lobbied for the creation of 
Yugoslavia).  
Butković, a Croatian nationalist, initially balked. Even when promised a leadership 
position, Butković believed that the Croatian Fraternal Union (CFU) should support a postwar 
independent Croatia. But there was pressure on him to change his mind. Thanks to the 
interventions of the Croatian Peasant Party, Communist Party of Yugoslavia, and Svetozar 
Pribićević in Croatian Fraternal Union politics during the late 1930s, the CFU’s leftists and 
liberals had formed a popular front of sorts, winning control over a majority of seats in the 
central committee of the CFU. Although the nationalist faction headed by Butković still held the 
presidency, his position was precarious. Still, as a nationalist, he had to try for a nationalist 




organization, setting up a purely Croatian alternative to the Odbor, the Croatian National 
Council.936 But the organization’s membership was too small to be viable. Further weakening the 
Croatian National Council, Peter Radić, the nephew of Stjepan Radić, the martyred leader of the 
Croatian Peasant Party and the Croatian nationalist movement, now living in America, had sided 
with the leftists and liberals, insisting that the CFU cooperate with Serbs and Slovene 
organizations to raise money for Yugoslavia.937 Additional pressure would be placed on 
Butković after Operation Barbarossa (the German invasion of the Soviet Union) in June 1941. 
Predictably, the Nazi onslaught against Soviet Union supercharged the pan-Slavic mood among 
Americans of Slavic origin that had been growing since the annexation of Czechoslovakia in 
1938.  As the Battle of Moscow continued on Christmas Day, 1941, Butković finally endorsed 
the Slav Congress of America, a loose organization of anti-fascist immigrant groups founded in 
the aftermath of the Munich agreement.938 Since Panslavism was a cousin of Yugoslavism, 
Butković was caught in a contradiction—he could hardly support the brotherhood of all Slavs 
while denying any fraternal relation between Croats and Serbs and Slovenes. Three months later, 
in March 1942 the Croatian National Council would be disbanded by pro-Yugoslav forces within 
the CFU, which joined the Yugoslav Central Committee.939 
 Initially, the Yugoslav Central Committee’s supported the Četniks, a name that refers to 
a loose grouping of Serbian monarchist guerillas in Yugoslavia during the Second World War.  
That there was a communist insurgency as well as a royalist one was virtually unknown until late 
1942. Because no American periodical would send a journalist into Yugoslavia until 1944, the 
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American media had to get their news from a few representatives of the government-in-exile, 
such as Sava Kosanović (or Konstantin Fotić) who were in contact with the Četniks by radio, 
telegraph, or courier.940 As a result, support for the royalist guerrillas, led by Draža Mihailović, 
was virtually unanimous.  At the April 1942 meeting of the Slav Congress of America, for 
instance (which Serbian, Croatian, and Slovene delegates chose to attend as Yugoslavs rather 
than separately), one of the major props was a portrait, hand painted by a Yugoslav artist from 
Detroit, of Mihailović with an American flag in his right hand, a Yugoslav flag in his left, and a 
swastika being crushed under his boot.941 Not even the Daily Worker, the organ of the 
Communist Party of the United States of America (CPUSA), knew about Tito. In July 1942, for 
example, the Daily Worker interviewed Kosanović and asked whether “the freedom army of 
Draža Mihailovich” would be able to open a second front in Europe, thereby taking the pressure 
off of the Soviet Union.942 Among the Communists, however, support for the royalists ended a 
month later, when the The Daily Worker and the Serbian periodical Slobodna Reč (Free Word) 
began to attack Mihailović as a “traitor,” “fascist,” and “Serbian chauvinist,” and to describe Tito 
in glowing terms.943 Since the CPUSA controlled The Daily Worker and the Communist Party of 
Yugoslavia (KPJ) Slobodna Reč (its editor, Mirko Marković, was a KPJ member), this sudden 
shift bespoke coordination from Moscow. 
Apart from the Communist press, however, the existence of Communist insurgents in 
Yugoslavia remained unknown until Tito convened a provisional government in Bihać, Bosnia, 
in November 1942. After several weeks, news of the ideological split within the anti-fascist 
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resistance began to trickle back to the United States. The earliest mainstream writer to publish 
this information was Louis Adamic (who else?) in an exposé of Mihailović’s guerrillas for the 
Saturday Evening Post issue of December 12, 1942, titled “Mikhailovich: Balkan Mystery 
Man.”944 Although Adamic described Mihailović as “a good professional soldier” and a “good 
Yugoslav…unlike a relatively small element of ultra-nationalistic Serbians, most of them aging 
politicians in Belgrade,” he nonetheless revealed that Mihailovic had been fighting the 
Communist Partisans along with the German occupation, and that Mihailovic stood for the 
restoration of the monarchy in Yugoslavia, unlike the Partisans, who wanted “a new deal in 
Yugoslavia,” a reference to Roosevelt’s New Deal in America. As gentle as Adamic’s treatment 
of Mihailović was, he nonetheless made the Partisans look more appealing, more in tune with 
American values. In one instance, Adamic compared the Partisans to American freedom fighters 
in the War of Independence, calling them “some of the finest people in Yugoslavia.” Moreover, 
Adamic disclosed, the Partisans were both more numerous than Mihailović’s forces and 
untainted by any cooperation with the German occupiers.945  
Adamic did not name his sources. However, there were KPJ infiltrators in the Office of 
Strategic Services (OSS), some of whom, it was later revealed by an FBI inquest, corresponded 
with Adamic and had been continually leaking information on military matters in Yugoslavia to 
Adamic for an indeterminate period of time.946 Adamic could also have gotten his information 
from the Daily Worker, although, considering the timing and his relatively sympathetic portrayal 
of Mihailović, that seems unlikely. Regardless, the ideological split in the resistance movement 
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had been revealed. Three days later, the New York Times mentioned, for the first time, the 
conflict between Mihailović and unnamed Communist Partisans (although it predictably sided 
with Mihailović), reprinting a statement from the Yugoslav government-in-exile that claimed 
that “Mikhailovitch… remains the central figure of Yugoslav resistance.”947 In fact, Tito’s name 
would not appear in the New York Times until June 1943.948 Even though Tito’s name leaked 
relatively late, there was now a non-monarchist, non-Serbian alternative to Mihailović.  
Yugoslav emigrants in the United States now had the option to support either the Partisans or the 
Četniks. 
 These revelations about Mihailović spurred each of the main Serb, Croat, and Slovene 
fraternal unions into holding congresses, at which they would debate both their plans for aiding 
the resistance and proclaim their aspirations for a post-war Yugoslavia. Of the three groups, the 
Slovenes were the most flexible about Yugoslavia’s postwar organization. At the Slovene 
Congress, held in December 1942, the left-liberal SNPJ (Slovene National Benefit Society) took 
the lead, supplying most of the speeches, although representatives of the clericalist KSKJ were 
also present. Not coincidentally, the SNPJ was still headed by Vincent Cainkar, who was the 
architect of an earlier attempt to unify Serb, Croat and Slovene fraternal organizations, the 
Yugoslav Fraternal Federation, a decade earlier. Representatives of the Yugoslav government 
attended, but contributed little to the discussion—Franc Snoj, a minister without portfolio, was 
present only as an observer and Konstantin Fotić, the head of the Yugoslav Legation was invited 
to speak but was booed (for reasons that will be explained later). Despite the gesture toward 
compromise with the government-in-exile that Fotić’s presence represented, the Slovene 
Congress’s resolutions represented a break with official Yugoslav doctrine and an embrace of a 
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new kind of Yugoslavism. Emphasizing both Slovenian and American identity, the Slovene 
congress called not only for a federal Yugoslavia, but also democracy, a Balkan Union, a 
European Union, and even a single world government.949 Although ahead of their time, this 
internationalist utopianism reflected the zeitgeist in the United States. Many within the United 
States saw the United Nations Declaration in January 1942, which united the countries fighting 
the Axis into a formal alliance, as a prelude to a global world federation.950 The Slovene 
Congress elected Louis Adamic as honorary president, not only because he was the most famous 
living Slovene-American, but also because he shared their vision and idealism.  
 Whereas the Slovenian Congress was characterized by compromise and concord, the 
Croatian Congress, held two months later, was split by factionalism. On one side was a coalition 
of liberals and leftists, supporters of Yugoslavia, led by the Croatian Fraternal Union’s vice 
president, the Ohio congressional representative Bill Boić. On the other side, conversely, were 
the nationalists, led, as always, by CFU President Butković, who wanted Croats to organize their 
own relief effort for the resistance in Yugoslavia. Attendees at the Croatian Congress were 
joined by an eminent guest, Ban Šubašić, the leader of the Croatian Banovina, who, like Stjepan 
Radić over a decade earlier, functioned as a symbolic leader of the Croatian people. Šubašić, like 
the minister Snoj, had arrived in the United States in September 1941.951 Although Butković 
hoped to lend Šubašić’s symbolic capital to the nationalist cause, the distinguished Croat leader 
gave his support to the Yugoslavists instead. Moreover, Butković’s proposal that the Croats 
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undertake a separate relief effort probably smacked too strongly of the fascist Domobran 
movement, which was currently being dismantled by the FBI (See Chapter 4). Yugoslavism, in 
contrast, could have been a way for delegates to reaffirm their loyalty to the United States. 
Ultimately, the leftists prevailed, with the Congress issuing resolutions recognizing Tito’s 
government at Bihać, denouncing the King and Mihailović, and calling for a federally-organized 
democratic Yugoslavia that would include Bulgaria. These were same demands as the Slovene 
congress (minus the call for a European Union and One World Government, of course). Sensing 
the zeitgeist, (and unable to openly defy Šubašić), Butković jumped on the Yugoslav 
bandwagon.952  
The Croatian Congress elected Zlatko Baloković, a famous concert violinist, as honorary 
president. Baloković was a relative latecomer to Yugoslav diaspora politics, having been active 
only since 1937, when he gave concerts to raise money for the Yugoslav Room in the Pittsburgh 
Cathedral of Learning.953 Untouched by two decades of factionalism, Baloković had few enemies 
and was universally palatable. Observers from the OSS characterized Baloković as a naive 
idealist; Šubašić regarded him as more figurehead than leader. 954 Nonetheless, Baloković was 
also an ally of Louis Adamic, having cosigned a message of greetings and support to the Bihać 
government a month earlier.955 As a result, despite Šubašić’s intervention, the Croatian Congress 
was (relatively) united behind Tito and linked to the Slovene Congress, both by personal ties and 
political objectives.  
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Despite having the support of virtually all the fraternal organizations within the United 
States, the UCSSA never won the support of the Serbian National Union. Instead, Serbian 
support for Tito coalesced around a group calling itself the “Vidovdan Congress,” named after 
the Serbian national holiday. A breakaway splinter of the Serbian National Union, the Vidovdan 
congress had its origins as a KPJ initiative in 1935, as discussed in Chapter 4, although it also 
received support from Stojan Pribićević and the liberal Serbs who sympathized with him. Once 
again, we see the extent to which Yugoslav opposition parties in the 1930s laid the 
organizational foundation for the Yugoslav diaspora. Although a list of active members of the 
Vidovdan congress eluded this researcher, most contemporaries stated that the Vidovdan 
congress represented a minority among politically-engaged Serbs.956 But how large was that 
minority—were they thirty percent, or just five? A rough estimate of their numbers can be 
gleaned by looking at subscriptions to the Vidovdan Congress’s associated newspaper, Slobodna 
Reč, which was edited by Mirko Marković, a KPJ member and veteran of the Spanish Civil War. 
With a circulation of around five thousand compared to Srbobran’s  twelve to fifteen thousand, 
Slobodna Reč was read by a substantial minority of American Serbs.957  Support for the Partisans 
was not just restricted to Communists, socialists, and fellow travelers, however. The Vidovdan 
Congress would be joined by three dissident Orthodox priests (and their congregations), headed 
by Strahinja Maletić, in late 1941.958 It would be these three groups that formed the Serbian core 
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of a pro-Tito Yugoslav diaspora in the United States. Although they were a minority, they were 
hardly insignificant.  
Despite being organized on a separate basis, the crystallization of pro-Tito movements 
among American Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes suggest that these groups functioned as an 
extended family, in the sense that each monitored and sought to match or emulate the political 
activities of the other. This was the natural outgrowth of their collaboration in the cultural 
sphere, as discussed in Chapter Five. Moreover, the holding of separate congresses as a stepping 
stone to pan-Yugoslav cooperation reproduced a pattern of activity established by the formation 
of the Yugoslav Fraternal Federation, which formed in the thirties. In fact, the leadership of the 
American Slovene Congress anticipated this unifying pressure. Approaching the OSS’s foreign 
nationality branch to talk about emigrant affairs, the Slovene delegation reportedly stated that 
“since they, the Slovenians, had so successfully got together at the Slovene National Congress in 
Cleveland,  December 4 and 5, and were at present so well-united, it was in order that the 
Croatians should do likewise, the Serbs being in their turn also organized [emphasis mine].”  
When asked by their OSS interlocutors whether  
the separate organization of the Croatians [would] prove to be the final nail driven 
into the Yugoslav coffin so far as Yugoslav elements in the United States were 
concerned…the answer was emphatically negative. When each of the three 
groups had its organization then steps could be taken toward some sort of 
common adjustment directed toward the federal idea of Yugoslavia…and so 
coordinate the political activity of American Croats and Serbs and Slovenes. 959 It 
was no coincidence that Vincent Cainkar of the SNPJ, who had employed this 
stepping-stone strategy a decade previously with the Yugoslav Fraternal 
Federation, headed the Slovene delegation. And once again, this was affirmation 
that Yugoslavism as an organizational principle was entirely compatible with 
Serbian, Croatian, and Slovene patriotism, especially since this was ingrained in 
the political habits of Yugoslavs in the United States. 
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True to Cainkar’s prediction, on June 19 and 20, 1943, representatives from the Slovene, 
Croatian, and Serbian Vidovdan Congresses met in Pittsburgh and agreed to confederate in a 
new organization called the “United Committee of American Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes,” 
which would be renamed the United Committee of South-Slavic Americans (or UCSSA) in 
August, an implicit recognition of Yugoslavism both as a nationality and as an organizing 
principle. Later that year, they were joined by the Bulgarian-Macedonian Congress, headed by 
George Pirinsky.960 Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes remained, however, the dominant element, with 
Louis Adamic being elected president, Zlatko Baloković (Croat), Žarko Bunčić (Serb), and Etbin 
Kristan (Slovene) becoming Vice Presidents, and Petar Radić (Croat), Mirko Marković (Serb), 
and Janko Rogelj (Slovene) becoming secretaries. Of this group, only Marković was a KPJ 
member; the rest were either Social Democrats or Agrarians, in the case of Radić. Moreover, it 
should be noted that the offices of Vice-President and Secretary each had a Serb, Croat, and 
Slovene occupant. In accord with their organizational principle, this new organization 
proclaimed both its support for “Serbian, Croatian, and Slovene fighters for liberty,” expressing 
their belief that “the National Army of Liberation (meaning Tito’s Partisans) will create a basis 
for a new Jugoslavia in which the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes will enjoy in freedom equal rights 
and perform equal duties.” This call for a new Yugoslavia based on equality under the law and 
freedom was accompanied by a proclamation of loyalty to the United States and a promise that 
“Americans of Serb, Croatian, and Slovene descent…must employ all their energy to expedite 
the complete victory of the United States and her allies.”961 With this proclamation, UCSSA 
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signaled that they were not just Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes and Yugoslavs, but Americans as 
well. American, Serb, Croat, Slovene, and Yugoslav patriotism coexisted in this document, 
bound together by a political program based on civil liberties. This was American Yugoslavism. 
A “Yugoslav Diaspora” in South America? 
 The Yugoslav Central Committee and UCSSA had an organizational counterpart in South 
America as well, albeit one that was significantly less influential and effective. Immediately 
following the German invasion of Yugoslavia, a group of Yugoslav-minded businessmen, with 
the support of the Yugoslav legation in Buenos Aires, founded a new organization, calling itself 
the Jugoslovenska Narodna Odbrana (JNO), the Yugoslav National Defense.962 Taking the name 
of a similar organization that had rallied support for the creation of a Yugoslav state during the 
first World War, the JNO aspired to create, more or less from scratch, a Yugoslav ethnic lobby in 
South America that would create and distribute propaganda on behalf of Yugoslavia and collect 
money from emigrants to support the government-in-exile.963  
In terms of ideology, this was a staunchly royalist organization; its slogan—“everything 
for the King and Fatherland”—left few doubts about its sympathies.964 Other than monarchism, 
however, the JNO had no political program. As the central committee of the JNO admonished 
one branch in Chaco in 1943, “the JNO, as a patriotic rather than internationalist organization, 
does not involve itself in the affairs of political parties, be they communist, clerical, monarchist, 
or republican…and will not dictate to the people in the old country what kind of regime they will 
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have after the war.“965 The existence of such a letter, however, suggested that some in the JNO 
disagreed with this neutral stance. After all, the JNO regularly sent money to the government-in-
exile and worked very closely with its diplomatic representatives in South America, including, 
ironically, Djuro Kolumbatović, who was now stationed in Santiago de Chile, far away from the 
milieu in the United States that he antagonized during the royal dictatorship.966  
One could also connect the self-professed apoliticism of the Yugoslav Central 
Organization967 (a short-lived patriotic emigrant organization in the United States that 
Kolumbatović founded and effectively ran) and that of the JNO. In both cases, “apoliticism” was 
a ruse to quash republican or leftist movements within an organization that was intended to 
support the government of Yugoslavia unconditionally. The Kingdom of Yugoslavia wanted 
emigrant money, not emigrant opinions.  
 Perhaps because of its missing political program and close ties to widely disliked 
Yugoslav diplomats, the JNO struggled to win the support of pre-existing emigrant societies in 
South America. Winning the loyalty of these societies was central to the JNO’s claim to 
represent the diaspora—the JNO was meant as an umbrella organization for South American 
emigrant civil society, gathering their leaders into a single central committee.968 Nonetheless, 
from the beginning, its leadership consisted of independently affluent businessmen, rather than 
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representatives of worker self-help groups.969 It was a major source of organizational weakness 
that the JNO, unlike UCSSA, was not an organization rooted in working-class activism. In the 
United States, class-based activism had created habits of cooperation between Serb, Croat, and 
Slovene fraternal organizations. These organizations, which were themselves cooperative 
enterprises, grew accustomed to pooling their resources to reach common goals. In South 
America, there was no similar network. Moreover, the relationship between employer and 
employee, on the other hand, is competitive, not cooperative, weakening any potential for a 
diasporic network. Likewise, the JNO’s conservative agenda had little to offer migrant workers, 
many of whom intended to return to the “old country” after a few years abroad.   
As a result, the JNO’s efforts to forge a coalition made little headway. Half a year after 
the JNO was founded, the central committee had grown so impatient with its attempts to woo 
other Yugoslav societies that it openly discussed “forcing an end to talks.” Croatian emigrant 
groups were particularly reluctant to join the JNO, choosing to federate instead into an 
organization calling itself the “Main Croatian National Committee.”970 Leftist organizations, in 
turn, joined the All-Slav congress based in Montevideo (which the JNO boycotted).971 And 
following the spread of news that Draža Mihailović had been making common cause with the 
German occupation to fight Tito’s partisans, the JNO itself experienced a schism, led by the vice 
president and an indeterminate number of discontented members.972 While this new group, which 
also called itself the JNO, did not support Tito, they did denounce the Yugoslav diplomatic 
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service in South America, for their conciliatory approach to fascist governments, as well as for 
their tacit support from the government-in-exile. While the parent group reluctantly recognized 
the London government, the JNO rebels rejected apoliticism, calling for a free and democratic 
Yugoslavia organized as a federation.973 With all this fragmentation and discord, then, the JNO 
could not credibly speak on behalf of an imagined “Yugoslav” diasporic community. The JNO 
came nowhere near the hegemonic position of UCSSA in North America, which linked together 
Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, along with leftists and liberals, with an articulated political 
program.  
 Why did political support for Tito remain marginal in South America? In answering this 
question, it is helpful to return to Sheffer’s conception of a “diaspora” as a political network that 
acts as a conduit for resources, people, information, and ideas.974 As we have already seen, the 
spread of information about the resistance in Yugoslavia is crucial in understanding the 
development of the Yugoslav movement in North America, especially during the chaotic 
conditions of war, where many channels of communication, like the postal service or telegrams, 
became inoperative. In North America, this field of connections between various South Slavic 
groups was dense. As documented in the preceding chapters, Serb, Croat, and Slovene self-help 
societies in North America had a tradition of working together and paying attention to what the 
others were doing and saying. Louis Adamic, in turn, was at the center of this spiderweb, 
disseminating knowledge about Tito that he obtained through his own connections with the OSS, 
the team of ministers, and the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, through these same Serb, Croat, 
and Slovene societies, many of which were honeycombed with leftists and Yugoslavists, thanks 
to the transnational activities of Yugoslav political parties in the 1930s.  
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The emigrant community in South America, on the other hand, was only weakly 
connected with civic life in North America. In August 1941, for instance, the JNO wrote to the 
head of the Yugoslav Legation in North America, Konstantine Fotić, whom they believed could 
put them in contact with representatives of the “Yugoslav diaspora” in North America. Fotić 
never replied.975 Unfortunately for the JNO, Fotić was quietly but covertly opposed to the 
Yugoslav movement in the United States, and (against the orders of the foreign ministry) had 
been leaking information about Ustaša atrocities to the Serbian emigrant newspaper Srbobran 
(translate) (see the next section). On the other hand, North American newspapers like Srbobran 
seldom reached South America, let alone the many small and dispersed emigrant colonies in the 
hinterlands. This was a source of great relief to the JNO and to the Yugoslav legation in Buenos 
Aires, which thought that the spread of information about emigrant affairs in North America 
would be “catastrophic” and “must be prevented.” 976  
At the same time when revelations about the existence of the Partisans triggered the 
formation of UCSSA, the rebellious members of the JNO professed to be “not well enough 
informed on the reason of the quarrel between the two resistance forces in Yugoslavia, whether 
tribal, religious, or ideological.”977 Only the Communists in South America seemed to be aware 
of Tito, sponsoring a resolution at the All-Slav Congress in Montevideo in support of Tito’s 
government in Bihac in April, 1943, 978 over five months after Adamic’s expose of Mihailović 
and six months after the formation of the Bihac government. The lateness of this announcement 
attests to the weakness of the transnational network in South America, which, again, was due to 
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its lack of a base in the working class. Moreover, the Yugoslav Communists lacked a popular 
figure (like Adamic) who could publicize their cause in the mainstream press. Consequently, 
information about Tito did not spread outside the pages of communist periodicals.  
The Government-in-Exile and the Serbian National Defense 
While the Yugoslavist movement in South America was weaker, the movement in North 
America would be more consequential, causing the government-in-exile to give priority to 
winning the loyalty of “Yugoslavs” in the United States. In September 1941, they sent a team of 
heavy-hitters, all ministers-without-portfolio: Bogoljub Jevtić, the former prime minister; Sava 
Kosanović, Nikola Tesla’s nephew; Božidar Marković, the minister of justice; and Franc Snoj, 
leader of the Slovene Clerical party. In addition, the governor of Croatia and the unofficial leader 
of Croatdom, Ban Šubašić, led the delegation, reflecting the government-in-exile’s concern for 
the numerically-dominant Croatian element of the Yugoslav diaspora. In January 1942, this team 
of ministers set up an information bureau aimed at rallying support among Yugoslav-Americans 
for the continued existence of Yugoslavia through speeches, press releases, and collaboration 
with emigrant activists.979  This propaganda work was nominally divided up by “tribe,” with 
Kosanović working with the Serbs, Šubašić the Croats, and Snoj the Slovenes.980 In practice, 
however, Kosanović and Šubašić ended up shouldering most of the work, as Jevtić, Marković 
and Snoj left for London in the first half of 1942.981 In 1943, Kosanović and Šubašić would go 
on to play an important role in UCSSA. 
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Upon arriving, however, Kosanović and company found the emigrant press in an uproar 
over the head of the Yugoslav Legation, Konstantin Fotić, and his alleged ties to a group of 
“greater Serbianists” called the Srpska Narodna Odbrana (Serbian National Defense) as well as 
the newspaper of the Serbian National Union, Srbobran, which acted as a mouthpiece for the 
SNO.982 Beginning in November 1941, Srbobran had launched a blistering press campaign 
against Croats, labeling them as traitors to Yugoslavia and questioning the viability of a future 
Yugoslav state. The opening salvo would be lurid descriptions of Ustaša atrocities in occupied 
Yugoslavia, for which all Croats everywhere were blamed. The source of much of this 
information was the Dankelmann memorandum, a set of grisly photographs and other documents 
compiled by a Serbian Orthodox bishop on behalf of a German general. These documents elided 
the German role in the Ustaša atrocities, placing the blame solely on Croats.983 And somehow, 
Srbobran had gotten its hands on a copy. 
Who was to blame? Because Srbobran had previously acted as a mouthpiece for the 
Yugoslav government—it had enthusiastically supported both Yugoslavia’s pact with Hitler and 
the anti-Nazi coup of March 27, 1941—many believed that the editors were writing on the behest 
of someone within the Yugoslav diplomatic service. In addition, the timing was suggestive, with 
Srbobran beginning its anti-Croat campaign in November, rather than in April, when Croatian 
defections allowed the German Wehrmacht to overrun Yugoslavia in a single month. November, 
however, coincided with the arrival in the United States of Jovan Dučić, the former Yugoslav 
minister to Bucharest and Spain, who could easily have used the diplomatic pouch to smuggle in 
documents. A poet from a peasant background, Dučić was more inclined toward greater-
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Serbianism than Yugoslavism.984 In any event, soon after Dučić’s arrival, at a meeting in South 
Chicago, the Srpska Narodna Odbrana was founded, taking the name of an earlier organization 
founded by Mihajlo Pupin during WWI to support the creation of Yugoslavia. Although 
American law prohibited Jovan Dučić, a foreign national, from leading this organization, it did 
not bar his cousin Mihajlo Dučić, a naturalized American citizen and Indiana dairy magnate, 
from occupying a leadership role or hosting his uncle in his home.985 As with the Domobran, 
familial relationships played a vital role for the Odbrana, helping old country politicians adapt to 
an American context. 
The Odbrana was a small far-right organization whose anti-Croatian provocations were a 
frequent subject of discussion, polemic, and criticism among emigres. Although this chapter 
compares the Odbrana with the Domobran, this comparison is not meant to suggest that the 
Odbrana were fascists. For one, their organizational structure was oligarchical, lacking any 
poglavnik/Führer-type figure.986 The Odbrana also lacked flashy uniforms and a paramilitary 
wing. Nevertheless, the Odbrana attracted the attention of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) 
(the prececessor of the CIA), which regarded the Odbrana’s feud with UCSSA as harmful to 
American wartime unity, especially given that Yugoslavs were overrepresented in the munitions 
industry. As observers, the OSS were relatively neutral, interested more in quashing the feud 
than in choosing sides.987 Perhaps as a result, advocates and detractors of the Odbrana felt no 
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qualms about telling the OSS what they thought about each other. Based on interviews with its 
leadership and its critics, the OSS estimated SNO membership to be between three thousand and 
forty-five hundred, small compared to the largest Serbian émigré association, the Serb National 
Union (which had twenty thousand members),988 but quite large compared to the Domobran in 
the United States, which only had around seventeen hundred members at its peak, which, by 
1941, was long past.989 Even so, membership does not tell the whole story, as not all the 
Odbrana’s members agreed with its anti-Croat political program. In December 1942, for 
instance, the Odbrana branch in McKeesport Pennsylvania announced that it was cutting ties 
with the national organization, pointing out that the original mission of the Odbrana (that is, the 
organization that existed during World War I), was promotion of the Yugoslav idea, to which 
many members of the McKeesport branch were still faithful. Because the Odbrana was not run 
democratically, however, members had no control over the anti-Yugoslav position chosen by the 
organization’s leadership in Gary, Indiana.990 Over time, however, the Odbrana would become 
more ideologically homogenous as dissenters were pushed out or left voluntarily. 
The Odbrana first purged the primary Serbian newspaper, Srbobran. After having 
somehow acquired the position of editor, the Odbrana leader, Branko Pekić, nicknamed “The 
Srbobran dictator,” threatened reporters and columnists with dismissal if they did not adopt an 
anti-Croatian line; one columnist, George Kovačević, a self-identified Yugoslavist, chose 
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unemployment. After that, the rest presumably fell in line.991 With Srbobran, the Odbrana had a 
platform to persuade the rank-and-file of the Serbian National Union, in some cases using 
misinformation. It was apparently standard procedure at Srbobran to edit speeches of King Peter 
of Yugoslavia to remove references to Yugoslav unity or Croatian resistance to the Nazis. 
Likewise, Srbobran altered press releases from the Yugoslav Information Bureau, regularly 
substituting the word “Serbian” for “Yugoslav.” In addition, Srbobran inflated statistics of 
Serbian deaths at the hands of the Ustaša death squads in occupied Croatia, over five hundred 
thousand (contrasted with the official estimate in 1942 of one hundred sixty thousand).992 One 
wonders why this was necessary; the reality was already appalling. In any event, the rapid turn of 
the main Serbian emigre organization toward Serbian chauvinism was more a coup than a mass-
movement, executed through pressure, threats, and disinformation by a small group of 
extremists.  
Although its membership never numbered more than a few thousand, the Odbrana had an 
outsize influence on its parent organization, the Serbian National Union (SNS), from which it 
received a subsidy. Odbrana sympathizers dominated the Supreme Board of the SNS, controlling 
nine out of twelve seats, and could therefore bully and browbeat the SNS’s centrist president, 
Sam Vrlinić.993 In 1943, the Odbrana faction within the SNS succeeded in ousting Vrlinić, who 
had been president of the SNS since its creation, and installing one of their own, Luka 
Kristoforović. Vrlinić had been (ineffectually and covertly) opposed to the Odbrana for some 
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time, but dared not act openly against them for fear of the sizable nationalist bloc within the 
SNS. When he finally openly declared his opposition by proposing an alliance between leftists 
and liberals within the SNS, the nationalists used his alleged Communist sympathies to get him 
expelled from his office. The final vote at the SNS electoral convention was a lopsided 60-40.994  
The Odbrana received another boost from the Serbian exarchate in the United States, 
(itself a client of the Yugoslav Legation) through its chief cleric, Archbishop Dionisije, who had 
succeeded Mardarije. In an interview with OSS agents, Dionisije admitted both to membership in 
a sort of joint directorate (along, presumably, with head of the SNO Dučić, president of the SNS 
Kristoforović, and Odbrana leader Pekić) managing the Odbrana, SNS, and the exarchate, 
although his exact role was unclear. Among the “greater Serbianists,” Dionisije was probably the 
most moderate, being “openly although not too virulently anti-Croat” in his conversations with 
an OSS interlocutor, expressing suspicion of anti-axis Croats, like Ban Šubašić, and skepticism 
about the potential for Serbs and Croats to live together in a single state.995 Dionisije also 
authored at least one article in Srbobran complaining about the collective responsibility of 
Croats for atrocities in the Independent State of Croatia.996  
The Odbrana, it seemed, had the endorsement of the Serbian Orthodox Church. 
Moreover, during Dionisije’s leadership, there were reports of Serbian parish priests going door-
to-door, reminding their parishioners not to participate in any Yugoslav organizations or 
associate with any Croats, and to join the Odbrana. Those who resisted were obliquely threatened 
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with ostracism or even excommunication.997 Although some priests may have willingly 
canvassed for the Odbrana, others acted under duress. According to one rumor, Father Andre 
Popović, who previously supported Yugoslavia in his sermons, was transferred (by Dionisije) 
from an affluent parish in South Chicago to a poor one in Pittsburgh. After Popovic begged for 
his old parish back, Dionisije assented, only requiring that he begin sermonizing against the 
Croats. Popović complied.998  
However, just as there was resistance in Srbobran, local Odbrana organizations, and the 
SNS, there were three Serbian Orthodox priests (out of the thirty-two in North America) who 
refused to adopt an anti-Yugoslav line. Reverends Nikola Drenović of Youngstown, Ohio; 
Emiljan Glocar of Akron, Ohio; and Strahinja Maletić of Aliquippa, Pennsylvania all filed suit in 
1943 against the Serb National Federation, accusing it of libel and interfering with their pastoral 
duties. These three had attracted Srbobran’s ire through their involvement with the United 
Committee of South Slavic Americans. Since many in their congregations read Srbobran, all 
three priests had been confronted by outraged churchgoers.999 Reverend Drenović, elaborating on 
his experience, mentioned that several in his congregation, on the basis of what they had read in 
Srbobran, accused him of communism and atheism, accusations that the writers of Srbobran 
evidently believed could either silence these dissident priests or result in their dismissal.1000 
Given that Dionisije apparently had some influence over Srbobran editorial policy, this instances 
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of coercion would suggest that the rightward turn of the Serbian Orthodox Church was dictated 
by Dionisije, who was coordinating his actions with Dučić’s clique of “greater Serbianists.” 
In many ways, the Srpska Narodna Odbrana resembled in its tactics, if not its goals, the 
Croatian Domobran movement, discussed in Chapter Four. Like the Odbrana, the Domobran 
expanded its ranks by coopting emigrant mutual aid organizations, bullying and intimidating 
those who resisted. Also similar are their paramilitary symbolism—even their names derive from 
the same root, odbraniti, to defend. The key difference, however, is that the Odbrana succeeded 
in flipping a fraternal union to its cause, whereas the Domobran did not. In fact, as Chapter 4 
shows, the Domobran only thrived in areas where preexisting emigrant associations were weakly 
developed.  
The tolerance or support of the Yugoslav Legation in Washington for the Odbrana may 
account for the difference. Without support from the legation, the Odbrana could not have gained 
control of Srbobran or the exarchate, both of which received subsidies through the legation. 
These two organizations gave the Odbrana a voice far out of proportion to their size, normalizing 
their extremist political views. This, in turn, would not have been possible without attempts by 
Yugoslavia to gain control over the Serbian Orthodox Church in the 1920s or the campaign to 
purchase the loyalties of various émigré newspapers during the period of Alexander’s 
dictatorship. Efforts by Yugoslavia to create a loyal diaspora had created a backdoor for a few 
anti-Yugoslav extremists to infiltrate and usurp control over a major emigrant association, 
bypassing the usual barriers to entry that kept the Domobran on the fringes. Without the 
Yugoslav government’s assistance, the Odbrana would have remained a marginal force in émigré 
political life.  
 




The Odbrana and the Ambassador 
Why would Konstantin Fotić, head of the Yugoslav Legation, a person who was 
ostensibly committed to promoting Yugoslav consciousness among migrants, embrace the 
Odbrana? Fotić was a polarizing figure whose exact motives and sympathies may never be 
definitively proven. After World War II, he was tried in absentia and sentenced to twenty years 
of hard labor by Tito’s Yugoslavia.1001 To supporters of Tito, Fotić was an unrepentant Serbian 
chauvinist who deliberately incited ethnic conflict in the United States.1002 But to his supporters, 
he was a hero to the Serbian (not Yugoslav) nationalist cause. In his autobiography, for instance, 
Fotić portrayed himself as a martyr to Communist terror, unfairly “accused of being a 
reactionary, a Serbian chauvinist, and…even a collaborator with the enemy” and “associated 
with the Serbian newspaper Srbobran, and…held responsible for its impassioned editorials 
denouncing the crimes of the Croat Ustashis.”1003 However, as this section will argue, Fotić was 
neither as guilty as his detractors made him out to be, nor as innocent as his autobiography 
suggests. 
Fotić’s involvement with the Odbrana began with a misunderstanding. Following the 
collapse of Yugoslavia in April 1941, Fotić had been put in charge of disseminating information 
about conditions in occupied Yugoslavia by Prime Minister Ninčić.1004 Unfortunately, those 
conditions were of internecine strife. When Fotić obliged and supplied Srbobran with 
information about Croatian atrocities (which possibly included the Dankelmann memorandum), 
he proudly reported doing so to the foreign ministry. Foreign Minister Ninčić rebuked Fotić, who 
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then denied responsibility for the articles in Srbobran.1005 Unfortunately, there is no smoking 
gun, such as a signed letter from Fotić, that proves Fotić was dictating editorial policy at 
Srbobran. On the other hand, Fotić did not pressure Srbobran to change its editorial line. Fotić 
tolerated Srbobran because, after its initial salvo against Croatdom, many of Srbobran’s 
jeremiads were directed at the team of ministers and the Yugoslav Information Bureau, whose 
presence in the United States he seems to have resented as a rebuke for his earlier blunder with 
Srbobran and an encroachment on his role as an propagandist for the government of 
Yugoslavia.1006 As the fate of the Emigrant Deputation (as documented in Chapter 5) indicates, 
Yugoslav diplomats in the United States were territorial about their responsibilities.  
After this incident, Fotić denied that he passed any additional information to Srbobran or 
the SNO. Nonetheless, he was ideally placed to do so. In 1943, Fotić bragged that he had enough 
documentary evidence of Ustaša atrocities in the embassy files to incite a “blood bath in all the 
Serb-Croat communities in the United States,” were they to be released to Srbobran, but he 
denied doing so.1007  Yet his possession of these documents was suspicious—how did he have 
access to this documentation, if his own government did not want him to pass them to 
Srbobran’s editor?  
Fotić must have had other channels. In reports presumably collected for Fotić’s trial in 
absentia by Tito’s Yugoslavia, one former official who had worked with the government-in-exile 
in Cairo testified that Fotić obtained these reports via a Colonel Putnik and Branislav Denić, who 
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acted as a liaison between royalist guerrillas in Yugoslavia and the government-in-exile. These 
two figures, in turn, obtained their information by amalgamating news from the party organ of 
Ante Pavelić in quisling Croatia, the party organ of General Nedić in occupied Serbia, and the 
Donau Zeitung, published by the German garrison in Belgrade.1008  Admittedly, a Communist 
show trial is not the most reliable source. But there are other corroborating accounts as well. In 
1947, Milan Sekulić, the former Royal Yugoslav government’s minister to the United Nations 
Relief and Rehabilition Association, sued Harper and Brothers for a claim in Louis Adamić’s 
book My Native Land that Sekulić had been the main point of contact between Prime Minister 
Nedić and Fotić. According to Adamic, Sekulić used a passport issued by Nedić to bring 
extensive documentation of Ustaša atrocities to the government-in-exile to London in 1941, from 
which Fotić smuggled it in to the United States via the diplomatic pouch.1009 This too is 
speculation, and it could well have been Jovan Dučić who brought the Dankelmann 
memorandum from London instead. The chronology lines up better. However, Dučić passed 
away in April 1943, so anything brought to the USA afterwards, such as, for example, articles 
written by Sekulić in London and published in Srbobran in June, 1943, 1010 cannot be linked to 
Dučić.  
That said, Fotić did exercise a moderating influence on the Odbrana. For instance, a few 
months after the Odbrana was founded in September 1941, the president of the Odbrana wrote to 
Fotić asking whether his organization ought to attend the yearly Yugoslav Unity Day celebration 
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and whether it could be renamed, probably to something Serbian.1011 Fotić replied in the 
affirmative to the former, informing the Odbrana that Yugoslavia represented the culmination of 
“those ideals for which the best sons of our people laid down their lives for over a century.”1012  
In another instance, in May 1942, Šubašić, through his contacts in the OSS, sought to pressure 
Fotić to persuade Srbobran to adopt a pro-Yugoslav line.1013 The OSS obliged, mainly to test 
whether Fotić held any sway over Srbobran.1014 As it turned out, he did—less than a week later, 
Srbobran abandoned its call for a greater Serbia, ceased to use irony quotations to refer to 
Yugoslavia, and came out in support of a (Serb-dominated) Yugoslavia.1015 A partial success, but 
better than nothing at all.  
In another incident in February 1943, Fotić called the editors of Srbobran to account after 
they had accused Slovenes of collective treason against Yugoslavia. Fotić was apparently fine 
with imputing the collective guilt of Croats, but insulting Slovenes was a step too far. The 
Foreign Ministry agreed, notifying Fotić that “the writing of Srbobran against Slovenes does not 
serve the interests of Yugoslavia” and ordering him to “make sure that they are categorically 
aware of this.” Fotić replied, stating that he had already done so,1016 again confirming the 
working relationship he had with Branko Pekić, Srbobran’s editor.  
Another instance of Fotić moderating Odbrana demands came in June 1943, when the 
Washington legation received a petition from the Odbrana urging Peter II of Yugoslavia to 
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change his title to King of Serbia. Fotić refused to convey this petition to his government, 
explaining to the petitioners that doing so was against the policy and interests of his 
government.1017  
None of these attempts to blunt the exclusive Serbian nationalism of the Odbrana, 
however, seemed to have a lasting effect. Moreover, they showcase Fotić’s influence over 
Srbobran and the Odbrana—making him partially responsible for not curbing their otherwise 
anti-Yugoslav activities. Lastly, these instances reveal that regardless of what Fotić may have 
thought of the matter, the Odbrana viewed Fotić as a leader and sympathizer to their cause. For a 
diplomat who had, in the OSS’s assessment, “been spoiled to a certain extent by his successes in 
Washington,” acquiring “a taste for authority (which is often found among the Serbs),”1018 the 
allure of embracing the Odbrana may have proved irresistible.   
Fotić's Questionable Friendships 
Aside from Srbobran, Fotić supported some leading figures in the Odbrana. There was, 
for instance, the matter of Ruth Mitchell, the honorary president of the Odbrana, to whom Fotić 
may have fed information on Croatian atrocities(Fotić denied doing so to his superiors in the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs).1019  
Ruth Michell is a fascinating figure. An American with British citizenship, Mitchell 
formed a romantic attachment to the Serbs after living in Yugoslavia for several years. Although 
ostensibly a correspondent for the London periodical the Weekly Illustrated, Mitchell’s 1943 
account of her time in Yugoslavia reveals skills more characteristic of a spy than a journalist: 
shooting, riding, evading surveillance, managing informants, bribing officials, and withstanding 
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torture.1020 Mitchell also knew of Bill Donovan (the founder of the OSS) and was closely 
connected to the British legation in Yugoslavia (spies typically operate out of embassies or 
consulates). Finally, the Italian, Yugoslav, and German intelligence services all thought she was 
a spy and tried to have her arrested or deported several times.1021 Where there is this much smoke 
there is probably fire. It is possible that Mitchell was a case officer with non-official cover for 
the British intelligence service, assigned to the Western Balkans in 1939 to organize resistance if 
Germany or Italy invaded.  
Buttressing this hypothesis, Mitchell joined the Četnik organization of Kosta Pećanac 
almost immediately after her arrival, and, once war broke out in 1941, worked for him as a 
spy.1022 Mitchell was based in Dubrovnik, where she collected information about the Italian and 
German garrison. In May 1941, Mitchell was captured by the Gestapo, who accused her of 
spying for the British (a charge her subsequent memoir never quite denies) and imprisoned her. 
Because Germany was reluctant to execute an American citizen, Mitchell survived her captivity 
and was eventually able to return to the US through a prisoner exchange in June 1942. Her cover 
blown, Mitchell continued to assist the Četniks as a propagandist and public speaker in the 
United States. Once in the US, she switched her allegiance to Draža Mihailović from Kosta 
Pećanac. This was a pragmatic move— Pećanac had begun to cooperate with the Nedić quisling 
government against communist guerrillas, which would not play well among an American 
audience. 1023  
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Mitchell would also write articles for Srbobran, where her devotion to Serbian 
ultranationalism was made all the more remarkable by her lack of Serbian ancestry.1024 
Mitchell’s view of the Balkans were shaped by a deep hatred of Germans (a product of her 
captivity), coupled with a quintessentially American racial essentialism. Croats were, to 
Mitchell, “a guilty race.”1025 Mitchell believed in the collective guilt of all Croats for the 
defections of Croatian army officers during the invasion and the atrocities of the Independent 
State of Croatia. Croats were, in her view, too Germanized and too fond of intrigue, in contrast to 
the Serbs, who she characterizes as a naïve and martial “race.”1026 Every disaster or mistake in 
interwar Yugoslavia was, according to Mitchell, the fault of Croat provocations, from Puniša 
Račić’s assassination of Stjepan Radić to Yugoslavia’s decision to join the Tripartite Pact!1027 
Not surprisingly, Mitchell did not believe in the viability of a future Yugoslav state. Despite her 
opposition to Yugoslavism, Fotić nonetheless recommended Mitchell for a medal to the foreign 
ministry in October, 1942, long after her political opinions had become public knowledge.1028 
In addition, Fotić had both personal and ideological motives to pass on propaganda from 
occupied Serbia. Through blood or marriage Fotić was related to General Nedić, leader of 
quisling Serbia, as well as Dimitrije Ljotić, who headed a fascist party in interwar 
Yugoslavia.1029 As previous chapters have underlined, family ties were often also political—one 
needs only look at Jovan and Mihailo Dučić, Svetozar and Stojan Pribićević, or Mile and Frank 
Budak. In addition, Fotić’s beliefs, expressed in confidence to an OSS interviewer, also aligned 
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him with the “greater Serbianists.” Serbs, Fotić averred, could not forgive the crimes committed 
against them by the Ustaša regime. Furthermore, Fotić believed that all Croats, including the 
Croatian Peasant Party, bore some responsibility for the killings and for the collapse of 
Yugoslavia during the April War.1030 Similarly, in his autobiography, which was written after 
World War II, Fotić stated that his “position was this: the theory of Yugoslav nationhood which 
had been tried out in the period between the two world wars had failed completely,” a failure for 
which he blamed the Croats at length.1031  
In view of these connections with the Nedić regime in Serbia, as well as his support for 
greater-Serbianists, Fotić may have been laying a contingency plan for a postwar settlement, 
possibly Nazi-dominated, that involved the creation of an independent Serbian state. In such a 
situation, Fotić probably would have kept his comfortable and prestigious job. After all, until the 
Battle of Stalingrad ended in defeat for Germany in early 1943, the Nazi juggernaut appeared 
unstoppable.  In other words, Fotić was not a committed Serbian nationalist, but an opportunist 
who was hedging his bets. 
It is for this reason that the upgrading of the Washington legation to an embassy and 
Fotić’s promotion from minister to ambassador in late 1942 (over the objections of Sava 
Kosanović, the rest of the team of ministers, the Yugoslav Information Bureau in Washington, 
and majority of the government-in-exile) infuriated emigrants, who saw it as an official 
endorsement of Fotić’s covert, but widely suspected, support for “greater Serbianism.”1032 In 
1943, Kosanović and the rest of the team of ministers were dismissed, except for Ban Šubašić, 
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who followed through on his threat to resign King Peter appointed Fotić to be ambassador.1033 
This governmental crisis also brought down Foreign Minister Ninčić, several months later, 
following a series of attacks on him in the emigrant press.1034  
Clearly, what the “tenth banovina” thought mattered to the government-in-exile. But the 
damage had already been done, and Fotić moved quickly to marginalize pro-Yugoslav voices in 
the diplomatic service in the United States. In April, 1943 Fotić disbanded the Yugoslav 
Information Bureau in New York, which had sided with Sava Kosanović against him. With the 
team of ministers out of the way, there was no one in a position to contest Fotić’s control over 
propaganda. Perhaps as a result, Fotić became more open in his opposition to a post-war 
Yugoslavia, now proclaiming it impossible unless “the Croats have expiated their crimes.”1035 As 
such, 1943 may be regarded as the end of the Royal Yugoslav government’s support for the 
promotion of overseas Yugoslavism.   
 By 1943, however, the government-in-exile had become largely irrelevant. Even before 
this final shake-up, changes in the government-in-exile were greeted with apathy or derision by 
the émigré press—the popular quip being that the new government was “neither new nor a 
government.”1036 Moreover, by 1944, the government-in-exile was bankrupt—one rumor, 
subsequently denied by the Yugoslav government, was that their account in London had been 
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frozen by Barclays following another cabinet shakeup, which left the position of minister of 
finance empty.1037 True or not, the government-in-exile was clearly in desperate straits. Sava 
Kosanović, for instance, had his pension illegally cut off on April 1, 1944,1038 which was both 
retaliation for his support for Tito and a way to economize. Lastly, the paper records of the 
Washington Embassy for 1944 are sparse compared to previous years, hinting at shutdown or 
dysfunction. The Yugoslav government-in-exile, it seemed, was a spent force.  
Sava Kosanović Defects to the Titoists 
Although emigrants from Yugoslavia were split between UCSSA and the Odbrana, the 
evident decline of the Yugoslav government, and the defection of one of its members, Sava 
Kosanović, to the Tito-supporters gave UCSSA a shot of much-needed legitimacy. Kosanović’s 
“Road to Damascus” ran through Louis Adamic. Beginning in 1942, as part of his work in the 
team of ministers and efforts to rally the diaspora, Kosanović contacted Louis Adamic, who 
consulted with Kosanović and Snoj about the internal politics of American Slovene 
organizations.1039 Adamic advised them that monarchism was unlikely to win over many 
Yugoslav Americans, Slovenes in particular being fiercely anti-royalist (Adamic certainly 
was).1040 Apparently Kosanović found Adamic’s advice useful, as he began seeking his council 
on other topics in the first half of 1943, such as Kosanović’s meetings with foreign heads of state 
like Beneš,1041 or  the postwar political organization for Yugoslavia. For the latter, Adamic 
favored a “fresh beginning” rather than prewar arrangements like the Croatian banovina.1042 
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Kosanovic would be increasingly exposed to Adamic’s opinions when he began proofreading 
chapters of Adamic’s new book, called My Native Land, published 1943, which glamorized 
Tito’s Partisans.1043 Only trusted friends read chapter drafts, and Kosanović had to have been 
sympathetic to the Partisans, or he would not have agreed on to this task. Kosanović may have 
also begun leaking information about the government-in-exile to Adamic at this point, as My 
Native Land had an entire chapter detailing backbiting and intrigues within the government-in-
exile. 1044 It is likely that Kosanović was Adamic’s anonymous source for this chapter—no one 
else had had access to that sort of information and the motive to reveal it to Adamic. Although 
still a minister, Kosanović, like Fotić, had begun to work against his own government, which 
appeared increasingly moribund 
Through Adamic, Kosanovic also became acquainted with another of Adamic’s allies, the 
mayor of New York, Fiorello la Guardia, whom Adamic had befriended in 1940 at a fundraiser. 
Adamic even had a nickname for la Guardia: “Cvyetko,” a Slovene translation of “Fiorello,” 
Italian for “Little Flower.” La Guardia, although of Italian origin, was sympathetic to the 
Yugoslav cause, based on his time spent as a consul in Italian Fiume, which had a Slavic 
hinterland.1045 Although la Guardia knew a few score “Yugoslav” words, (chiefly profanity)1046 
he could not read the letters written to him in Serbo-Croatian that he occasionally received as 
mayor of a multiethnic metropolis. Kosanović helped la Guardia translate.1047 La Guardia, in 
turn, helped Kosanović deliver a radio address in Italian on September 18, 1942, on Yugoslav-
Italian diaspora relations. Interestingly, this would be the first speech where Kosanović dropped 
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explicit references to Mihailović and adopted some leftist phraseology, addressing the “peasant 
and worker masses.”1048 Kosanović, spending time with Adamic, was drifting left. Once 
Kosanović lost his position in the government-in-exile in June 1943, he had little keeping him 
from joining the pro-Tito camp. By November, 1943, Kosanović was writing articles for 
Slobodna Reč and the UCSSA bulletin (which Adamic edited), and openly praising Tito.1049 In 
December 1943, Kosanović sent cordial greeting to the Tito-Ribar government and placed 
himself at their disposal.1050 Just as Fotić bet on a postwar Nedić-governed Serbia, it seems 
Kosanović’s embrace of Tito’s Yugoslavia was partially opportunistic. Nonetheless, Kosanović, 
as a former minister, diplomat, and elite accustomed to moving in high circles, was a valuable 
ally for the lobbying efforts of UCSSA. 
 Kosanovic’s defection was not welcomed by the Odbrana, who repeatedly denounced 
him as a traitor, and, bizarrely, as a descendent of a notorious 19th century Ottoman official, a 
crypto-Croat, and a Nazi.1051 Kosanović also received at least one death threat, in which the 
writer promised to “break all the bones, that the Germanic Croats have put in your body (sic)” if 
the writer saw “in the newspapers any more attacks on our Serbian Knightly Chetnik Ruth 
Mitchell.”1052  
Diplomacy with the Odbrana seemed increasingly futile as their rejection of Yugoslavism 
became louder and more vehement. On June 27 and 28, 1943, the Odbrana held a “Serbian 
Congress,” a response to the pro-Tito Croat, Slovene, and Serb Congresses held earlier that year. 
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At this new congress, the Odbrana backed Draža Mihajlović to the hilt, but endorsed a platform 
of full-throated Serbian nationalism. The honorary president of the Odbrana, Ruth Mitchell, 
dressed up in a Četnik outfit, was the keynote speaker. In her speech, Mitchell denounced 
Yugoslavia, Croats, and Slovenes, calling for an ethnically pure Serbian state including all 
Serbian settlements outside of Serbia proper—a project that would have required ethnic 
cleansing, given that Serbian exclaves in the Western Balkans were not territorially contiguous 
with Serbia proper. Additionally, Mitchell called for the expulsion of all non-Serbian members 
of the government-in-exile.1053 New converts tend to be overzealous. In any event, by mid 1943, 
the main division in the diaspora, the rivalry between Serbian nationalists and Serb, Croat, and 
Slovene Titoists, had hardened. 
 The division between the pro-Mihailovic faction and the pro-Tito faction manifested 
themselves in the 1943 Unification Day celebrations in New York in December. As an invented 
tradition, Unification Day now served to unite the diaspora, but also, paradoxically, to divide it. 
Unlike previous years, there were two competing events. There was, of course, the usual 
celebration, which was held in a Serbian Orthodox and Slovenian Catholic church, supported by 
the legation, and boycotted by Croats. For the first time in the consul’s memory, the Slovene 
priest withheld the customary benediction—an inauspicious sign. Even more ominous for the 
regime, there was also an anti-government Unification Day gala hosted by UCSSA, despite the 
holiday’s origins as a propaganda tool for the Yugoslav monarchy. Of course, UCSSA renovated 
the holiday somewhat, removing the religious elements and bringing in several speakers, 
including Kosanović, who praised Tito and denounced Mihailović, Fotić, and the government-in-
exile. In lieu of the Yugoslav anthem, the organizers played a mix of American songs and “Ej 
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Sloveni,”1054 or “Hey Slavs,” a patriotic song whose chief virtue was the lack of a King in its 
lyrics.  
Unbeknownst to UCSSA, “Ej Sloveni” was popular among Tito’s Partisans as well and 
would eventually become Yugoslavia’s postwar national anthem. Although just a coincidence, it 
was a striking one—the sounds and rhetoric of Yugoslavia’s future were being heard in 
Arlington Hall, New York.  
The Death of Nikola Tesla 
 The bitter divisions between the supporters of Tito and those of Mihailović were even 
more apparent during the death and funeral of Nikola Tesla in 1943. Tesla was universally 
revered by Yugoslav emigrants, and although he had never shown much interest in the disputes 
between Belgrade’s supporters and detractors over the previous decades, his endorsement was 
avidly sought nonetheless.  
Beginning in 1937, Tesla, now impoverished, began periodically approaching the 
Washington legation for short-term loans of several thousand dollars. Over the next few years, 
this evolved into a monthly stipend of $600. Ironically, the legation was far more generous with 
Tesla than they were with the various emigrant educational and cultural initiatives designed to 
promote Yugoslavism. But Tesla had something that could pry open Fotić’s tight fist, some sort 
of theoretical energy weapon, a “death ray.” Keeping Tesla solvent could help keep Yugoslavia 
secure from foreign foes, the legation reasoned. Morever, Tesla seemed quite close to death, 
reasoned Fotić in 19371055—the stipend would only be a short-term investment. Ironically, Tesla 
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would outlive the first Yugoslavia by a few years, although Yugoslav soldiers armed with “death 
rays” might have saved it from German invasion. After 1941, despite the strained finances of a 
government without people to tax, the stipend continued, albeit diminished by a third.1056 
Clearly, Tesla’s stipend was never just about military hardware, but also propaganda.  
For that reason, it is not surprising that Louis Adamic, over the course of 1942 and early 
1943, lobbied a number of American public figures, from Wendell Wilkie to Eleanor Roosevelt, 
insisting, without corroboration, that Tesla resented receiving a pension from the Yugoslav 
government-in-exile and asking about securing a pension for Tesla from an alternate source.1057 
Ironically, in 1934 Tesla had issued a scathing denunciation of Adamic’s first book, A Native’s 
Return, for the New York Times, calling it “malicious.” Tesla resented Adamic’s anti-
monarchism and revered King Alexander I, whom he called “a heroic figure…both the 
Washington and the Lincoln of the Yugoslavs.”1058 Adamic apparently did not hold a grudge. 
Neither, it seemed, did Tesla. In the last years of his life, Tesla devoted himself to 
fighting the growing influence of the Odbrana while seeking to unify the rest of the diaspora. 
Addressing the Serb National Federation in 1941, Tesla denounced the Nazi invasion but subtly 
declined to implicate Croats, calling Ante Pavelić simply a “criminal” without appending an 
ethnic signifier, and reminding his audience that King Alexander’s last words were “Preserve 
Yugoslavia.”1059  A year later, Tesla wrote an open letter in Serbo-Croatian to “his brothers in 
America,” publicizing the epistle with the help of Sava Kosanović and the Yugoslav Information 
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Bureau in New York. In the letter, Tesla underlined that Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes had to 
support the war effort together to show their loyalty to the old country and their new adopted 
land.1060 Tesla addressed the Serbian Vidovdan Congress in Detroit a few months later with 
much the same message,1061 a tacit endorsement of UCSSA. Moreover, in 1942, Tesla rejected 
the Odbrana’s attempt to make him honorary president of their organization (they would 
eventually choose Ruth Mitchell for that position).1062 Tesla, despite his monarchism, was not 
interested in the Odbrana’s brand of politics. Tesla spoke to the All-Slav Congress insisting that 
Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes support the war effort together and that efforts to undermine this 
unity were “helping the enemy.”1063 And there matters stood, when Tesla passed away on 
January 7, 1943 of coronary thrombosis, aggravated by poverty. He was eighty-six. 
 Instead of halting with Tesla’s death, the battle for his endorsement only intensified 
during the scientist’s funeral, which featured competing eulogies by both Partisan and Četnik 
supporters. Fotić delivered the Četnik eulogy, emphasizing Tesla’s “great love for science and 
his two fatherlands.” But which “fatherland” did Fotić mean—Yugoslavia or Serbia? The rest of 
Fotić’s speech implied it was the latter. For instance, Fotić emphasized Tesla’s “modest Serbian 
home…in Smiljevo” and his early memories of Orthodox churches, while promising to build an 
engineering institute named in honor of Tesla in postwar Belgrade,1064 (even though Tesla was 
born in Croatia and had only spent a single day in Belgrade, in 18921065). Fotić also refused to 
specify whether Belgrade would be the capital of a postwar Yugoslavia or a postwar Serbia.  
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A diametrically opposed portrait of Tesla’s political sympathies was presented by Sava 
Kosanović, in one final message to the Serbian National Federation, which he still hoped to bring 
back to the Yugoslav fold. In his address, Kosanović claimed that Tesla “hated chauvinism and 
nationalist blindness,” that Tesla had told him that he “was a Serb but at the same time a Croat, 
because we are one.” He represented Tesla’s decision to rebuke the Odbrana’s offer of 
membership as part of a lifelong commitment to Yugoslavism and anti-fascism.1066 A further 
effort to associate Tesla with Yugoslavism was made by having UCSSA ally and Croat Zlatko 
Baloković play “Tamo Daleko,” a Serbian song, over the radio announcement of Tesla’s death. 
“Tamo Daleko,” a song in a minor key whose name translates to “There, far away,” expresses 
nostalgia for a distant homeland. In the original lyrics, that homeland was Serbia. However, 
because Baloković’s performance lacked lyrical accompaniment, which homeland remained 
unspecified. Within this context, “Tamo Daleko” was less about Serbia and more about the 
experience, common to all Yugoslav migrants, of exile and old-country nostalgia. Ironically, 
Adamic’s eulogy, delivered after Baloković’s performance by Fiorello la Guardia, was probably 
the most faithful to Tesla’s politics. Presenting him as a man above nationality or the pursuit of 
profit, a dreamer concerned only with scientific possibility, Adamic wrote and la Guardia spoke:  
Why mourn Tesla? His life is a triumph…which is our triumph, a triumph of all 
the people of the world…we celebrate his contributions to our life, to the sum 
total of civilization, and human potentialities in America and everywhere, which 
will be as permanent as man himself…he is a feather in the cap of the whole 
human race, and Yugoslavia and America can be proud of him.1067  
 
After all, Adamic was not just a Yugoslav patriot, but also an American nationalist and a 
socialist internationalist, and his Tesla could fit that mold as well (so long as one glossed over 
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Tesla’s monarchism). Ultimately, Tesla’s funeral, like Unification Day, was another example of 
how the symbolic vocabulary of Yugoslav legitimacy were being repurposed and given new 
meanings, both toward a socialist version of Yugoslavism, but also toward national separatism. 
Syncretism of the South Slavs in America 
In the last years of the war, the activities of the UCSSA consisted not only of fundraising 
and lobbying on behalf of the Partisans, but also articulating a specific form of Yugoslavism that 
drew political lessons from the United States. The three major speechmakers of the UCSSA, 
Zlatko Baloković, Louis Adamic, and Sava Kosanović, stayed relentlessly on message.  
At a press conference discussing the formation of a Tito-led provisional government for 
Yugoslavia, Kosanović described the new government as “liberal and progressive” and argued 
that the “forces of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes…tend toward unity, freedom and 
democracy.”1068 In a radio interview for WHN conducted a few days later  in New York, 
Kosanović emphasized that the partisan struggle had laid the groundwork for “a real people’s 
democracy,” that Tito’s government was “unequivocally pledged to the peaceful democratic 
development of Yugoslavia,” and that the problem of Serbo-Croat relations would be resolved 
with “unity and democracy.” The glorification of democracy is, of course, not unique to 
American political discourse. But it was certainly calculated to appeal to an American audience, 
a motive we also discern in Kosanović’s decision to call King Peter the Liberator (whose 
grandson had a brief place in Tito’s government) “Yugoslavia’s George Washington.”1069  In 
another undated speech found in his papers, Kosanović developed on this theme, drawing 
extended political parallels between the United States and Yugoslavia. Like Yugoslavia, he 
argued, the United States, when it was still a young nation and “politically immature,” went 
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through a bloody civil war, and yet emerged united and wiser for the experience. Yugoslavia, 
Kosanović argued, would undergo a similar evolution.1070 Time will tell whether he was overly 
optimistic for both states, or just one of them.  
 
Fig. 12: UCSSA Fundraiser with Zinka Milanov singing. At bottom, from left to right, Louis 
Adamic, Fiorello LaGuardia, Zlatko Balokovic, and three unidentified people. Undated, 1943-
45?. Zlatko Baloković papers, Box 3, Folder 7. IHRCA.  
 
Regardless, American history could be mined and repurposed to serve the UCSSA 
version of Yugoslavism. The committee’s events, as we can see above, tended to deploy the 
symbols of American patriotism alongside their efforts to rally support behind Yugoslavia. 
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Moreover, the leaders of UCSSA repeatedly compared the American and Yugoslav experience in 
their speeches and writings. Adamic, for instance, repeatedly highlighted the parallels between 
the American revolution and Yugoslavia’s struggle for independence. Speaking at one luncheon 
hosted by the New York Herald Tribune in early 1944,  Adamic argued that “Tito’s military 
force, now so valuable to us, grew as a revolution, grew from political and spiritual motivations 
in the people which are democratic and in line with the American revolution.”1071 In another 
speech held a few weeks later in the Serbian enclave of Gary, Indiana, Adamic argued that “the 
spirit of idealism which we here call Americanism lives elsewhere, under other names, or 
without a name. In Yugoslavia, for instance.”1072 In fact, Adamic made this connection in almost 
every speech made after 1943. Nor was he alone.  
Zlatko Baloković, in a speech made at a luncheon in late 1944, commented that the 
“Yugoslav people,” in their struggle against foreign domination, exhibit “the same indomitable 
resolve which inspired Patrick Henry’s outcry: ‘Give me liberty, or give me death’.” Within the 
same interview, Baloković quoted Lincoln’s Gettysburg address, asserting that the political goal 
of the partisans was a “government of the people, by the people, and for the people.”1073 
Baloković clung to this view even after the war ended and it became apparent that Tito was not, 
in fact, a democrat. In a 1946 interview Baloković argued that because of the long history of 
migration from Yugoslavia to America, “the contact between Yugoslavian democracy and 
American democracy is absolutely something living and Yugoslavia will never stop until she has 
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a perfect political, economic, and ethnic democracy.”1074 Indeed, UCSSA’s support for Tito was 
based not on support for socialism, but on the perceived resonance of Tito’s Partisan movement 
with American-style democracy and federalism.  
Moreover, it is possible, albeit unlikely, that the committee’s activities and lobbying 
contributed to Roosevelt’s decision to begin supporting the Partisan movement at the Tehran 
conference in late November,1943. Although this is speculative, Adamic did have the ear of the 
president. Adamic famously met with Roosevelt for dinner in January 1942, after which he jotted 
down his recollections, later collected (and probably embellished) in a book published in 1946 
after Roosevelt’s death. 1075 This meeting took place, however, before Adamic knew of Tito. 
Adamic also corresponded with Eleanor Roosevelt over the course of 1942.1076 Lastly, Adamic 
mentioned in the afterward to his book that he had written  Roosevelt in 1943 to urge him to 
support the Partisans, but a copy of this letter eluded this researcher.1077 Although the evidence 
for a continued relationship between Adamic and Roosevelt during and 1943 is rather sparse, 
there exists the possibility that Adamic may have helped persuade Roosevelt to support Tito. 
On the other hand, evidence suggests that Roosevelt was not particularly interested in 
Southeastern Europe—at one speech in late 1942, Roosevelt mistakenly substituted “Serbia” for 
Yugoslavia in his list of countries fighting the Axis, a lapse which the Odbrana immediately 
seized upon, to the annoyance of UCSSA’s leadership.1078 And when making conversation with 
Adamic at dinner in January 1942, Roosevelt asked Adamic if he knew King Peter of Yugoslavia 
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and told him with a dated anecdote about how in 1919 he had met with “King Nikita of 
Montenegro (sic).”1079 Afterwards, Roosevelt realized, to general amusement (and Adamic’s 
disquiet), that he had forgotten to get Albania’s signature for Declaration of the United Nations, 
which laid the groundwork for the UN Charter.1080 If anything, the decision of the Allies to 
switch their support to Tito had more to do with British realpolitik and Tito’s military acumen 
than Adamic’s weak influence over Roosevelt. Still, with books like Two Way Passage and My 
Native Land, or with speeches that emphasizing that Tito was a democrat in the American mold, 
UCSSA helped make public opinion more amenable to Tito, making Roosevelt’s support of a 
Communist guerrilla leader a political possibility.  
Stojan Pribićević’s Partisan Adventure 
 The Allied endorsement of the Partisans, in turn, made it possible for UCSSA to expand 
the scope of its activities in favor of a postwar Yugoslavia. As the previous chapters have 
underlined, travel to the old country plays an outsize role in diaspora nationalism, helping 
migrants “rediscover” their heritage and giving these travelers symbolic capital in nationalist 
movements. During World War II, for obvious reasons, travel to the old country was beyond the 
reach of all but the most adventurous and heavily-armed. This, however, simply improved its 
symbolic cachet.  
In UCSSA’s rivalry with the Odbrana and the supporters of Mihailović, having first-hand 
experience of conditions in occupied Yugoslavia could give an organization additional 
credibility and legitimacy. We see this, for instance, in an acrimonious epistolary exchange 
between Konstantin Fotić and Stojan Pribićević, who wrote an article for Fortune in late 1943 
insinuating that Fotić had been fabricating telegrams from Mihailović to drum up support for the 
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Četniks. This exchange, which Fotić called “angry and threatening,” ended with both Pribićević 
and Fotić claiming to have possession of “facts which… could not possibly be placed at [the 
other’s] disposal.”1081 
Winning the argument was less important than being seen to have an inside line to 
Yugoslavia, as the latter was prized by the diaspora nationalist imagination. There are few better 
examples of this than the case of Ruth Mitchell, who, based on her experiences with the Četniks, 
became an “honorary Serb.” It was difficult for Kosanović to dispute or debunk Mitchell’s lurid 
descriptions of Croatian atrocities in occupied Yugoslavia, forcing him to sidestep the issue of 
Mitchell’s veracity and attack her as an agent-provocateur for fascists.1082 After all, Mitchell had 
been in occupied Yugoslavia and Kosanović had not. To counteract the effects of Mitchell, one 
group of pro-Tito Yugoslavs based in the Santa Clara valley of California tried to publicize their 
own Ruth Mitchell, a Partisan woman who went by the pseudonym Milka Kovačević. According 
to her account, she, like Mitchell, escaped from Yugoslavia with the help of the Partisan 
underground. Also like Mitchell, she had a few exciting anecdotes, such as when she robbed a 
train carrying munitions, after which she and her partisan compatriots “returned those munitions 
in our own way!”1083 Nonetheless, Ms. Kovačević never achieved the same level of notoriety as 
Mitchell, perhaps because California was too geographically removed from the main hubs of 
Yugoslav activism in the Midwest. UCSSA needed someone else.  
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That person would be Stojan Pribićević, another ally of Adamic, who shared Adamic’s 
desire to make the Partisans more widely known. They were also on friendly terms and edited 
each other’s work.1084 Pribićević had gotten a job as a war correspondent for Time magazine, and 
in May 1944, he was deposited by an allied plane on a mountain airfield behind partisan lines, 
accompanied only by the Reuters correspondent and two photographers. This would be his first 
time in his “old country” since 1932,1085 when he was sent to the United States by his father 
Svetozar to polemicize for the Demokratska Stranka (Democratic Party). Now Stojan was 
writing for Time and Tito—the involvement of Yugoslav parties in American politics had a 
legacy that few in the 1930s could have predicted. 
   Pribićević’s articles were not brief—one ended up being five columns spread over three 
pages, with pictures. That Time would give Pribićević so much space speaks volumes about the 
increasing acceptability of Tito in American political discourse. As a nod toward American 
tastes, his depiction of Tito neglected all mention of ideology, focusing instead on appearances: 
Tito’s underground base; his “permanent flicker of a smile on [his] boldly-carved face”; his 
“German police dog the size of a calf”; his tastes in food, cigarettes, and automobiles; and lastly 
his various offensives against the Germans. The effect was to convey a portrait of a 
swashbuckling figure, a bold guerrilla leader with a taste for Camel cigarettes, brandy, and 
jeeps.1086 When avoiding ideology was not possible, Pribićević chose to downplay it. When 
describing the hammer and sickle and the red star on the partisan caps, for instance, Pribićević 
wrote that “this does not mean that the members of the corp are communist, since the majority 
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are non-communist.” Rather, he asserted, it was simply the “traditional emblem” of a single 
brigade, one which, moreover, would soon be replaced with a national emblem of five flames, 
each symbolizing one Yugoslav nationality.1087 In another dispatch, Pribićević discussed the 
supposed freedom of speech in Partisan-occupied Yugoslavia, claiming that in Bosnia “all 
political opinions are allowed except those advocating or justifying collaboration with the 
Germans or the quislings.” Even monarchism was permitted, he claimed, although not 
popular.1088 In another, Pribićević wrote that “there is no collective farm planning…every 
peasant sows and plants what he thinks best.1089 Collectivization was, of course, a bugbear for 
many Americans leery of communism. In making Tito seem more American, Pribićević’s 
account was entirely consistent with the UCSSA platform.  
But what turned Pribićević’s educational (but quotidian) documentary about life in 
occupied Yugoslavia into a propaganda masterstroke was his dramatic capture by German 
paratroopers. Though quick thinking and knowledge of German kept him from being shot as a 
spy, Stojan would spend the next day a prisoner, unarmed, and under sharpshooter fire—his 
German captors kept him on the front line and forced him to carry their wounded. Stojan only 
finally managed to escape after the Germans were routed, at which point he was rescued by the 
partisans—ironically, by a brigade named after Nikola Tesla.1090 It was an adventure out of a 
Hollywood script, and it would be this article, according to Adamic, which would really excite 
the American public.1091 How could it not?   
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UCSSA and Democracy 
Adamic and UCSSA sought to influence the postwar development of Yugoslavia by 
convincing politicians on both sides of the Atlantic to support their vision of a postwar 
democratic Yugoslavia. At his meeting with FDR in early 1942, Roosevelt briefly discussed 
another of Adamic’s books, Two Way Passage, published in 1941, which proposed that the 
postwar reconstruction of Europe be accomplished through the voluntary repatriation of 
“immigrants who have entered the United States during the past fifty years…to their respective 
fatherlands, taking with them all their cultural, education and financial attributes and 
possessions, to transplant them among their people in all walks of life and watch the great 
transformation which will take place in those lands.” The great transformation, Adamic believed, 
would be “an American revolution in Europe,” democratizing Europe through “these European 
immigrants [that] founded a democracy here in America.”1092 This was much the same program 
as UCSSA had for Yugoslavia—writ large. Roosevelt thought Adamic’s Two-Way Passage 
proposal “opens vistas,” if Adamic’s account is to be trusted.1093 But why Roosevelt liked this 
proposal is left vague—he may have simply been being polite. On the other hand, the victorious 
allies would have had to install provisional governments in liberated countries (outside the 
Russian sphere of influence), and having emigrants who were already politically vetted as 
reliable democrats might have proved useful.   
 Adamic also corresponded with Eleanor Roosevelt, again about his Two-Way Passage 
proposal. In one letter sent in January, 1942, Adamic made a detailed proposal for the export of 
American-style democracy to postwar Yugoslavia. Citing the example of Czechoslovakia, 
Adamic noted that the post-WWI Czechoslovak government had its origins in a movement by 
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Czech and Slovak emigrants in Pittsburgh. Because of this immigrant and American influence, 
Adamic, argued, Czechoslovakia had become “one of the most Democratic governments in 
Europe…her system of government was patterned closely after ours.” By setting up provisional 
governments for postwar Europe in the United States, and by placing emigrants in high 
government offices, Adamic believed that the US could thereby create strong, indigenous 
democratic movements in all the states of Europe, including Yugoslavia.1094  Naturally, Adamic 
believed he would be just the person to lead such a government, even though ill-health had 
compelled him to resign his honorary presidency of UCSSA in early 1944 (he nonetheless 
remained involved in UCSSA’s work). 
Adamic’s speeches even reached the halls of the US Congress, where they were cited by 
Senator Homer Bone of Washington in 1944 in a debate over the shape of postwar 
Yugoslavia.1095 While Adamic’s Two Way Passage proposal was never actually implemented, 
his idea was nonetheless significant because it amounted to an emigrant reply to decades of the 
old country rhetoric surrounding the“Emigration Question”: “how can migrants, living abroad, 
benefit their fatherland?” The Kingdom of Yugoslavia answered this question by, as we have 
seen, imposing increasing obligations on migrants—making them part of the nation by 
subjecting them to national law: a census, censorship, punitive deportation, pseudo-taxation via 
remittances, and even military recruitment, all the while using them for propaganda displays. In 
talking about the origins of his Two Way Passage idea, Adamic identified this phenomenon:  
The dollars which immigrants sent from America spread their balm beyond the 
family, beyond the village; they penetrated the entire economic life of the old 
countries. Yugoslavia, for instance…received from her people [in the United 
States] from twenty to forty million dollars a year. This sum was a boon to the 
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Belgrade regime. It helped to keep it in power. It enabled the government to way 
foreign debts and the interest on them, cover trade balances, maintain the value of 
its currency on foreign exchanges, pay its diplomatic corps, and hold taxes lower 
than they would otherwise have been.1096  
 
Adamic was also certainly no stranger to Yugoslavia use of famous immigrants to drum up 
investment and improve Yugoslavia’s international image, having encountered this on his trip to 
Yugoslavia in 1933. But although emigrants had obligations to the fatherland, they had almost no 
voice in how their old country was run, despite all the rhetoric surrounding the “tenth banovina.” 
This phenomenon held true for many countries with diasporas, and as a result, Adamic was 
hardly the only person in 1941 to ask whether migrants should have a greater voice in old-
country politics. Adamic recalled reading similar suggestions in the New York Post, Saturday 
Evening Post, and the English section of a Japanese-language paper from Los Angeles, or 
hearing them in a conversation with an Italian American acquaintance, as well as Vaso 
Trivanović, a Serbian acquaintance. Several regular Americans of European origin also wrote to 
Adamic with variations on this idea.1097 Looking at a Europe engulfed by war and ethnic 
nationalism, many Americans of foreign extraction identified a sickness in their old country’s 
body politic, an affliction which they, inoculated by their experience living in a multicultural 
democratic state, might be able to cure.  
 Adamic’s ambitions to lead a postwar Yugoslav government brought him to the attention 
of J. Edgar Hoover and the FBI in 1944. According to their investigation, Adamic believed that 
he was backed by several highly-placed American officials to lead a postwar “Allied-controlled 
puppet government” in Yugoslavia. Moreover, despite the legendary anti-communism and 
arguable paranoia of this organization, the FBI ultimately concluded, on the basis of several 
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interviews with Adamic’s close associates, that he was no communist, merely a “militant 
liberal,” suggesting again that Adamic really did want to export democracy to Yugoslavia. 1098  
 Adamic was not simply telling powerful Americans what they wanted to hear either— in 
1943, following the proclamation of a new partisan government at Bihac, UCSSA addressed a 
radio message to Ivan Ribar, the official head of the Partisan government (Tito was instead the 
de-facto head), asserting that UCSSA was “deeply and sympathetically impressed by the 
coalition of all democratic and anti-fascist parties…in the formation of the constituent assembly 
under your leadership…we see in your movement an effort to preserve what unity and promise 
of the future was realized within Yugoslavia between the two World Wars.”1099 In pledging their 
support to the new government, even from the beginning, UCSSA underlined their support for 
democracy and Yugoslav unity.  
Adamic also corresponded with Josip Smodlak, another member of Tito’s nascent 
government, sending him copies of his book, where he argued for a “free, democratic, and 
federative Yugoslavia which sees her model just in these same United States of America.”  
Smodlak welcomed the advice, passed on word about Adamic to Tito, and promised Kosanović a 
cabinet position.1100  However, Tito’s subsequent message to Adamic contained no comment on 
Adamic’s political program, only an expression of thanks for his support of the Partisans and his 
exposure of “traitors” in the emigration who had supported Mihailović.1101 Although this was an 
ominous sign, UCSSA, Kosanović, and Adamic nonetheless seemed poised to have a voice in 
Yugoslavia’s postwar development (although whether they were listened to will be discussed in 
the conclusion). 
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 Discussing the formation of UCSSA and the rallying of American Yugoslavs in support 
of the new “Old Country”  during World War II, Ulf Brunnbauer refers to them as a “temporary 
diaspora [that] emerged when the lives of family, kin, friends, and former neighbors were at 
risk.” Furthermore, he argues that the “various Yugoslav diaspora-building initiatives [of the 
Kingdom of Yugoslavia] contributed to fertilizing the soil from whence a—short lived—
diaspora identity could grow after receiving an external impulse.”1102 This is largely correct—
after all, Louis Adamic’s friends and family in Yugoslavia doubtless gave a personal edge to his 
activism. But it also does not tell the whole story. If anything, Brunnbauer’s description is more 
accurate for the Odbrana movement, a far-right Serbian-American reaction to the slaughter in 
Yugoslavia that became prominent as a result of the close relationship between Srbobran, the 
Serbian Exarchate, and the Yugoslav Legation. 
 The United Committee of South Slavic Americans, on the other hand, had more 
influences than Yugoslav cultural diplomacy of the 1920s and 1930s. If anything, the UCSSA 
was more a rebellion against official Yugoslavism than an outgrowth of the metaphorical soil it 
fertilized, the fullest expression of the tensions, identified by Sheffer, that, due to the selfish and 
self-serving policies of the old country, emerge between it and “its” diaspora. Moreover, the 
organizations involved in UCSSA, like the Serbian Vidovdan Congress, or the Prosvetaši and 
Levičari wings of the Croatian Fraternal Union, were influenced by three Yugoslav political 
opposition parties that agitated among Yugoslav-Americans in the 1930s—the DS, the Croatian 
Peasant Party, and the KPJ. These parties also provided several individuals to the American 
mileau that would contribute to UCSSA—Petar Radić, Stojan Pribićević, and Mirko Marković, 
 
1102 Ulf Brunnbauer. “Globalizing Southeastern Europe,” 244.  




showcasing, again, the role played by transnational organizations in a Brubakerian “quadratic 
nexus.” And we can also see the traces of emigrant cultural and political initiatives in the 1930s, 
such as Vincent Cainkar’s attempts to create a Yugoslav Fraternal Federation, or the cooperation 
between Croatian, Serbian, and Slovene groups to build a Yugoslav Room, which provided a 
blueprint for future confederations of Serb, Croat, and Slovene organizations. In times of crisis, 
these habits of cooperation could coalesce into a “Yugoslav Diaspora.” But although 
Yugoslavism prevailed in 1945, supporters of the UCSSA would soon find the new Yugoslavia 




















CHAPTER SEVEN: THE YUGOSLAV DIASPORA DISINTEGRATES  
 
On September 4, 1951, Louis Adamic was found dead of a gunshot wound in the burning 
remains of his home in Milford, New Jersey.1103 Although the police ruled his death a suicide, 
the circumstances were suspicious. Both the .22 caliber rifle, with which Adamic had allegedly 
shot himself, and the axe, with which Adamic had supposedly punctured the kerosene tins used 
to set the blaze, had no fingerprints. Moreover, the latter showed evidence of having been wiped 
clean with an oily rag.1104 The arson, had it fully destroyed Adamic’s house, would have 
obliterated any evidence of foul play, such as the unfired .38 caliber bullet found in the kitchen. 
The firearm associated with this bullet was never found, being a match neither to Adamic’s 
hunting rifle nor to the pistols used by police.1105 State police blamed “money troubles” for the 
“suicide,”1106 although six years later $12,350 dollars were found cached inside one of the walls 
of Adamic’s burned house.1107 Adamic left no note, leaving any motive for suicide unclear. 
Although Adamic had a nervous disposition, he hardly seemed suicidal—he had, after all, just 
submitted the manuscript for a new book to his publisher, suggesting he felt like he still had 
work to do.  
Moreover, that upcoming book—whose purpose was to rally American public opinion 
behind Tito in his feud with Stalin—had already led to several threats against Adamic’s life. In 
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1949 and early 1950, Adamic had been approached by men (who were familiar enough with 
Slavic phonology to pronounce his name “Adamich”) who called him “a traitor to the working 
people” and warned him that there would be “a bad ending” for him if he persisted in publishing 
his book.  In March, 1951, Adamic was badly beaten by more men who threatened to kill him 
unless he turned over his manuscript. Adamic suspected the men who beat him were working for 
Ante Pavelić, who had emigrated to Argentina, or Stalin.1108 Stalin was known to use 
assassination to resolve differences of opinion—as Lev Trotsky could attest—and had sent 
multiple assassins after Tito. None succeeded.1109 Adamic was the most prominent public 
intellectual associated with Tito, had influence over American public opinion, and was much less 
well-guarded. 
Adamic had grown increasingly isolated in diaspora politics over the past two years. In 
April, 1950, over a year before Adamic supposedly took his own life, Adamic’s close friend and 
ally in UCSSA, Sava Kosanović, left his position as Tito’s ambassador to the United States. At 
the farewell dinner hosted by the embassy, one reporter was amused to note that the embassy 
silverware still bore the royal seal.1110 It was an unintentional metaphor—as ambassador, 
Kosanović had griped to the foreign ministry in 1947 that the new Yugoslavia was repeating the 
mistakes of its predecessor, treating the diaspora as “a part of our national organism,” rather than 
citizens of their new homeland.1111 Moreover, thanks to the Cold War, Washington’s relations 
with Yugoslavia had grown rather chilly. The effects of the Cold War had also driven Zlatko 
Baloković, Adamic’s other UCSSA ally, from the public light. Accused by the House Un-
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American Activities Committee of being a red, Baloković withdrew from public life, resigning 
from his position in a host of left-leaning diaspora organizations. Between Tito, Stalin, and 
Truman, the existence of a center-left Yugoslavist organization no longer seemed tenable. 
Diaspora politics had become a dangerous game. And yet, in 1945, UCSSA seemed poised to 
orient Yugoslavia toward the West and democracy. What happened?  
  While a detailed overview of postwar Yugoslavia’s relationship with “its” diaspora 
would require another book-length monograph to do justice, this chapter nonetheless attempts to 
provide an epilogue for the people and organizations discussed in the previous chapters. Political 
change often has a generational element, and many of the individuals discussed in the previous 
chapters would be dead or politically marginalized by 1959, if not earlier. As endings go, this 
makes for depressing reading, but it is nonetheless necessary to show the constructed, fragile 
nature of diaspora political networks. As such, this chapter argues, the “Yugoslav diaspora,” 
defined again as a transnational network between Serb, Croat, and Slovene organizations that is 
large enough to plausibly represent an imagined diasporic community, fell apart in the decade 
following V-Day. The causes of its demise are many, but are chiefly rooted in a political climate 
in the United States and in Yugoslavia that was unfriendly to the kind of New-Deal liberalism 
represented by UCSSA. Moreover, this chapter argues, the New Yugoslavia continued many of 
the practices of its predecessor when dealing with the emigration. While this speaks to the 
importance of interwar Yugoslavia for studies of socialist Yugoslavia’s emigration policy, it also 









Although the half-decade following UCSSA’s triumph at the end of World War II was 
deeply demoralizing for the Yugoslav movement in the United States, the immediate aftermath 
of Victory Day had the atmosphere of a parade. A shower of medals and patronage awaited 
Tito’s supporters in the United States. Louis Adamic and Zlatko Baloković were the first to be 
decorated, receiving the Order of Brotherhood and Unity in October 1944.1112 Mirko Marković 
(KPJ member and editor of the communist periodical Slobodna Reč) and Etbin Kristan (an 
venerable Slovene-American activist who had been active since before the Great War) received 
the Order of Unity the following January.1113 That same month, Fiorello la Guardia, another ally 
of Adamic, received a signed photograph of Tito, along with Tito’s own revolver.1114 Medals, 
Adamic thought, would be just the thing to “put new pep into the movement here,” passing on a 
list of individuals to be decorated to Sava Kosanović,1115 who became Minister of Information in 
Tito’s cabinet in March, 1945.1116 In 1946, Kosanović became Yugoslavia’s ambassador to the 
United States as well.1117 Besides Kosanović, several members and supporters of UCSSA in the 
United States received jobs in Yugoslavia, including Steve Dedijer, who became editor of 
Politika1118 and the Serbian priest Strahinja Maletić, who became commissioner of 
immigration.1119 Adamic rapidly became the go-to person for returnee jobseekers, receiving 
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letters from as far afield as New Zealand.1120 In 1947, Adamic was still being contacted by 
Yugoslav-Americans; he confessed to being “very tired of people…who have given a little 
money for Yugoslav relief…and now expect special favors and special treatment for their people 
over there.”1121  But Adamic should have anticipated this behavior—a common complaint among 
emigrants about the old Yugoslavia, and part of the broader discourse surrounding the 
“emigration question,” was Yugoslavia’s neglect of its overseas population. Emigrants were 
expected to give remittances but were not given a voice in how their old country was run. With 
this shower of patronage, the government of Yugoslavia was signaling that it would give 
emigrants a voice in the administration of their old country.  
Nonetheless, there were more continuities than ruptures in the way the new Yugoslavia 
interacted with its overseas population. For instance, the practice of handing out medals to 
emigrants to use them as patriotic symbols for the homeland hearkened back to the old 
Yugoslavia. This was primarily a feature of the period of royal dictatorship, although the policy 
had its beginnings as early as 1924, when the Yugoslav foreign ministry decided to award 
Mihajlo Pupin the Order of the White Eagle.1122 In 1926, the other Serb scientist, Tesla, received 
the order of St. Sava.1123 In 1927,  the Yugoslav foreign ministry sent out a directive to its 
consulates in the United States asking them to suggest other “prominent emigrants” for 
decoration. Awarding medals to emigrants, the old Yugoslavia’s foreign service thought, would 
show “our people” that “they are not forgotten and that the old country is paying attention to 
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their work, even when they are living in far-off lands.”1124 Nikola Tesla, for instance, would be 
decorated again in 1931 with the Order of the Yugoslav Crown 1st Class, just for good 
measure.1125  Although Tesla contributed little to the Yugoslav movement in the United States, 
the residual shine of Tesla’s achievements could reflect onto Yugoslavia via these gleaming 
medallions. During the years of the royal dictatorship, the trickle of decorations became a flood, 
with a whole host of emigrants receiving various Yugoslav medals for their management of 
singing societies, gymnastic groups, and the like.1126 Put in this light, the decoration of the 
leaders of UCSSA in 1944 and 1945 was the continuation of a longstanding policy that 
substituted flashy awards for a genuine investments in emigrant political institutions.   
Official holidays for emigrants were another early sign of continuity. In 1929, the  royal 
dictatorship implemented the Law on Holidays, which made celebration of several state holidays 
mandatory in Yugoslavia.1127 And as Chapter Three showed, Yugoslav diplomats tried to make it 
so that emigrants in the “Tenth Banovina” celebrated these holidays as well, although their 
powers of compulsion were limited. Under Tito, the practice continued, although the holidays 
changed. Under the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, the main holidays had been the royal birthday and 
Unification Day, December 1. In the Federal People’s republic of Yugoslavia, the main holidays 
became the anniversary of the beginning of the Yugoslav uprising, March 31, took the place of 
Unification Day,1128 along with “Republic Day,” November 29—conveniently nearby 
Unification Day on the calendar. As before, the government of Yugoslavia took great interest in 
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these proceedings, sending Sava Kosanović, now an ambassador, to preside over staged displays 
of emigrant patriotism.1129  
Although parades and medals were only superficial continuities, they nonetheless 
reflected an administrative mentality that was carried over to Tito’s new government: the 
diaspora existed to be milked for propaganda. The myth of the loyal emigration could grant 
legitimacy to the new Yugoslavia as well as the old. For instance, a popular topic in the postwar 
Yugoslav press were telegraph greetings from emigrant groups to Tito. These messages were 
reprinted in major Yugoslav newspapers with minimal commentary, along with Tito’s replies to 
“our emigrants.”1130 Yugoslavs in Yugoslavia, for instance, were told in newspaper headlines 
that “Millions of Slavic Americans Congratulate the Victory of the National Front,”1131 that 
“Americans of Yugoslav Origin Congratulate Tito on his Election Victory”1132 and “250,000 
Slovenes Living in the United States Seek the Annexation of Trieste and the Julian Marches to 
Yugoslavia.”1133 A contested territory between Italian Veneto and Yugoslav Slovenia, Trieste (or 
Trst) and the Julian March had been split between Italy and the Federal People’s Republic of 
Yugoslavia after World War II. Although Yugoslavia received the Istrian peninsula and the 
Slavic speaking hinterland of Trieste, the city itself (which was Italian-speaking) remained out of 
Tito’s grasp. Using the diaspora in the United States to lobby for Trieste’s annexation to 
Yugoslavia was the primary objective of Yugoslavia’s embassy in Washington. Prominent 
Slovene Americans, particularly Louis Adamic, were to be enlisted in the service of 
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irredentism.1134 This, too, came from the playbook of the Old Yugoslavia, which had used the 
testimony of Americans like Mihajlo Pupin to support its claims to Bačka and the Banat after 
World War I. 
Tensions with the United States 
Unlike Woodrow Wilson, however, Harry Truman was less willing to humor the 
territorial ambitions of small countries, particularly if they were communist. The Trieste issue 
rapidly poisoned relations between the U.S. and Yugoslavia. Altercations between Americans 
and Yugoslav soldiers on the Italian border became more frequent. American planes repeatedly 
violated Yugoslav airspace, a clear provocation in Yugoslav eyes. 1135 On August 9 and 19, 1946 
two American C-47 planes entered Yugoslav airspace over the contested area of the Julian 
March and were shot down by Yugoslav fighters, triggering an international incident.1136 
Although the frustration of Yugoslavia was understandable, lashing out against the United States 
was a tactical error. Joyce Baloković, who was en-route to Yugoslavia at that time with her 
husband Zlatko, commented in her travel diary that “the anti-Jugoslav press campaign built up to 
a furor around the airplane incidents, [which] had done so much damage that it would take 
‘years’ to recover the lost ground. Even the American-Jugoslav groups have been scared 
[emphasis mine]…Those Jugoslav pilots certainly provided the enemy with devastating 
ammunition. ”1137 As Joyce Baloković astutely perceived, hostile relations between Yugoslavia 
and the United States had a chilling effect on the activities of émigré groups like UCSSA. While 
it was easy to argue during World War II that Yugoslav and American patriotism were 
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complementary (since Yugoslavia and the United States were allies), the effect of worsening 
relations between Washington and Belgrade made this stance appear increasingly contradictory, 
demoralizing Yugoslav-American groups like UCSSA. Were they American patriots, or 
Yugoslavs? 
This, in turn, was complicated by the disconnect between what Tito was and what 
American Yugoslavs had imagined him to be. Although UCSSA had based its support for Tito 
during World War II on the conviction that he was a social democrat, the fact remained that, at 
least before the Tito-Stalin split in 1948, Tito was an orthodox Stalinist. Like Stalin, Tito 
cultivated a cult of personality—his men referred to him as stari, or “The Old Man,” a parallel to 
Stalin’s nickname of vozhd, or “the Leader.” 1138  Likewise, his rank, Maršal, or Marshall, was a 
Russian borrowing—the Serbo-Croatian equivalent was vojvoda.1139 Milovan Djilas, a close 
confidant of Tito before his fall from favor, recalled that Tito made efforts to imitate Stalin’s 
manner of speaking and style of signature.1140 Articles written about Tito in the press borrowed 
phrases and styles common to press descriptions of Stalin. The Yugoslav constitution of ‘46 
cribbed heavily from the Stalin constitution of ’36. Likewise, Yugoslavia’s central planning 
bureaucracy, and judicial system were based on Soviet models. Collectivization, although it 
would never be implemented in Yugoslavia, appeared imminent by early 1948.1141 Repression 
against political enemies, although never as extreme as during the Soviet Union during the late 
1930s, did exist. Alleged collaborators and sympathizers with the Četniks or Ustaše faced 
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Soviet-style show trials.1142 Draža Mihailović would be executed in 1946 in one such trial. 
Konstantin Fotić would be sentenced at the same trial to twenty years of hard labor—which he 
never served, opting to continue his role as leader of the Serbian right wing in the United States 
after the war.1143  In trying to punish its overseas critics, Tito’s Yugoslavia was repeating yet 
another mistake of its predecessor— even if Fotić was probably guilty of inciting tensions 
between American Serbs and Croats during WWII, receiving such a draconian penalty from Tito 
just made him into a martyr.  By passing a sentence they had no ability to enforce, Tito’s 
Yugoslavia just enhanced Fotić’s stature in the United States, allowing him to re-brand as an 
anti-communist and defender of civil liberties. In his 1959 obituary, the New York Times 
eulogized Fotic as a “man convinced representative government would return to the world”1144 
even though Fotić was the ambassador of a repressive and undemocratic government and 
covertly stoked greater Serbianism during the Second World War.   
While Tito’s authoritarianism helped opponents of Yugoslavism like Fotić, it placed 
Yugoslavia’s advocates like Kosanović and Adamic in a bind. Tito’s defenders needed to prove 
to their readers (and perhaps to themselves) that Tito was still the liberal UCSSA had billed him 
as. In 1946, the UCSSA Bulletin, which Adamic edited, put out a pamphlet complaining about 
the “anti-Tito propaganda in the press and radio” and refuting several common criticisms of 
Tito’s new regime. The new Yugoslavia, Adamic felt compelled to assert, had neither religious 
nor ethnic persecution or favoritism. Moreover, there was no censorship, the secret police in 
Yugoslavia was no worse than the FBI, and that there was private property and free elections.1145 
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Of these issues, freedom of the press acquired the greatest salience, with Kosanović’s embassy 
being forced to issue several statements in August 1945 asserting that Yugoslavia’s new press 
law had not introduced censorship,1146 and that foreign journalists would be not be interfered 
with.1147 Ironically, just several months later, the government of Yugoslavia expelled a foreign 
journalist, Mary Thayer, for alleged “tendentious” statements,1148 again putting Kosanović and 
the Washington embassy on the defensive. Journalists from Time, Newsweek, and the New 
Yorker all wrote to the embassy in protest.1149  Tito’s Yugoslavia had apparently learned little 
from the example of its predecessor, whose attempts to silence its overseas critics simply made 
martyrs and more enemies. 
Kosanović and Kardelj 
Kosanović was publicly blamed for these incidents, although his instinct, expressed 
privately in correspondence, was to handle the foreign press more delicately. In fact, Kosanović 
was sharply critical of Yugoslavia’s propaganda efforts in the United States. Representatives of 
Yugoslavia had been making a variety of basic errors—translating Yugoslav press-releases into 
English, making no effort to tailor them to American sensibilities, which reacted to the word 
“socialism” with horror.1150 On at least two occasions, Kosanović wrote to Tito with his 
concerns.1151After the Tito-Stalin Split of 1948 made cultivating the West more urgent, 
Kosanović advised Kardelj that heretofore Yugoslavia had been simply dispensing information 
through Tanjug, Borba, or Politika press releases, sources American journalists did not take 
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seriously. Such an approach, Kosanović tartly noted, could prompt a foreign journalist to “supply 
his own ‘interpretations’ of what he reads in the Belgrade press—and from such ‘interpretations’ 
may the good Lord spare you.” Foreign journalists should not be kept at arm’s length, Kosanović 
argued, as a sense of “isolation from the real source of news” could “foster a feeling of 
resentment” and “drive the correspondent to seek information from embassies and other foreign 
observers here, or from reactionary Yugoslavs.” Such as, for instance, Konstantin Fotić. 
Kosanović then provided Kardelj with a detailed description on how to run a Western-style press 
conference, what a press officer did, the meanings of the terms “on/off the record” and 
“attribution,” and how to buy journalists’ affection with complementary tickets to sporting 
events and concerts.1152 Kardelj, although a veteran revolutionary, was only a novice at public 
relations. Kosanović, on the other hand, had nearly a decade of experience of American political 
life. Based on his experience in the United States, Kosanović correctly apprehended that giving 
journalists access usually translated into sympathetic coverage, negating the need for clumsy 
state propaganda.  
Kosanović also attempted to acquaint Kardelj with the principles of American liberalism 
in 1950, suppling Kardelj, at his request, with a reading list of ten books on American history, 
including works by the famous historians Arthur Schlesinger Sr. and Charles Beard.1153 At that 
time, Kardelj, as Tito’s main theorist, was brainstorming a formula for “Yugoslav Communism” 
that would give the break with Stalin and the Cominform an ideological tinge. As previously 
noted, prior to 1948 both Stalin and Tito were both Leninists. As such, the dispute between them 
had been geopolitical—Stalin believed in the leading role of the Soviet Union and wished to 
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preserve his accommodation with Churchill at Yalta that allowed for a sphere of influence in 
Eastern Europe, something which was not compatible with Tito’s ambition of a Balkan socialist 
federation that included Greece (as Greece had been awarded to the United Kingdom at 
Yalta).1154 This did not, however, make for a compelling narrative that could legitimize Tito’s 
continued rule. In attempting to frame the break with Moscow as an ideological dispute, it seems 
Kardelj turned to the United States for inspiration. In 1952, Kardelj also called in Kosanović to 
provide commentary on the new Yugoslav constitution being drafted,1155 which departed from 
the Stalinist model of the 1946 constitution, allowed for greater local autonomy and civil 
liberties, and tried to institute a new model of Yugoslav socialism based around “Worker Self-
Management,” an invention of Kardelj.1156 Although Kosanović’s commentary was unrelated to 
Kardelj’s flagship idea, he did draw on his experience in the United States to critique the 
structure of the presidium, parliament, and the powers of the executive branch vis-à-vis these 
bodies. Candidates for the Council of Nations, Kosanović argued, ought to be chosen by direct 
election. Kosanović was also concerned about the power of the President (Tito), who, he 
believed, ought not to vote in the National Assembly. Kosanović was also concerned about the 
consequences of the president’s veto power over this assembly.1157 Taken together, these 
proposals reveal that Kosanović, in a cautious and limited way, was trying to import American-
style separation of powers and to weaken the power of the executive. While some suggestions of 
Kosanović were discarded, such as his suggestion that candidates be chosen democratically 
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rather than appointed, others, like his critique of Tito’s influence over the legislature, appear to 
have been taken seriously.1158  As such, to Kosanović we can assign partial credit for the liberal 
turn in Yugoslavia’s constitution in 1953, although the real impetus for these changes was 
Yugoslavia’s desire for closer relations with the United States and the West after the Tito-Stalin 
Split had turned the Soviet Union into a threatening adversary.  
Kosanović’s advice for how Yugoslavia should handle “its” emigration were largely 
ignored, however. Kosanović raised several complaints about the ways his underlings and fellow 
functionaries were interacting with the diaspora, his correspondence creating the impression of 
an isolated figurehead ambassador within an embassy of apparatchiks. Yugoslav functionaries in 
the foreign service had been writing to émigré organizations, nakedly inquiring about their 
political loyalties and deluging them with pompous propaganda pamphlets. 1159 Outlining his 
guiding principles in dealing with the diaspora in 1947, Kosanović wrote:  
The emigration in the United States…cannot be considered a part of our national 
organism that can remain as such. Facing the vast majority of Americans of 
Yugoslav origin, one must never present their old national affiliation as something 
contradictory to their new—American—affiliation. As soon as we present things 
that way, as we frequently and forcefully do [emphasis mine], we lose whatever 
support and assistance we might have had in our emigration. In the emigration 
there exists a sentimental feeling of blood ties with us…This is the capital that we 
must cultivate in a suitably unobtrusive manner, but we cannot overvalue it and 
think that it, among the majority of our emigration, is stronger than their feelings 
toward America. 
 
Kosanović had learned from the last two decades, when the emigration was called the “tenth 
banovina” and expected to send remittances, donations, investments, and even, during the early 
years of the Second World War, military recruits. Such an approach inevitably disappointed Old 
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Country representatives and triggered emigrant resentment at being treated like a “milking cow,” 
as one emigrant memorably phrased it in 1934. 1160 At the same time, Kosanović alludes to 
Yugoslav representatives “frequently and forcefully” repeating the mistakes of the past, treating 
Americans of Yugoslav origin as subjects rather than friends. 
A prime example of this was Socialist Yugoslavia’s citizenship laws. Royal Yugoslavia, 
it should be recalled, not only allowed for dual citizenship, it also made Yugoslav citizenship, 
which carried the obligation of military service should migrants return, extremely difficult to 
shed. Like its predecessor, the FNRJ initially considered emigrants and their children as citizens 
by default, unless they chose to renounce their citizenship.1161 Thanks to a travel advisory by the 
US State Department, “American citizens who may be regarded by Yugoslavia as Yugoslav 
citizens are warned that in case they should enter that country they will become subject to the 
laws of Yugoslavia, under which difficulties may be encountered particularly with respect to 
obtaining permission to depart therefrom.”1162 Assuming Yugoslav-Americans were able to parse 
this prolix prose, the State Department’s missive threatened to discourage émigré tourism. 
Emigrants, after all, did not want to visit the old country only to be drafted or arrested. Besides 
being lucrative, tourism was important, Kosanović argued, because “visitors usually return home 
satisfied, which has a very positive political effect, particularly in subduing hostile 
propaganda.”1163 This too was a lesson from the interwar period—the izlet was particularly 
effective at turning emigrants into nationalists. Although Kosanović proposed amending the law 
such that naturalized Yugoslav-Americans would automatically lose their Yugoslav citizenship 
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or informing citizens abroad that they could travel to Yugoslavia and back unmolested, elements 
within the bureaucracy suggested that doing so amounted to a “capitulation” to the United States 
and suggesting that those who would return to Yugoslavia should renounce their American 
citizenship instead (!).1164 Although it is unclear whether Kosanović won this dispute, it is 
nonetheless illustrative of the persistence of old attitudes within the new Yugoslavia’s foreign 
service bureaucracy, the idea that emigrants belonged to Yugoslavia, not the United States. 
Despite the prescience of his observations, Kosanović's views on the diaspora were not 
representative of the new Yugoslavia’s diplomatic service. Nor were they, for the most part, 
harmonious with the views of Tito. When Kosanović wrote directly to Tito in 1948, underlining 
again the importance of not treating the diaspora as an extension of Yugoslavia and of treating 
the American English-language press gently,1165 Tito’s terse telegraphed reply agreed only with 
the latter premise.1166 Tito did not take Kosanović seriously, treating him as a token liberal to 
assuage Western anxieties about one-party rule. According to one observer, by 1948 Kosanović 
was a figurehead within his own embassy, even being assigned a political chaperon who ran 
things in his stead.1167 It should be remembered that Tito, during his rise to power in the 1930s, 
put little stock in campaigning among the emigration, mainly to distinguish himself from Gorkić, 
who did.1168 Party members, Tito believed, would only make a difference by agitating in 
Yugoslavia. Tito’s previous indifference to émigré politics perhaps explains the tendency, during 
the early years of his rule, to repeat the mistakes of his predecessors—bureaucratic inertia is a 
powerful thing, particularly if one is not well informed on a subject. In 1950, Kosanović would 
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be recalled to Yugoslavia to advise Tito on how to improve Yugoslavia’s diplomatic relationship 
with the United States. Kosanović’s replacement as ambassador, a close confident of Tito and 
veteran party functionary, promised to be less trouble.1169 Although given a cabinet position as a 
consolation prize, by August 1950, Kosanović had had enough and tendered his resignation to 
that as well. 1170 In 1956, Kosanović passed away in Belgrade of apparently natural causes, 
despite only being sixty-one.1171  
Before his untimely death, Kosanović wrote a memoir of his political work on behalf of 
Yugoslavia, titled Jugoslavija Bila je Osuđena na Smrt, or “Yugoslavia was Condemned to 
Death.” Writing during the early 1950s, when Yugoslavia was internationally isolated, 
Kosanović argued that during World War II Churchill, Roosevelt, and Stalin flirted with the idea 
of dissolving Yugoslavia after the war and never fully committed to its defense.1172 While a 
questionable historical argument, Kosanović’s memoir nonetheless reveals a deep 
disillusionment with the United States, which no longer seemed to be a force for good in the 
world. Given the sensitive nature of Kosanović’s work and the delicate balancing act between 
East and West that was postwar Yugoslav diplomacy, it is not surprising that Kosanović’s 
memoir would not be published until 1984, after Tito’s death. Still, this was yet another case pf 
the sort of censorship applied to émigré critics of Yugoslavia. 
Although Tito’s Yugoslavia treated “its” diaspora similarly to its predecessor, the 
message of its overseas propaganda had changed in an important way—gone was any theory of 
the ethnic unity of “Yugoslavs.” Beginning in 1951, the new Yugoslavia founded a series of 
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cultural organizations for emigrants all collectively bearing the name Matica (pl. matice), which 
meant, variously, queen bee, magnet, or source. These organizations, based in Yugoslavia, 
focused on maintaining and celebrating emigrant culture and nurturing ties with the old 
country.1173 In interwar Yugoslavia, this sort of cultural outreach was handled by Yugoslav 
consulates and the Emigration Commissariat. However, breaking from previous practice, the 
work of the Matice were split up by nationality—the Croatian Matica dealt with Croatian 
emigrants, the Serbian Matica with the Serbs, and so on. This led, in turn, to the abandonment of 
any attempt to promote a synthetic Yugoslav culture in emigrants, and, in 1967 and 1968, the 
Croatian Matica would be reprimanded for its narrowly Croatian “nationalist spirit.”1174 
We can also see the abandonment of Yugoslavism in the various speeches Kosanović 
delivered to emigrant organizations in the United States as part of his duties as ambassador. 
Speaking at the Second Croatian Congress in Cleveland in April 1947, for instance, Kosanović 
praised the “unity of American Serbs, Croats, Slovenes and Macedonians in America in the fight 
for the unity of the Yugoslav peoples in Yugoslavia” and how they “manifested their sympathy 
for the national-liberation war under the leadership of Tito.”1175 In the new mythmaking about 
the diaspora, three key elements emerged. First, when referring to the diaspora, Kosanović 
almost invariably called them “Americans of Yugoslav origin” or “Americans of 
Serbian/Croatian/Slovenian origin” rather than Yugoslavs in America, a recognition of their 
loyalties and acculturation to the United States. Secondly, Kosanović acknowledged the separate 
people-ness of Serbs, Croats, Slovenes, and now Macedonians, rather than insisting, as the old 
Yugoslavia did, that “Yugoslavs” were a single people with three branches or tribes. And third, 
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when referring to the diaspora specifically, Kosanović underlined that all Yugoslav peoples 
contributed to the national-liberation struggle. This seems to have been the official line, as one 
month later, when Kosanović called upon the Slovene American National Alliance, he delivered 
much the same message, praising the efforts of “Americans of Slovenian and Yugoslav 
origin…to support your brothers in the old country in the Serbian, Croatian, and Slovene 
resistance to fascism [emphasis mine].”1176 And at the Serbian congress held in October of the 
same year, Kosanović again highlighted how “Americans of Serbian origin, together with other 
Yugoslav-Americans proved to your fellow American citizens that you support the resistance of 
your brothers in the old country against fascism.”1177 Per official rhetoric, what tied American 
Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes together was ideology and a history of opposition to fascism and 
support of Tito, rather than a unified “Yugoslav” culture. Nonetheless, while using socialist 
ideology to hold Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes worked in Yugoslavia (at least for a while), this 
was an unviable tactic in the United States, currently in the grip of its second Red Scare.  
The Yugoslav Diaspora and the Second Red Scare 
 Although republicans and conservative democrats opposed to the New Deal had been 
accusing their political enemies of being Soviet agents since the late 1930s,1178 the witch hunt 
dramatically worsened after 1945. Following the sensational defections of the Soviet spy 
Elizabeth Bentley and Daily Worker editor Louis Budenz, lawmakers and the FBI began to treat 
Soviet infiltration as a serious threat.1179 In that same year, the Dies Committee, a temporary 
House committee that investigated subversive activity, acquired permanent status as the House 
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Un-american Activities Committee, or HUAC. In March 1947, President Truman, having 
received a pummeling from the Republicans in the 1946 elections over the “Communists in 
government” issue, instituted a federal employee loyalty program.1180 In 1948, sensationalist 
reports of Bentley and Budenz’s activities reached the press.1181 The “Red Menace” acquired 
even more threatening dimensions with the testimony of former party-member Whittaker 
Chambers before HUAC that Alger Hiss, a government official, had been spying for the Soviet 
Union,1182 which acquired atomic weaponry the following year. And in 1949, Mao Zedong 
triumphed in the Chinese civil war.1183 Communists seemed to be on the rise everywhere. In the 
eyes of the media and public officials, US government and society was riddled with a vast 
communist conspiracy. Accusations, even if never proven, ruined lives and careers, subjecting 
social-democrats and liberals to ostracization, blacklists, and FBI harassment. The “Old Left” in 
American politics was virtually annihilated, pushing the center of gravity in American politics 
firmly to the right for the next seventy years.1184 
 UCSSA and Adamic were early victims of what would come to be known as the Second 
Red Scare, since both Bentley and Budenz fingered Adamic as a spy for the “Reds.” The 
accusation was nonsense—Adamic was not even a Party member, as the FBI found out, and was 
far too “mercurial” and “obstreperous” to submit to Party discipline. 1185  Budenz was also a 
crackpot—in 1945, he left the Party and converted to Catholicism,1186 after which he 
 
1180 Ibid, 110-111. 
1181 C. P. Trussell, “Woman Links Spies to U.S. War Office and White House,” The New York Times, July 31, 1948; 
John Morris, “Communists Held Hiss to Be Member, Budenz Testifies,”The New York Times, August 27, 1948;  
1182 “Two Hiss Brothers Deny Red Charges,” New York Times, August 4, 1948; John Morris, “Communists Held Hiss 
to be Member, Budenz Testifies,” New York Times, August 27, 1948. 
1183 Storrs, The Second Red Scare, 110. 
1184 Storrs, The Second Red Scare, 259-264.  
1185 Tony Smith, “Ms Bentley Charges Adamic Spied for Reds,” Washington Daily, September 13, 1950. Louis 
Adamic Papers, Box 1, Folder 3, IHRCA; “Louis Adamic,” FBI File on Louis Adamic, September 9, 1949, p 3-5. Louis 
Adamic Papers, Box 1, Folder 3, IHRCA 
1186 “Daily Worker Editor Renounces Communism for Catholic Faith,” New York Times, October 11, 1945. 




continuously fed conspiracy theories to credulous congressmen. Among his bigger hits was his 
claim that “All Communists Here are Spies” and his assertion that the CPUSA had been ready to 
start a “civil war” in 1939.1187 And aside from Budenz, with whom Adamic had occasionally 
discussed events in Yugoslavia between 1943 and 1945, Adamic had no relationship to any of 
the other individuals implicated by Bentley’s testimony.1188 Additionally, Adamic’s support for 
Tito placed him at odds with the CPUSA, which was staunchly Cominformist. 
 Although the case for “espionage” was weak, the FBI investigation nonetheless cast 
suspicion on the long list of organizations where Adamic had a leadership role, including the 
Slovene American National Council, the American Croatian Congress, the American Slav 
Congress, the American Committee for Yugoslav Relief, and the United Council of South Slavic 
Americans.1189 Zlatko Baloković was implicated as well, although the full list of individuals 
tarnished by their association with Adamić has been heavily redacted in his FBI file.1190 
Nonetheless, it seems clear that the same web of connections linking together Yugoslav civil 
society organizations and self-help groups, connections that were instrumental in the formation 
of the “Yugoslav diaspora,” now facilitated accusations of guilt by association. Even if the 
leaders of these organizations were not prosecuted or convicted, there now existed pressure for 
their leaders to move toward the center and downplay their sympathy for Yugoslavia, which was, 
after all, a Communist country.  
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 Following the investigation of Adamić, Zlatko Baloković found himself in the crosshairs. 
In June 1949, in The New York Times, Baloković was accused, falsely, of having been “bitten by 
the communist bug” and of being a “professional revolutionary at the upper levels of the Stalinist 
apparatus,”1191 a statement that so enraged Baloković that he wrote to the editorial board seeking 
to clear his name.1192 Baloković took proactive measures as well, resigning his honorary 
positions at a slew of left-leaning organizations like the American Slav Congress1193 or the 
American-Soviet Friendship Society.1194  Baloković would become much more politically 
circumspect in the United States, never again venturing into the rowdy realm of émigré politics. 
Nonetheless, Baloković continued to travel and give concerts, on occasion in Yugoslavia, where 
his presence would be used for propaganda by the government, encouraging its citizens to take 
pride in the achievements of a prominent émigré. Baloković passed away in 1965 on one such 
trip to Yugoslavia, where his 70th birthday was to have been feted.1195 He would be interred in 
Mirogoj cemetery in Zagreb, a final argument that he belonged to Yugoslavia. 
The new Red Scare would have deleterious effects on the major Yugoslav emigrant 
groups as well. In 1948, the United Committee for South Slavic Americans was labeled a 
“subversive organization” by the Attorney General.1196 This designation led to great difficulties 
for the American Council for Yugoslav Relief (ACYR), UCSSA’s sister organization that raised 
money from emigrants to send to Yugoslavia, although the ACYR’s financial difficulties truly 
began after the downing of the two American planes over Yugoslavia in the summer of ’46. 
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Following this incident, ACYR took in much less money in donations than it had the previous 
year—being able to send $373,159 to Yugoslavia, compared to $554,990 in 1945.1197 By 
November, 1948, the combined accounts of the ACYR had shrunk to $15,000. With few funds to 
purchase relief supplies for Yugoslavia, the board of the ACYR agreed to disband the 
organization, liquidate its assets, and donate whatever remained to the Red Cross.1198 In its final 
meeting held the following January, the board complained of intimidation and the stigma of 
being designated a subversive organization, suggesting that HUAC indeed delivered the coup de 
grace. Even so, the ACYR’s sum contribution to Yugoslavia totaled $2.7 million,1199 a number 
that suggests that Yugoslavism was hardly an insignificant force in the United States.   
While the anti-communist zeitgeist sapped the energies and cohesion of the American 
Yugoslavist movement, it gave prestige and legitimacy to its opponents. Konstantin Fotić, now 
an ex-ambassador, had remained in the United States after the war’s end. Building on his 
wartime activities, Fotić openly assumed leadership of the Serbian National Defense, an 
organization covered in the previous chapter.1200 Despite the loss of his prestigious title, Fotić 
effectively occupied Adamić's former position as a professional “expert on Yugoslavia.” 
Mirroring Adamić’s success with The Native’s Return in 1934, in 1948 Fotić published a book, 
The War We Lost, a pro-Mihailović memoir, receiving favorable reviews in the New York 
Times.1201 Further attesting to his influence, Fotić would be frequently tapped by the New York 
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Times for commentary and quotes on Yugoslav affairs, at least until his death in 1959.1202 The 
same could not be said for Ruth Mitchell, who largely disappeared from the public eye after 
1945. In 1953, she published her second (and last) book, My Brother Bill. A biography of her 
brother General Billy Mitchell, Mitchell’s new book showed that her engagement with Serbian 
émigré politics had largely ended. Mitchell accomplished little in the next sixteen years, dying in 
1969 in a nursing home in Portugal at the age of eighty-one.1203  Bishop Dionisije, another 
ringleader for the Odbrana, lasted another ten years, passing away at the age of 80 in 1979. Much 
of Dionisije’s postwar activity centered around his feud with the Holy Synod of the Serbian 
Orthodox Church in Communist Yugoslavia, which attempted to defrock Dionisije in 1963. 
Dionisije refused to accept this verdict, triggering a schism between the Serbian Orthodox 
Exarchate and the Holy Synod in Belgrade.1204 This quarrel doubtless allowed Dionisije to 
maintain his position at the head of the Serbian right wing, providing an endless series of small 
conflicts to stoke Serbian outrage and mobilize it in his defense.  
The Second Red Scare also strengthened the more conservative and nationalistic 
organizations of the Croatian-American community at the expense of the moderates and liberals. 
In 1946, the Croatian Catholic Union, Hrvatski Kolo, the American Branch of the Croatian 
Peasant Party, and the CFU under the leadership of President Butković formed an umbrella 
organizations calling itself the “United Croatians of America and Canada.”1205 Although the 
Croatian Fraternal Union finally ousted the conservative Butković in 1947, replacing him with 
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the pro-Yugoslav Mandić,1206 in 1949 the Croatian Fraternal Union would be “exposed” as a 
supporter of the American Slav Congress, another organization deemed subversive by 
HUAC.1207 Threatened by the anti-communist mania, the CFU reacted much like Baloković 
did—retreat and silence. To avoid answering questions about Yugoslavism or Tito, the CFU 
adopted the position that  
We recognize but one Flag and but one authority and that is the Flag and the 
Constitution of the United States […] WE have a tender regard , too, for the 
homeland of our fathers, but in any test of allegiance, in any question of loyalty, 
we assure you all that we stand unswervingly behind this Country.1208 
 
Americanism, now instead of reinforcing Yugoslavism, helped shield the Croatian Fraternal 
Union of charges of disloyalty. The CFU would not abandon its apolitical stance until 1967, 
when it became pro-Yugoslav, a stance that lasted until Tito’s death in 1980, when the CFU 
became pro-Croatian.1209  The remnants of the Ustaša, however, seemed to operate in impunity. 
In Argentina, Ante Pavelić founded the Croatian Liberation Movement in 1956. Branches of this 
organization soon popped up in the United States, and parallel Ustaša organizations were 
founded in Spain and Germany as well.1210 The West, it seemed, was no longer as hostile to 
fascism as it had been in 1945. 
Who Killed Louis Adamic? 
It would be these tense circumstances that made the loss of Adamic in 1951 such a 
devastating blow to the Yugoslav movement in the United States. As we have seen, many people 
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had reason to want Adamic dead: Cominformist Yugoslavs, the USSR, along with the Serbian, 
Croatian, and American right wing. But who pulled the trigger—Adamic, or his many enemies?  
Although Dan Shiffman’s 2003 biography of Adamic argues that Adamic’s death was 
probably a suicide,1211 John Enyeart, in a more recent biography of Adamic argues that there was 
foul play, specifically by Ustaša/Domobran emigres. Enyeart concludes that the KGB or its 
agents were unlikely to have assassinated Adamic for a variety of reasons. First, the KGB’s 
murder of dissidents was a common trope in the American anti-communist media during the 
1950s. As a source base, they were known for exaggerating the “threat” of communist spies, 
agents, and sleeper cells in the United States for both ideological reasons and out of pure 
sensationalism—one need only look at how many mainstream sources believed McCarthy’s 
claim in 1950 to have a list of 205 communists’ names in the State Department. And second, 
Enyeart argues, Stalin would have known that ordering a hit on Adamic would have been a waste 
of time. After all, Adamic had already been marginalized, having lost his organization, his allies, 
and media platform during the Second Red Scare. The Ustaša, Enyeart believed, were motivated 
more by passion than logic, and could have killed Adamic as revenge for his support for Tito.1212 
However, there are several problems with this theory as well. During Adamic’s period of 
wartime activism, neither Adamic nor the Ustaša’s proxies in the United States, the Domobran, 
butted heads. While Adamic was vocally opposed to fascism, there was, simply put, no 
organization on the far right in the Croatian-American community with which he could spar. The 
Domobran, as Chapter 4 shows, had been shut down by the FBI in 1941 after years of 
organizational weakness and infighting had decimated their membership and financial assets. 
UCSSA, in turn, emerged in 1942-3. Because Adamic had little history of public enmity with the 
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Domobran, this makes for a weak motive for assassination. Moreover, the Domobran’s 
organizational weakness made them unlikely candidates to assassinate Adamic. Adamic’s 
murder, if it was that, was the work of a professional: the killer left no identifiable forensic 
traces, having wiped any fingerprints and set a blaze to cover their tracks. While it is possible 
that the arrival of battle-hardened Ustaša emigres from postwar Yugoslavia strengthened the 
remnants of the Domobran organization in the United States, most of the leading Ustaše, 
including Ante Pavelić, went to Argentina, not the United States.1213  In short, the Domobran 
lacked both the capabilities and a strong motive to assassinate Adamic.  
An alternative suspect could be someone from the Serbian National Defense—the 
Serbian right wing, rather than the Croatian right wing. As documented in Chapter 6, the Serbian 
National Defense was vocally and bitterly opposed to Adamic’s activities on behalf of Tito—
here, at least, there is a clear motive. Additionally, Sava Kosanović, Adamic's ally, received at 
least one death threat from this group. However, it is doubtful whether the Serbian National 
Defense was capable of murder. And if the Serbian National Defense killed Adamic, why wait 
until 1951 rather than kill Adamic in 1943, when it could have done the most damage to the 
Yugoslav movement?  The professionalism of the assassination, if it was that, as well as the 
impending threat posed by Adamic’s upcoming pro-Tito book speaks to Stalin’s involvement, 
right-wing press tropes notwithstanding.  
Ultimately, resolution of the mystery of Adamic’s death will have to await the 
declassification of specific documents from the FBI inquiry, which found several suspects. One 
informant described being recruited to shoot Adamic by a woman, name redacted, with reddish-
brown hair and dark-rimmed glasses who worked on behalf of the American communist party. 
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The FBI was skeptical, however, noting that the informant in question was a “drifter” and a 
heavy drinker.1214 Nonetheless, if true, this would suggest that Adamic’s death was ordered by 
Moscow. Details about the four other suspects, however, are sparse—the FBI’s conclusions are 
swathes of black ink.1215 Given that this material was last reviewed for release in 1990 and that 
thirty years have elapsed since then, we may hope that future Freedom of Information Act 
requests will prove more fruitful. 
 Regardless, Adamic’s death speaks to a basic truth about diaspora politics. Adamic was 
caught between much larger forces: Rogers Brubaker characterizes diaspora politics as 
conditioned by the tug-of-war between host country and sending country.1216 Although our 
approach has also factored in the role of transnational organizations, the fact remains that 
diasporas are weak compared to states.  Their ability to affect geopolitics is quite limited—one 
needs only look at the disappointment of the Yugoslav Committee during WWI when their 
efforts failed to create a federal Yugoslav republic1217 or the disappointment of UCSSA when 
their lobbying failed to do the same thing. Moreover, it takes the right confluence of 
circumstances in the host country, sending country, and the milieu of transnational political 
parties for a diaspora lobby to have any effect at all. During the interwar period, Adamic’s vision 
of Yugoslavism was supported or tolerated by the United States, the KPJ, and the Yugoslav 
Fraction of the CPUSA. Moreover, it fed off resentment toward an autocratic and conservative 
‘old country.’ That ‘old country,’ moreover, lacked both the money and geopolitical heft needed 
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to curb this growing overseas dissident movement. Everything changed in the postwar era. 
Yugoslavia had become a communist state, the CPUSA sided with the Cominform against Tito, 
and the US launched a witch hunt against the left. These factors made diaspora politics a 
dangerous and demoralizing experience, especially for a person of principle like Adamic. 
Unwilling to change his political sails when faced by headwinds from the host country, sending 
country, and international organizations like the Cominform, Adamic paid the ultimate price. 
Regardless of who pulled the trigger, it was this quadratic nexus that killed Louis Adamic. 
The Fragility of Diaspora 
With the death of Adamic and the marginalization of Kosanović and Baloković, the 
Yugoslav movement in the United States had lost several key unifying figures. With Tito’s rise 
to power, the Yugoslav movement in the United States had lost its raison d’etre, a liberal, 
democratic Yugoslavia. And with the end of UCSSA and the ACYR during the Second Red 
Scare, the Yugoslavist movement had lost its unifying organizations. As such, 1951 is a good 
place to conclude this narrative. After all, during the late 1940s and early 1950s, the “Yugoslav 
diaspora”, (defined, once again, as a transnational network of emigrant organizations large 
enough to plausibly speak on behalf of an imagined emigrant Yugoslav community) had come 
unraveled.  
  During the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s, successive waves of anti-communist and 
nationalist political emigrants from Yugoslavia came to the United States, tilting the balance 
even further to the right. Some groups, like the Croatian Križari (Crusaders) or the Serbian 
Otadžbina movements, even carried out terrorist attacks on Yugoslavia or its diplomatic 
representatives abroad.1218 Communist Yugoslavia, meanwhile, continued to learn little from its 
 
1218 Ragazzi, Governing Diasporas in International Relations, 62-8; Brunnbauer, Globalizing Southeastern Europe, 
269-270.  




predecessor, and had categorized emigrants into the so-called “old emigration,” emigrants from 
the old Yugoslavia or Austria-Hungary, and the new “enemy Yugoslav migration” or “hostile 
emigration” composed of anti-Communist exiles who were threats to Yugoslavia’s security and 
ideological purity.1219 This attitude was also strongly reminiscent of the old Yugoslavia, which 
had securitized discourse around “separatist,” republican, and communist groups.    
Even so, support for Yugoslavia faded only gradually. The Croatian Fraternal Union, for 
instance, maintained close ties with Communist Yugoslavia and the Croatian Matica, continuing 
to organize group trips to Yugoslavia and accepting funding for cultural activities.1220 Still, by 
the 1980s, overseas Yugoslavism was largely moribund as a political movement. When the 
nationalist politician Franjo Tudjmann went to Canada in search of friends and funds, he met 
little organized opposition, despite lacking the support of several major self-help groups like the 
Croatian Fraternal Union.1221 Raising millions of dollars from wealthy anti-communist emigres 
in North America, Tudjmann’s newly founded party, the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) was 
able to win control of the Croatian parliament on an explicitly secessionist platform. 1222 It would 
be the HDZ’s success that kicked off the brutal civil war that led to Yugoslavia’s dissolution, 
even if Milošević’s leadership and economic stagnation made such a conflict inevitable.  
If the Yugoslav diaspora ultimate proved ephemeral, what is the point of studying it? The 
rise and fall of the “Yugoslav” diaspora underscores an important point, namely, that diasporas 
are artificial—they can be made, and they can be unmade just as easily. The formation of the 
“Yugoslav diaspora,” defined as a transnational network between Serb, Croat, and Slovene 
organizations large enough to plausibly represent an imagined diasporic community, was a 
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gradual process. During the 1920s, the newly-formed government of Yugoslavia sought to build 
ties with what it saw as “its” emigration, even though their time and port of departure linked 
most migrants with Austria-Hungary, not Yugoslavia. From the beginning, Yugoslav 
policymaking was shaped by an instrumentalist view of the diaspora, seeking to use it as a source 
of money and political legitimacy. At the same time, Serb, Croat, and Slovene diaspora 
organizations began to consolidate, driven by the demographic pressure imposed by American 
laws that choked off the flow of new migrants from the Western Balkans. These new societies, 
such as the Croatian Fraternal Union or the Serbian National Federation, often found their 
resources equal to or greater than those that the government of Yugoslavia was willing to 
allocate to support emigrant cultural institutions—ultimately, Yugoslavia wanted to extract more 
from its “diaspora” than it invested.  
The increasingly adversarial relationship between the Kingdom of Yugoslavia and “its” 
emigration provides a useful case study for theoreticians of “diaspora” like Gabriel Sheffer, who 
was interested in the sort of tensions that emerge as a result of homelands who take diaspora 
political and economic activity on its behalf for granted.1223 In this Yugoslav case this 
discrepancy created a sense of bitterness, but also taught independence, both financial and 
ideological. It strengthened the diaspora network and created an opening for cultural and political 
syncretism with the host country. Even going back to the 1920s, Yugoslav emigrants often drew 
on the democratic, liberal, and federal organization of the United States in formulating their 
views on what Yugoslavia should be like. This confirms Nina Glick-Schiller and Peggy Levitt’s 
assertion that acculturation to the host country and the construction of transnational ties are not 
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mutually exclusive,1224 especially when the values of the host country resonate with the 
complaints of a politically unsatisfied diaspora. Moreover, the adversarial relationship between 
fraternal unions and the government of Yugoslavia was strengthened during the 1930s, when 
agents of the royal dictatorship sought to import Yugoslav political repression to overseas 
communities. Grievances against Belgrade were further popularized by travelers to Yugoslavia, 
among them Louis Adamic, who raised awareness of Yugoslavia and its political problems. At 
the same time, this period was characterized by the intensification of national activity by 
fraternal unions, often on a Yugoslav basis, but largely funded independently of the government 
of Yugoslavia. Yugoslav rooms, gardens, and radio stations all emerged during the 1930s, 
reinforcing the habits of cooperation between Serb, Croat, and Slovene groups. Conscious of 
their strength and disillusioned with the government of Yugoslavia, the ground was laid for 
mobilization during the Second World War against the government of Yugoslavia but for 
Yugoslavia’s reconstruction on a liberal, federal basis.  
One of the Yugoslav diaspora’s vulnerabilities was that the political horizons of diasporas 
are often delineated by the host country, as Nadejda Marinova argues. The host country 
government, for instance, can decide which emigrant groups are taken seriously by the press or 
called in to testify before Congress. To take a modern-day example, the Iraqi National Congress 
led by Ahmed Chalabi, a relatively minor organization in the “Iraqi diaspora,” became important 
because their testimony was useful to hawks in the White House seeking to legitimize the 2003 
Invasion of Iraq. In return for (false) testimony and a public relations campaign averring that 
Saddam Hussein had weapons of mass destruction, the INC received millions of dollars in 
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funding from the CIA and privileged treatment by the mainstream media, including the New 
York Times, Washington Post, and Atlantic. Moreover, the INC’s newfound status positioned it 
at the center of a new network of Iraqi émigré organizations, where it acted as an intermediary 
between them and the Bush administration.1225  Conversely, the uselessness of UCSSA to the 
United States after 1945, in light of its leftist tendencies, rendered it vulnerable. From the 
beginning, American Yugoslavism was imbued in the spirit of American liberalism and 
progressivism, particularly during the New Deal years. The dream of a federal, democratic 
Yugoslavia was inspired by the American model. When that discourse changed during the 
outbreak of the cold war, and it became more important to be against Communism than to be for 
democracy, the Yugoslav-American diaspora disintegrated. Adamic, who once, similar to 
Chalabi, had the ear of the president and contacts in the OSS, the predecessor of the CIA, found 
himself politically isolated and powerless, affecting his ability to maintain the networks of 
donors and fraternal organizations that sustained the “Yugoslav diaspora.” 
 Moreover, the “Yugoslav diaspora” was fragile because no fraternal union was 
successfully organized on a Yugoslav basis. The Yugoslav Fraternal Federation, an attempt in 
the early 1930s to merge the major Serb, Croat, and Slovene fraternal unions in the United 
States, failed in the face of opposition by the nationalist wing of the CFU. Had a single Yugoslav 
fraternal organization been created, it would have integrated Yugoslavism into the day-to-day 
life of migrants, sustaining a sort of “banal nationalism” that could be easily mobilized in times 
of crisis.1226 Instead, Yugoslavism remained an ad-hoc organizing principle for one-off projects 
like the Yugoslav room in the Pittsburgh Cathedral of Learning, the Yugoslav Garden in 
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Cleveland, or Yugoslav radio. While these projects created the habits of cooperation that tied 
together Serb, Croat, and Slovene organizations and paved the way for political cooperation 
during the Second World War, this was a weak integrating force compared to a formal 
organization with bylaws, a charter, its own newspaper, and so forth. Institutions have more 
inertia. Instead, the organization tying South Slavs together would be UCSSA, which was based 
around a specific political cause that could be delegitimized.  
The Importance of Travel 
 Still, a Yugoslav diaspora did emerge and it is useful to evaluate which of the techniques 
deployed to promote national consciousness—musicians, parades, language schools, newspaper 
propaganda, exchange programs, etc.—had the greatest effect. Somewhat surprisingly, travel and 
travelers seem to have had the most potent impact on diasporic politics. Of course, all migrants 
are, by definition, travelers. However, in this case, what matters is travel back to the home 
country, rather than migrants’ first trip overseas. It is worth recalling, for instance, that Louis 
Adamic only became a Yugoslav nationalist and a famous public intellectual after he traveled to 
Yugoslavia in 1932. Besides Adamic, however, a number of other important individuals in the 
Yugoslav diasporic network either returned to Yugoslavia as tourists or came from Yugoslavia 
as politicians: Ivan Mladineo, Vincent Cainkar, Nikola “Uncle Sam” Kovačević, Mirko 
Marković, Petar Radić, and Stojan Pribićević, among others. This also holds true for the anti-
Yugoslav opposition. Look, for instance, at Ruth Mitchell and Branko Pekić of the Serbian 
National Defense, or Branimir Jelić, all of whom parlayed their experience as travelers to or 
from Yugoslavia into political influence within a diasporic community. Not only does travel 
make nationalists, it also gives them the symbolic capital within a diasporic context. 




One could also point to the success of izlet type excursions during the 1930s as another 
example of travel’s effect on national consciousness. There are also a contemporary parallel for 
this phenomenon: Israel’s “Taglit Birthright” program. In 1999, Israel began to sponsor free 
travel to Israel for young, nationally-suggestible adults. Like the Izlet, Birthright was a response 
to fears that Jews in the United States were getting a bit too assimilated.1227 Also reminiscent of 
the izlet, Birthright tourists are guided through major cities in Israel, partaking in banquets and a 
generous helping of propaganda in the form of speeches, lectures, and meetings with members of 
the Israeli Defense Forces. The Israel Prime Minister at the time of writing, Benjamin 
Netanyahu, routinely addresses Birthright travelers. Although Netanyahu’s politics have proven 
polarizing to some young American Jews, his engagement with the Birthright program 
nonetheless attests to its importance to the Israeli government.1228 Recent studies of Birthright’s 
effect on the Jewish diaspora universally show its dramatic effects on national consciousness. 
Going to Israel, travelers find themselves to be more confident in their national identity. The 
homeland becomes something “concrete,” a new “homeland” alongside the country of their birth. 
Moreover, they become more aware of the geopolitical “insecurity” of their “Old 
Country”(which, like Yugoslavia, is also relatively new). In this way, the narrative of 
persecution that partially underwrites a Jewish diasporic network is reinforced.1229 Yugoslavia 
probably benefited even more from this sense of peril; Germany and Italy during the interwar 
period were much greater threats than contemporary Palestine or Iran, and Yugoslavia, unlike 
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Israel, lacked a nuclear deterrent. Nor is the effect of Birthright trips limited to the travelers 
themselves. The parents, friends, and social networks of participants also experience a greater 
sense of connection to Israel.1230 As a result, travelers become hubs within a broader diasporic 
network. Although Lord Acton memorably commented that “exile is the nursery of nationality,” 
it appears that the journey was more important than the destination. 
Why the United States? 
 Even though the Yugoslav diaspora was fragile, it nonetheless existed. But why did an 
organization that could plausibly claim to speak for Serb, Croat, and Slovene migrants only 
emerge in the United States? What about the United States during the interwar period made it 
such fertile soil for Yugoslavism? While acknowledging that my American background might 
interfere with my objectivity, I would nonetheless propose a three-part explanation.  
 First, the political and economic situation of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes in the United 
States acted as a centripetal force on their organizations, pushing them toward cooperation on 
Yugoslav lines. American Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes were concentrated in the major cities of 
the American Midwest and to a lesser extent California. Living together in the same cities, it is 
not surprising that Serb, Croat, and Slovene organizations, even at the beginning of the 1920s, 
were generally aware of one another’s activities. Working-class activism, especially in the 
communist party, brought Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, along with their organizations, into 
dialogue. This was unlike the situation in South America, where migrants were dispersed over 
the countryside, or in Belgium, where the migration was so new that large fraternal unions had 
not yet developed organically. In short, in the United States there was the potential for a 
diasporic network; all they needed was an impetus to cooperate. That impetus arrived with the 
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1924 quota law, which cut off almost all South-Slavic migration from Europe. Suddenly, Serb, 
Croat, and Slovene fraternal organizations needed to merge, consolidate, and cooperate to 
compensate for the lack of new members coming in from Europe (see table 2 in the appendix). 
Indeed, over the course of the 1930s the top Serb, Croat, and Slovene fraternal unions either lost 
members or remained stagnant (see table 6). This demographic pressure drove the Serbian and 
Croatian fraternal unions to consolidate on ethnic lines. The SNPJ took matters a step further, 
creating an umbrella organization as a steppingstone to a Yugoslav Fraternal Union. While this 
ultimately proved a failure, Serb, Croat, and Slovene fraternal unions increasingly made saw the 
benefit of pooling resources. The children of immigrants needed to be taught patriotism as 
well—again, to make up for the absence of new migrants from Yugoslavia. In the 1930s, the new 
language schools, foreign exchange programs, and initiatives like the Yugoslav Room or 
Yugoslav Radio were supported by fraternal organizations to fight assimilation and ensure their 
organizational longevity. The legacy of this was a habit of cooperation on Yugoslav lines, 
independent of whether migrants saw themselves as “Yugoslavs,” a habit that manifested in 
political Yugoslavism during the Second World War.     
 The second reason the United States developed a Yugoslav movement was that Yugoslav 
politicians, seeing that most of the “tenth banovina” lived in the United States, concentrated their 
efforts there. Emigrants in the United States bore the brunt of the Yugoslav state’s efforts to 
censor their speech and deport their dissidents. Yugoslavia went from being something irrelevant 
and far away to an immediate threat against which migrants needed to mobilize.  Moreover, the 
lure of diaspora dollars attracted opposition politicians from the Demokratska Stranka, the 
Croatian Peasant Party, and the Communists, all of whom also had an incentive to cooperate 
against Belgrade and the strain of Croatian ultranationalism represented by the Ustaša, especially 




during the era of Popular Front politics. As was emphasized in the previous section, travel and 
travelers have powerful effects on diasporic nationalism. Coming to the United States, making 
speeches, and raising money, these transnational politicians mobilized more emigrants, causing 
them take a greater interest in old country affairs. Moreover, their parties inserted themselves 
into the politics of the Serb, Croat, and Slovene self-help societies, strengthening the network of 
relationships between Serb, Croat, and Slovene groups and pushing them to work together to 
defeat fascism.   
The third part of this explanation is that American prejudice against East-Europeans 
pushed migrants toward Yugoslavism as a way of demonstrating their American-ness. In early 
twentieth century America, South Slavs were “Bohunks,” second-class citizens in an Anglo-
Saxon sea. The pressure to conform, to “Americanize,” created a backlash, with emigrants like 
Ivan Mladineo seeking to prove that they had a place in America, that their history and 
achievements in their new homeland were equal to, if not greater than, those of other migrant 
groups. In crafting this narrative, nationalists like Mladineo or Adamic realized that combining 
the achievements of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes would create the most impressive portfolio—
better to have Tesla, Bishop Baraga, and Columbus’s Croatian sailors in a single pantheon than 
kept separate. Moreover, this narrative was also based on the contributions of the South Slavic 
industrial working class, the thousands of anonymous miners, metal-workers, and construction 
workers, all occupations where Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes worked together rather than apart. 
This narrative also resonated with the United States’ cultural pluralist movement in the 1930s. 
Mladineo, after all, was a member of the Foreign Language Information Service, just as Adamic 
was a founding member of the Common Council for American Unity. Celebrating the 




achievement of all of America’s ethnic groups, in turn, boosted the liberal, multicultural version 
of Yugoslavism that emigrants were articulating. 
These three factors—closed borders, the attention of Yugoslav politicians, and a backlash 
against the idea of America as a “melting pot” —strengthened the network of interlocking 
relationships connecting Serb, Croat, and Slovene groups and gave them a common symbolic 
vocabulary. It was due to these circumstances, rather than any inherent virtue of the United 
States, that a Yugoslav diaspora formed in interwar America.  
The Tenth Banovina and the Other Nine 
Although examining the “Yugoslav diaspora” expands our understanding of diaspora and 
nationalism, it also leads us to a transnational interpretation of Yugoslav history. Understanding 
Yugoslav politics during the 1930s is difficult without looking abroad.  The Kingdom of 
Yugoslavia’s attempt to create Yugoslavs involved mutually-reinforcing initiatives on both sides 
of the Atlantic. The patriotism of the “tenth banovina” was supposed to be a model for the other 
nine, and vice versa.  Yugoslav legislation, like prohibitions on political dissent or the 
introduction of new holidays, in turn, found themselves being enforced overseas.  The activities 
of other diasporas in the United States, like the 1930s craze for trans-Atlantic tourism, inspired 
Yugoslav migrants to return to their old country, which, in turn, sought to use these trips as 
propaganda stunts for the benefits of its own citizens. By creating Yugoslavs abroad, 
Yugoslavia’s government was also creating them at home.  
This sleight of hand, however, depended on state control over the various channels of 
information—news media, travelers, and word of mouth—to preserve the illusion. Neither 
emigrants nor Yugoslav citizens could know that that their compatriots across the Atlantic 
resisted the dictatorship. This, in turn, was predicated on the assumption that the diaspora was an 




organic part of the nation, and as such could be subjected to the apparatus of state control that 
existed in the homeland. This was Yugoslavia’s primary mistake in handling “its” diaspora. As 
Chapter Three and Chapter Four show, enforcing this information quarantine was beyond the 
capabilities of a small and poor state like Yugoslavia. It may be beyond the capabilities of any 
contemporary state, especially in a world where the technologies of travel and 
telecommunications are far more advanced than in the interwar period. Even in an era without air 
travel or internet, banned émigré newspapers were nonetheless smuggled into Yugoslavia, just as 
news about brutal repression in Yugoslavia made their way through the emigrant grapevine, 
ending up on the pages of Zajedničar or The Native’s Return. Another metaphorical hole that 
could not be plugged was travelers, especially opposition politicians from Yugoslavia. Look, for 
instance, at the examples of Svetozar Pribićević or August Košutić, whose embrace of federalism 
can be partially attributed to their desire to please their constituencies in North America. And 
during the Second World War, the Yugoslav government-in-exile was unable to maintain its 
monopoly on information coming out of Yugoslavia past mid-1942, despite the wartime 
conditions imposing an information blackout. Diasporic networks, despite their weakness vis-a-
vis states, nonetheless resist state control. And by failing to take this into account, interwar 
Yugoslavia provoked a backlash that intensified resistance still further.   
Political instability in interwar Yugoslavia also had overseas roots. As Chapter Four 
shows, Croatian workers in South America and Belgium were recruited overseas by Ustaša 
activists, and sometimes returned to Yugoslavia to carry out terrorist attacks. Those Croatian 
migrant workers who joined the Ustaša only became ultranationalists overseas and mainly for 
pragmatic reasons—the lure of unemployment insurance and the threat of violence. Since the 
Ustaša were most successful where emigrant civil society was weakly developed, we can see 




how the Yugoslav foreign ministry’s neglect of newer migrant communities in favor of focusing 
on the United States had catastrophic blowback. Moreover, looking through the prism of 
overseas politics reveals how the Communist Party of Yugoslavia went from a marginal political 
party with a few thousand members in the 1930s to a political hegemon in 1945. It also explains 
why the HSS and the DS were willing to work with the KPJ during the transition-period after 
1945. Far from being a sudden shift in fortunes brought about by the volatile situation in WWII-
era Yugoslavia, we can see how the Communist Party of Yugoslavia gradually lost its pariah 
status in the field of émigré politics over the preceding decade. Opposition political parties like 
the Democratic Party or the Croatian Peasant Party found the Communist Party a willing 
collaborator with a coherent ideological program that could appeal to a migrant constituency that 
was overwhelmingly working class and was, thanks to discourses in Yugoslavia about the 
“emigration question,” imbued with great symbolic capital. 
More generally, studying Yugoslav émigré politics suggests that political Yugoslavism 
was not the total failure that historians of Yugoslavia typically present it as. The conventional 
wisdom on interwar Yugoslavia, as presented by Dejan Djokić and Pieter Troch, argues that 
Alexander's repressive and corrupt dictatorship and the regency that followed discredited the 
Yugoslav idea.1231  Similarly, Sabrina Ramet, based on a study of the other nine banovine, 
concludes that interwar Yugoslavia built neither a legitimate political system nor a sense of 
community linking Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes. The core problem was that “Serbs and Croats 
inhabited two different worlds.”1232 Part of this was geography, of course, but Serbs, Croats, (and 
 
1231 Dejan Djokić, “(Dis)integrating Yugoslavia: King Alexander and Interwar Yugoslavism,” in Dejan Djokić, 
Yugoslavism: Histories of a Failed Idea 1918-1992 (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2003), 150-3; Pieter 
Troch, “Yugoslavism Between The World Wars; Indecisive Nation Building,” Nationalities Papers 38, no. 2 (2010): 
227-244. 
1232 Sabrina Ramet, The Three Yugoslavias: State-Building and Elgitimation 1918-2995 (Washington, DC: Woodrow 
Wilson Center Press, 2006), 601-2, 




Slovenes) lived within separate symbolic and political worlds as well. Political life in interwar 
Yugoslavia was organized around ethnic parties, aligning political disagreement with ethnic 
cleavages. Similarly, there was no common vocabulary of national symbols to which political 
leaders could appeal. Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes lacked a common alphabet, a common 
religion, a common flag, a common pantheon of famous people, and a common history.1233  
Within émigré circles in the United States, however, as I have tried to show, Serbs, Croats, and 
Slovenes increasingly lived in the same world. They lived in the same cities. Their fraternal 
organizations worked together to build common Yugoslav spaces, like the Yugoslav room, 
Yugoslav schools, or Yugoslav radio, that also functioned as unifying symbols. A common 
historical imaginary emerged, based on the historical contributions of Yugoslav migrants to the 
United States, as well as contemporary resistance to Belgrade. Overseas, opposition to the 
monarchy did not weaken Yugoslavism—it strengthened it. Eventually, this manifested in a 
common South Slavic political lobby. While there were those that opposed Yugoslavism, such as 
the Serbian National Defense or the Domobran, these organizations were a definite minority. 
Moreover, this Yugoslav diaspora did not crumble in the face of the ethnic bloodletting within 
Yugoslavia during the Second World War, but disintegrated due to purely exogenous factors, 
namely the Second Red Scare. In short, Yugoslavism was not entirely a “failed idea,” as Dejan 
Djokić memorably characterized it1234—all it needed was the right context, the “tenth banovina.” 





1233 Ibid, 36-37 
1234 Dejan Djokić, Yugoslavism: Histories of a Failed Idea 1918-1992 (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2003) 
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APPENDIX A: STATISTICAL OVERVIEW OF YUGOSLAVS IN THE UNITED STATES 
 
Note: Prior to 1900, the United States counted arrivals by citizenship, such that a Croat 
from Austria-Hungary would be “Austrian” rather than. “Croatian.”  In 1908, the United States 
began classifying arrivals by nationality (sort of): Serbs, Bulgarians, and Montenegrins were one 
category, Croats and Slovenians a second, and Dalmatians, Bosnians, and Herzegovinians a 
third. Ivan Mladineo’s dataset here is a compilation of these three statistics. However, it should 
be noted that, consequently, Bulgarians (who are not distinguished from Macedonians) are 
included in this count of “Yugoslavs.”  Mladineo estimates the number of “Bulgarians” in the 
United States to be 12,000. Moreover, these statistics also do not count the children of Yugoslav 
migrants, who may or may not see themselves as the same nationality of their parents. Lastly, 
these statistics are included to provide a sense of scale, not to make a political statement (as 



























South Slavic Migration to the United States 1900-1930  
Year Arrivals Returns 
Year-end 
total 
1900 11264 3755 85396 
1901 19271 6424 97162 
1902 32528 10843 117659 
1903 41122 13707 143623 
1904 27855 9285 160571 
1905 43566 14522 187719 
1906 60388 20129 225698 
1907 82393 27464 277821 
1908 42465 35600 281839 
1909 28283 11951 295189 
1910 59603 10285 341062 
1911 33604 21142 349989 
1912 38695 22239 362781 
1913 56106 24583 390361 
1914 57517 31098 422512 
1915 5753 4840 419191 
1916 4051 370 418643 
1917 1533 255 415623 
1918 198 962 410710 
1919 232 3397 403470 
1920 1620 32858 368510 
1921 19665 14155 370280 
1922 5460 14155 361664 
1923 6627 10423 362333 
1924 6014 2298 362777 
1925 999 2108 357886 
1926 1490 2075 353691 
1927 1299 2818 348640 
1928 3317 4388 344093 
1929 3460 3986 340131 
1930 3749 3752 336727 
TOTAL 778877 343935  
 











South Slavic Migration to the United States 1900-1930, Visualized  
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South Slavic Population by State, 1930, Mapped 
 
 







































HBZ 1894 940 61173 31285 92458 $64,747,067  $5,481,676.67  
SNPJ 1904 653 44846 18602 63448 $41,766,825  $4,764,186.58 
KSKJ 1894 188 23092 11399 34491 $23,365,253  $2,659,574.89  
SNS 1901 360 14527 7358 21885 $14,608,265  $1,054,771.92 
JSKJ 1898 187 14094 7022 21116 $13,043,094  $1,499,742.83 
SSPZ 1909 200 7732 3426 11158 $6,208,924  $697,941.67 
SDZ 1910 52 6790 2949 9739 $5,989,009  $827,383.43 
HKZ 1922 46 3048 1710 4758 $2,689,774  $203,621.27 
ZSZ 1908 39 2285 1013 3298 $1,876,442  $141,708.16 
JPZS 1908 17 1945 611 2556 $1,594,900  $226,218.56 
DSD 1915 17 1310 783 2093 $831,334  $66,936.72 
SHZ 1903 25 1397 577 1974 $1,273,480  $231,384.76 
HSP 1910 18 1051 160 1211 $738,000  $96,234.22 
SPSJ 1920 15 688 263 951 $555,200  $44,098.83 
Total 
 
2762 184709 87158 271867 $179,862,368  $18,055,793.74  
 
Key: 
 HBZ – Hrvatska Bratska Zajednica (Croatian Fraternal Union) 
 SNPJ – Slovenska Narodna Podporna Jednota (Slovene National Benefit Society) 
 KSKJ – Kransko-Slovenska Katoliška Jednota (Carniolan Slovene Catholic Union) 
 SNS – Srpski Narodni Savez (Serbian National Union) 
 JSKJ – Jugoslovanska Katoliška Jednota (Yugoslav Catholic Union) 
SSPZ – Slovenska Svobodomislena Podporna Jednota (Slovene Freethinker Benefit 
Society) 
SDZ – Slovenska Dobrodelna Zveza (Slovene Charitable Society) 
HKZ – Hrvatska Katoliška Zajednica (Croatian Catholic Union) 
ZSZ – Zapadna Slovanska Zveza (Western Slavic Society) 
JPZS – Jugoslovanska Podporna Zveza “Sloga” (Yugoslav Benefit Union “Unity”) 
DSD – Družba Svete Družine (Society of the Holy Family) 
SHZ – Slovensko Hrvatska Zveza (Slovene Croatian Union) 
HSP – Hrvatska Sveza na Pacifiku (Croatian Union on the Pacific) 
SPSJ – Srpski Potporni Savez “Jedinstvo” (Serbian Benefit Society “Unity”) 
 























HBZ 1020 53513 27229 80742 $8,578,928.48  
SNPJ 637 35453 14043 49496 $7,168,106.34 
KSKJ 187 24326 10932 35258 $3,952,652.42  
SNS 328 11197 6837 18034 $1,551,765.79 
JSKJ 187 13994 9103 23097 $2,254,224.33 
SSPZ 377 6700 2400 9100 $916,997.92 
SDZ 56 7624 3616 11240 $1,423,530.10 
HKZ 123 4844 3048 7892 $439,264.24 
ZSZ 50 2102 1658 3760 $252,859.79 
JPZS 27 2025 479 2504 $363,925.35 
DSD 31 1074 571 1645 $79,648.76 
SHZ 47 1031 380 1411 $286,950.21 
HSP 27 835 220 1055 $135,282.52 
SPSJ 45 1101 518 1619 $79,889.44 
Total 3142 165919 78953 246204 $27,484,026  
 
Key: All acronyms are the same. Green indicates a positive change since 1931, red indicates a 
decline, black indicates no substantial shift. 
 
Source: Ivan Mladineo, ed. Narodni Adresar Hrvata-Slovenaca-Srba (New York: 1937) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
